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This thesis, argues for the theological viability of Coleridge’s ontological insight into artworks 
and natural phenomena as aesthetically intimative of transcendence. However this finding is 
dependent on a critical analysis of Coleridge’s work, separating poetical insights from a 
systematic context which works against their theological promise. This Coleridgean analysis is 
in turn dependent, philosophically, upon a critical examination of a variety of Kantian and post-
Kantian texts, through which is derived an account of pre-conceptual imaginative process, as 
related to a Bergsonian account of time considered as an organically non-calculable structure, in 
light of a Kierkegaardian theological norm.  
 
I discern a tension running through Coleridge’s work between the insights of the poet and the 
ambitions of the post-Kantian metaphysician. I argue that this tension is subversive of 
Coleridge’s underlying religious and poetic motivations. Through an  analysis of Coleridge’s 
thought in both its systematic and less formal, aesthetic tendencies, I extricate his claim for the 
aesthetic intimation of transcendence through nature and art from the post-Kantian systematic 
conceptuality through which Coleridge is often led to distort it, in a countervailing drive 
towards systematically complete explanation.  
 
The thought of Kierkegaard will serve to illumine the ethico-aesthetic dynamics of Coleridge’s 
account of the appropriation of transcendent insight, conceived as an event of the dawning of 
religious truth as a conceptually indeterminate imaginative process, which as such, is only 
accessible to an imaginative and participative receptivity on the part of the aesthetic subject. A 
similar, imaginative ethos is discerned in the aesthetic positions of Coleridge and Kierkegaard; 
an attentive humility in openness to the potential manifestation of genuinely creative alterity. 
Through this thesis, the theological claim is advanced, in a new way, that in the eyes of 
Christian faith, an intimation of transcendence can be interpreted as a glimpse of the everyday 












Although this thesis is aimed primarily at an analysis of divergent tendencies in the thought of 
Coleridge, I argue that the damaging effect of this tension, which amounts to a conflict of 
differing theological and philosophical allegiances, can only be properly understood by a 
contextualising examination of Coleridge’s work in light of the post-Kantian thought-world 
which he inhabited. An analysis of Kierkegaard’s existential reaction to that thought-world will 
in turn helpfully illumine the nature of the particular, ethical role of imagination which I discern 
in aspects of Coleridge’s aesthetic thought. Through a reading of Coleridge’s aesthetic insights 
thus informed, I justify my claim for a problematic tension between Coleridge’s systematic 
theorising, and the theological promise of the conceptually indeterminate, aesthetically 
mediated religious experience on which such systematic construction is based. Thus it shall be 
suggested that the idealist logic fuelling Coleridge’s drive towards complete systematicity 
works against his own existential insight, as both a poet and a Christian, into the role of art in 
the intimation of transcendence. In light of these developments, my thesis aims to demonstrate 
the theological viability of Coleridge’s ontological claim that artworks and natural phenomena 
may intimate an awareness of transcendence, when this claim is extricated from the post-
Kantian idealist conceptuality in which it is ensnared.  
 
An account of pre-conceptual imaginative process (drawing on Kant), in relation to an account 
of time considered as an organically non-calculable structure (drawing on Bergson) functions as 
an explanatory context in which Kantian and post-Kantian texts are critically examined. This 
focal explanatory context serves to orientate a complex argument, and on this basis original 
positions are advanced.  
 
A variety of texts are addressed – epistemological, metaphysical and aesthetic – exploring their 
theological implications in relation to my thesis goal, to show the theological viability of 
Coleridge’s poetic insights into the ethico-aesthetic discernment of transcendence, once 
separated from the counteracting tendency of his systematic post-Kantian metaphysics. The 
original conclusion is reached that Coleridge’s account of aesthetic symbolism, once separated 
from the damaging systematic metaphysical context in which he often attempts to contain it, 
depends on similar imaginative practices to those at work in Kierkegaard’s use of indirect 
communication to promote personal engagement with paradoxical revelation.  
 
In terms of its overarching orientation, this thesis seeks to draw attention to an antagonism 
between two broad philosophical motivations in post-Kantian philosophy. I draw attention to a 
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difficulty in harmonising the demands of formal logical rigour with a perception of the 
potentially infinite fecundity of conceptually indeterminate aesthetic productivity. I find reason 
to suggest that this disturbing tension of opposing tendencies first becomes manifest in the work 
of Kant himself, as the aesthetic insights of the Critique of Judgement are shown to sit uneasily 
within the formal architectonic constraints laid down in the Critique of Pure Reason.  
 
In relation to the work of Schelling, I then show how an appeal is made to a free act of 
intellectual intuition in terms of polar self-productivity, or infinite self-objectification, in order 
to try to do justice the demands both of the ontological content and the epistemologically 
constructed form of experience. Thus in Schelling, as in Hegel, logic is itself polarised and 
made ‘dynamic’ in order to try to account for and thus contain the counteracting demands of 
dynamics and form. This tension between content and form, between logic and actuality, will be 
shown at its most glaring in the work of Coleridge; I suggest in chapters six and seven that 
Coleridge’s existentially rich poetic and theological vision is in effect betrayed by his 
countervailing urge towards post-Kantian logical systematicity.  
 
Thus I detect a damaging tension between the demands of comprehensive systematicity on the 
one hand, and a concern with performativity or existential dynamics on the other, in the post-
Kantian philosophy which developed in response to Kant’s critical epistemological project. In 
light of this overarching problematic, I argue that despite the theological failings of his more 
thoroughly systematic work, Coleridge’s less formally driven aesthetic thinking successfully 
unites a promising tendency in Kantian aesthetics – stressing the imagination’s conceptually 
indeterminate productivity – with an imaginative and participatory, or existential approach to 
the discernment and appropriation of ethical truth, similar in some respects to that pervading the 
pseudonymous authorship of Kierkegaard. 
 
I begin an analysis of the conceptual contours of this problem of divergent formal and dynamic 
priorities in the first two chapters, by suggesting that even the existentially oriented and anti-
Hegelian thought of Kierkegaard can be read as constrained unnecessarily by the formalism 
governing his account of existential ‘spheres’. While Kierkegaard justifiably denies that mere 
logic can form a bridge between the states of unbelief and revealed Christian faith, I suggest 
that Kierkegaard less justifiably denies a role for conceptually indeterminate artistic activity in 
the intimation of transcendent creativity. It is in this regard that my account of Coleridge, as 
informed by Henri Bergson’s dynamically ‘anti-Kantian’ conception of time, is important. I 
shall argue in chapter seven that – once stripped of the procrustean constraints of a polar logical 
scheme – Coleridge’s poetically and religiously motivated aesthetics moves in the direction of a 
conceptually indeterminate intimation of transcendence that is itself a revelation of Createdness.  
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Coleridge points to the perception of divine creativity through the receptive and attentive 
activity of poetic imagination. 
 
In chapter six, I argue that Coleridge’s systematic philosophy is unacceptable on theological 
grounds. Dialectical or polar logic pre-determines the relation of the created to the divine, as 
based on an all encompassing concept of absolute power from which Coleridge’s trinitarian God 
and creaturely existences are both derived, in differentiated identity. Here conceptual form 
replaces an ethico-aesthetic attentiveness to the possibility of conceptually uncontainable 
revelation. Coleridge’s post-Kantian logic thus acts, in effect, as a conceptual idol, a false 
ultimate. However, in chapter seven I argue that in his aesthetic thinking, Coleridge conceives 
the aesthetic relation of subject and object in terms of an imaginative mediation through which 
disinterested attentiveness to the object for its own sake, or in its own alterity, enables the 
corrigible perception of a shared, creative derivation of both subject and object: of both the form 
and the content of experience. This intrinsically relational derivation is also an infinitely open-
ended, processive intimation of the divine as an incalculable ‘telos’, through aesthetic 
symbolisation. The aesthetic intimation of such relatedness might be taken as a created echo of 
trinitarian relatedness. Createdness is experienced as a process of divine self-giving that is, 
paradoxically, also the empowerment of the creature. Such an incalculable awareness of creative 
process cannot be reduced to the conceptual determinations of post-Kantian polar logic. 
Overview of chapters 
My theological norm in this thesis is provided by Kierkegaard’s account of paradoxical faith, in 
Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, which I address in 
chapters one and two, especially with regard to the role of imagination in the life of faith. 
However – and echoing my concern with the logical formalism of Coleridge’s systematically 
conceptualised philosophy – in my first two chapters I argue that for reasons of internal 
coherence, Kierkegaard's denial of a role to artistic or 'outward' aesthetic activity in the 
movement to the existential sphere of paradoxical faith is problematic. I have been suggesting 
that a distortion of Coleridge’s conceptually fluid aesthetic intuitions is caused by the 
theoretical form in which he is inclined to cast them; in my first two chapters I suggest that a 
similar resistance to formal and artificially imposed constraints is arguably discernible in 
Kierkegaard’s thought concerning the relation of faith to aesthetics. However, I will go on to 
show, in my final chapter, that just as Kierkegaardian thinking affords insight into Coleridge’s 
religiously motivated aesthetics, thus aiding in distinguishing it from Coleridge’s more 
systematic constructions, so, by the same token, a role for the aesthetics of art and natural 





In chapter three, I begin to focus on the nature of the nature of time, regarded as a 
transcendental condition of experience from a Kantian and post-Kantian perspective: a temporal 
emphasis that is common to romanticism, idealism and the Kierkegaardian existentialism which 
responds to both. In the thesis as a whole, I investigate different accounts of time because the 
dynamic conceptual indeterminacy I detect in Coleridge’s thinking needs to be theorised in 
terms of a suitably dynamic account of temporal movement. For this reason I give an account of 
Kantian epistemology in chapter three, focusing upon the imaginative construal of time as 
central to Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories. Through this focus, I situate and 
highlight the theme of productive imagination, which will play an important role as my thesis 
progresses.  
 
An account of Kantian and post-Kantian teleology and aesthetics is offered in chapter four, as 
providing the rationale behind a romantic doctrine of intimative access to transcendence 
through aesthetic symbolism. This discussion of the dynamics of aesthetic imaginative process 
leads to a critical comparison of post-Kantian (Schellingian) and Bergsonian concepts of time. 
Bergsonian duration is shown to be more promising than Kantian models on theological 
grounds: as resistant to conceptual determination, temporal process conceived as duration is 
thereby shown to accord with a paradoxical or Kierkegaardian concept of revelation. The 
temporal thus serves as a theological criterion of distinction between panentheistic determinism 
(as represented by Schellingian, post-Kantian idealism) and Bergson’s concept of a 
metaphysical process that is open-ended and intelligible only through imaginative conceptual 
indeterminacy (as defined in Kantian aesthetic terms).  
 
In chapter five, I analyse the structure of Kantian productive imagination, as introduced in 
chapter three. I argue that Bergson's problematic concept of intellectual intuition is best 
understood in terms of Kantian aesthetic indeterminacy, which is itself now to be understood 
more fundamentally in terms of an imaginative activity which is inextricably also an ethical 
receptivity. This latter concept of Kantian imagination as fundamentally an ethico-
epistemological structure is  discovered in light of findings gained concerning the nature of 
organism, in chapter four, as these relate to the findings of chapter two concerning 
Kierkegaard’s ethical ‘imagination of inwardness’.  
 
In chapter two, it was discovered that Kierkegaardian imagination mediates between poles of 
experience in terms of metaphorical tension, enabling a paradoxical – and ethically structured – 
imaginative active-receptivity to the supervention of conceptually incalculable, revelatory 
insight. This Kierkegaardian model is opposed to the trajectories of those post-Kantian 
dialectical methods which envision the imaginative mediation of temporal process in terms of a 
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calculable, Kantian teleology, thereby claiming to achieve absolute knowledge through the 
reconciliation of polar, metaphysical concepts. In chapter five, I now argue that the structure of 
Kant’s transcendental imaginative activity is organic, and thus categorically unaccountable, in 
terms of Kant’s own model of organism, in a way unacknowledged by Kant. On this account, I 
suggest that Kant’s productive imagination grounds experience in a conceptually paradoxical 
manner, and is thus at least potentially reconcilable with the ‘inward’ imaginative criteria 
pertaining to Kierkegaard’s paradoxical revelation. On this basis, I advance in my search for an 
account of artistic imagination (or in Kierkegaardian terms, ‘external’ aesthetics), which might 
be compatible with Kierkegaard’s own, paradoxical understanding of Christian revelation. 
 
Kantian, post-Kantian and Bergsonian investigations into the conceptually irreducible structures 
of time and imagination lead to the discussion, over the next two chapters, of a romantic poet 
and aesthetician who is also a profound Christian thinker: S. T. Coleridge. On the same 
temporal-philosophical and theological grounds as hitherto, I criticise Coleridge's systematic 
philosophical theology, and provide an existential criterion for distinguishing his poetic and 
aesthetic work from his systematic activity.  
 
In chapter six, I give an account of essential features of Coleridge's metaphysics, demonstrating 
both how they follow and how they differ from a Schellingian, post-Kantian model. On the 
basis of these distinctions, I am able to differentiate between what I characterise as Coleridge’s 
‘existential’ metaphysical insights and the formal, objective treatment to which he submits such 
insights in his more systematic work. I offer a ‘Bergsonian’ critique of the calculable, 
meontological presuppositions of Coleridge’s systematic metaphysics, as bound up with the 
'spatialising' tendency of Coleridge’s essentially Kantian and teleological understanding of time.  
In chapter seven some original positions are arrived at. I address Coleridge's poetic vision in 
terms of a romantic aesthetic of intimated transcendence, showing through textual evidence that 
Coleridge's aesthetic approach, when in non-systematic mode, accords with a standpoint of 
Kierkegaardian faith. I show Coleridge’s symbolic doctrine of the sublime, and his own 
aesthetic practice, to be rooted in a concern for the nature of biblical poetics. I further show that 
Coleridge’s accounts of personal aesthetic experience in relation to transcendence are 
predicated on an imaginatively dis-possessive, or ethico-aesthetic awareness of temporal 
indeterminacy as a genuine, and thus theologically significant, creative process.  Thus I present, 
through my last chapter, a new approach to Coleridge’s account of the aesthetics of art and 
natural beauty that harmonises more with Kierkegaard’s later understanding of Christian faith, 







































Chapters one and two represent an analysis of Søren Kierkegaard’s position with regard to 
imaginative activity. The context and progression of the current chapter shall be indicated in 
this introductory section, with reference to the conclusions to be drawn in the next concerning a 
problem relating to Kierkegaardian aesthetic practice and theory. With reference to ‘The 
Immediate Erotic Stages or The Musical Erotic’ (Either/Or part 1)1 this chapter will suggest 
that Kierkegaard’s criticism of the ‘aesthetic’ or natural, pre-ethical sphere of existence takes 
two fronts. Kierkegaard writes against a rationalistic objectivity that excludes ethical 
inwardness (focusing on G.W.F. Hegel’s idealism) and also against an infinitely restless 
aesthetic subjectivity, without commitment to any definite values, as epitomised in Friedrich 
Schlegel’s account of romantic irony. It is argued that Kierkegaard exposes the ethical problems 
facing both viewpoints, ultimately in relation to his own, radical conception of Christian 
existence. 
 
Against Schlegel’s egoistic and implicitly nihilistic version of romanticism, this chapter argues 
that Kierkegaard has to censure the absolutisation of the creative, imaginative subject, as 
essentially an escapist devise designed to avoid the ethical problems and demands with 
which reality confronts the individual. Against Hegel, I shall suggest that Kierkegaard asserts 
the necessary role of imagination in ethical life. Then, with reference to the passage of 
aesthetic reflection on Mozart’s Don Giovanni, in Either/Or, I shall begin to argue that 
aesthetic awareness, in the form of imaginative activity, plays an inwardly reflective role in the 
life of Christian faith, as Kierkegaard perceives it.  
 
On this basis, in the next chapter I shall significantly deepen my analysis of Kierkegaard’s 
conceptually paradoxical account of Christian life, especially concerning the role of imagination 
in faithful receptivity to revelation. I will then progress to a consideration of what I discern to 
be an important problem facing Kierkegaard’s negative theological judgement of the outwardly, 
(i.e., communicatively) oriented aesthetics of artistic expression, as well as a related, aesthetic 
receptivity to the significance of natural beauty. In these developments, I shall be building on 
my analysis, in this current chapter, of the difference between such outwardly, or externally 
oriented aesthetics and an inwardly focused, or subjective and ethically reflective, aesthetic 
                                                                        
1 I shall generally refer to this passage simply as ‘The Musical Erotic’. Either/Or 2 parts, in H.V. & E.H. Hong (ed. & tr.), 
Kierkegaard’s Writings (IV), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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consciousness, as Kierkegaard envisages this. As a conclusion to my treatment of Kierkegaard, 
in chapter two, I shall suggest that Kierkegaard’s own theological communication of Christian 
inwardness necessarily depends on outward-looking, conceptually indirect, aesthetic activity. 
Yet Kierkegaard will be shown formally or theoretically to deny any role for outwardly 
focused, artistic imaginative expression within the life of Christian faith through his account of 
the different spheres of existence, as conceived in terms of radically separated aesthetic, ethical, 
and religiously paradoxical life-orientations.  
 
Having established this problematic through chapters one and two, the remainder of this thesis 
builds towards an attempt, in chapter seven, to show the theoretical compatibility of 
Kierkegaard’s own aesthetic communication of theological paradox with a certain kind of 
theologically-motivated aesthetic of art and natural beauty, as discernible in the work of 
Coleridge. My ultimate aim, therefore, is directed towards an aesthetic theory which can 
accommodate Kierkegaard’s own theoretically unaccounted-for aesthetic practice. 
 
Thus in this work I shall be differentiating between what I dub a Coleridgean, or ethico-
aesthetic romanticism – as an account of artistic and natural aesthetics in harmony with 
Kierkegaard’s practice of aesthetically indirect theological communication – and the kind of 
ultimately nihilistic, escapist flights into egoism, which this chapter will show to be typified by 
Schlegel’s romantic irony. While the grounds for this distinction of romanticisms are not those 
famously indicated by Arthur O. Lovejoy
2
, yet I would agree with Lovejoy that thoroughly 
divergent ideas, emphases and motives have come to be labelled romantic, and thus that an 
unqualified use of the term can only lead to confusion. I would therefore make it clear from the 
outset that my own understanding of the term ‘romantic’ is a development to be introduced in 
the final chapter, on the basis of explorations carried out in earlier chapters. This understanding 
of romanticism is restricted to a particular doctrine of aesthetic symbolism, drawn from 
Coleridge, as analysed in relation to the thought of Kierkegaard, Kant, Schelling and Bergson. I 
will be claiming that such aesthetic symbolism is in essence a process demanding imaginatively 
ethical subjective attentiveness, in order to mediate conceptually indeterminable intimations of 
transcendence. In intervening chapters the word ‘romantic’ will however be assigned, as is 
customary, to notable historical positions, such as Schlegel’s and Wackenroder’s. 
 
Subsequent chapters should make clear that Coleridge’s aesthetic thinking builds, critically, on 
(and against) Kant’s accounts of beauty and organic structure, as found in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment. In chapters six and seven, I critically assess Coleridge’s work in light of 
                                                                        
2 See Lovejoy’s ‘On the Discrimination of Romanticisms’, Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, 39: 2 
(1924), pp. 229-253. 
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other findings relating to Kant’s productive imagination3, as well as Henri Bergson’s concept of 
a durational élan vital.
4
 I oppose Coleridgean romanticism (on the same Kantian and 
Bergsonian grounds) to what I would term ‘pseudo-romanticism’5, as epitomised in Friedrich 
Schlegel’s Athanaeum Fragments, a writer whom I address in the present chapter from the 
viewpoint of Kierkegaardian faith
6
. In this present chapter, I suggest that it is this latter, 
Schlegelian sense that Kierkegaard, following Hegel, seems to understand the term romanticism 
in general; that it is against such an understanding that both Kierkegaard and Hegel uphold their 
(highly divergent) ethical positions. 
 
In this thesis as a whole, I question the divorce of outwardly aesthetic expression from faith, as 
demanded by Kierkegaard, as not only inconsistent (as making for the incoherence of his own 
strategy of indirect communication), but also insofar as the divorce of faith from art and its 
appreciation, and the appreciation of natural beauty, is based on inadequate grounds of 
assessment. I shall argue as this thesis develops that Kierkegaard’s critique of art from the 
perspective of faith is justified and effective only against what I have just characterised, above, 
as a pseudo-romantic aesthetic model. 
 
In pursuit of these aims, I commence now by turning to Kierkegaard’s theological strategy of 
conceptually indeterminate, or aesthetically indirect, ethical communication. 
 
(1) The life of authentic faith: Kierkegaard’s project of indirect communication 
 
Kierkegaard saw Socrates’ ethical attitude as exemplifying the subjective relation to truth.7 
Although eternity infinitely transcends time in value, if one is honestly interested in the eternal 
value of goodness, one is ethically bound to use one’s time in its interests, ‘accenting’ one’s 
inward existence ethically, rather than identifying oneself with the ‘timeless paragraphs of 
systematic philosophy’.8 One should be passionate about goodness as something to strive for in 
one’s life, rather than about the theory of goodness as an abstract hypothesis. In objective 
                                                                        
3 See chapter 3, section 3. 
4 See chapter 4, section 1. 
5 Following Charles Williams: see appendix 1. 
6 Oskar Walzel, in his German Romanticism, (Alma Elise Lussky (tr.) (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1932), pp. 41-48; 70-75) 
differentiates between earlier and later phases in Schlegel’s thought in the closing years of the eighteenth century. A first  phase, 
influenced by Fichte, (not counting an initial classicism) is focused on irony and protean wit, as intellectual intuition of 
subjectivity’s infinite source makes the poet aware of his inability as a finite ego ever to express the truth for which he strives. A 
later, monistic phase, is influenced by Schelling and Schleiermacher (as expressed in Schlegel’s third collection of fragments or 
Ideen). In this later phase, romantic striving or yearning, recognised as love, finds its source in a more organically inclusive concept 
of an Absolute regarded as embracing while transcending both subjectivity and objectivity. Such infinite love is made symbolically 
manifest as the spiritualised sentiment pervading romantic poetry and above all, music. As we shall discover in chapters six and 
seven, while there is much of this latter approach in Coleridge’s aesthetic, through the influence predominately of Schelling, it is 
importantly modified by his Christian theological interests, especially through his early concern to understand the distinctive poetics 
of the Old Testament. 
7 James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 153. 
8 Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 152. 
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passion of the latter sort one evades responsibility, by-passing the irksome fact that temporal 
becoming is prone to error, and always uncertain. We are never finished, as living subjects, and 
thus cannot have any certainty of how we stand at any given time in relation to goodness. Our 
temporal situation is essentially uncertain. Only with necessary truths of reason is certainty 
possible, but these are a-temporal, hypothetical. Thus to identify oneself with such a priori 
objects of thought is to seek to avoid real life. It is much more flattering to believe one 
possesses goodness certainly, that is to say, objectively, but this is like knowing the anatomical 
moves that enable one to swim, while being frightened to enter the water. Knowledge of 
natation does not make one a swimmer, just as being a philosophical ethicist does not make one 
good. One may only ever strive for goodness by attempting to appropriate it in and as the 
‘shape’ of one’s personal life in interaction with others. 
 
In Kierkegaard’s conceptually indirect or indeterminate writings, behind Socratic irony and a 
maieutic method ‘lay a personal regard for the truth, not only as an objective thesis, but also as 
a motivating, practical principle which should make a difference to one’s life’.9 Kierkegaard’s 
paramount concern is for the manner in which his hearers relate themselves to the truth and are 
modified by it in their way of life. Hence he communicates indirectly, so as to provoke the 
learner’s own appropriative effort. Kierkegaard encourages the reader to begin to discern and 
‘inhabit’ ideas as personal possibilities, realising that it is up to the individual whether he 




The idea of making what has become despised and over-familiar strange again, thereby 
refreshing one’s awareness of it, hearing the old with the shock of the new, or seeing the 
customary in an altered and subversive light, was taken up within the Modernist aesthetic 
movement in the twentieth century (for example, in the poetry of T. S. Eliot).
11
 Values 
dismissed as trite or to which, at best, lip-service is paid for the sake of appearances, only 
appear inapt and passé insofar as they are not grasped authentically in their intrinsic 
significance, independently of the inherited vehicle of an out-worn and over-familiar mode of 
expression. Ethical and religious signifiers in a complex modern society have become separated 
from their significance, and so Kierkegaard’s task, like the modernist poet’s, is to reacquaint us 
with what we think we already know, but have never engaged with authentically for ourselves. 
Most of us relate merely passively, (i.e., objectively or externally) to ethical and religious 
meanings, as if to so much cultural wall-paper, rather than relating to them as a task for 
personal realisation through living appropriation. Christian truth is only genuinely 
                                                                        
9 Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p.152. 
10 Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p.152. 
11 See Mary Karr, ‘Introduction’ to Eliot’s The Waste Land, in The Waste Land and Other Writings, (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2002), p. xxiii. 
18 
 
communicated for Kierkegaard in its ‘how’, in the manner of its expression.12 The words of 
faith themselves can be said glibly enough, but then they are merely empty forms, flatus vocis, 
and not the content of faith: not ‘faith-full’ words. Such words, such forms, need to be re-
inhabited, in a living relation of a qualitatively different kind.  
 
As we progress through this and the next chapter, I will show how Kierkegaard’s account of the 
dynamics of such a faithful response involves imaginative, aesthetic activity. It will be shown 
that Kierkegaard’s approach characterises Christian faithfulness in terms of an imaginatively 
tensile and intrinsically paradoxical interaction between infinitely indeterminable revelation and 
finite interpretation, between interpretive activity and attentive receptivity to the divine as non-
objective, or that which transcends the subject-object relation as  ‘wholly other’.  
 
Thomas Carlyle took up a similar concern over outworn symbolism is his book Sartor Resartus 
(The Tailor re-Tailored).
13
 Carlyle, however, draws on an approach to the issue of the recovery 
of transcendent ethical meaning on the basis of an idealist, dialectical harmonisation of 
opposites, rather than through the indirect communication of a conceptually irreducible, 
ultimate paradox. Such an approach, as yet another variant of romanticism, will be critically 




In pursuit of his policy of cognitively indirect communication, Kierkegaard will not expound as 
a teacher, objectively or dogmatically. Rather he employs a maieutic, Socratic method. This 
means that like a midwife, Kierkegaard wants to enable the reader to ‘give birth’ to his own, 
authentic understanding of existential possibilities, by writing in such a way that the reader is 
forced to do a lot of interpretive work, to hold the truth as something he has himself discovered 
through the ambiguous promptings of the text. The individual must form his own judgement. 
William McDonald describes Kierkegaard’s stylistic approach as exhibiting an ‘incessant play 
of irony, a predilection for paradox and semantic opacity. The text becomes a polished surface 
                                                                        
12 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments 2 vols., in H. V & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), 
Kierkegaard’s Writings (XII), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), vol. 1, p. 202. 
13 Thomas Carlyle, K. McSweeney & P. Sabor (ed.), Sartor Resartus, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
14 For Carlyle, nature can submit to conceptual calculation as a mirror of its reductive programme, or it can function as a symbolic 
window on a deeper, qualitatively irreducible dimension of reality. The same reality that can be calculated can reveal itself to an 
ethically rejuvenated approach as a creative miracle, as miraculously dynamic as the freedom of the will. Nature is thus itself 
described as supernatural, but for Carlyle, this deeper meaning in nature is only open to purified feeling, and can never be known 
systematically. The Kantian subjective forms of space and time (see chapter three, below), in which the epistemologically relative, 
causal order of phenomena is clad, are regarded by Carlyle as veils hiding a natural miracle of dynamic creativity. A revelation of a 
‘thing in itself’, in Kant’s terms, is possible, only what is revealed is not a thing, but of the same order as human will: a living power 
in nature, or natura naturans, as opposed to its product, the ‘dead’ phenomenal order, or  natura naturata (for more on this 
distinction, see my treatment of Schelling in chapter four). Phenomena are regarded from one perspective as a deceptive veil, 
concealing a living kinship with nature, but also as potential symbols, capable of disclosing their creative ground. But for Carlyle, 
as for Kierkegaard, traditional Christian symbols have lost their force to reveal the living Being of beings.  
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for the reader in which the prime meaning to be discerned is the reader’s own reflection’.15 But 
this assessment must be qualified. 
 
As we shall see later in this chapter, in the indirect writings of ethical and religious significance 
(for example, those ascribed to the pseudonymous ‘Judge William’ or ‘Johannes Climacus’), 
the ‘reader’s own reflection’ should not be an eisegesis of the text, an interpretation dependent 
only on subjective taste – the aesthetical absolutisation of the ego’s interpretive activity, as is 
exemplified in the very position Kierkegaard attacks, Friedrich Schlegel’s ‘romantic irony’ (to 
which we turn next). Rather what is called for is an attentively engaged, subjectively concerned 
exegesis of truth.  
 
In relation to Kierkegaard’s conception of Christian faith as a living ‘exegetical’ pilgrimage, as 
it were, or mode of life born of a responsive relation to Christ, it will be shown in the next 
chapter that such a faithful response is neither subjectively active nor passive, purely. Rather it 
is conceived as a receptive re-activity to incalculable revelation, through an imaginative 
mediation – without conceptual reconciliation – of the finite and the infinite poles of Christian 
experience. 
 
(2) Friedrich Schlegel’s aesthetics of ironic self-transcendence as indirect communication 
 
As just noted, and as outlined in this chapter’s introduction, Kierkegaard shares with Hegel a 
disparagement of Friedrich Schlegel’s romantic aesthetics. Hegel perceives a misuse of Fichte’s 
post-Kantian conception of the absolute ego as constitutive of all objective significance. For 
Schlegel, as Hegel sees him, perhaps unjustly, the empirical self posits all values, and thus 
cannot seriously regard them as binding. Hegel writes of the consequent evacuation of all true 
significance from objective positions: 
The proximate form of this negativity which displays itself as irony is, then, on the 
one hand the futility of all that is matter of fact, or moral and of substantive import 




What for Fichte is an intellectual intuition of absolute subjectivity as an ontologically simple 
and transcendent source of objective reality, is seen by Schlegel as an aesthetic intuition which 
informs a process of infinite self-manifestation through the aesthetic activity of the poet: a 
process of realisation of the undifferentiated ground of the artist’s subjectivity which, as infinite 
                                                                        
15 McDonald, William, “Søren Kierkegaard, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta 
(ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/kierkegaard/. Date accessed, 4/8/2006. 
16 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, Bernard Bosanquet (tr.) (London: Penguin, 1993), p. 72. 
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or absolute, cannot in principle come to an end.
17
 The poet, on account of his genius, is 
aesthetically aware of his own infinite ground, inspired to celebrate and explore his own infinite 
truth through the aesthetic self-creation that is the process of poetic activity itself.
18
 But the poet 
must simultaneously distance himself from the fruits of his inspiration. The poetic form of his 
life, his aesthetic productivity, is the focus of the romantic poet, rather than the poetry he writes. 
One thinks here of Byron’s aesthetic journey – self-discovery as self-invention – through the 
reflective cantos of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage.19 For Schlegel, the romantic poet must show 
an awareness that the infinite ground of his subjectivity is the true aesthetic content of his work, 
by embodying a self-conscious, critical distance within the very fabric of his poetry qua finite 
product. The individual can intuit his absolute ground, his ultimate metaphysical significance, 
and he can intimate it, inadequately, in a necessarily endless process of poetic self-activity; but 
he can never arrive at a finite knowledge of himself sub specie aeterni, as no determinate 
cognition can contain the infinite. Romantic poetry is therefore a self-critical, self-distancing 
reflection upon its own activity. The focus rests on the creative subject rather than his products, 





Schlegel holds that the manifestation of the absolute is impossible save in fragmentary 
intimations or pointers, which must simultaneously be disclaimed as finite.
21
 No ethical position 
can be objectively certain, therefore, which leads Hegel to disapprove of the inevitable nihilistic 
tendency of romantic-ironic detachment.
22
 Hegel sees the lifestyle of the romantic poet as 
culminating in an impasse, in what Kierkegaard would regard as despair: 
All appears [to the poetic ego] as nothing worth and futile, excepting its own 
subjectivity, which thereby becomes hollow and empty, and itself mere conceit. 
But on the other hand, the reverse may happen, and the ‘I’ may also find itself 
unsatisfied in its enjoyment of itself, and may prove insufficient to itself, so as in 




                                                                        
17 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Athenaeum Fragments’, Fragment 116, in Philosophical Fragments, P. Firchow (tr.) R. Gasché, (intro.) 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). 
18 It becomes clear here how Kierkegaard conceives the infinite, ethical task of striving to become oneself as a reaction to these 
romantic ideas of aesthetic self-poesis. 
19 See J. J. McGann’s introduction, pp. xxii-xxiii, xxvii, and endnote, p. 1026, to ‘Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage’, in McGann (ed.), 
Lord Byron: The Major Works, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 18-206. 
20 See ‘Introduction’, J. M. Bernstein (tr. & intro.), Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), pp xxvii, xxx-xxxiii; Walzel, German Romanticism, pp. 22-25, 42-46; Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, p. 31, xiii-
xv, xxx-xi. 
21 See Friedrich Schlegel, ‘On Incomprehensibility’, in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, pp. 297-308.  
22 As developed by Nietzsche, perhaps the seeds of some strands of post-modern thought are already latent in the epistemological 
and ethical implications of the aesthetics of romantic irony. 
23 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, p. 72.  
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The absolute is a necessarily non-manifest deity for romantics such as Schlegel.
24
 The poetic 
ironist can be pre-conceptually aware of the infinite ground of his creativity, and can intimate 
this awareness through the indeterminacy of aesthetic forms.
25
 But since the aesthetic 
intimations of romantic artistry are embodied in finite forms, the absolute is always a presence-
in-absence; through such romantic-ironic artworks, one is supposedly awakened to an 
awareness of the divine in the form of an infinite yearning for that which necessarily eludes 
manifestation. 
 
In much of his pseudonymous work, (for example, in Philosophical Fragments), I suggest that 
Kierkegaard uses a romantic-ironic style reminiscent of Schlegel’s, but for a very different 
reason. Schlegel aims to intimate a creative ground that is un-manifest by the standard of 
rational necessity, and to display critical awareness of the inadequacy of his finite attempt to 
communicate the infinite by adopting a stance of ironic detachment from his work. Kierkegaard, 
as will be seen, aims to communicate the possibility of ethical commitment to an adequate and 
salvific revelation of the infinite God: the mortal man, Jesus.  
 
Kierkegaard’s ironic style is thus deliberately deceptive. By attracting the ‘aesthetic’, educated 
reader with the offer of a sophisticated and sparkling intellectual entertainment, free of all the 
slow-paced trammels and demands of seriousness and commitment, Kierkegaard is at the same 
time indirectly inviting him to perceive the opposite for himself: opening a vista towards the 
possibility of embracing a Christian way of life as his own. Thus a maieutic, or Socratic-ironic 
strategy hopes to assist an inner openness to truth through a tour de force display of lightly-
worn and detached erudition in the fashionable mode of romantic irony. We shall see later how 
Kierkegaard adopts – and subverts – a romantic-ironic style in the ‘Musical Erotic’, a section on 
musical aesthetics in the first part of Either/Or.
26
 But to understand the conceptual moves 
Kierkegaard makes through intertwined layers of indirect communication, we will need to be 






                                                                        
24 See K. Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 84-85. 
25 I shall be offering, through an analysis of Coleridge’s aesthetics (in chapter seven, below), an alternative account of the aesthetic 
intimation of transcendence, and thus identifying a significantly different form of romanticism, in contrast to which the ‘ironising 
romanticism’ addressed here, and against which both Hegel and Kierkegaard took issue, will be identified as ‘pseudo-romanticism’. 
See introduction to chapter 1, above and appendix 1, below. 
26 See footnote 1, above, for details. 
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(3)  Hegelian and romantic aesthetics subserve Kierkegaardian theology: layers of indirect 
communication 
 
In subsections (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3), I offer materials necessary to understand the different 
aspects of Kierkegaard’s ‘Musical Erotic’, as gradually presented over section three.  These 
sections, cumulatively, form the context of understanding for my theological interpretation of 
Kierkegaard’s aesthetic position in (3.4). The continuity of the next subsections is thus provided 
by their cumulative relevance to an argumentative focus in (3.4). 
 
As indicated at the end of section two, in the next subsection I shall be considering the Hegelian 
conceptual background of the aesthetic criticism offered by Kierkegaard in the ‘Musical Erotic’. 
This is because an understanding of Kierkegaard’s critical approach here depends not only on 
awareness of the strategy of indirect communication he employs (as addressed above), but also 
of the Hegelian aesthetic which is espoused by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, ‘A’, or ‘the aesthete’. 
The ‘aesthete’ will be shown to offer a multi-valenced, or layered position, his Hegelianism 
subverting the romanticism of his style.  
 
Central to the argument of the ‘Musical Erotic’ is the suggestion that music reflects a pre-ethical 
state of human nature. An understanding of the arguments developing from this position will 
depend on my presenting Kierkegaard’s concept of moral imagination in (3.2), as an 
imaginative inwardness in opposition to the romantic musical aesthetic that is criticised, along 
Hegelian lines, by Kierkegaard’s aesthetic pseudonym. This romantic musical model (related to 
Schlegel’s romantic-ironic position, already met) will itself be briefly introduced in (3.1).  
 
Thus I shall argue in this section that a form of Schlegelian romantic-ironic discourse is utilised, 
(in a doubled irony against itself), to argue on Hegelian grounds against a related romantic 
understanding of the quasi-religious significance of ‘absolute’ music.27  
 
In (3.3), conceptual elements already introduced will be seen at work, as I offer an exegesis of 
the ‘Musical Erotic’ in terms of metaphysical desire.  
 
In (3.4), I suggest that Kierkegaard himself intends to subvert, indirectly, the Hegelianism of his 
pseudonym. I shall argue that not only is romantic discourse subverted, but that the 
pseudonym’s Hegelian position is also subverted in a further Kierkegaardian twist. I shall 
                                                                        
27 See Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, ‘The Characteristic Inner Nature of the Musical Art and the Psychology of Today’s 
Instrumental Music’, from ‘Contributions to the Fantasies on Art for the Friends of Art together with Ludwig Tieck’s Preface’, in 
Mary Hurst Schubert (tr. & intro.), Wilhelm Wackenroder’s ‘Confessions’ and ‘Fantasies’, (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1971) pp. 188-194; see also Walzel, German Romanticism, pp. 121-124. A contextualising introduction to this 
musical romanticism will be provided in section 3.1. 
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contend that the complex literary counterpoint of ‘The Musical Erotic’ is ultimately invoked by 
Kierkegaard in the interests of an indirect communication of Christian revelation. 
 
(3.1) Hegelian philosophy and absolute music in the ‘Musical Erotic’ 
Hegel’s concern for the intrinsic significance of the aesthetic content of a work of art, against 
Schlegel’s ironic absolutisation of aesthetic form and creative subjectivity, is utilised as a 
convenient vehicle for Kierkegaard’s aims.28 Hegel is thus invoked as a partial ally, for once, in 
Kierkegaard’s attack on romantic, aesthetic subjectivity through its own modes of speech. But 
Kierkegaard’s indirection is two-sided: a double-edged sword. I will attempt to show that 
Hegelian assumptions about the nature of spirit are subverted from within, as Hegel’s own 
conceptual apparatus is turned against him by Kierkegaard to sub-serve the interests of Christian 
faith as Kierkegaard understands it. 
 
Don Giovanni is considered by Kierkegaard’s aesthetic anonym to be the principle, or spiritual 
qualification of sensuous immediacy.
29
 As its archetypal embodiment, the legendary Don Juan 
stands as an exemplar of the mode of life embraced by ‘A’.30 Schlegel’s aesthetic adaptation of 
Fichte’s absolute subjectivity was disapproved both by Hegel and Kierkegaard, but, I suggest, 
with diametrically opposite estimates of the nature of the absolute truth each sought to promote 
as transcending the viewpoint of aesthetic subjectivity. 
 
What should eventually emerge is not only an understanding of Kierkegaard’s subversion of 
Hegel’s conception of spirit, or ‘God’, in terms of absolute objectivity, but Kierkegaard’s own 
rehabilitation of the aesthetic dimension of truth as a correlate to the indeterminacy of 
existentially genuine communication, as intrinsic factors in the authentic life of faith. In relation 
to this latter conception of a ‘higher’ aesthetic truth, it will be suggested that for Kierkegaard, 
music represents a ‘lower’ medium of conceptual indeterminacy, and is thus dethroned from the 
sublime
31
 associations with which first Wackenroder, and then Schopenhauer adorned it in the 
wake of Kant and the post-Kantian drive for a synthesis to overcome Kantian epistemological 
dualism.
32
 I shall be suggesting that a ‘higher indeterminacy’ of faith, or ‘musical indirectness’ 
(as interpreted by Steven Shakespeare),
33
 and a subjective response in the form of an 
imaginative holding together of conceptual determinacy and indeterminacy (as understood by 
                                                                        
28 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, pp. 70-74. 
29 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, pp. 92-93. 
30 Notice especially ‘A’s unwillingness, habituated almost into an incapacity, to commit to any position or settled mode of life, as 
evoked in the chapter ‘Diapsalmata’, in Either/Or part 1, pp. 19-43. 
31 For an in-depth, historically informed assessment of the concept of aesthetic sublimity, see Samuel H. Monk, The Sublime, (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960). 
32 For Kantian dualism, see chapter 3, section 1. This drive pervaded romanticism and absolute idealism alike, as two related 
streams: see Carl Dahlhaus, Nineteenth Century Music, J. Bradford Robinson (tr.) (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1989,) p. 91. 





 are opposed by Kierkegaard to Hegel’s rational objectivity, as he combats 
Hegel’s claim to have surpassed faith, objectively, through a dialectical logic capable of 
knowing the absolute. 
 
In the ‘Musical Erotic’, while simultaneously utilising the style and undermining the 
significance of Schlegelian irony, Kierkegaard takes up arms against another strand of romantic 
aesthetic thought, in which, (notably in the work of Wilhelm Wackenroder, Ludwig Tieck, 
E.T.A. Hoffman
35
 and subsequently Schopenhauer), post-Kantian idealist themes (especially 
relating to views put forward in Schelling’s Philosophy of Art) are put to use in musical 
aesthetics.
36
 Music is seen as a more concrete embodiment than any other art-form of the 
‘poetic’: that which is creative in works of art, a romantic term for the expressive intimation or 
evocation of the absolute, manifest aesthetically as an infinite yearning for wholeness. Along 
such lines, Wackenroder and Tieck developed an aesthetic of the musical sublime.
37
 Against the 
prevailing ‘psychological’ aesthetic of eighteenth century classicism, for which, (following 
Rousseau against Rameau in musical aesthetical terms),
38
 the personally immediate 
communication of feeling through vocal music was a model for instrumental music to imitate, 
romantic aesthetics (especially in E. T. A. Hoffmann) takes the symphony, as a solely 
instrumental form of purely musical structures of meaning, as its paradigm.
39
 Music ceases to be 
seen merely as a means of moving and cultivating personal feelings.
40
 Thus Schopenhauer could 
regard emotion itself, conceived as a metaphysical dynamic, rather than an individual’s 
experience of emotion, as presented musically. Romantic aesthetics sees in ‘absolute music’ 
                                                                        
34 M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 
35 For Wackenroder and Tieck on music, see note 27 above; for E. T. A. Hoffmann, see David Charlton (ed. & intro.), E. T. A. 
Hoffmann’s Musical Writings: ‘Kreisleriana’, ‘The Poet and the Composer’, Music Criticism, Martyn Clarke (tr.) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). For Schopenhauer on music, see The World as Will and Representation 2 vols., E. F. J. Payne 
(tr.) (New York: Dover Publications, 1969) vol. 1, pp. 255-267; vol. 2, pp. 448-457. 
36 For F. W. J. Schelling on music, see The Philosophy of Art, Douglas W. Stott (ed., trans. & intro.) (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 107-119. Unlike Wackenroder, however, who sees music as expressing a language of emotion elevated 
above the mere ‘husks’ of words and concepts, music for Schelling (in 1801) represents the informing of eternal metaphysical 
identity, or ‘indifference’, into finitude as considered in its relatively material aspect, or as sonority, (as opposed to painting, which 
embodies insight into the infinite through the relative ideality of light). As thus formally or ideally undifferentiated (not to be 
confused with ‘indifference’), music is the furthest of the arts from language and reason, representing the centrifugal force of 
multiplicity pulling away from centredness. So as allegorically evoking an ever-absent eternal wholeness, rather than symbolically 
embodying it through finite form (as in a painting), music is said to be furthest of the arts from self-consciousness, for which it 
longs in the form of pure emotion or endless yearning. Schopenhauer would extend this view, while elevating music to the adequate 
representation of the Will, conceived as his ultimate metaphysical principle. 
37 Dahlhaus, Nineteenth Century Music, p. 89. 
38 Dahlhaus, Carl, The Idea of Absolute Music, Roger Lustig (tr.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 47-48. This was 
the famous ‘Querelle des Anciens et Modernes’, in which Jean-Jacques Rousseau espoused a contemporary aesthetic of ‘sensibility’ 
against Jean-Philippe Rameau, the composer and musical theoretician, who favoured a traditional Pythagorean-Platonic, 
numerological view of music, regarding harmonic relationships as embodiments of cosmological archetypes, or structuring 
principles. (For the Pythagorean account of harmony, see ‘Fifth Century Pythagoreanism’, in Jonathan Barnes (ed., tr. and & intro.), 
Early Greek Philosophy, (London: Penguin, 1987), pp. 208-211. For Plato on the harmonic proportion of the universe, see 
‘Timaeus: Creation of the World-Soul’, in Joscelyn Godwin (ed.), Harmony of the Spheres: A Sourcebook of the Pythagorean 
Tradition in Music, (Rochester: Inner Traditions International, 1993), pp. 3-6; for a treatment of the principles of harmony in terms 
of Platonic geometry, see Johannes Kepler, ‘Mysterium Cosmographicum: Planetary Aspects and Intervals’ and ‘Harmonices 
Mundi: Planet Songs’, in Harmony of the Spheres, pp. 221-235. For Rameau’s harmonic/metaphysical approach to musical theory, 
see excerpts from his ‘Traité de Harmonie’ and ‘Nouvelles Réflexions’, in Harmony of the Spheres, pp. 309-313. For Rousseau on 
music, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Dictionnaire de Musique, (Paris, 1768; reprint, Hildesheim, 1969). 
39 See especially Hoffmann’s review ‘Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony’, in E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings, pp. 234-251. 
40 ‘...a means for moving and cultivating personal feelings’: this view was above all expressed in the eighteenth century aesthetic 
concept Empfindsamkeit, according to which vocal music was a paradigm for instrumental imitation, a position notably represented 
in the compositions of C. P. E. Bach). 
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(pure, or wordless, instrumental music) an end in its own right for aesthetically disinterested 
contemplation.
41
 Such ‘pure’ music is semantically indeterminate in that there is nothing that it 
could be said to be ‘about’ (programme music and the imitation of nature being regarded as an 
aberration) except its own, material form of rhythmic, harmonic and melodic patterns.
42
 In the 
aesthetics of Wackenroder and Tieck, divine, healing wholeness is not captured or grasped, 
rather the pre-subjective unity of subjective and objective reality is manifest as the infinite, 
conceptually indeterminate yearning that is the concrete, temporal development of a musical 
performance’s organic, inherent structure. The infinite is intimated in and as pure, musical 
architectonics. The inner essence of a piece of music, its internal, purely musical structure is a 
temporally finite presentiment of infinite longing: an embodied intimation of absolute 
wholeness. Musical structure is thus thought to be the most concrete embodiment of the 





While Hegel and Kierkegaard both see verbal meaning as essential to the communication of 
divine truth, as opposed to a romantic conception of music as a sublime intimation of absolute 
reality, they completely differ in their conception of the creative principle or arche of reality. 
The Hegelian logos is a metaphysically self-constructive logic, proceeding through self-
negation to self-realisation,
44
 (an epistemic ‘realisation’ masquerading as an ontological one, for 
Kierkegaard),
45
 while Kierkegaard’s ‘logos – Christ – is the infinite paradox of an eternally 
significant, and thus qualitatively unique, spatio-temporal, personal communication.
46
 But 
perhaps Kierkegaard communicates his theology pseudonymously through the metaphysical 
structure of Hegelian aesthetics, in ‘The Musical Erotic’. Therefore an indication of Hegel’s 
aesthetic philosophy must be given, in order to see how Kierkegaard could be said to transform 
it in the light of an opposing conviction: that of Christian faith. 
 
Through his metaphysical logic, his conception of the self-developing absolute, Hegel seeks to 
surpass the position of Schelling, whose intellectual intuition of the grounding unity of ideality 
and reality is dismissed in the Phenomenology of Spirit as a ‘night in which all cows are 
black’.47 Hegel also seeks to surpass a romantic concept of the primordial unity of subjectivity 
and objectivity that can be aesthetically intuited through the sublime indefiniteness of a certain 
kind of art, but never adequately embodied, since the very finitude of artistic production 
                                                                        
41 The earlier, romantic sense in which the term ‘absolute music’ is used here is to be distinguished from Eduard Hanslick’s post-
idealist use of the term, half a century later, (see Dahlhaus, The Idea of Absolute Music, pp. 128-129). 
42 As, for example, in Joseph Haydn’s oratorio, The Creation. 
43 Dahlhaus, The Idea of Absolute Music, pp.89-91. 
44 Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, A. V. Miller (tr.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §§ 31-59, 
pp. 18-36. 
45 See, for example, Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 1, p. 190. 
46 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 1, pp.196-206. 
47 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 16, p. 9. 
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simultaneously denies a tangibility to such intimation.
48
 For Schlegel, as seen, absolute truth is 
necessarily non-manifesting. Against this, Hegel puts forward his conception of a historically 
self-developing, and thus content-rich absolute. 
 
Hegel’s aesthetics can only be understood in relation to his overarching absolute idealism, for 
which mind, or spirit (Geist) is the self-developing essence of reality as a whole. Philosophy is 
historicised on the basis of Hegel’s identification of metaphysics with a dynamic conception of 




Hegel writes, in his Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics,
50
 that at the stage of the historical 
development of absolute spirit represented by classical Greek civilisation, a sculptural 
idealisation of spirit’s immediate concrete form, the human body, constituted an adequate 
awareness of absolute truth. Aesthetic representation was adequate to the ideal to be portrayed, 
aesthetic form and ideal content being sufficient to each other. In classical sculpture, art thus 
reaches an unsurpassable zenith at an early stage of the development of spirit.  
 
But this adequacy of art to truth is historically relative, representing an as yet immature stage of 
the self-consciousness of absolute spirit. Art will never again be adequate to what it seeks to 
portray, as self-unfolding truth deepens into purely spiritual manifestations beyond the reach of 
sensuous apprehension.
51
 Art may develop as art, but the beauty it strives for and succeeds in 
evoking ever more deeply will no longer be an adequate vehicle for absolute truth. In the 
Christian era, (which is the romantic era artistically speaking, according to Hegel’s and a 
common, early romantic-philosophical
52
 use of the term), art strives, and succeeds in moving 
towards spiritual inwardness, reflecting the prevailing cultural awareness of absolute spirit’s 
pilgrimage and return to adequate self-consciousness, through the self-negation of its own 
embodiment, which is now religiously apprehended.  
 
As pre-philosophical – pre-Hegelian, that is – this religious affirmation of absolute truth is still 
only an implicit awareness, however. As conscious understanding (Verstand) in the form of 
faith projects its own inner truth outside itself, it overlays an implicit awareness of absolute 
truth with the figurative forms (Vorstellung), or ‘picture-language’ of a divine incarnation that 
passes through the negation of crucifixion, to be resurrected as the divine spiritual presence that 
is at one with, and empowers the life of the Christian community.
53
 Just as the aesthetically 
                                                                        
48 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, pp. 69-74. 
49 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §§ 36, 37, 48, pp 21-22, 28-29. 
50 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, § CVI, pp. 82-85. 
51 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, p. xxvi. 
52 See Schelling, Philosophy of Art, §§ 39-61, pp. 45-82. 
53 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §§ 765, 786, pp. 463, 476. 
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imagined and appreciated idea is not adequate to the emergence of an inward and spiritual 
understanding of the presence of God to the faithful soul, so such faith itself is inadequate as 
compared to philosophical reason (Vernunft), whose polar, logical structure, as the structure of 
mind itself, is identical to the self-creative structure of reality. 
 
What marks the transition for classical to romantic art for Hegel is an inward re-focusing of the 
human spirit with the birth of Christianity. Romantic art, reflecting the Christian religious 
understanding that God is spirit, strives, through painting, music and poetry to break away from 
fully concrete three-dimensionality in its portrayals of the ‘idea’ (Hegel’s term for absolute 
reality, or truth in and for itself, as reflected back through its own negation).
54
 It will have its 
successes measured by purely artistic standards, but its aspirations towards spirit will never be 
adequate to spirit.  
 
Music is a romantic art situated on the hierarchy of inwardness above painting’s abstraction 
from material three-dimensionality, but beneath poetic language, which, in utilising concepts, is 
superior to music in spirituality, according to Hegel’s identification of rational thought with 
spirit, as the ultimate nature of reality. Music expresses awareness of the spiritual nature of ideal 
truth by confining itself ‘to an undefined movement of the inward, spiritual nature’: music is 
thus characterised as semantically indeterminate.
55
 Hegel says that ‘musical sounds’ are ‘as it 
were, feeling without my thought’.56  
 
This Hegelian formula – feeling without thought – clearly influences Kierkegaard’s (or his 
anonym, ‘A’s) notion of music as the spiritual qualification of sensuous immediacy in ‘The 
Musical Erotic’, as will be seen. The primordial ‘Word’ for Hegel – the creative logos – is 
dialectical or polar logic. It will be suggested that Kierkegaard’s ‘aesthete’ takes up a variant of 
this Hegelian position on the inadequacy of art to spirit in his discussion of the inferiority of the 
language of music as compared to verbal language in Either/Or, but in the interests of the role 
of the subject in paradoxical Christian faith. 
 
For both Hegel and Kierkegaard, the adequacy of a beautiful work to convey an aesthetic idea is 
dependent on the degree to which medium and message are integrated by it. Content and 
aesthetic form should be perfectly adapted to one another. ‘A’s writing in ‘The Musical Erotic’ 
is fully informed by the Hegelian understanding of aesthetics, and Kierkegaard’s aesthetic 
pseudonym is ironically self-conscious of the fact: ‘in a classic work, good fortune – that which 
                                                                        
54 Hegel, ‘Lectures on Aesthetics, (1818-1820)’, in E. A. Lippman (ed.), Musical Aesthetics: A Historical Reader 3 vols. 
(Stuyvesant (N.Y.): Pendragon Press, 1988) vol. 2, pp. 86-97. 
55 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, § XLV, p. 32 
56 Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, § XLV, p. 32 
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makes it classic and immortal – is the absolute correlation of the two forces [content and 
form]’.57 There is nothing obvious or contrived – no appearance of effort – about the utterly 
appropriate conjunction of formative activity with the subject matter or content it is expressing: 
‘This correlation is so absolute that a subsequent reflective age will scarcely be able, even in 
thought, to separate that which is so intrinsically conjoined without running the danger of 
causing or fostering a misunderstanding’.58 
 
The aesthete praises Hegel as one concerned to bring objectivity back into the appreciation of 
art, who ‘reinstated the subject matter, the idea, in its rights, and thereby ousted those transient 
classic works, those superficialities, those twilight moths’59 of an unbridled aesthetic 
subjectivism: Schlegel’s romanticism, as we have seen, having denied the equal importance of 
content to artistic form. Kierkegaard continues: ‘what these [romantic] productions lacked was 
ideas, and the more formally perfect they were, the more quickly they burned themselves out’.60 
It is contended that a Schlegelian romantic approach to art is no more than ‘an expression of the 
unbridled producing individual in his equally unbridled lack of substance’.61 It might be said 
that the romantic poet is engaged in his own form of the endless deferral of significance; he will 
always be in the throes of an intrinsically un-fulfil-able yearning for a necessarily absent 
‘absolute’.62 His fashionable follower, more mundanely, will be in thrall to the pursuit of 
necessarily transient pleasure and a concomitant and self-defeating struggle against boredom, 





Yet Kierkegaard does acknowledge an important, ethical role for aesthetic consciousness, albeit 
a role which separates imaginative activity entirely from its artistic employments. Ethico-
aesthetic activity can find no room for artistic creativity and appreciation. And yet it is precisely 
Kierkegaard’s own literary creativity that enables him indirectly to communicate his ethico-
religious message. I shall be expanding on this problem as we proceed through the next chapter. 
As stated in the introduction to this, a resolution of this dilemma forms the goal of my thesis. 
Now I turn to discuss Kierkegaard’s concept of ethical imagination, or aesthetic consciousness, 
as needed for an appreciation of the significance of music, as deemed to be expressive of pre-
ethical or a-moral life, in ‘The Musical Erotic’. 
 
 
                                                                        
57 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, p. 49. 
58 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, p. 49. 
59 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, p. 53. 
60 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, p. 54. 
61 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, p. 53. 
62 See Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, p. 84. 
63 See, for example, Kierkegaard, ‘Diapsalmata’, in Either/Or part 1, pp.36-37. 
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(3.2) Judge William: ethical inwardness and the beauty of faithful love 
In spite of his dim view of the false freedom of unbridled aesthetic subjectivity, Kierkegaard 
believes that aesthetic values find a transformed place in more intrinsically fulfilling modes of 
existence. Collins, in The Mind of Kierkegaard, writes that ‘the culmination of Hegel’s dialectic 
is the complete self-consciousness of the absolute notion, whereas the culmination of 
Kierkegaard’s dialectic is the relating of the finite individual to the transcendent but loving 
God’.64 The individual in his inwardness, his character, is Kierkegaard’s focus, whereas Hegel’s 
is an external point of view regarding the individual, as what amounts to no more than a spatio-
temporal point determined by universally necessary laws of thought. The interest for such an 
abstract point of view lies in the impersonal determinants, not in the individuality which is 
determined by them, and thus from Kierkegaard’s perspective of subjectivity, the whole, as the 
interior significance or concretely meaningful existence of the personality, is passed over. 
 
Thus there can be no question of logical determination as a means of transition between the 
triad of anthropological spheres that are postulated by Kierkegaard. There are three ‘stages on 
life’s way’: the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious, which latter phase Kierkegaard 
subdivides into natural religion, or a relation to divine eternity as an objective ideality, on the 
one hand, as opposed to a paradoxical faith in Christian revelation, on the other.
65
 Christian 
revelation is an infinite subjective relation to an infinite paradox, an ever deepening journey 
into inwardness through repentance. This ‘inwardising’ movement is described both in the 
sermon at the end of the second part of Either/Or, which hints towards the inadequacy of an 
autonomous of self-sufficient ethical stance
66
, and also in Stages of Life’s Way, Kierkegaard 
suggesting in the latter that the ethicist who seeks to found his principles on his own moral 
rectitude will always eventually discover himself morally bankrupt: ‘The aesthetic sphere is the 
sphere of immediacy, the ethical, the sphere of requirement (and the requirement is so infinite 
that one always goes bankrupt) the religious sphere the sphere of fulfilment’.67 Kierkegaard thus 
suggests that the ethical sphere is transitional, its highest expression being ‘repentance as a 
negative action’. Repentance is a surrender of all illusory claims to moral autonomy as the 
awareness dawns of one’s infinite and saving relatedness, which is at the same time infinite 
judgement, through personal encounter with Christ. 
 
While logical determination is ruled out as a means of transition between existential spheres, 
Kierkegaard already acknowledges, through the ethicist, Judge William in the second part of 
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Either/Or, the accommodation that aspects of natural, or aesthetic human nature must find 
within the ethical sphere.
68
 The aesthetic components of human being, imagination and the felt 
immediacy of emotion and mood, are not bad in themselves, but are one-sidedly dominant in 
aesthetic existence. These functions are transformed, according to the Judge, within the ethical 
sphere, and find their real fulfilment not in art or ephemeral self-gratification, but through the 
‘inward’ role they play in ethical commitment. 
 
The Judge insists against common aesthetic prejudice that the beauty of ‘first love’ survives 
through the settled nature of married life. He maintains that there is no deeper appropriation of 
what is felt in the merely aesthetic concept of love, and therefore no real possession.
69
 The 
difference between the love that interests us in a story by being suited to artistic representation 
and ethically faithful love concerns the temporal nature of life. Life can find a deepening or 
growing centre within a self-consistent course of personal and inter-personal cultivation, or 
alternatively one can seek one’s fulfilment outside of oneself in a string of unrelated diversions, 
allowing attention to be momentarily captured by exciting or engrossing situations.
70
 The latter 
course demands no truly personal involvement: one takes up a third person perspective, no 
matter how excited one may become, just like a spectator in the theatre.
71
 The aesthete of the 
first part of Either/Or, is given over to this latter conception of the temporal relation between 
self and others in that he seeks to make of his life a work of art, contriving interesting and 
diverting situations and predicaments with which to entertain himself, whiling away his time.  
 
In view of these two alternative styles of living, the Judge writes: ‘with regard to individual life 
there are two kinds of history, outer and the inner’.72 These form two currents, moving away 
from one another. The outer, or aesthetic conception of love is suited to dramatic and narrative 
presentation, but a fairy tale can end, or the curtain come down with an assertion that life will 
be lived ‘happily ever after’, without the audience feeling cheated because this continuance is 
not portrayed as a dramatic theme. In Judge William’s terms, the ‘outer’, or dramatically 
representable relation to love stops short just where the ‘inner’, or ethical aesthetic of a love 
which deepens in the outwardly uninteresting continuity of faithfulness takes flight. But this 
flight does not soar, silhouetted against an admirable sunset as something to be aesthetically 
beheld. Rather it takes place in shared looks and glances, mutual recognition and remembrance, 
in private jokes and pet foibles known only to each other; and in the passage through and 
survival of temptation, difficulty, and suffering. The goal of such ‘existential’ aesthetics – 
inhabited and made real from within –  is the way travelled, not its representation; a 
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representation which could not be successful in any case, since it is an inner yet reciprocated, 
invisible beauty – a truly spiritual beauty. If the representation of such beauty were attempted it 
would bore us, since by its very nature it is externally unremarkable: it does not take an 
uninvolved onlooker’s breath away. The difference between external and inward beauty in love 
is one of time, inhabited and made meaningful from within through being claimed as one’s 
own. The life-long union of two people thus turns their shared time into the medium for a 
growing incarnation of love. 
 
The immediate point of concern here is that Kierkegaard finds a place, as we have discovered, 
for aesthetic activity and appreciation to be transformed within a higher, ethical sphere of 
existence. However, Kierkegaard also regards this ethical sphere as itself transitory, as in need 
of a paradoxical religious dimension beyond the capacity of a philosophical ‘natural religion’ to 
provide. It remains to be seen whether an aesthetic, imaginative element may not also be 
involved in the life of paradoxical faith, as Kierkegaard presents it. This issue will form the 
focus of chapter two.  
 
As specified in the introduction to this section, and on the basis of what we have just learned, I 
now bring together the different conceptual contexts examined in (3.1) and (3.2), to show the 
ethical interest undergirding the pseudonymous author’s aesthetic interpretation in ‘The Musical 
Erotic’. But in (3.4) I shall suggest that Kierkegaard himself may be pointing beyond Hegelian 
aesthetic tenets to his own strategy of the aesthetically indirect communication of paradoxical 
Christian faith. 
 
(3.3) Mozart’s music: Kierkegaard and metaphysical desire 
In ‘The Musical Erotic’, Kierkegaard (in the guise of ‘A’) suggests that Mozart’s opera Don 
Giovanni is a truly unique classic because it perfectly expresses sensuous immediacy, or pure, 
striving vitality, which is the most abstract content – i.e. the most rationally undeveloped, 
according to Hegel’s conception of historical reason – in the most abstract form of aesthetic 
representation – music. Musical significance, as not linguistically mediated, is semantically 
indeterminate. Just as music expresses felt, subjective immediacy for Hegel, so for Kierkegaard 
it evokes pure feelings in themselves, as the immediate ‘shapes’ of experienced vitality.73 The 
uniqueness of Don Giovanni lies in the perfect compatibility of form and content. Primordial 
sensuality, or sensuous immediacy,
74
 cannot be perfectly painted, because it has no tangible 
contours. It cannot be a perfect subject for poetic expression because it is instinctive, part of the 
animal substrate of human life, and thus pre-linguistic. 
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Don Giovanni or Don Juan is not just a character in Mozart’s opera as ‘A’ sees things, but the 
entire opera constitutes an expression of ‘Don Giovanni conceived as an archetypal figure or 
principle, as the adequate symbolic embodiment of the meaning of sensuous immediacy. As an 
archetype, ‘Don Giovanni’ is more than just an individual character expressing physical desire; 
desire in itself is a metaphysical principle symbolically embodied as this character.
75
 But this 
symbolic embodiment, as the content and theme of the entire opera, is not restricted to the input 
of the lead-role, but pervades every note of the music. The archetype ‘Don Giovanni’ thus 
makes his presence felt even when the character is off-stage. ‘Don Juan [as the adequate 
representation and evocation of natural vitality, the undetermined will-to-live] is a picture that is 
constantly coming into view but does not attain form and consistency, an individual who is 
constantly being formed but is never finished’.76 Human life is always individuated, finite (my 
life as opposed to yours) and yet always unfinished. There can be no adequate, objective 
definition of a living ‘work in progress’ such as the subjectively experienced reality of human 
becoming. However, the ethical subject chooses self-consistently, tries to train his becoming to 
conform to self-motivated and motivating norms, and thus lives in the process of becoming his 
chosen ethical objective or ideal. But as we have seen, this project will always ‘go bankrupt’, as 
ideals are infinitely complete and the resources of human beings are those of finite and erring 
process. The aesthetic subject does not choose himself ethically, and thus the aesthete has in a 
sense no life to call his own, but is swept up into a vicious circle of un-ending repetitions of a 
craving that is in principle insatiable. Don Giovanni, as a symbol, is this principle of 
insatiability: and as such an archetypal evocation ‘about whose history one cannot learn except 
by listening to the noise of the waves’.77 
                                                                                                                                      
The Don Giovanni archetype is interminable, he is Schopenhauer’s metaphysical will, and thus 
indeterminate in himself. He is the relentless energy of both inorganic and organic nature. He 
stands as much for the ceaseless reformation of matter through attrition and erosion, as for the 
processes of decline and decay, of regeneration and reproduction. 
 
Hegel sees musical tone as the immediate inwardness of matter because in music it is released 
from spatiality as essentially oscillation in time, which corresponds to the transient oscillations 
between excitation and depression of emotion and desire in human, pre-reflective subjectivity. 
Similarly, Kierkegaard writes ‘sensuous love is a disappearance in time, but the medium that 
expresses this is indeed music’.78 
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Music for Kierkegaard is a semantically indefinite medium, but insofar as it generalises felt 
immediacy, it expresses meaning, and thus is, in an ambiguous sense, spiritual: a language 
without words, or spiritually qualified by its exclusion from language proper.
79
 Music is the 
only suitable format to portray and embody the Don Juan symbol because ‘he’, like music, is 
essentially oscillation. Just as sound is oscillating energy manifesting as distinct tones, so 
dynamic vitality is always embodied as individuals. 
 
I mean to argue that what Kierkegaard, or at least his anonym, has to say about the nature of the 
relation between spirit and the natural vitality we have been discussing as excluded from the 
Christian spirit would suggest a disconcertingly Hegelian conception of traditional Christian 
belief. First, however I need to introduce some contextualisation. 
 
It is held, as we have just seen, that the purely natural or pre-ethical in human being is 
spiritually qualified through music as that which is most abstract and un-reflected; as furthest 
from language, it is qualified as that which is excluded from the realm of spirit. A distinction, 
furthermore, is made between vital desire in its pure sensuous immediacy, or ‘Don 
Juan/Giovanni’, and the figure of ‘Faust’. Both are perhaps like Hegel’s Vorstellungen. As 
mentioned previously, Hegel saw traditional narrative, ‘picture thinking’ as a stage in the 
development of mind in which thought is still weak and largely unaware of its own nature. 
Mythical and folkloric themes spring up spontaneously, and largely unconsciously, as far as 
concerns any awareness of the true, rational significance that undergirds the figurative symbols 
that thought in its naivety clings to for support.  
 
Just as, for Hegel, the ‘picture language’ of orthodox Christian doctrine is not fully conscious of 
the deep truth which rationally undergirds it, concerning the dialectical identity of the rational 
human subject and absolute mind, so Kierkegaard’s aesthete suggests that mediaeval folklore80 
acquired the ‘partly conscious, partly unconscious’81 idea that individual personifications can 
act as symbols of aspects of human nature, expressing the whole through a particular refraction 
such as sensuous immediacy in its universality (the significance of which we have seen to be 
that which is spiritually qualified through its exclusion from the realm of spirit). Kierkegaard 
distinguishes Giovanni from Faust on the basis of their relation to the revealed Christian spirit, 
suggesting that Faust in a sense is Giovanni, only as representing the universality of human 
sensuality in a different relation to spirit. While Giovanni is that which knows nothing as yet of 
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the Christian revelation, Faust is the same blatant sensuous immediacy acting in rebellion to 
spirit, in full awareness that it has been judged by spirit as that which lies outside spirit: i.e., sin. 
Faust is unfettered desire after consciousness of the spiritual judgement passed upon it. Faust is 
thus demonic rebellion, while Giovanni is pre-ethical vitality, before sin-consciousness. In this 
regard, it may be profitable to quote what Kierkegaard says of Giovanni at some length: 
In the middle Ages, much was told about a mountain which is not found on any 
map; it is called Mount Venus. There sensuousness has its home; there it has its 
wild pleasures, for it is a kingdom, a state. In this kingdom, language has no home, 
nor the collectedness of thought, nor the laborious achievements of reflection; there 
is heard only the elemental voice of passion, the play of desires... The first-born of 
the kingdom is Don Juan. But it is not said thereby that it is the kingdom of sin for 
it must be contained in the moment when it appears in aesthetic indifference. Only 
when reflection enters in does it manifest itself as the kingdom of sin, but then Don 
Juan has been slain, then the music stops, then one sees only the desperate defiance 
that powerlessly resists but can find no firm ground, not even in sounds. When 
sensuousness manifests itself as that which must be excluded, as that with which 
the spirit does not wish to be involved, but when spirit has not as yet condemned it, 
sensuousness takes this form, is the demonic in aesthetic indifference... 
Don Juan, then, is the expression for the demonic qualified as the sensuous [that spirit 





Here the Hegelianism of ‘A’s aesthetic discourse broadens out into a position reminiscent of 
certain aspects of Hegel’s characterisation of ‘the unhappy consciousness’, in his 
Phenomenology of Spirit.
83
 Hegel (as also ‘A’) suggests that faith has at best only an implicit 
awareness of the essential spiritual identity of worshipped and worshipper. The mediaeval 
Christian experiences this objectification – as God – of his own innermost truth in terms of a 
painfully divided consciousness. He experiences an impasse between flesh and spirit that is 
unbridgeable from his finite viewpoint. All moral action is experienced as useless, worthless, 
because the Christian needs supernatural salvation from sin, having projected all true value into 
a transcendent beyond. Yet guilt-consciousness is experienced as very real and oppressively 
painful. I will be arguing later that this is an invalid description of Christianity (both on the part 
of ‘A’ and that of Hegel). Rather it is a picture of the Pauline description of a pre-Christian 
bondage to the law, which makes sin ‘exceeding sinful’ before the possibility of justification by 
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 The description of ‘Don Giovanni’ as condemned by spirit in the ceasing 
of the music and the fall of the curtain would also accord well with Judge William’s picture of 
ethical autonomy, which we have already seen Kierkegaard to regard as inevitably destined for 
moral bankruptcy, from the perspective of paradoxical faith.  
 
But I shall also argue, at the end of this chapter, that although this understanding of ‘the 
unhappy consciousness’ is in no way Kierkegaard’s own avowed position concerning Christian 
faith, his denial of any role to outward-looking or artistic aesthetic activity within the life of 
faith (and, it would follow, to any role for the appreciation of beauty in nature), is discordant 
with his own aesthetic practice as a Christian writer, and, indeed, reminiscent of Hegel’s 
thinking with regard to ‘the unhappy consciousness’, as also of his pseudonymous description 
of Don Giovanni as ‘slain’ when ‘the music stops’, utterly condemned by judgement. I will be 
suggesting, therefore, that there is something pre-Pauline and legalistic lurking behind 
Kierkegaard’s theology of paradoxical grace, a damaging tendency that at least merits the 
attention of a thesis in pursuit of a possible solution. 
 
However, I will also be suggesting as we progress that, even in ‘The Musical Erotic’, 
Kierkegaard (outward-looking aesthetics aside) does not entirely relegate the aesthetic aspect of 
human being to a spiritless desert, but sees the aesthetic as fulfilled and transformed, exclusively 





Collins, in The Mind of Kierkegaard, assesses Kierkegaard’s use of themes drawn from Hegel’s 
analysis of ‘the unhappy consciousness’ as directed at what is perceived to be a particular 
distortion of the Christian Gospel: 
Just as St. Paul declares that sin came into the world insofar as the law aroused a 
consciousness of sin, so Kierkegaard attributes the appearance of the embodiment 
of sensuality, Don Juan, to Christianity in the sense that it directed attention away 
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have already drawn attention towards – as the issue of Kierkegaard’s own tendency to replicate this ‘ascetic’ move from a 
Protestant rather than mediaeval viewpoint. One might speculate that a traditional (and often violent) Protestant antipathy to 
religious art viewed as ‘idolatrous’ may be behind Kierkegaard’s concerns here, though I shall not be following up that issue. (Of 




To clarify things, we have seen Kierkegaard’s aesthete maintain that sensuous immediacy, as 
the dynamic of life itself, has only existed as a principle in explicit consciousness since the birth 
of Christianity. The principle of sensuous immediacy can only be hinted at in words, or 
symbolised, as that which lies on the other side of the border from (essentially verbal) spirit. In 
a neat dialectical move, Kierkegaard suggests that only by its exclusion from the spiritual, as 
being outside the religious ethic of the Christian era, is sensuous immediacy recognised for the 
first time, and for itself, in its own right. The searchlight of developing self-consciousness picks 
up its own, pre-reflective ground.
87
 Spiritual significance posits by exclusion its own opposite.
88
 
And yet, ironically, spirit could not become aware of itself without reflection in its own 
antithesis, as Saint Paul makes clear in his Letter to the Romans: ‘it was sin, working death in 
me through what is good, in order that sin might be shown to be sin, and through the 
commandment might become sinful without measure’.89  
 
So in the anonym’s account of Christian experience, the mind is said to become aware of 
sensuous immediacy for the first time as a contrast to the Christian consciousness which could 
not be perceived clearly before such consciousness was awakened, just as the contrast ‘light’ is 
needed to understand the concept of ‘darkness’. To be thus excluded from spirit’s self-
awareness is to be posited by spirit as a factor of which it takes account – but as the awareness 




It is held in ‘The Musical Erotic’ that the living expression of passionate desire, as such a 
qualification of spirit by exclusion, cannot be adequately achieved by language (since it is an 
essentially inarticulate and pre-linguistic drive) but only through non-conceptual means – and 
those means are musical. We have already seen that the medium of music is itself spiritually 
qualified: a kind of language insofar as it expresses meaning. But by the very virtue of its 
unique adequacy to be a vehicle for the expression of sensuous immediacy, music is 
impoverished as compared to poetry, as it is adapted to express only indeterminate significance, 
and thus has its own essential content outside of spirit.
91
 While music can be used to accompany 
determinate meaning, this is not its most fitting content. The perfect musical content is the life-
force itself, pure desire, persisting for the sake of itself in endlessness. As indeterminate, music 
is regarded as an inferior, deficient language (against the common romantic paradigm of the 
musical sublime, as introduced above). As expressing determinate meaning, words are higher in 
                                                                        
87 I shall be offering very different analyses of Kantian and post-Kantian accounts of productive imaginative activity as a 
fundamental condition of self consciousness in later chapters. 
88 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, p. 61. 
89 Romans, 7.13, (New Revised Standard Version). 
90 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, p. 66. Again, the idea of bounds, and of being bound, from a Pauline, orthodox perspective 
connotes law, whereas ‘nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in the whole creation, will be able to separate us from the love of 
God in Jesus Christ our Lord’, Romans, 8.39, (NRSV). See my final section in this chapter for a fuller contrast of the legalistic and 
the Christian, with reference to Kierkegaard’s theology. 
91 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, pp. 70-71. 
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value than the language of tone and feeling. But when poetry focuses on its own beautiful 
effects rather than on its content or subject matter– the ‘how’ of its sound- combinations at the 
expense of the ‘what’ of its ideas – as in romantic subjectivism (Schlegel), it misunderstands 
itself by ‘aspiring’ to be music. Poetry thus surrenders its own proper role as a superior medium 
of aesthetic communication. ‘A’ suggests that such verse may indeed be very beautiful, but has 
fallen beneath its own level as language. Musical indeterminacy also forms the cradle of verbal 
language through the inarticulate cries of babies (and, I would venture, the soothing sounds that 
lull them). At either end of the scale, therefore – in poetic musicality as in pre-linguistic cries 





Don Giovanni, then, as the flesh-incarnate portrayed by Mozart, is not avowedly evil, but the 
artistic representation of the ‘demonic in aesthetic indifference’.93 Don Giovanni is only a 
possible representation in Christianity, he could not have occurred in a non-Christian context, 
since he is that which the Christian spirit excludes: the riot of selfish instinct. But the musical 
representation of him, for and in imagination, brackets out his exclusion to display spirit’s 
awareness of what it excludes. Spirit thus specifies what it excludes, musically. Spirit enables 
sensuality’s manifestation as musical indeterminacy. Kierkegaard, as ‘A’, locates the difficulty 
of philosophising upon musical experience in the view that music is the expression of the 
feeling-tone or mood that accents one’s conscious life.94 We can name moods and feelings, but 
only music actually evokes them, traces their path as it is experienced in consciousness. 
Therefore to talk about emotional/musical memories is somehow to betray them, dredging them 
up from the borders of consciousness and the privacy of the cherished moments, in the full 
knowledge that in translating such non-verbal and thus essentially untranslatable memories into 




In the next subsection I shall build on what we have just learned. I shall argue that language, far 
from being superior to aesthetically indirect communications such as music by virtue of its 
conceptual universality, as Hegel and Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous ‘aesthete’ would have it, 
may itself need to rely on aesthetic forms in order to overcome that very generality in relation to 
the divine. I shall argue that for Kierkegaard, communicating subversively behind his own 
pseudonym, not only does the generality of linguistic concepts prevent any direct, cognitive 
grasp of the everyday particularity of human life, but that language depends entirely on 
                                                                        
92 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, p. 69. 
93 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, p. 90. 
94 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, pp. 59-60.  
95 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, pp. 59-60. 
38 
 
aesthetic indeterminacy to communicate a divine revelation that cannot be directly 
conceptualised: the human particularity of the infinite God as Christ. 
 
(3.4) Kierkegaardian dialectics: the communication of faith as ‘musical indirection’ 
In ‘The Musical Erotic’, we have just been learning that the position excluded by Christianity is 
sensuous immediacy: the pre-rational ground of meaning on which meaning depends, and as 
such, the reality that forms a necessary foundation for the emergence of human self-
consciousness. We learned in (3.1) that this foundational immediacy of being, a pre-condition 




For the Kierkegaard of Johannes Climacus, similarly, being is recognised by thought as its own 
substratum, as something that self-consciousness depends on, although thought can never reach 
being in itself, but must always unavoidably translate reality into ideality. Language mediates 
reality, and thus tries to translate it, although, as I have suggested above in relation to music’s 
non-conceptual immediacy, even approximate adequacy of translation is only really possible 
between verbal systems. Thus is introduced the possibility of doubt and error.
97
 In both ‘The 
Musical Erotic’ and Johannes Climacus, self-consciousness is a collision of ideality and reality. 
Reality is pre-conditional but un-sayable as reality within consciousness. Reality, or as we have 
been addressing it, dynamic sensuous immediacy, is thus made known with the awakening of 
self-consciousness as that which self-consciousness posits as necessarily lying outside of 
thought as its substratum. Don Giovanni, as archetypal personification, is this substratum, as a 
spiritual qualification of sensuous immediacy, and can thus only be adequately expressed in the 
conceptual indeterminacy of music. 
 
Steven Shakespeare suggests that, in Either/Or, Kierkegaard subverts the aesthete’s thesis that 
music embodies sensuous immediacy by his dialectical recognition that any such embodiment 
is, as an expression, already an interpretation – and thus a ‘spiritual qualification’, or mediation 
– of immediate reality. Kierkegaard’s entire project is, as an interplay – or dialectic – of many 
voices, an indirect communication.
98
 Just as music, the communication of the dynamic of pre-
reflected life, must idealise sensuous immediacy as its communication, and is thus itself 
                                                                        
96I mean by this that Hegel (at least as Kierkegaard understands him), far from actually overcoming finitude’s incompleteness 
philosophically, has comically allowed a myopic identification with the objects of his own thought to deceive him into regarding his 
own existing subjectivity as an ultimate irrelevance, in utter unconcern for the ethical implications of such neglect. In a manner 
rather reminiscent of the story about Democritus being so intent on sky-gazing that he did not notice the ditch he was about to fall 
into right in front of him, Hegelianism tries to ignore existence as a cognitively uncertain, but definitely given task, the philosopher 
fantastically persuading himself that his only actual significance is his intellectual work, regarded as eternity’s own consciousness 
of itself. Kierkegaard sees Hegelian mediation as an attempt to walk over the chasm between history and eternity by triadic 
dialectic. By an illusory introduction of movement into logic the eternal appears to evolve through time: history is regarded as the 
manifestation of a self-reflexive eternity, but it has in fact been ‘passed over’, as I phrase it above. See, for example, Kierkegaard, 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 51-52,145,191-193, 197-198, 212-213, 306. 
97 Søren Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, in H. V. & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), Kierkegaard’s Writings (VII), (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), pp. 167-168. 
98 Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, pp. 64-70. 
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spiritually qualified, so the communication of paradoxical faith as an existential orientation, 
must exploit the poetical, aesthetic possibilities inherent in verbal language for a ‘musically 
indirect’ style of communication; possibilities made available by the condition of linguistic 
ideality as always dependently rooted in reality, interpreting it. Musical interpretation and 
scientific objectivity need to be regarded as polarities, linguistic possibilities at opposing but 
essentially related ends of an interpretive continuum.  
 
Just as music reaches a fundamental level of existential communication by communicating felt 
immediacy non-objectively or wordlessly, so verbal language, in communicating subjective and 
paradoxical religious truth, must make use of its inherent capacity for rhetorical and poetic 
communication; its capacity for musical indirection. Divine reality can only be indirectly 
communicated as neither objective nor subjective purely, but an objectively impossible, or 
paradoxically revealed ‘object’, the God-man of Philosophical Fragments. The God of faith is 
neither an a priori pre-condition of ideality and reality, as thought in the romantic Jena Circle of 
Friedrich Schlegel and Schelling, nor yet a dialectically mediated identity of ideality and reality, 
as Hegel has it, but the higher indeterminacy of a rationally unthinkable ‘object’: a super-
rational and supernatural revelation. Christian truth can only be communicated indirectly 
because God’s revealed reality is still apophatically beyond both ideality and reality, as indwelt 
by the finite subjective becoming of human being. 
 
The un-reflected ‘zealotism’99 or unmediated objectivity of the religious fanatic, or 
‘enthusiast’100 is denounced by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Climacus in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments on precisely the same grounds, and to just 
the same extent, as Hegelian intellectualism: both would have a determinate knowledge of some 
objectively ascertainable, essential significance of Christian faith. An unreflective, fideistic 
assertion falls just as much into the error of believing itself to have achieved a final and 
indubitable possession of ultimate truth as does Hegelianism.
101
 Both positions seek to privilege 
select groups, regarded as an ‘elect’: the academically ‘initiated’ on the one hand and a self-
righteous ‘holy huddle’ on the other, as somehow exalted above the rest of humanity as ‘the 
one’s in the know’. Against both positions, Kierkegaard maintains that faith is not an 
enthusiastic posture to be assumed by the ‘revivalist’, enabling him to appear ‘matchlessly 
brilliant’ while avoiding the hard intellectual work of trying to understand: ‘better, in that case, 
speculative thought’s misunderstanding, in which, apart from this, there is an abundance to 
learn and admire in the men who combine the power of genius with the endurance of iron [...] 
The contradiction of the arrogating revivalist is that he [...] wants to be out on the street and be 
                                                                        
99 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, p. 31. 
100 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, p. 504. 
101 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, p. 562. 
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matchlessly brilliant’.102 The outwardly striking display of the revivalist marks him out as still 
not having left behind the aesthetic sphere of life in which external considerations predominate 
to entice the individual away from the sheer difficulty of a living appropriation of paradoxical 
ethico-religious truth. Climacus’s revivalist mistakenly thinks that he has understood the un-
understandable,
103
 the paradox that is Christian faith, missing the point that the paradox is not 
something divisive, segregating those who can from those who cannot understand it, but is 
‘connected essentially with being a human being.104 
 
Neither Hegel’s nor Kierkegaard’s view of ultimate truth is that it is simply objective, a 
straightforward determinacy above the indeterminacy of sensuous immediacy and its artistic 
representation. On the one hand, Hegel envisages a ‘higher’ objectivity of properly 
philosophical knowledge (Vernunft), an absolute knowledge of absolute reality, including or 
sublating all relative positions as absolute spirit (an overarching, dispassionate objectivity 
purporting to include existing subjectivity within it). But such absolute knowledge, according to 
Kierkegaard, amounts to no more than content-less and hypothetical tautology:   a dialectical 
conjugation, (as it were), of the verb ‘to be’ that stays within the objective reflection of an 
existing subject. When all the ramifications and variations of Hegel’s supposedly metaphysical 
logic have been played out, therefore, no more is accomplished than an empty logical identity – 
the re-duplicative assertion that ‘truth is’.105 This idealised being of truth passes for Hegel as 
containing existence or actuality within itself, whereas empirical reality is simply by-passed. 
The Hegelian forgets his own subjective status, the concrete yet ever moving quality of his own 
being, not only in its day-to-day significance, but also in relation to divine judgement and 
salvation. On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s divine paradox is that of an impossible ‘object’, the 
God-man, whose significance must be actively appropriated in a necessarily aesthetic or 
indirect manner as an ‘object’ that cannot be determinately known in principle.106 Christian 
truth is actively appropriated through the ‘how’, the living mode of faith; a way of living one’s 
finite life, a way of becoming or coming into infinite relatedness to a concretely manifested, yet 
eternal creator. As an infinite relation, therefore, the process of relating is necessarily un-finish-
able: death itself being only an intrinsically mysterious ‘breaking off’ from an observer’s 
perspective. 
 
There are thus two kinds of indeterminate, or aesthetic significance in play for Kierkegaard, not 
counting Judge William’s ethically beautiful fidelity as properly independent, since, as shown, 
                                                                        
102 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, p. 564. 
103 Faith is seen as a paradox that nevertheless, paradoxically, one must unceasingly try to integrate into a pattern of living; a 
sustained, but above all responsive effort that is itself transformative is the life of faith according to Kierkegaard, as I shall be 
contending in the next section. 
104 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, p. 566. 
105 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, p. 190. 
106 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, pp. 610-611. 
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for Kierkegaard, the ethical stage is incomplete in itself, only receiving a proper basis in 
relation to Christ.  
 
A lower, artistic indeterminacy is focused on music as expressing the pre-linguistic conditions 
for verbal language. Kierkegaard uses an imagery of linguistic limits to express what is in effect 
a circular situation in the analysis of such indeterminacy, in which infantile or inchoate 
inarticulacy features as a beginning, while at the other extreme of sophistication, a return to 
inarticulacy is discovered. This return takes the form of a surrender of determinate meaning as 




But a higher, existential indeterminacy is also put forward, in the form of a linguistically 
mediated awareness of Christ that has to employ conceptually indeterminate rhetorical or 
aesthetic features, or, as Shakespeare says, musical indirectness, in order to communicate a 
revelation in time but not of time. Communicating the Christological paradox demands a use of 
the imagination, demands a subjective effort. This activity takes the form of a response to Christ 
as an empirically manifest reality; and yet as an unknowable, impossible reality, a concrete 
union of the finite and the infinite. The resources of imagination thus have to be invoked in the 
apprehension and appropriation of the perspective of faith. 
 
As will be suggested below in chapter two, according to M. Jamie Ferreira, the function of 
imagination is to hold disparate elements in a unity of tension. In the faithful response to 
Christological paradox, as in its communication, the finite and the infinite are grasped as united, 
not in a Hegelian synthesis, but in an act of imaginatively sustained tension. 
 
In faith, therefore, indeterminate, imaginative activity is employed to sustain a mode of personal 
relation to the paradoxically incarnate Word of God. The musical expression of sensuous 
immediacy lies beneath language, and we have seen for Judge William that the aesthetic 
dimension of life only finds true fulfilment as the beauty of faithful human love. But ethical 
autonomy, as the sermon at the end of Either/Or begins to indicate, is ultimately an illusion, as 
our inward ethical task is found, in the response of faith, to be infinitely relational. Only in the 
life-long response to Christian revelation does the ethical life – and thus the human capacity to 
love – find its truly creative condition of possibility, and the human imaginative dimension its 
highest possibility for creative fulfilment in performance of the qualitative leap of faith. It is to 
this role of imagination in the Kierkegaardian leap of faith that I shall turn now. 
 
                                                                        







A Kierkegaardian impasse: ‘inward’ imagination’s need for outward 
communication  
Having considered Kierkegaard’s inward aesthetic of ethically imaginative reflection, in this 
chapter I address what is discernable as an important problem in relation to Kierkegaard’s 
position regarding the outwardly oriented aesthetics of art and natural beauty. I shall argue that 
this problem points to a serious structural difficulty at the heart of Kierkegaard’s project of the 
indirect communication of Christian truth.  
 
(1) Kierkegaard and the imagination of inwardness 
 
In her book Transforming Vision,
108
 M Jamie Ferreira suggests that Kierkegaard’s writings 
show not only a preoccupation with imagination, but strongly affirm its ethical significance. 
Kierkegaard, for Ferreira, (whose account I shall be following in this section), expresses ‘a 
remarkable appreciation of the value and even necessity of imaginative activity for genuine 
self-development’.109 Ferreira understands imagination to play a central role in religious 
conversion for Kierkegaard. Ferreira holds that the proper use of imagination, according to 
Kierkegaard, is always as imagination of ‘otherness’.110 Hence Kierkegaard’s (or at least ‘A’s) 
apparent concurrence with Hegelian views, as noted with reference to ‘The Musical Erotic’, that 
Schlegel’s ironising romanticism  wrongly disallows any important significance to aesthetic 
content, focusing attention on the subject considered primarily as aesthetic ego. But while 
Kierkegaard’s paradoxical faith does, indeed, have objectivity, this is in the unique form of an 
impossible ‘object’, or one that cannot be determinately known through concepts under any 
circumstances, and which as a consequence always requires imaginative activity to be 
apprehended. 
 
Ferreira argues against any understanding of the Kierkegaardian ‘leap of faith’ as a purely 
voluntary action, where this implies an action performed ‘on purpose’. Rather the leap is 
considered not as a purposeful decision to do something, but rather as a decision ‘that’ 
something is the case, that a qualitatively altered and thus different state of affairs pertains in 
light of the converted perspective. Such a transformation of perception is indeed deemed to be 
constitutive of the turn to faith.
111
 Such a view may be seen to correspond with my earlier 
presentation of the importance attached to the ‘how’ of faith by Kierkegaard in which the claim 
                                                                        
108 M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 
109 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, pp. 1-2. 
110 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 3. 
111 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 7. 
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was made that the mode of mediation, or communication, of Christian truth is inseparable from 
the validity of the content so mediated. It is suggested that finite freedom, as Kierkegaard sees 
it, is situated between necessary compulsion and arbitrary wilfulness, the latter being regarded 
as an impossible, negative idea of freedom: the very conception attacked by Kierkegaard, as 
exemplified by the absolutisation of the individual aesthetic ego in romantic irony. Ferreira 
examines concepts of ‘leap’ and ‘passion’ in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments and 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript (both attributed to the pseudonym, Johannes Climacus) 
showing that these accounts qualify and correct one another, and that through his habitual 
correlation of the term ‘leap’ with the term ‘passion’, Kierkegaard indicates the crucial role of 




In examining this Kierkegaardian ‘transition to faith’, Ferreira finds that conversion involves a 
‘qualitative shift’, or change in the quality of the convert’s perception insofar as his general life-
orientation is concerned. Faith thus constitutes, and is constituted by, a perspectival shift. 
Kierkegaard’s use of the term ‘decision’ indicates that this subjective turn is a discreet and 
irreversible event: ‘a moment of embrace’. Kierkegaard regards subjective freedom as crucial in 
this movement of embrace, against a Hegelian deterministic translation of Christianity into 
speculative thought, which Kierkegaard regards as utterly alien to the real experience of faith. 
However, Ferreira insists that it is never Kierkegaard’s intention to suggest that the freedom of 
faith depends on an arbitrary act of will, starkly discontinuous with the rest of one’s experience 
of reality. Rather it is contended that reality as a whole is seen through a transformed 
perspective, through the eyes of faith. Dispensing, therefore, with any idea of direct sovereign 
decision-making as inadequate to explain the Kierkegaardian ‘leap’, Ferreira suggests that the 
concepts of ‘critical threshold’ and ‘qualitative shift’ help to clarify and protect the concept of 
freedom that she finds at work in the two ‘Climacus’ accounts analysed.113 
 
(1.1) Between activity and passivity: Kierkegaard’s passionate willing 
Ferreira thus offers a ‘re-conceptualisation of the transition to faith’ which ‘challenges the 
relevance of the model of decision’ as purposeful choice:114 
I suggest that Climacus’ understanding of faith, and Kierkegaard’s contribution to 
an anatomy of faith, is able to be adequately appreciated only when the concepts of 
‘leap’ and ‘passion’ are seen as parallel, and are seen as mutually and substantively 
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114 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 8. 
115 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 9. 
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As distinct from theoretical knowledge, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym writes that faith is not a 
knowledge: ‘knowledge is either eternal or historical, not the absurdity that the eternal is the 
historical’.116 
 
Faith in Christ is therefore a paradox in that it unites genuine contradictories. But it does so not 
as Hegelian sublation, in terms of a higher, logical synthesis of contraries. For Kierkegaard, 
contradictories are not merely polar or related opposites, and thus not contrary manifestations of 
a unifying and higher power. The Chalcedonian paradox – that as fully human, Jesus is fully 
divine, is both historical and eternal – is an actual and yet impossible ‘both/and’, not a merely 
conceptual harmonisation of an antithetical ‘either/or’, as antitheses which the Hegelian claims 
have only been partially grasped hitherto. Thus distrusting the possibility of speculative 
synthesis as Kierkegaard does, for him all true knowledge must be empirically based, must have 
its basis in sensation, and be subject to the philosophical principle of contradiction as defined in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics: ‘it is impossible for the same thing at the same time both to be in and 
not to be in the same thing in the same respect’.117 This is a basic rule of thought, of the mind’s 
own way of working objectively, thus constituting a condition that must be satisfied for a 
knowledge claim to be upheld. 
 
But for Ferreira, that Kierkegaard regards faith as a paradoxical ‘both/and’ position, one that 
holds contradictory positions at the same time about the same ‘object’, does not imply that he 
regards Christian faith as a purely arbitrary position, adopted purposefully against reason as a 
direct and wilfully irrational act of unilateral, purely subjective decision. The leap of faith is a 
qualitative shift in awareness, not a calculated ‘fiat’. But at the same time, of course, the act of 
faith if not logically determined as something that compels one’s will theoretically.118 
Kierkegaard’s intention is, after all, to wrest the quality of faith – as irreducibly a matter of 
personally inward freedom – from the clutches of fashionable Hegelian thinking. 
 
By stressing the individual’s freedom in the turn to faith, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym seeks to 
rule out both the logically quantifiable determinism whereby one position automatically falls 
into its own opposite – the ‘movement ‘ of Hegelian dialectic – as well as a position in which 
the subject’s claim to knowledge is straightforwardly conditioned from without, that is, 
                                                                        
116 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol 1, p. 62; Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p, 22. 
117 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Hugh Lawson-Tancred (tr.) (London, Penguin, 1998), 1005b, p.88. Accordingly, the orthodox 
standard of faith, the Christological definition of Chalcedon, is paradoxical in the full Kierkegaardian sense: ‘...one and the same 
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empirically conditioned. But nevertheless, an element of passivity in the movement from 
unbelief must be present, since, in Philosophical Fragments, Climacus contrasts faith not just 
with knowledge, but also to unconditioned volition.
119
 Faith, as indirectly mediated or 
conditioned, must imply a conditioned activity of will, and thus the involvement of a passive 
element. Faith can thus be described as an act of freedom only to the extent that it is not 
unconditionally determined. Christian faith could not take the form of unconditionally free 
action, since there must be an element of constraint insofar as responsible faith is not the 
arbitrary creation of the subject, not a subjective and romanticist exercise in self-cultivation or 
self-development: the aesthetic stance of Schlegelian irony attacked by Kierkegaard. 
 
Far from being an exercise in purely subjective construction, Christian faith claims to embody 
an encounter with an actual otherness in the unique form of an impossible objectivity. This 
element of constraint is what determines Climacus’ faith as an infinite passion just as much as 
an active leap, although ‘passion’ is used in an ambiguous manner, since it serves to indicate 
not only the convert’s affectedness by an infinite otherness, but also denotes the essence of the 
leaping activity that is actually inseparable from it (though separated for purposes of theoretical 
analysis in Ferreira’s account). This is because Ferreira views the leap as an overmastering and 
passionate, imaginative ‘outreach of the mind’,120 about which more will be said below. 
Ferreira’s account reveals an aesthetic dimension at work in Kierkegaard’s conception of 
Christian faith, which is thus identified as the form of life in which the aesthetic dimension of 
human existence ripens in a fulfilment over and above the beauty of faithful love, as seen from 
the perspective of Judge William’s self-regulative ethics. Faith is thus neither a determinate 
knowledge, nor a purely spontaneous romantic construct, but a passionate leap: a qualitative 
shift in orientation to reality. 
 
Kierkegaard’s passionate leap of faith opposes the calculative cognitive necessity of Hegelian 
logic, while at the same time maintaining that essential features of the lower aesthetic and 
ethical spheres of existence are preserved at the level of faith. This preservation is not in the 
form of the quantifiable ‘higher objectivity’ of a Hegelian rational synthesis; rather it is a claim 
that the aesthetic faculty of human being is existentially transformed, meaning that subjective 
experience is infinitely re-orientated, and thus qualitatively transformed. In faith, inward life is 
qualitatively transformed as infinitely re-oriented through conceptually indeterminate, and thus 
aesthetic judgement. An overall change of existential perspective thus takes place, which as we 
progress will be shown to embody elements of ‘gestalt-shift’ and metaphor. The movement to 
faith is a move to the recognition of created-ness; that one’s existence happens through an 
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infinitely dependent relationship, or as Climacus metaphorically has it, that one’s life floats ‘out 
on 70,000 fathoms of water’.121 Since existence, as infinitely, creatively related, is not a Kantian 
ethical autonomy – nor a Schlegelian aesthetic construction of the empirical ego, nor yet a 
Hegelian dialectical identity of subjectivity and absolute spirit – it follows that truly Christian 
existence implies the recognition of no calculable conceptual ground at all. Christian existence 
involves the awareness that one’s life is indemonstrably and indeterminably grounded. 
 
The term passion distinguishes faith from volition. As Kierkegaard writes in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript: ‘Faith is not an act of will’.122 Faith is always based on that which 
cannot be achieved through a sovereign act of will, which is to say, faith is pre-conditioned by 
and is a response to concrete yet supernatural revelation. The passion of which faith consists is 
neither willing, nor knowing; neither something which just occurs, nor that one achieves in pure 
spontaneity. Ferreira suggests that Kierkegaard’s passion is itself, like its object, paradoxical, 
since both active and passive. The passion of faith is neither active nor passive purely, just as 
Kierkegaard describes the concomitant experience of a rational (Pauline) ‘offence’ as both a 
stance that one takes up and a reaction which one suffers. 
 
Ferreira suggests that the sense of the word ‘passion’ envisaged by Kierkegaard is that of an 
‘eager outreach of the mind’, an ‘overmastering enthusiasm’.123 This is far from pure passivity. 
As Aristotle argued, emotions or passions ‘embody judgements’, they do not simply accompany 
them. Thus emotions always have an active, cognitive element. Judgement, not pure affectivity, 
is what distinguishes emotions from one another.
124
 Affectivity, as the bodily component, is 
inextricable from the judgement, and emotion is made up of both. For example, one could not 
experience fear (as distinct from anxiety) as differentiated from any other emotion, without 




Climacus, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, refers to the transition to faith in terms of 
‘passion’ and ‘will’ interchangeably, according to Ferreira. The passionate movement of faith is 
ambiguously both active and passive at once.
126
 This is seen to be the case in the following 
passage. Referring to the leap of faith, Kierkegaard writes: ‘That something in which [the leap] 
occurs is the happy passion of faith’.127 
 
                                                                        
121 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, p. 204. 
122 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, p. 62; Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 23. 
123 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 23. 
124 Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, Lane Cooper (tr.) (New York: Appleton-Century, 1932), 1: 10, pp. 56-57, 2: 1, p. 92; 2: 2, p. 
93; 2: 5, p. 107; Ferreira, Transforming Vision, pp. 23-24. 
125 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 23. 
126 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 27. 
127 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol 1 p. 59; Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 27. 
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Here ‘leap’ and ‘passion’ are identified, indicating that the event in question s neither purely 
subjective action nor something of which one is simply the passive recipient. There is subjective 
creativity involved in the movement of faith, therefore, just as much as faith is also a response 
to genuine otherness. Faith is thus not a purposeful, self-conscious decision to ignore the 
rightful demands of reason, some sort of calculated act of display in the form of a decision to 
identify oneself with an unthinkable paradox. Rather, ‘passion’ qualifies ‘leap’ in Climacus’ 
descriptions of the transition to faith, rendering untenable any interpretation of the ‘leap’ of faith 
in terms of an arbitrary act of will in despite of the understanding. 
 
Climacus’ use of the term ‘passion’ as a corrective of ‘leap’ is explained as a holding together 
of opposites in imaginative activity, or imaginative effort. Indeed, it is in this sense of ‘effort’ 
that Kierkegaard employs the term ‘will’ in relation to paradoxical faith, thus directing the 
reader away from an identification of will with straightforward and unilateral decision-making. 
The leap of ethical passion – a tension of activity and passivity – is illustrated in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, thus: 
If I could get [a man] seated on a horse and the horse made to take fright and gallop 
wildly, or better still, for the sake of bringing the passion out, if I could take a man 
who wanted to arrive at a certain place as quickly as possible, and hence already 
had some passion, and could get him astride a horse that could scarcely walk... Or 
if a driver were otherwise not specially inclined towards passion, if someone 
hitched a team of horses to a wagon for him, one of them a Pegasus and the other a 
worn out jade, and I told him to drive, I might succeed.
128
 
The art of balancing Pegasus and the nag, steering a course with opposite tendencies, is the 
relation of infinity to finitude, eternity to time, involved in the leaping passion that is 




(1.2) Between activity and passivity: Kierkegaard’s productive imagination 
In Kierkegaard’s broader account of truth as subjectivity in the ethical sphere as well as its 
infinite intensification in the sphere of paradoxical religion, Ferreira suggests that such holding 
of opposites in imaginatively productive tension is precisely the significance of ‘passion’ as 
Climacus here uses the term. Such passion is also and simultaneously an effort of will in the 
form of a willingness to sustain an imaginatively productive tension of opposites in and as the 
state of consciousness which is faith. Romantic concepts of metaphysical polarity (as in the 
systematic philosophical work of Coleridge, as we shall discover in later chapters), just like the 
                                                                        
128 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, p. 276; Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 32. 
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Hegelian sublation of contraries addressed above, tends to stress an inherent and logical mutual 
co-implication, a necessary belonging-together of opposites, such as activity and passivity, 
subjectivity and objectivity. However, Kierkegaard (according to this reading) maintains that 
only strenuous, even violent and uncomfortable personal effort can generate sufficient 
imaginative tension to hold mutually repellent or contradictory aspects of consciousness 
together through the conceptuality of aesthetic indeterminacy.
129
 In such a way a passionate 
effort of will must unceasingly or infinitely engage with the understanding (in a manner which 
shall shortly be explained) in the necessarily endless task for finite subjectivity of assimilating 
an infinite personal and revelation, impossibly beyond the limits of finite understanding. 
 
In a lower existential sphere than that of paradoxical faith, the work of ethical self-realisation (in 
the second part of Either/Or) requires imaginative vision, since one’s finite and on-going 
situation has to be ‘seen’ in terms of an infinite thought content that is related to an existential 
possibility for becoming, a possibility to be actively realised. Such is the on-going, temporal 
movement involved in choosing oneself ethically: not a direct decision to do something, but an 
indirect decision, requiring imaginative mediation. One might describe this existential concept 
of imaginative decision as a decision that one will try to act and behave according to a certain 
self-image. But such an image is not to be thought of as a picture held at a distance to which one 
occasionally refers to take one’s bearings. Rather, according to Kierkegaard’s Judge William, 
one becomes ‘transparent’, as Kierkegaard has it,130 to the ethical possibility entertained; 
through the use of imagination, one sees oneself as or in light of  such ethical possibility. In 
Kierkegaard’s phrase, concrete life is thus permeated with ethical consciousness.131  
 
Thus in its ethical deployment, as raised to the higher sphere of subjective inwardness, 
Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stresses the role of imagination as holding together infinite and  finite 
elements in a concrete, living tension. Imaginative ‘concretising’ as a developmental deepening 
of inwardness is thus contrasted with the aesthetics of artistic imaginative representation, which 
can draw attention away from everyday ethical demands. A life unduly focused on the external 
aesthetics of art or natural beauty is thus regarded as in a certain sense a flight from ethical 
reality. However, he who would become an ethical subject sees himself in terms of a persuasive 
otherness: an imaginatively envisioned, existential alternative. 
 
                                                                        
129 The issue of imagination as key to the structure of paradoxical faith will be addressed shortly. 
130 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 2, pp. 253-256. 
131 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 32, 65-68. See also Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 2, p. 256: ‘The person who views life ethically 
sees the universal, and the person who lives life ethically expresses the universal in his life. He makes himself the universal human 
being, not by taking off his concretion, for then he becomes a complete non-entity, but by putting it on and interpenetrating it with 
the universal...the ethical individual...has come to the point where he has become the unique human being – that is there is no other 
human being like him – and he has also become the universal human being’. Such is the intended sense of my expression 
concerning the permeation of concrete life with ethical consciousness, above.  
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We have seen how the leap of faith may be thought as a qualitative change rather than a 
quantifiable or discreet act. Climacus writes in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript of a ‘leap 
of continuity’, a breach of immanence’. These expressions serve to describe a move from non-
belief to faith which is not an ‘immediate transition’, as Ferreira puts it.132 This is to say that the 
qualitative leap of faith is not a voluntary choice between options, as would be expressed in a 
purposeful and quantitatively discreet act of will. In line with the description of ‘choosing 
oneself’ ethically outlined above in terms of the permeation of concrete individuality with 
consciousness of ethical possibility – seeing oneself as a certain type of individual in the 
reshaping of one’s activity – Ferreira suggests that Climacus similarly understands the 
paradoxical leap of faith as a qualitative shift in consciousness involving imaginative activity. It 
is then suggested that faith’s ‘infinite passion’ as such an imaginative transformation of 
perspective, takes the form of a gestalt shift. It is to this issue – shedding light on the specific 
role of imagination in paradoxical faith – I shall now turn. 
 
(1.3) Kierkegaard’s Wittgensteinian ‘gestalt’-shifts and the imaginative transformation of 
experience 
Ferreira writes that ‘in a situation in which a gestalt shift can occur, initially we can see only 
one possibility’, for example, a picture of a duck.133 But, ‘at some point, after concentrated 
attention, or perhaps after coaxing and guidance, another alternative (a rabbit figure) comes into 
focus for us’.134 Ferreira holds that this transition to a new perspective or perceptive standpoint 
is not and cannot be directly willed, although the effort of imaginative concentration will be 
hard at work. Through such effort, this qualitative transition emerges or dawns as the indirect 
result of a conscious wish to see things differently.
135
 Choices are made between alternatives, 
and since at first viewing no alternative is perceived, the shift in perspective cannot be called a 
choice. Since we cannot force ourselves to see what, if it happens at all, will just come to us, the 
movement in which such an altered perception occurs must involve passivity as well as effort, a 
transition in which the operation of imagination manifests as a productive tension between 
                                                                        
132 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 34. 
133 Walter Ehrenstein, ‘Untersuchungen über Figur-Grund-Fragen’, Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 117, pp. 339-412. 
134 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations (third edition), G. E. M. Anscombe (tr.) (Blackwell: Oxford, 2001) part II, 
§xi, pp.165-194. Wittgenstein distinguishes within a continuity of immediate visual perception (focused on a dual-aspect ‘puzzle-
picture’) the ‘dawning’ awareness of a totally different ‘aspect’ or organisation of the whole (= ‘gestalt’), the perceptual data 
remaining absolutely unchanged. Wittgenstein writes: ‘The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception 
and at the same time of the perception’s being unchanged...My visual impression has changed and now I recognise it has not only 
shape and colour but a quite particular ‘organisation’, – my visual impression has changed; – what was it like before and what is it 
like now? – If I represent it by means of an exact copy – and isn’t that a good representation of it? – no change is shewn’ (p. 167). 
The visual example Wittgenstein offers is a familiar dual-aspect picture offering images of a duck and a rabbit – exclusively of one 
another and each one co-extensive with the whole presentation – without any alteration in the visible elements of the design . A 
similar example is that of a vase in silhouette which is alternatively two profiles facing one another . 
135 As Wittgenstein insists, the visual content remains continuous and unchanging in the altered perception of a double-aspect 
picture. Yet the dawning of a new perception occurs without the direct mediation of conscious thought. Indeed, the puzzle-
experiment shows that conceptual interpretation cannot lead directly to the perception of an alternative form for the same content. 
Since on the other hand, no visible change occurs in the image itself, Ferreira suggests that such formal or organisational alteration 




active and passive poles of experience, a paradoxical effort of letting-happen, as a qualitatively 




In gestalt-shifts, after a certain intrinsically unpredictable point a transition occurs in 
consciousness and this may be viewed as a ‘culmination’ of previous factors (e.g. the personal 
effort involved, the prodding by others). But it is not of the same qualitative order as the state of 
consciousness that preceded it. In crossing from one perceptual possibility to another, a ‘critical 
threshold’ is reached.137 Just as water turns to vapour after a certain critical temperature is 
reached, so the imaginative ‘activity’138 on our part paradoxically delivers to us a new 
perception, which we could be said to receive passively. Imagination is thus viewed as a tension 
between activity and passivity, as well being capable of delivering insight by holding in polar 
tension disparities such as infinity and finitude. The crossing of the critical threshold is tellingly 
characterised by Kierkegaard as a ‘leap’ in consciousness: ‘the leap by which water turns to ice, 
the leap by which I understand an author and the leap which is the transition from good to 
evil’.139 The journal extract just cited occurs in a discussion of qualitatively different varieties of 
leap. But Kierkegaard goes on to maintain that, qualitatively different though these examples 
may be, they are all relatively homogeneous in comparison to the leap by which the infinite God 
enters into finitude.  
 
The incarnation of Christ is the only non-homogeneous leap, for Kierkegaard, as of an infinite 
order. All Kierkegaard’s other examples are similar by analogy, and there is therefore a 
continuity between them relative to one another, as range-able on a quantitative scale of finite 
comparison. The infinity of God is however off any possible scale, supporting it. There is 
therefore a discontinuity – a divine, and thus infinite revelatory approach – but also a continuity 
in the form of subjective receptivity is admitted in Kierkegaard’s account. The human aspect of 
conversion is comparable with other kinds of human and non-human, but finite, transition.
140
 
The infinite relatedness of Christian faith, its difference from all other existential relations, is 
due to a divine initiative. Faith is therefore not a sui generis phenomenon because of any 
interesting characteristics of the believer. Unlike Schlegelian subjectivity, faith is a possibility 
for everyone, regardless of talent, and independent of any temperamental factors in the 
individual. Faith is a non-volitional – not arbitrarily and directly willed – imaginative response 
in the existential or inward aesthetic mode, and is thus ethico-aesthetic. Such ethico-aesthetic 
                                                                        
136 The quality of experience and not its visible quantity is transformed. At the same time no conceptual determination directly leads 
to the transition of awareness. No willing and no act of direct judgement can allow the mind to perceive a new formal patterning of 
the sensory content, and yet imaginative effort is involved in what cannot be made to happen, but will simply occur. 
137 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 34. 
138 Scare-quotes are used to indicate that the imaginative effort is not a directly purposeful act. 
139 H.V. & E. H. Hong (ed.), Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers 7 vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975) vol. 
3,  p. 17 
140 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 35. 
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activity was introduced in the last chapter through Judge William’s account of the role of 
faithful love in an autonomous ethical existence, in opposition to the outward aesthetic mode 
which externalises the subject, alienating him from himself and from ethical relations with 
others. The aesthete was found to be focused away from his concrete status, losing himself in an 
infinitely unattainable ideal of beauty. But as was seen earlier, the ethical ideal of right 
behaviour is also intrinsically unattainable, and in need of divine grace. Kierkegaard shows how 
aesthetic and ethical concerns are retained and transformed in the imaginative life of 
paradoxical faith. 
 
On the human side of the revelatory encounter, an infinite qualitative shift of ‘aspect’ takes the 
form of a non-compelled recognition. But this is still a conditioned response, analogical in kind 
to the grasp that one might suddenly just find oneself having of the meaning of a difficult poem 
upon a second reading. Such an uncompelled achievement of meaningful insight is the work of 
imagination, holding disparate semantic elements or aspects of the poem together in a tensile or 
dynamically interactive unity. In a similar way, the qualitative leap of faith is ‘so to speak, a 
creative culmination rather than a mechanical accumulation’.141 
 
However, the leap of faith, as an imaginative leap of insight, is not simply a matter of gestalt 
shift or change of aspect. It is importantly different from the experience of Wittgenstein’s 
‘duck/rabbit’ picture since one cannot move backwards and forwards from one image to the 
other at will. As pointed out already, a critical threshold is crossed, and therefore the model of 
gestalt shift needs to be balanced by a model of metaphor, through which a lasting re-
conceptualisation of reality occurs. 
 
A metaphor holds in imaginative tension an object from one semantic field with aspects of 
another, allowing the first to be seen in terms of the second. Ferreira writes that such re-
conceptualisation is what allows metaphorical operations to be irreducible cognitive 
advances.
142
 The non-reversible achievement of re-conceptualisation in a metaphorical shift in 
perspective is the result of a sustained maintenance in tension of distinct frames of reference. 
This endurance and persistence distinguishes metaphorical transformations from simple gestalt 
shifts, as well as highlighting the specific role of imagination as a holding-in-tension of 
disparate elements. There is an irreversible aspect involved in the transition to faith in that a 
definite advance in consciousness occurs. Whereas with aspect-seeing, one can flip between one 
image and the other indifferently and at will once the ability to see the second possibility has 
dawned upon one non-volitionally, a metaphorical translation enables a new situation to 
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supervene, as a non-reversible advance in consciousness. This cognitive advance is not however 
the result of pure thinking or empirical observation, but largely the result of imaginative seeing: 
a new way of relating to the world around one has come into play. Just as Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous, indirect writings can steer one towards faith – offering one a translation, an 
alternative interpretation of existence – but cannot themselves perform the personal transition, 
the personal embrace of the perspective of faith, so neither can one directly choose to embrace 
that offer of an altered relationship to reality as a whole, as inhabited from the perspective of 
infinite personal relatedness to its founder. If and when it arrives, the transition to faith will be a 
qualitative change of perspective that is unlike a gestalt shift in that, through being at home in 
the language of faith as now one’s own mode of infinite relatedness, a new way of living has 
been embraced, a new language and mode of engagement with reality learned. Thus a personal 
and situational advance in awareness has occurred through
 
an imaginative mediation over which 




(1.4) Imagination’s ethical suspension of the understanding 
The personal embrace or transition to an imaginatively entertained possibility of paradoxical 
faith – a newly perceived translation of the world, a tension of finitude as seen in the light of 
infinity, offering the prospect of a new life ‘suspended over 70,000 fathoms’ – demands yet 




Ferreira cites the example of learning a foreign language to enable insight into his meaning. At 
some point I will stop translating a foreign language in order to understand it, and will have 
made the transition to thinking in that language. But this will not be by a direct act of will. 
Similarly, the imaginative embrace of the ‘new language’ of faith is not the result of a direct 
volition. In paradoxical faith, as in assimilating another language, the transition, the 
assimilation, requires a passive element. Ferreira suggests that for Climacus, this takes the form 
of a surrender of understanding.
145
 But the paradox will not cease to be paradoxical once faith 
has been embraced. The understanding’s judgement upon the paradox will still be valid, 
meaning that the understanding, through imaginative activity, will be simultaneously affirmed 
and suspended, judging and desisting. The understanding will be both active and passive in 
imaginative tension, or suspension.
146
 The role of inward or moral imagination is to bracket out 
accustomed prejudices in order to entertain new possibilities for interaction with others.
147
 Here, 
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145 See Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, 48-51. 
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the old way of moral ‘seeing’ is not simply abandoned, but customary judgemental tendencies 
are suspended.
148
 Similarly, a Kierkegaardian ‘letting go’ of the understanding demands that 





Ferreira identifies this imaginative suspension with what Climacus describes as the ‘captivity’ 
of the understanding. To be thus suspended is for the understanding to be simultaneously 
present and non-active. Climacus’ use of ‘captivity’, as a term describing the predicament of the 
understanding in the turn to faith, implies passivity.
150
 But Climacus also refers to the non-
annihilation of the understanding,
151
 contrasting the position of faith in relation to the 
understanding with something that just happens.
152
 Without the understanding’s active presence, 
there could be no recognition of the paradox as paradox. This non-annihilation of the 
understanding must therefore be involved in a tension with its being taken captive.
153
 What 
Climacus describes as the ‘crucifixion of the understanding’154 in the life of faith is not achieved 
simply by setting the understanding on one side; Kierkegaard writes that ‘one must have it 
[understanding] in order to believe anything against understanding’.155 Ferreira claims that the 
notion of ‘suspension’ conceived as such an unfocused presence elucidates Climacus’ idea of 
the ‘captivity’ of the understanding. Rather than simply followed or denied, the understanding is 
present in faith, but as de-emphasised: an observer taking note but hovering in the background, 
as it were. Thus the paradox of faith is embraced in the imaginative tension in which the 
understanding is present in suspense. Climacus’ qualitative leap of faith is a situation, therefore, 
in which the understanding ‘wills its own downfall’.156 The understanding is held – in full 
consciousness – in suspended animation, deciding neither for nor against the paradox, but aware 
of it as paradox. 
 
Endeavouring to communicate the subtlety of an experience of imaginative tension that is both 
active and passive, and yet neither purely, as is envisioned in the relation to paradoxical 
revelation, Ferreira looks at art appreciation, as understood by C. S. Lewis in his Experiment in 
Criticism.
157
 Lewis suggests that ‘the first demand any artwork makes upon us is surrender’.158 
Whether a given work deserves the act of surrender will not be known until one has performed 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
nor simply passive: it is like “seeing”, a kind of reflection and a kind of exploring at the same time’. Ferreira cites Murdoch’s article 
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it. Such an act of surrender is an imaginative act of passivity. In a similar way, when one is 
offended by something, offence is also a stance which one takes up for oneself. The surrender of 
the understanding in faith is an act which cannot be performed at will. Ferreira writes: ‘the 
tension between active and passive embodied in the concept of surrender expresses itself in a 
response which as such is both our action and dependent on the power of the attraction of 
something outside us’.159 Thus such a non-volitional surrender – whether considered 
aesthetically, emotionally or in the revelatory relation of paradoxical faith – takes the 
active/passive form of an act of engagement. 
 
Surrender and engagement always occur together in active-passive tension. We do not actively 
choose to be engaged by a given event, but find ourselves engaged.
160
 The transition to faith, 
described by Climacus as ‘infinitely interested’, is just such an instance of imaginative 
engagement, in which we find ourselves engaged by infinite ‘otherness’: ‘subjectivity is 
infinitely interested’. In the imaginative tension, the active-passivity of faith, imagination as 
infinite passion is interested in what has attracted it as a personal possibility for becoming. This 
mode of imaginative relation stands in contrast to the disinterested, objective mode of thought in 
which imaginative tension is missing. Kierkegaard writes that in the objective relation to the 
truth, instead of engaging with a content of consciousness as a possible pattern of behaviour 
which one might manifest through one’s life, as actively informing one’s life, the content of 
thought ‘has been turned one-sidedly into possibility’.161 
 
To consent to faith is thus to let the attractiveness of an option – the divine approach – win out, 
to take the risk of openness to faith’s persuasiveness and, as Lewis points out, whether this is 
the right move to make can be known only after the relation of imaginative engagement has 
been entered into, or after we have suspended active resistance and let the event of the paradox 
‘happen’ to us and for us. Faith is an activity in so far as it is an imaginatively attentive listening 
to an infinite personal address. On this model of Christian faith, to ‘will’ is to want for oneself 
the appeal of this impossibility. In faith, one wants to embrace this personal address as one’s 
own-most possibility, through the effort of imaginative tension in which one engages with an 
infinite and yet personally related otherness. To ‘will’ a leap of faith, therefore, is not to take an 
arbitrary leap into a purely subjective and fideistic form of imaginative wish fulfilment.  
 
In this section we have seen thus far that imagination mediates a productive tension of opposites 
as active and passive tendencies, as well as subjective and objective viewpoints, interact in a 
transition to the life of faith. In conversion, the imagination enables a ‘qualitative shift’, or 
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change in the quality of the convert’s perception in engaging with the world. Faith thus 
constitutes, and is constituted by, an imaginative transformation of experience in response to an 
unknowable yet revealed otherness. Kierkegaard’s use of the term ‘decision’ indicates that this 
transformation is a discreet and irreversible event, but through an embrace of the unknowable, 
rather than a self-willed act. 
 
We saw in the last chapter not only Kierkegaard’s condemnation of ‘totalising’ philosophical 
positions such as Hegel’s, but also his criticism of fideistic religious claims to possess the truth 
exclusively. A recognition of the impossibility of containing transcendence within a human 
conceptual scheme – such as Hegel’s – is related to the recognition that any claims to possession 
of ultimate truth – whether philosophical or ecclesial – can lead to possessiveness and the 
attempt to control the lives of others. Claims to final possession of the truth tend to be ethically 
manipulative and idolatrous. I shall be arguing in the following chapters from a theological 
premiss that ethical receptivity to the full force of God’s saving judgement upon one’s biases, 
pre-occupations and pre-conceptions is of primary significance in Christian faith, demanding 
imaginative openness and patience in attempting to discern the truth, in all the relations of daily 
life.  
 
This conviction that a personal divine revelation permeates and transforms ordinary living is 
what distinguishes Kierkegaard’s account from a prominent tendency in thinking about 
transcendence after Kant, as we are about to see. However, it will also be suggested that 
Kierkegaard’s division of activities appropriate to different existential spheres or levels works 
against his central, incarnational insight. 
 
 (2) Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein: a Reflection 
 
As mentioned earlier, Kierkegaard’s aesthetic and metaphysical insights are remarkably close to 
Schopenhauer’s – a fact noted late in his brief life by Kierkegaard himself162 – although the two 
writers assess these insights in diametrically opposing ways. Similarities to Kierkegaard’s 
position in the earlier thought of Wittgenstein – which was, at least in overarching vision, 
greatly influenced by Schopenhauer – will be briefly addressed at this point, as the discovery of 
the crucial difference between the positions of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein helpfully 
illumines the nature of Kierkegaard’s concern with paradoxical faith. This reflection will 
thereby serve to set Kierkegaard’s thought apart from the tendency in certain strands of 
romantic thought to deny the efficacy of moral and aesthetic values within the sphere of 
everyday life; a tendency whose presence can be traced in the work of Schlegel, Schopenhauer 
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and the early Wittgenstein. But more importantly, this reflection will help to highlight and 
situate the theological problem which I detect in the work of Kierkegaard, and which the rest of 
this thesis will set out to address. 
 
In ‘The Musical Erotic’, we have seen in chapter one that the author writes about Mozart’s 
music in a lyrical and evocatively poetic style, thus utilising the resources of one of the polar 
opposites (the other being inchoate, pre-linguistic cries) between which the range of 
determinate meaning lies. The writer illustrates his difficulty in presenting purely indeterminate, 
musical content by attempting to make a survey of its ‘geographical’ outline.163 Kierkegaard 
tries to trace the ‘shape’ of musical content, as that which lies across the frontiers of verbal 
discourse – from a position necessarily on the linguistic side of the border. The shape of the 
territory of music (and thus also of its correlate, subjective and immediate vitality) is intimated 
through Kierkegaard’s use of a profusion of unrelated and sometimes conflicting linguistic 
figures. By stretching lyricism to the edge of incoherence as he gestures towards purely 
musical, non-verbal significance, Kierkegaard delineates the limits of verbal language. 
 
Rather than attempting, like Kierkegaard, to communicate the transcendent through imaginative 
indirection, Wittgenstein claims that ‘what we cannot speak about we must pass over in 
silence.’ Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus,164 traces in his own way the limits of meaningful 
language, in order to render Schopenhauer’s metaphysical vision in terms of logical atomism.165 
Schopenhauer himself, as we have seen, equates music with absolute truth, a language above 
language embodying the metaphysical will-in-itself, as if music constituted another world 
whose concrete content is only palely translated into the conceptuality of his own philosophy. 
While the endlessness of dynamic desire and its musical language lie beneath verbal language 
for Kierkegaard, concepts, as merely pale abstractions from reality, cannot even begin to 
approach the experience of metaphysical truth through music for Schopenhauer, influenced as 
he is be the romantic concept of music as a sublime intimation of absolute truth.
166
 Wittgenstein 
agrees with Schopenhauer: ‘there are indeed many things that cannot be put into words. They 
make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical’.167  
 
Writing on Kierkegaard, Edward Mooney notes as follows: ‘Barth wrote that Mozart’s music 
was itself a ‘parable of the kingdom’ and that even a dog could be a parable of the kingdom – 
meaning a repetition of scripture in which one is given back in a new way, as a gift, words (or 
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events or things) that one had thought to have grown stale’.168 Mooney suggests a 
Wittgensteinian parallel for Kierkegaard’s indirect writing strategy; a strategy conceived as the 
intimation or ‘parable’ of the objectively unsayable – the kingdom of God: 
Wittgenstein claimed that when you purchased his Tractatus, you were missing the 
real book, the one on ethics that was outside Tractatus and couldn’t (logically) be 
written. Perhaps Kierkegaard is always pointing to a book that it is impossible to 
write, a non-book we’d have to remain silent about. Meanwhile, he’ll write books 
by pseudonyms, hinting, thereby, that his real ‘Tractatus’ resides elsewhere.169 
I would suggest, though, however instructive this  comparison may be, (and there are certainly 
parallels in indirect approach), that Kierkegaard differs from the early Wittgenstein in that he 
would affirm the reality and efficacy of supernatural activity in the empirical sphere, not 
evacuating it to some trans-empirical realm of value. Whereas Wittgenstein’s realm of value 
transcends logic, Kierkegaard revelation of the God-man is at the heart of the empirical world in 
spite of its logical impossibility for the understanding that relates to that world. The ‘un-say-
ability’ of ultimate value or revelation belongs to a paradoxical and personal actuality, not to a 
non-empirical realm. Indeed Wittgenstein suggests in the Tractatus  (following Schopenhauer) 
that the truly ‘ethical’ state of mind must lie outside of the contingencies of human interaction, 
as some form of unique and purely intellectual illumination or gnosis. For the early 
Wittgenstein, therefore, and unlike Kierkegaard, the realm of aesthetic and ethical value is 
excluded from verbal discourse as beyond the logic of language, and in this Wittgenstein’s 
thinking also resembles that of Friedrich Schlegel, who, as we saw in the last chapter, writes on 
the impossibility of a full revelation of absolute truth.  
 
We saw that, for Schlegel, the task of the romantic poet is unachievable in principle. In seeking 
to evoke the absolute through artistic singularity, or a uniquely individual perspective, the poet 
is also embarking on a self-critical procedure by which he simultaneously cancels or 
‘deconstructs’ his work’s claims to any transcendent significance through an ironic detachment 
from the content of his own creativity.
170
 Thus the poet expresses an awareness of the 
fragmentary nature of any finite aesthetic product. So too, for Wittgenstein, ultimate 
significance can have no practical bearing on the phenomenal order, his Tractarian logic 
rigorously enforcing an absence of divine efficacy. For Schopenhauer, too, and – as the 
immediate source for the metaphysical vision behind Wittgenstein’s position – in a similar way, 
there is no prospect of divine salvation, and all our striving is ultimately no more than pointless 
illusion. Thus we can discern a thematic continuity flowing from Friedrich Schlegel, through 
Schopenhauer, to the early Wittgenstein, according to which there is an empirically 
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transcendent significance, but it has no role to play in the business of everyday life, and 
certainly no involvement in its pain and anguish.  
 
Against the nihilistic danger posed to ethical commitment by Schlegel’s romantic irony, 
Kierkegaard, as we have seen, stresses ethico-religious, subjective inwardness as the province 
of the revealed, transcendent and paradoxical ‘Word’. Kierkegaard sees faith as a pattern of 
living interaction that cannot be communicated directly, as pointing towards the impossible 
possibility of divine salvation in the here and now. Yet I will now argue that it is precisely this 
distinctively Christian claim, so powerfully advanced by Kierkegaard, which is resisted by a 
certain aspect of his own thinking. I suggest that a problematic tendency acts as a counter-
current to the main direction of Kierkegaard’s presentation of incarnational redemption.  
 
The problem may be stated thus: if the aesthetic sphere, in its characteristic outward orientation 
as natural vitality is that which stands outside of revelation, or in opposition to it, as suggested 
by the figures of Don Giovanni and Faust in ‘The Musical Erotic’, then Kierkegaard’s model of 
redemptive grace amounts, in effect, to no more than a moral demand: another Law. It is 
ultimately this theological objection which underlies the questioning in this thesis of  
Kierkegaard’s inconsistent denial of a role for art and the aesthetics of natural beauty in 
Christian life; a life which nevertheless he can only communicate through poetic indirection. A 
stark segregation of the natural from the ethico-religious life would appear to apply in both 
cases. Such segregation is perhaps an extreme result of Kierkegaard’s anti-Hegelian 
dichotomising, his refusal of the conceptual mediation or sublation of opposites addressed 
earlier.  This theological objection must now be more closely examined.  
 
As we have seen, Kierkegaard maintains that music perfectly represents ‘the sensuous in its 
elemental originality’. What Kierkegaard goes on to say in ‘The Musical Erotic’ is strongly 
reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s account of music in relation to the endless – and mindless – 
surging of metaphysical will towards its own increase. I have suggested that both thinkers – 
Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer – point towards what Heidegger regards as the essence of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ is analysed by Heidegger as fundamentally 
a ‘will to will’ – a will that ‘wills its own willing’ to begin all over again ad infinitum. Thus I 
would suggest that Kierkegaard shares with Schopenhauer a conviction concerning the ultimate 
meaninglessness of sensuousness or natural vitality. Earlier, the question was raised whether 
there might be a connection between the constant and deepening repetition of ‘inward’ 
movement involved in the turn to Christ, and the circle of the ungovernable and purposeless 
striving of natural vitality that is represented by Kierkegaard’s conception of sensuous 
immediacy. I suggested that there must be such a link between aesthetic or pre-ethical life and 
60 
 
the life of faith, if the Christian doctrine of redemption through divine incarnation is to be 
upheld. We saw in the last chapter, in relation to the archetypal figures of Don Giovanni and 
Faust, that the aesthetic life is understood by ‘A’ in two aspects: as pre-Christian natural vitality 
and as that same natural vitality as excluded by Christian revelation, or sin. This suggests that 
redemption would involve the repudiation or abandonment of the aesthetic as an outward 
orientation – or in manifestations of natural vitality per se – altogether. Yet thus to exclude the 
aesthetic sphere in its characteristically outward bearing, or as natural vitality, from Christianity 
is surely to exclude the very possibility of any redemption of fallen nature – human and non-
human. But it is this redemptive possibility that constitutes the heart of the Christian message. 
One might go so far as to say that this possibility is the Christian message. As Gregory 
Nazianzen writes ‘that which was not assumed [i.e., fully entered into by God in Christ] is not 
healed; but that which is united to God is saved’.171 
 
It is not being suggested, of course, that Kierkegaard is unaware of this central tenet – the 
Christian tenet ne plus ultra; far from it. But I do argue that in Stages on Life’s Way no less than 
in ‘The Musical Erotic’, Kierkegaard’s exclusion of all outward aesthetic vitality – including 
outward, poetic imagination – from the life of faith contradicts his concern to communicate a 
saving incarnation; a communication which demands from him the use of an outward aesthetic 
conceptuality of semantic indeterminacy.  It is being argued that the account of the relation 
between spirit and natural desire in ‘The Musical Erotic’ leaves human vitality in all its 
outwardly aesthetic expressions unredeemed, as outside of spirit. The context of musical 
philosophy can shed further light on this issue. 
 
Schopenhauer, as we have learned, sees aesthetics through the romantic experience of art, 
according to which music is the language of the ineffable, the language above language.
172
 Such 
views gave rise to a fully fledged ‘art religion’ in the nineteenth century (inspiring the music 
dramas of Wagner, for example), and Dahlhaus, in his Idea of Absolute Music, is unsure 
whether that move represents the secularisation of religion or a feeling for the sacramentality of 
the secular. We have seen from his music criticism in the first part of Either/Or that such a 
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claim for the supreme theological significance of purely instrumental or ‘absolute’ music is 
strongly denied by Kierkegaard’s aesthetic pseudonym: ‘I have never had a sympathy [...] for 
the sublimated music that thinks it does not need words. Ordinarily, it thinks itself as superior 
to words, although it is inferior’.173 Comparing this musical-critical attitude with the views 
prevailing in the Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, we can see 
that the aesthete’s view of music accords with a sharp differentiation between the spheres of 
paradoxical faith and the outwardly aesthetic life of intellectual and emotional pleasure; any 
aesthetically external or outward expression, it would seem, is beneath the life of faith. And yet 
there is a problem here, since Kierkegaard is writing at all because he sees a genuine need to 
communicate the gospel through personal indirection, that is, to express himself outwardly 
through the conceptual indeterminacy of aesthetic communications.  
 
It will be a major contention in this thesis that genuine ethical receptivity to transcendence is 
necessarily allied to an aesthetic or imaginative mode of receptivity, as divine communication 
cannot but be distorted by a univocal and determinate use of, and relation to, concepts. The 
gospel, as Kierkegaard sees it, is infinite paradox, and thus cannot be contained in any finitely 
determined communication. As Saint Paul writes,
174
 the liberating spirit and the constraining 
letter of the word of God need to be distinguished, if blasphemous bibliolatry is to be avoided; 
if one is not to be one of Climacus’s ‘zealots’ and ‘enthusiasts’.175 
 
So, Kierkegaard points to music as a deficient discourse, denying the possibility of art’s having 
a sacramental character. Art in general is regarded as something far beneath the level of ethico-
religious language. But we have also seen, in chapter one, that Kierkegaard utilises aesthetically 
indeterminate communication in the service of a higher existential sphere based on the 
revelation of paradox. As we saw then, Steven Shakespeare suggests that just as music, the 
communication of the dynamic of pre-reflected life, must idealise sensuous immediacy as its 
communication, and is thus itself spiritually qualified, so the communication of paradoxical 
faith as an existential orientation, must exploit the poetical, aesthetic possibilities inherent in 
verbal language for a musically indirect style of communication; possibilities made available by 
the very condition of linguistic ideality as always dependently rooted in reality, interpreting it. 
 
By emphasising the exclusion not only of objective philosophy, but of art, music and poetry 
from the life of faith, Kierkegaard argues polemically to combat a threatened aesthetic 
replacement of genuine Christian practice by philosophy and art. In this, Kierkegaard offers a 
much needed theological service, but it must also be said that he thus appears to condone the 
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marginalisation of his own powerful and acute artistic ability and sensibility, and especially, and 
most importantly, the genuine evangelical potential of his own practice of musically indirect 
communication. Nevertheless, it may be that attention to other aspects of Kierkegaard’s work 
would seem to soften the dichotomy between art and faith.  
 
Mooney suggests that Kierkegaard’s admiration of Socrates is as much for his piety as his 
rational honesty and philosophical method. Kierkegaard, the religious philosopher, shares 
important traits with Socrates, who admits his inability to comprehend in order to allow room 
for wonder. Socrates expresses wonder at the beauty of love in the Symposium, and commends 
the value of religious poetry to give expression to such wonder at life’s mystery.176 Mooney 
cites Kierkegaard’s own evaluation of the Symposium as an ‘incredibly wonderful presentation 
of the power of love to ennoble man’.177 Mooney points out that Socrates, like Kierkegaard, puts 
care of the souls of those around him ahead of the pursuit of wealth or ambition. Socrates 
expresses his piety in deferring to his daimon, as a reminder to him of his limited insight, of the 
need for thinking to give way to praising in religious verse. This theme finds expression in the 
Phaedo. Socrates, in prison and awaiting death, has been honouring the gods in verse as his 
thoughts turn to meditation on a future life.
178
 Mooney therefore discerns a similar need both for 
Socrates and Kierkegaard, in their admittedly very different ways, to move away from direct 
questioning at certain points, in favour of an aesthetic form of communication as appropriate to 
the highest concerns and deepest mysteries of life. Both thinkers, one might say, would hold, 
against Aristotle, that a certain self-critical humility is proper to the philosopher, such that 
philosophy both begins, and ends, in wonder, and above all in the wonder of love.  
 
Such a softening of the distinction between art and faith, through due attention to the nuanced 
and multivalent nature of Kierkegaard’s writings, would therefore seem also to indicate a 
softening, if not of the distinction, then at least of any rigidly enforced segregation of pagan eros 
– Kierkegaard’s sensuous immediacy or vital desire – from Christian agape. Eros, we must 
remember, is ‘Don Giovanni’: unbridled desire; and yet this is the same desire which, within 
loving relationships, can educate, calm and indeed exalt, according to Diotima’s and Socrates’ 
account in the Symposium, an account which Kierkegaard prizes as manifesting the ennobling 
power of eros, according to Mooney. George Pattison suggests that poetry, for Kierkegaard, can 
indeed have a religious register,
179
 leading Mooney to contemplate that Socratic love ‘can work 
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as a metaphor, intimating a Christian religious love’.180 Such a concept of the illuminating 
power of human love to reveal divine love will be addressed in my final chapter. 
  
(3) Proposal, Summary and Prospect 
 
In view of the specifically theological tensions which I have noted in the Kierkegaardian 
account of art in relation to faith, I am still led to propose that Kierkegaard’s apparent denial of 
any place to purely external or artistic aesthetics in the life of faith remains highly problematic. 
Mooney’s hints indeed register Kierkegaard’s need for the aesthetic in order to communicate his 
paradoxical message, but do not of themselves solve the problem that I have outlined. The 
ground for this problem, this perceived Kierkegaardian impasse between the inward aesthetic of 
ethics and faith and the external aesthetics of art and nature would be the apparent absence, 
according to the account given in ‘The Musical Erotic’, of any possibility of ethical orientation 
as at least implicit, or intimated, in the lower aesthetic sphere.  
 
Against this characterisation of a necessary ethical lacuna in the aesthetic sphere, however, I 
shall be suggesting in later chapters that an inner, ethical orientation is, indeed, essential to any 
genuine artistic discernment, whether in the creation or appreciation of works of art. I shall be 
further suggesting that a romantic discernment of the un-grasp-ability of divine truth – a 
position against which Kierkegaard sets his face – can lead to attitudes and aesthetic practices – 
such as those of Samuel Taylor Coleridge – very different from Schlegel’s ironising ethical 
relativism. The term ‘romantic’ has been used in a plethora of highly divergent and sometimes 
contradictory ways, as I suggested at the beginning of chapter one; it certainly cannot be limited 
to the work of Schlegel’s Jena Circle at the turn of the nineteenth century.181 
 
To sum up the findings of this chapter while pointing ahead, I suggest that Kierkegaard’s 
‘musically indirect’ works, as understood in the foregoing, play a crucial role in his oeuvre 
considered as a whole. These meticulously-wrought compositions occupy a central position, 
whilst often embodying a high degree of lyrical suggestiveness and literary skill, as deployed in 
an authorship which Kierkegaard himself owned to be a personal, divine vocation. This 
vocation – to refresh and make available to his contemporaries a gospel-message that had been 
lost through a long history of over-familiarity and blatant hypocrisy – could only be fulfilled by 
Kierkegaard’s invoking to the full his personal powers of artistic insight and creativity.  
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I suggest, therefore, that Kierkegaard’s finding no place for the ‘outward’ aesthetics of art and 
‘the language of nature’182 within the life of faith is actually contradicted by the nature of his 
own theologically and artistically powerful work, as a reflective strategy of communication of 
the Christian gospel. Kierkegaard’s focus on existential or ‘inward’ aesthetics, whether as the 
appreciation of the beauty of faithful love or in the appropriation of faith, needs balancing by an 
approach which, while sharing Kierkegaard’s concern for truthfulness to ethico-religious reality, 
can also do justice to the ethical and theological value of art as mediating intimations of 
transcendence. Such is typically the aim of certain romantic styles of creative expression, and so 
it is to romantic art, so considered, that my attention will be directed in later discussions, in an 
attempt to show the underlying relatedness of romantic and existential approaches to the issue of 
possible human access to divine transcendence.  
 
Kierkegaard’s own highly effective aesthetic practice of the indirect communication of faith as 
an authentic subjective possibility itself suggests that a properly theological account of such 
practice should be sought; an account for which Kierkegaard’s own theological position, in his 
anti-Hegelian delineation of conceptually un-mediable existential spheres, does not apparently 
find room.  
 
While Kierkegaard has presented good reason to exclude a process of determinate conceptual 
mediation from his account of the nature of true faith, I find that he still needs an indeterminate 
or aesthetic mediation of concepts in order truly to communicate the gospel; a gospel which is 
itself the preaching of Christ’s salvific entry into death through the destructive depths of human 
sinfulness, since, as Gregory of Nazianzus argues, what is un-assumed by Christ is unredeemed. 
So in order to do justice to such a gospel, and to account, theologically, for Kierkegaard’s 
ability to preach it in aesthetically reflective terms, an account must be found that is capable of 
reconciling the inward aesthetics of faith with a romantic intimation of genuinely ethico-
religious transcendence, through art, and the aesthetic appreciation of a nature at least 
potentially open to redemption in Christ.  
 
In seeking a common ground of romantic and existential approaches to transcendence, I am 
drawn first, in the following chapter, to Kantian epistemology considered, following Paton, as 
primarily a ‘metaphysic of experience’. I will give reason in chapter three for regarding Kant as 
the source of insights across a wide and divergent field of post-Kantian thought, ranging from 
absolute idealism, through romanticism, to Kierkegaard’s existential reaction to both the former. 
Thus in what follows next I shall attempt to show that both romantic and existential styles of 
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thought are moulded by, or in reaction to, Kantian thinking, especially in relation to the themes 
of selfhood, time and the productive or transcendental imagination.  
 
My aim, in thus beginning with Kant, therefore, is to uncover the ground on which a possible 
reconciliation between Kierkegaard’s literary practice and the theological aims to which this 
practice of indirect or aesthetic communication is devoted. This is the quest which governs my 
thinking throughout the following chapters. By the end of this thesis, I aim to have 
demonstrated that genuine ethical faith and aesthetic discernment are intimately related, and 
that the properly receptive disposition in relation to divine transcendence is ethico-aesthetic; 
that a faithful response to the paradox of revelation may be achieved through what can be called 



















I have suggested in chapter two that Kierkegaard’s finding no place for the ‘outward’ aesthetics 
of art and nature within the life of faith is actually contradicted by his own theologically and 
artistically powerful work, as a reflective strategy of communication of the Christian message. 
Thus I have claimed that Kierkegaard’s focus on existential or ‘inward’ aesthetics needs 
balancing by an approach which, while sharing Kierkegaard’s concern for personal integrity in 
a truthful response to paradoxical religious reality, can also do justice to the theological value of 
outward aesthetic expression and experience as intimative of transcendence.  
 
I have shown, in chapter one, that such an aesthetic encounter with transcendence is typically 
the aim of certain romantic styles of creative expression, and so it is to a specific, Coleridgean 
form of romanticism, so considered, that my attention will be directed in chapter seven, in an 
attempt to show the underlying relatedness of a Coleridgean to a Kierkegaardian approach to 
the issue of possible human access to divine transcendence. My aim, in focusing this chapter on 
Kantian epistemology, especially with reference to Kant’s accounts of the self, imagination and 
time, is to uncover the ground on which such a possible relatedness of approach and concern 
might be discovered, thus reconciling Kierkegaardian faith with a particular Coleridgean 
concept of romantic thought. Such a common ground can be found in Kantian epistemology. 
Therefore, this chapter examines the distinctive and fundamental connection between 
temporality, imagination and selfhood, as brought to light by Kant, and as it continues to be the 
focus of thinkers after him, in the related traditions of romanticism, absolute idealism, and 
existentialism. Whether in reacting against Kant, or in seeking to continue along the same path, 
I will show in later chapters that a pattern of influence can be traced through well known voices 
representing these three modes of thought.   
 
In terms of preparing the ground for chapters to come, therefore, this chapter, through its focus 
on Kant, aims to perform an initial survey of the ‘lie of the land’, or of the relevant conceptual 
‘territory’ in terms of which other thinkers will be addressed, and over which later moves will 
be made as the argument of my thesis develops. This chapter is thus primarily concerned with 
issues of conceptual orientation and thematic location, as regards a Kantian understanding of 




I will progress to the theme of time, as reconceived by Henri Bergson in terms of his concept of 
‘duration’, in the next chapter, as embodying a mode of thought reacting against a Kantian and 
idealist deterministic approach to time. Bergson’s powerful account of duration will provide a 
criterion for later differentiations between romantic, ‘intimative’ approaches to transcendence – 
such as are reconcilable with Kierkegaardian faith – and the objective, deterministic approach to 
temporal process of post-Kantian idealism, (which Kierkegaard attacks through the work of 
Hegel, as seen in chapter one). The present chapter will provide me with the materials, through 
attention to Kant’s account of time, with which to set Bergson’s ideas in critical interaction.  
 
(1) Constructing a perspective: Kant’s task in the Critique of Pure Reason  
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant equates the limits of possible, conceptually determined 
knowledge with those of possible inner and outer experience.
183
 In thus situating knowledge 
temporally (inner sense) and spatially (outer sense), Kant rules out the possibility of any 
perspective-less knowledge of reality, any metaphysical thesis that claims to define timeless 
principles of reality in objective terms. For Kant, empirical knowledge gives us genuine 
cognitive access to the world, but the world thus known can only amount to a particular 
perspective on an intrinsically unknowable source of sensible appearances. What is known 
through the senses is also to some extent an unconscious or pre-conscious construction out of 
the cognitive and intuitive forms within which sensible data must be received, organised and 
judged. 
 
Kant calls such formal, epistemic construction-work transcendental.
184
 In describing our 
empirical awareness as an epistemological construct, (so far as its cognitive form as distinct 
from its sensible matter or content is concerned), Kant is suggesting that human beings view 
reality through a perspective, or framework, which is always already a product of intuitive 
spatio-temporal forms and ‘pure’ or empirically un-derived, conceptual categories, which serve 
– transcendentally – to structure experience, rendering it possible.  
 
The strikingly new feature of Kant’s critical epistemology is that he is the first philosopher to 
view reality as conformed – transcendentally – to our mode of adaptation for receiving it, of 
‘tuning in’ to the world around us. Kant likens his transcendental epistemological thesis to the 
astronomical hypothesis of Copernicus: as the sun does not revolve around the earth, so our 
knowledge of reality is not conformed to reality, rather, reality is conformed to our knowledge 
of it: 
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I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a 
kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in 
myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, to which all objects of 
experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree.
185
 
 We view the world through tinted cognitive spectacles; Kant investigates the nature of this 
‘tinting’, through a process of transcendental argumentation. A transcendental argument is a 
process of inference disclosing the a priori pre-conditions owing to which experience as we 




At the beginning of the introduction to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
is already drawing our attention to the temporal origin and nature of our experience: ‘as far as 
time is concerned then, no cognition in us precedes experience, and with experience every 
cognition begins’.187 Kant’s project moves from this acknowledgement of the temporal situated-
ness of empirical awareness to justify the universal application of certain conceptual categories, 
and formal elements of intuition or sensibility, as not only necessary for the possibility of 
subjective experience, but also as necessary conditions for that same, phenomenal experience 
being of an objective world, distinct from or opposed to ourselves. It is to the central role of 
time, considered as a formal experiential a priori – the necessary, sequential form of any 
possible sensible intuition – that I now turn. 
 
(2) Kant: Time as the Fundamental Condition of Experience 
Kant’s transcendental epistemological constructivism involves not only pure conceptual 
components, as discussed in the section of the Critique of Pure Reason known as the 
‘Transcendental Analytic’, but also it extends to the forms of space and time themselves, 
described as pure forms of intuition, as analysed in abstraction from any empirical content, or 
‘matter’ of sensation.  
 
The discussion of space and time takes place in the section of Kant’s first Critique entitled ‘The 
Transcendental Aesthetic’.188 After showing Kant’s position to be that time and space are 
formal conditions of the possibility of sensible intuition, I will analyse his grounds for such a 
claim, leading me to conclude that time is regarded as the more fundamental condition of 
possible experience. This will lead me on to a discussion of the relation between time and 
imagination in conditioning the possibility of experience, in part three. The concept of a 
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transcendental imagination as conditioning possible experience will loom large in later chapters 
of this thesis, as my argument progresses. 
 
Kant argues that it is not gathered either through sensibility or conceptual thought that our 
cognitive representations are spatially extended and conformed to a necessary order of temporal 
succession. This means that time is not an empirical concept, that is, it is not an a posteriori 
concept derived from experience, even though it is through experience – or through analysis of 
its possibility – that we can come to this recognition. To the contrary, Kant shows that we could 
not represent co-existence or succession if time were not an a priori precondition of our 
awareness of things.
189
 Whilst our representations are indubitably spatio-temporal in that 
notions of contemporeity and succession are implied within them, if their sensible content does 
not indicate this directly, then space and time can only be the a priori, formal conditions of 
those representations. Time and space are ‘necessary representations’, formal principles of 
combination underlying all our sensible intuitions, which are therefore only possible as 
temporally ordered, or transcendentally conformed, a priori, to the temporal form of our 
intuition.
190
 Space and time therefore have no status independently of experience, but are 
experiential conditions.  
Space is described as the form of outer sense by Kant, meaning that it is transcendentally prior 
to the possible representation of any object of outer, sensible awareness, in that space is an 
immediate (i.e., not conceptually mediated) and a priori ‘given’. On the other hand, time cannot 
be outwardly intuited. This is not to say that spatial objects are not known to co-exist at one 
time, or to precede and follow on from one another in ordered sequence, but that our awareness 
of such temporal patterning is never directly presented to us from without.
191
 This is because 
time, as the form of inner sense, of intuition of ourselves and our inner state (including all our 
awareness of objects in outer sense), cannot itself be a determination of outer appearances (and 
thus is not given to outer sense). Time has nothing to do with position or shape, therefore, but 





Equally, while space is indeed an a priori form of sense, spatial appearances, as containing 
matter of sensation or empirical content, are always mediated through time as the form of inner 
sense, since empirical representations have no existence as representations independent of the 
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subjective conditions of their construction.
193
 All human experience occurs within inner sense, 
of which time is the form, and this overarching temporal conditioning thus points to the 
transcendental priority of temporal, inner sense over outer sense in the constitution of empirical 
subjectivity. Time is, for Kant the primordial element of human consciousness.
194
 External 
awareness of the spatial manifold is made possible by our awareness of the temporal flow of our 
own mental states. Since empirical experience is actual only in virtue of the fact that sensible 
data have come to be formally constructed within our own minds, our awareness that outer 
representations are temporal is possible because they exist as representations solely within the 
temporal form of inner sense.  
 
According to Kant, therefore, time is more fundamental to human subjectivity than space, since 
any external representations can exist only within or on the basis of inner sense, or time, as their 
condition of possibility. Being human is, fundamentally, being temporal; our awareness never 
stands still, and is possible as self-conscious awareness only because of this temporal element, 
as we shall see later. Unlike, so far as we know, any other creature, we can transcend any given 
present moment in thought. Thought itself is interpreted by Kant as the relation of 
representations in judgements (concepts being judgemental forms or functions of unity in 
judgements), which implies that thinking is only ultimately a possibility for us since we can 
make connections.
195
As we shall see, the fundamental ground of such an ability to connect 
through comparison and contrast is the ability to relate a ‘then’ to a ‘now’, and a ‘then’ and a 
‘now’ to what might become.  
 
I suggest, on this basis, and recalling the Kierkegaardian position discovered in chapter one, 
that within the Kantian and post-Kantian framework human subjectivity is ultimately a 
consciousness of one’s own becoming. Animals, we must presume, are tied to the immediacy of 
the moment, and are never able to transcend that momentary consciousness through a mediated 
representation of temporal unity that allows the contents of consciousness to be thought, and 
thus connected together in an objective temporal order.  
 
It is to the problem of just how such cognitive distance is established that I turn in the next 
section, which will centre upon issues that can be summed up as follows. Kant needs to show 
how a categorically structured temporal order of succession, as an objective order of necessary 
causal relations, can come to be thought, when categories of thought such as cause and 
substance are never sensibly given in experience. To this end, he must show how pure a priori 
thoughts and sensible affections necessarily belong together in experience, even though they are 
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as diverse as activity from passivity. In other words, Kant aims to discover a condition, neither 
sensible nor conceptual, which can nevertheless mediate between sensible appearances in time 
and concepts of the pure understanding. The imagination, considered in transcendental terms, 
will be shown to provide just such an experiential condition by uniting the polar opposites of 
sensibility and thought.  
 
(3) Kant, Imagination and Selfhood 
 
In his Critique of Pure Reason, (under the heading ‘On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of 
the Understanding’,196 although known more simply as the ‘transcendental deduction’), Kant 
looks for an explanation as to how pure concepts of the understanding can come to apply to a 
sensibility from which they are not derived, and with which it would seem that they could have 
no necessary connection, as, in their origin, they are merely forms of our thinking. In order to 
become categories, or forms of the unity of the manifold of sense as known in synthetic a priori 
judgement, pure concepts of the understanding need to be schematised by the imagination.  
 
In what follows, I shall address the transcendental role of imagination, as an essential 
component of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories. This means that I will address 
the transcendental imagination’s role as a mediator between concepts of the pure understanding 
and sensibility. For the sake of clarity and relevance to the aims of my thesis, I will do my best 
to focus solely on the function of imagination at this point, and to do so, I will be selectively 
focusing my account on the ‘subjective’ aspect of Kant’s deduction. That is to say, I will be 
drawing on that part of Kant’s argumentation found largely in the earlier, ‘A’ version of the 
deduction, as given in the first edition of the Critique. This account is designed to show how 
pure thoughts, as forms of subjectivity, can become conditions of objective empirical 
knowledge.  
 
We have already seen it suggested, in relation to Kierkegaard’s thought in chapter two, that 
imagination plays a key role in human receptivity to the paradox of revelation. My engagement 
with Kant’s account of the epistemological role of imagination aims to establish a basis of 
understanding upon which to advance later in this thesis. Later on, Kierkegaard’s thinking will 
serve as a criterion by which to assess different idealist and romantic post-Kantian models 
which address imagination – although in importantly different ways – as a transcendental 
medium of metaphysical insight. As transcendental, such accounts eschew what Kant would 
describe as an uncritically dogmatic metaphysical approach
197
 (that is, an approach making 
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empirically transcendent generalisations with concepts that only have cognitive value in relation 
to sensibility).  The relation of Kant’s thought to that of Henri Bergson will also be 
foreshadowed below in connection with the issue of transcendental imaginative schematism. 
My account here will thus prepare the way for Bergson’s critique of Kantian temporality 
through his own conception of time as ‘duration’, to be addressed in chapters four and five.  All 
this, it should be remembered, is in furtherance of my stated thesis-goal of reconciling 
Kierkegaard’s account of faith to his own practice of aesthetic intimation, or indirect 
communication. 
 
Firstly then, as just indicated, I will outline the nature of the problem for which Kant offers his 
transcendental deduction as a proposed solution. This will then enable a closer focus on the role 
of imagination within Kant’s argument. 
 
(3.1) Imagining Time 
If the conceptual categories of the pure understanding, that give experience its cognitive 
structure, are not to be merely empty forms of thought, they need a content, or real application 
to sensibility.
198
 But such a pre-experiential, or transcendentally conditioning content could only 
be found in the pure forms of sensibility: time and space. I shall explain. 
 
Since the cognitive categories are conditions for the very possibility of knowing sensible 
contents of knowledge, what is sensibly received – the matter of sense, sense data or sensa – 
cannot itself be a condition for the applicability of such transcendental concepts. But the sense 
data known in empirical or phenomenal knowledge, and which are thus always already 
categorically structured, must also have been spatio-temporally conformed, or processed by the 
pure spatio-temporal forms of intuition. Thus it is to these pure, intuitive forms of time and 
space that the transcendental categories must look for their purely a priori applicability. 
 
It is Kant’s claim that the categories of the pure understanding make objective, empirical 
knowledge possible a priori, which entails that their content cannot be derived from what is 
given passively (or a posteriori) to the senses. If categorical concepts derived their content from 
sense, they would not be transcendental. They would only be a posteriori or empirical concepts, 
with only contingent significance, and thus would lack the a priori necessity which such 
concepts must possess in order to act as foundational, or certain principles of knowledge; 
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How then do truly synthetic yet pure, or a priori concepts come by their content? In solving this 
problem, Kant is led to accord an epistemologically constructive role to the imagination, as 
providing content, by construing sense data, for the necessary conceptual connections which 
enable an objective awareness of time, in terms of categories of cause and substance. Kant 
defines imagination as a faculty making present to consciousness that which is absent to the 
senses.
200
 It is the nature of experience to have one, unified order of succession, to occur in a 
uni-directional and predictable sequence, and transcendental concepts, through imaginative 
mediation, provide such a temporal framework. 
 
I shall now attempt to account for this synthesis or temporal ordering of sensibility that renders 
perception possible, thereby enabling a content for empirical thought. (But it should be 
remembered that in focusing solely on this sensible synthesis I am abstracting from a wider 
context in which the transcendental unity of apperception – as a condition of possible self-
consciousness – is found to be the ultimate condition of the objectivity of successive 
perceptions, as the highest principle of the understanding. This condition of possible self-
consciousness will be addressed below in section five). In order to exist as the content of one, 
unified consciousness, and thus to be known as objects of my experience, the successive 
synthesis of appearances must be carried out according to necessary categorical forms so that 
one, objective temporal order may be possible, an objectively unified manifold for 
consciousness to know.  
 
In the course of ongoing experience, the capacity for a pure, temporal construal of sense data, 
such as can mediate between sensibility and conceptuality, between empirical conceptual 
activity and sensible passivity, belongs to the reproductive imagination. The reproductive 
imagination construes the temporality of sensibility by reproducing or retaining what is no 
longer present to sense and anticipating what might not yet be present to sense. Therefore Kant 
defines the imagination as ‘the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in 
intuition’.201 In its role of enabling the application of pure concepts of the understanding, and 
thus conditioning the possibility of experience a priori, this formative yet non-conceptual 
capacity is known as the transcendental or productive imagination.  
 
It is therefore the transcendental imagination which accounts, as a process of combination, for 
the apprehension of the temporal mode into which pure forms of the understanding can be 
adapted, thereby rendering such forms intrinsically necessary to possible knowledge of the 
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 Imaginatively mediated adaptation to temporal intuition enables pure forms 
of thought to act as universally valid, categorical criteria of the objectivity of experience. Pure 
categories of experience such as causality cannot be derived from the content of sense, but 
through the medium of imagination, pure conceptual and pure intuitive forms can coalesce in 
the objective interpretation of a given, sensible manifold.  
 
For Kant, the role of imagination, in our appropriation of intuition as temporal, is to present a 
temporal connectedness of content for thought to think. Reminiscent of what we have learned 
from Kierkegaard’s account of the imagination, and surely influencing it, Kantian imagination 
is neither purely active (as regulated by the pure understanding), nor purely passive (as 
moulding the data of sense). This paradoxical status of imagination should be noted here, since 
the imagination’s ambiguous ‘active-passivity’ will be very important for later discussions, as 
we have already seen it to be in connection with Kierkegaard’s thought.  
 
Kant writes in the ‘A’ version of his transcendental deduction of the categories that any 
‘affinity’ or combinability of the manifold of sense data into conscious experience is, at bottom, 
a result of the ‘transcendental function of the imagination’ in a priori synthesis.203 I shall 
explain.  
 
For Kant, as also for much post-Kantian thought (as, for example, for Kierkegaard, as we have 
seen, and in diverse ways for Schelling and Coleridge, as we shall see) the imagination is by 
nature a medium between the passive receptivity of sense and conceptual activity. For Kant 
himself, this means that imagination allows experientially constitutive conceptual structure to 
be brought into synthesis with sensibility, as a condition of possible conscious experience. 
Through the transcendentally productive imagination’s discernment of patterns, or temporal 
schemes (Kant’s ‘schemata’) in what is sensibly received, concepts of the pure understanding 
are temporally ‘schematised’, or related to appearances as temporally organised.204 In such a 
way, the merely logical, analytical conceptual forms of ground and consequent, (for example), 
can manifest themselves as a synthetic a priori categorical condition, as conditioning the 
temporal structure of experience in terms of cause and effect. As said already, forms of intuition 
are nothing in themselves; it is imagination’s appreciation of the temporal succession of 
appearances – a formal intuition – which schematises purely analytic concepts, giving them 
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This conception of the imagination’s schematising role, its enabling any cognition of the 
manifold as temporal, is similar to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘aspect-seeing’ (which, again, we 
have met in connection with Kierkegaardian imagination in chapter two). Transcendental or 
productive imagination, by allowing the world to be seen as temporal, is closely bound up with 
Kant’s account of the transcendental unity of apperception, as the condition sine qua non of 
experience, as we shall see in more detail below.  
 
So we have found that imagination is understood by Kant as a crucial factor in time 
consciousness, which is itself the core of human awareness. The two stems of conceptuality and 
sensibility are said by Kant to spring from ‘a common but to us unknown root’.206 Schelling, 
Coleridge and Heidegger
207
 understand the transcendental, or ‘primary’208 imagination to be 
itself this root. Kant, as the pioneer of such insights, believes that intuitions without concepts 
are blind, but equally that conceptual synthesis depends entirely on the schematising, or 
mediating role of the productive imagination in relating transcendental (and also empirical) 
concepts to sense data, an issue which I will now address in more detail, as analyses of the 
mediating role of imagination in Kant and his successors, in chapters ahead, will be vital to the 
overall argument of my thesis. 
 
(3.2) What is Schematism? 
J. Michael Young suggests that one should understand Kant’s thinking on the issue of 
imagination, both in its empirical, or reproductive and its transcendental aspects, in terms of an 
ability to construe sensible affects in temporal terms, rather than as a capacity for forming 
mental images.
209
 Young insists that this focus on imaginative construal distinguishes Kant in 
this respect from empiricists such Hume.
210
 To regard the imagination as a faculty for 
construing reality temporally, and thus as a capacity to see more than is given sensibly in any 
instant, is to break with an empirical tradition that regards imaginative images as faded relics of 
a purely sensible or passive perception on which they depend. Imaginative schematism is 
imagination’s ability to construe the manifold of sense, to discern patterns in appearances. But 
the imagination’s ‘reading’ of sensibility is as much a pre-conceptual act, as it is a response to 
what is sensibly given. The theme of this intermediary condition of imagination, as situated 
between activity and passivity, should be noted in anticipation of developments in later 
chapters.  
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In interpreting Kant, Henry Allison agrees with Young that an imaginative schema is not an 
image. Images could be seen as samples of types, or examples.
211
 Examples share with images 
the property of particularity. They are determined, and thus limited. A concept, however, has 
universal significance. A concept is a rule for judgement that confers universality, and thus 
necessity on a judgement; in other words, it is by means of concepts that a judgement’s claim 
for public recognition is warranted, as publically sharable. An objective judgement can expect 
the agreement of anyone else judging of the same situation. Examples, as fixed in reference, are 
useful, therefore, but of limited value to empirical judgement,
212
 since the applicability of a 
specific example to different situations will depend upon an indeterminable number of 
contingent circumstances, that no determined example could possibly cover, in principle. This 
is why Kant insists that the capacity to judge well is an inherent ability, which is lacking to 
someone who never outgrows the need for examples, and therefore cannot perceive their 




To judge well, therefore, one needs the ability to discern ‘the universal in the particular,214 to 
distinguish imaginatively in a given context between the general, and yet still individuated and 
limited pattern, or ‘schema’, as embodied in and illustrated by the particular example – the not 
yet determined, not yet conceptual shape which is presented in the content before one. Only 
through the imagination’s distinguishing the schematic shape – the temporal generality involved 
in the particularity of an appearance – can one judge whether this temporal, or intuitively formal 
pattern is applicable in light of contingent circumstances attending the given context of 
judgement.  
 
This is why Allison refers to schemata, both empirical and transcendental, as ‘recognitional’ 
capacities:
215
 a schema is a mode of construal of the sensible manifold, and guides the correct 
application of universal concepts to perception. As Young points out,
216
 as the capacity for 
‘representing an object even without its presence in intuition’,217 imagination necessarily 
perceives more than is present in sensation, it construes that sensation into a recognisable 
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The role of imagination in transcendental logic is distinct from its role in relating to the general 
logic that governs empirical concepts in ordinary knowledge, however, in that there are specific 
transcendental schemata that are necessary to the application of the categories. This difference 
is rooted in the apriority of transcendental logic. Unlike general logic, which only analyses what 
can already be known, transcendental logic, (as categorical), enables knowledge itself, or is 
synthetic, in that it conditions possible experience.  
 
I will now illustrate how Kant envisages transcendental schematism in action with reference to 
Young’s article, ‘Kant’s View of Imagination’.219 The nature of Kantian schematising activity 
must be understood, in order to grasp, in the next chapter, Bergson’s criticism of Kant from the 
point of view of a supposedly more fundamental concept of temporal process. In chapter four I 
shall show the difference between a Kantian, (or, as Bergson terms it, ‘spatialised’) concept of 
time and the actual process that is time’s integral movement. Bergson’s account will reveal time 
as the bearer of a genuinely unpredictable cognitive novelty that cannot be accounted for in 
Kantian terms. This distinction between Bergsonian and Kantian concepts of time will be 
shown to affect the possible compatibility of certain styles of romantic aesthetics with a 
Kierkegaardian or paradoxical concept of revelation, in chapters to come. To facilitate this line 
of argument, therefore, I now turn to Young’s account of Kantian epistemological schematism. 
 
(3.3) Kant’s numerical schematism and the quantification of the intrinsic quality of 
process 
Young’s analysis of a key instance of transcendental schematism – the schema for the concept 
of quantity – serves to illuminate a problem with Kantian temporality that I shall show to be 
addressed by Bergson. According to Kant’s account, the distinction between the pure concept of 
quantity and its schema, number, is bound up with the question of how a given quantity of 
sense-data can be represented in consciousness.
220
 Only by referring to sense can a 
representation of any finite portion or amount of experiential content be achieved. The 
knowledge of sensibly given quantities depends ultimately upon our ability to identify 
collections, but we are presented only with particulars through sensible affection. In order to 
justify a reference or application for pure concepts, such as quantity, we have to be able to 
group particulars together. As no such combination is given sensibly, this grouping is always 
the work of the imagination, guided by the understanding.
221
 But what is involved in the 
construal of a given affective state as a collection? It implies the gathering up of what is before 
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us into perceptive consciousness. What is before us is contained in the form of time. Therefore 
this gathering up into consciousness will be serial.  
 
But if there are only particulars in the pure manifold of sense, how can one particular be 
connected to another? Only by retaining the previous sensible contents in memory can they be 
linked together with their successors as members of a series. Membership implies homogeneity, 
a likeness or affinity between particulars. Memory can only retain past ‘moments’ (or ‘points’ 
as Kant calls them)
222
 as members of a series if these can be seen to belong together on the basis 
of such homogeneity. Therefore to say that we remember the past and anticipate the future 
leaves out a step.  
 
In order to determine a quantity, we must be able, imaginatively, to construe
223
 what is to be 
retained in memory as belonging together. We have to construe a continuity of homogeneous 
moments according to a recognisable pattern, and to continue the serial interpretation we must 
be able to add the homogeneous to the homogeneous; that is, we must have a temporal plan of 
activity. Such a temporal plan is a method. To construe a series, we submit what is presented 
sensibly to a methodical interpretation, which involves ‘running through a collection of things, 
one after another, determining thereby that they conform to a certain rule’.224  
 
I will analyse this last assertion. The imaginative ‘running through’ of the manifold is a matter 
of serial or temporal construal. It is made possible because the imagination works methodically, 
recognising a collection as belonging together, on the basis of a homogeneous mode of 
construal of the successive items to be retained. Such a method involves the possibility of 
anticipating how to construe the next datum in line in terms of its similarity to its predecessors. 
Methodical activity such as this is rule-determined, and can only exist as such. A haphazard 
succession is not methodical. Something must therefore guide, normatively, an imaginative 
procedure of running through the manifold, to take it up into consciousness. The pure concept 
of quantity is, in our example, such a guiding rule, and in belonging to the understanding, this 
concept of quantity derives from what Kant describes as ‘a faculty of rules’.225 This necessary 
principle of methodical, temporal ordering enables homogeneity in the manifold to be 
recognised through a process of imaginative synthesis or union of the contents of consciousness 
for the understanding; which is to say that the imagination, guided in this case by the pure 
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concept of quantity, construes the manifold as a necessarily or objectively ordered field of 




We are looking, therefore, for a necessarily ordered and successive process of quantifying, 
which can retain previous marks by construing them as if along a continuous line by means of a 
method which, in principle, is an awareness of how to extend this line ad infinitum; we are 
looking for a methodical procedure that is always able to anticipate what will come next by 
virtue of an implicit standard of homogeneity. This rule governed, interpretative method is what 
we mean by counting. A method of determining the manifold in time transcendentally is a 
transcendental schema, and the schematised category of the pure concept of quantity, is number. 
The concept of ‘number in general’ (e.g. the intelligibility of the concepts ‘nine’ or ‘ten’, say, in 
abstraction from groups of objects corresponding to those number-concepts) is thus not derived 
from sense. Sensible contents are always particulars, and a number is a representation in 
consciousness of a group. Numbers cannot be derived from the pure understanding however, 
because they can only be justified with reference to sense. But sense has a formal as well as a 
material aspect, as we have found. A number is therefore a concept depending for its objectivity 
on time as the form of inner sense. A formal intuition of time is thus a method for determining 
what is intuited in time in accordance with a pure concept, or rule, of the understanding, such as 
quantity. The concept of number in general is thus the representation of a transcendental 
schema of that pure concept of quantity, as magnitude.  
 
Time can never be directly intuited, as Kant makes clear in the transcendental aesthetic, and in 
the first analogy of experience.
227
 The representation of the permanent, of substance in outer 
sense, is necessary for awareness of all alteration as contained in one time, and just as is the 
case with relation to the specific instance of counting, we can only represent time itself by 
imaginatively constructing a line in the spatial form of outer sense, geometrically. This line 
must in principle be continuable ad infinitum, as just pointed out. This means that since its 
homogeneity is rule-determined, we always know how to keep the line going; such a linear 
representation of time is therefore spatially mediated.  
 
Thus any awareness of time, for Kant, is fundamentally a matter of addition of homogeneous 
marks according to a method; and we have seen above that the principle of such a method is a 
pure concept of the understanding, that of quantity. Kant offers us therefore a spatialised and 
quantified conception of time.  
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But in knowing, necessarily, that the time-line is infinitely extendable, as Henri Bergson would 
object (as we will see in the next chapter),
228
 we always know, in principle, exactly how that 
time-line can be determined in advance. Time is thus, on the Kantian account before us, 
necessarily and formally pre-determined, and there is no room for genuine novelty, for any 
genuine creativity within the spatialised temporal order which Kant presents to us as the only 
possible field in which we can function cognitively. This is of direct relevance to the possibility 
of genuinely paradoxical, or Kierkegaardian revelation, as will emerge in later chapters. 
Bergson would in fact agree with Kant that conceptual knowledge is blind to novelty, to 
freedom. But, as we shall see in the next chapter, he also offers a radically different conception 
of time, a participative awareness that cannot be reduced to objective conceptual determination. 
Bergson, we shall see, suggests that Kant’s spatially intuited time-line is really nothing of the 
sort. All there is for Kant, according to Bergson, is the series of homogeneous marks or points 
in space. Kant is found to be blind to the actual flow of genuine temporal awareness.  
 
For as Bergson will point out, Kant’s objective connecting of spatial points or markers takes 
time, a movement for which Kant offers no account (and can offer none in objective conceptual 
terms). Such time-taking, as the process of our counting, signifies that we are aware that we 
undergo an actual transition in the progress from homogeneous point A to homogeneous point 
B, et cetera. Bergson will therefore claim that Kant is unable to account for such immediately 
felt transition, as his concept of time abstracts from this feeling of lived duration and is 
consequently blind to its movement. As William James also realised,
229
 such a Kantian or 
spatialised understanding of time is an essentially utilitarian or instrumental notion, as 
abstracted from concrete becoming, or duration, purely for the purposes of action. Such 
understanding, however, is not the tool to deliver insight into concrete becoming, into actuality 
understood as an essential process of self-manifestation:  a creative and organic, ontological 
dynamic.  
 
(4) Kant’s concept of possible objective consciousness as rooted in the conditions of 
subjective awareness 
As bound up with the account of the transcendental imagination just addressed in section three, 
the thinking involved in Kant’s account of possible self-consciousness greatly informs later 
developments in this thesis, and so needs to be addressed before moving on.  
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229 See, for example, William James, A Pluralistic Universe, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 247-258. 
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In drawing this distinction between thought and knowledge, Kant holds that by virtue of its own 
reflexivity, human consciousness can become aware of its own limitation from within. We can 
know that we ourselves construct a formal perspective on the world, without, however,  
returning to a pre-critical or transcendentally realist position, (an impossible, perspective-less 
‘view from nowhere’, exemplified in the traditional tenet that knowledge is the result of 
conformity of experience to an object outside experience). Human knowledge can infer the 
boundaries of its own possibility from within.
230
 Empirical reality, as a moulding of sensible 
conditions through pure a priori categories and pure forms of inner and outer intuition, is no less 
real for the insight that its sensible contents are transcendentally conformed to our own forms of 
awareness, so that it is at the same time transcendentally ideal. As Gardner points out, the 
knowledge-claim that we are perspectivally oriented towards reality makes no claims about the 
ultimate nature of reality, but only determines the limits of experience from within as a 
‘knowledge of the shape of our perspective’.231 In asserting a noumenal or unknowable 
condition for empirical reality, therefore, Kant is not taking up a perspectiveless, 
transcendentally realist position. 
 
In view of what has just been said, and anticipating discussions to come, I would suggest that, 
for Kant, the very possibility of a critique of pure reason, and thus of an insight into its 
necessary limitation, is dependent on the reflexivity of consciousness, as establishing the 
possibility of a discursive distance from immediate perception through the ‘transcendental unity 
of apperception’,232 or the possibility of cognitive self-consciousness. The transcendental unity 
of apperception, discussed more fully in the next section, is represented in an act of thinking in 
which thinking becomes aware of the necessity of its own activity in focusing its objects,
233
 as a 
unifying condition of the possibility of thinking and knowing. This representation, ‘I think’, as 
an awareness of the fundamental, unifying act in which thinking becomes possible at all, as a 
focusing of sensible content into a necessarily structured form, must in principle be capable of 
accompanying all my representations.
234
 Possible self-consciousness in thinking
235
 is thus a 
necessary condition of experience.
236
 Equally, and in a necessary structure of polarity with the 
cognitive subject, cognitive self-awareness must depend for its possibility on the sensible 
manifold, since it is only through recognising its own activity in objectively unifying this 
manifold that thought becomes aware of its own identity in apperception. Thought is always 
thought of something. Through claiming a self-oriented unity of experience for its own, the 
transcendental unity of apperception establishes a reflective distance from that experience. To 
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be able to form an awareness of the objects of one’s own consciousness is to be able to stand 
back from sensible appearances by virtue of thinking them. As grounded in such a reflexive act, 
our capacity to think is a distancing from sensible appearances that enables a re-union, or self-
conscious return upon those appearances in the synthesising activity of conceptual judgement. 
As implying such separation, the capacity to think exceeds the limitations of what may be 
positively known in such judgements. Thought’s capacity to reflect upon itself means that it 
transcends merely perceptive immediacy in the act of pure apperception. However, for Kant, 
our liberating discursive distance from the ‘blind’ immediacy of animal awareness entails a 
limiting distance from reality in itself, in respect of the world-in-itself as much as of the self-in-
itself, as these might exist outside of the formal and sensible construction of empirical 
experience.  
 
 (4.1) Kant’s notion of transcendental subjectivity 
I have referred above to the transcendental unity of apperception, (possible self-consciousness 
in thinking), as argued for in Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories. As central to a 
theory of the possibility of the ‘subject-object’ relation,237 and thus of the possibility of the 
perspective of human experience, transcendental subjectivity is obviously at the nerve centre of 
the Kantian critical structure. Like the conceptuality of transcendental imagination addressed in 
section three, the thinking involved in Kant’s account of possible self-consciousness greatly 
informs later developments in this thesis, and so needs to be addressed before moving on. In the 
course of this section, I will also be building on what has just been learned in section four by 
elaborating further on the relationship between Kant’s thinking concerning possible 
apperception and varieties of later idealist, romantic and existential thought, thus deepening the 
contextualisation of discussions in the chapters ahead.  
 
The unity of apperception is, broadly, the possibility that I can think of myself in relation to any 
possible object of knowledge.
238
 As enabling a unitary experiential flow of temporal awareness, 
apperceptive unity is of specific significance to my thesis in that it entails the impossibility of a 
direct knowledge of the self in-itself, or as anything more than empirical appearance, an issue 
that will be taken up in both romantic and idealist post-Kantian thought. It is also relevant to 
Kierkegaard’s position that subjectivity, as interposed between reality and ideality is never 
transparent to itself (a predicament, as seen, which Kierkegaard describes as ‘inter-esse’). In a 
profound sense, for Kierkegaard, we do not know who we truly are, and can only begin the 
process of self-discovery in light of the saving judgement of paradoxical revelation.  
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For Kierkegaard, as we found, our self-awareness is always subject to what could be described 
in the wake of Kant as a transcendental, conditioning structure. We are, necessarily, always in 
the process of becoming ourselves through time. Kierkegaard could be described as at the 
crossroads between romantic and modernist conceptions of selfhood, alongside Schopenhauer, 
whose relationship to the thought of Kierkegaard was touched upon in chapter two.
239
 Both 
thinkers deny what is purported to be a transparency and wholeness of self, as asserted in the 
earlier romantic and idealist reactions to Kant, (although, in relation to certain forms of 
romanticism, I will present reasons to challenge this contention in a later chapter). It is Kant, 
however, who first denied such self-transparency long before either Kierkegaard or 
Schopenhauer. In what follows, I hope to lay the foundation for developments in later chapters 
which deal with such nineteenth century developments from Kant’s position. 
 
To help explain this concept of the transcendental unity of apperception, perhaps an example is 
in order. One can note the impossibility of any experience that was not transcendentally unified 
as Kant describes, in Dickens’s use of poetic licence in the words he gives to a character in his 
novel Hard Times, as she lies dying: 
‘Are you in pain, dear mother?’ 
‘I think there is a pain somewhere in the room,’ said Mrs. Gradgrind, ‘but I 
couldn’t positively say that I have got it’.240 
An awareness of a bodily feeling that both is and is not one’s own, barring a paranormal ‘out of 
body’ experience, is hard to credit. This is what Kant means when he insists that the thought ‘I’ 
must be able to accompany any possible experience,
241
 as an experience one is in fact having, as 
identifiable within a unified and ‘claimable’ conscious field. This transcendental unity of 
apperception (the term apperception meaning simply a thought of oneself as the unifying centre 
of the experiential perspective) is necessary to any possible empirical experience. Mrs. 
Gradgrind’s fictional predicament describes an impossible empirical experience, as not unified 
for a possible apperception: not claimable as one’s own in thought. 
 
For Kant, the transcendental unity of apperception is the fundamental form of unification for all 
thought, thought itself being essentially a process that unifies content through forms of 
judgement. The transcendental unity of apperception is to thought, therefore, what the 
conditioning forms of time and space are to all possible intuition.
242
 In a sense, as the focus of 
the necessary connection of all experience within a unitary consciousness that can be aware of 
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its own experience, the transcendental unity of apperception just is what is meant by the faculty 
of thinking.
243
 It is more than this however.  
 
In order that there can be experience, or empirical knowledge, as distinct from mere thought, 
thought must be combined with intuition into a pattern of objectively connected unity for 
apperception. The manifold of intuition must be objectified in accordance with necessary 
categorical modes of unification, as derived from, and directing the content of possible 
knowledge towards transcendental apperception as the ultimate condition of experience.
244
 We 
have seen how the imagination fulfils a connecting or mediating role between thought and 
sensibility, by establishing a transcendental synthesis of the manifold by means of a pure 
temporal intuition. Through the transcendental imaginative synthesis, as regulated by the 
categories, the manifold is submitted to a necessary ordering according to categorical forms of 
judgement. The ultimate source of such forms of judgement as necessary conditions of 
experience is the transcendental unity of apperception, because the focused unity of the 
manifold, its synthesis into objective forms of connection for a single consciousness, is the 
fundamental act of objective unification from which all categorical judgements, as forms of the 
necessary unity of the manifold, derive their possibility.
245
 Such categorical judgements are 
themselves connected to the manifold of sense through its temporal synthesis by means of the 
imagination. Since the imagination unites the manifold in accordance with the necessary forms 





(4.2) The unknowable source of selfhood 
I will now look more closely into the question of the nature and role of the transcendental unity 
of apperception, and its relation to empirical self-awareness, whose temporal conditions are 
established according to the unity of apperception through the transcendental synthesis of 
imagination. The necessity of reflexivity, or self-consciousness to the possibility of objective 
experience should thus become clearer, and I shall relate my findings to my earlier assertion 
that the issue of reflexive consciousness is an important focus for thinkers in the idealist and 
romantic traditions immediately following Kant. I will illustrate this connection with reference 
to the work of Schelling and Coleridge, in furtherance of my aim, stated at the beginning of this 
chapter, of locating central themes to be encountered in the conceptual landscape that I will be 
exploring in the chapters to come. In the process, the link between Schelling’s thinking and that 
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of Henri Bergson, the focus of my next chapter, will come to light, as we see how each in his 
own way responded to Kant. 
 
For Kant, empirical self-awareness is always mediated by the temporal form of experiential 
receptivity, and therefore one only knows oneself indirectly as an empirical ego, or as one is 
affected by oneself through the formal conditions of inner sense.
247
 As distinct from such 
empirical self-awareness, and conditioning its possibility, the ‘I’ of transcendental apperception 
is merely an awareness of thinking.
248
 It is a merely intellectual consciousness in that it is 




Kantian time-consciousness in general, just like the possibility of empirical self-consciousness 
(which possibility it enables), relies on an awareness of objective permanence, as time’s 
necessarily indirect representation. The transcendental unity of apperception that is made 
possible by the awareness of such permanence, however, only gives the possibility of an ‘I’ in 
the form of an intellectual awareness of an identity in thinking which must be able to 
accompany any possible representation,
250
 as conforming to one conscious stream. While 
something really is given in this ‘I think’, we can have no concept of this something: a self-in-
itself cannot even properly, or objectively, be known to ‘exist’, therefore, since this would bring 
the non-empirical ground of the representation ‘I’ under the concept of existence,251 while any 
use of such  a concept is only warranted within empirical experience.  
  
All we seem to be able to claim is a ‘feeling of an existence’ of an ‘I’,252 as Kant suggests in his 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.
253
 But neither can this awareness be properly 
described as a ‘feeling’, since it is intellectual, and thus an activity of consciousness. Feeling 
implies passivity, and the receptive form of intuition proper to humanity. But as in part passive 
and receptive, humans are incapable of what Kant hypothesises, by contrast, as a divine, self-
constitutive ‘intellectual intuition’, so the thought of ‘I’ that is bound up with the transcendental 
unity of apperception is highly ambiguous, as identifiable neither in a conceptual act nor a 
receptive intuition, properly speaking. It should be recalled that the imagination, as it has 
entered our discussion so far, has been described in such ambiguous terms. This connection will 
be important. 
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Kant suggests that, in apperception, ‘I am conscious of myself, neither as I appear, nor as I am 
in myself, but only that I am’.254 This perhaps could be described as a ‘negative knowledge’, in 
the sense discussed above: a knowledge of the boundedness of knowledge.
255
 I can think that I 
am, but I cannot know what I am as other than phenomenally reflected, as empirical ego.  Thus 
empirical self-acquaintance does not constitute direct self-knowledge, as one would be 
habitually inclined to believe. 
 
Transcendental apperception is thus a manifestation of activity to thought alone, working 
without intuition.
256
 Without intuition, such mere thought cannot yield knowledge of the self in 
itself, as any possible human knowledge must be sensibly conditioned. Such sensible, spatio-
temporal intuition could not be available for the apperceptive awareness in principle, and this is 
because transcendental apperception is the ultimate spontaneous source of the pure intuition of 
time as the formal condition of all sensible intuition, a pure intuition enabled through the 
medium of productive imagination which apperception directs. Manifesting to thought as such 
spontaneous synthesising activity, the transcendental self therefore cannot, itself, be intuited: it 
cannot be intuitively caught in the act of enabling intuition. Only an infinite knowledge could 
be ‘self-active’,257 or self-creative, determining its own existence through a purely intuitive 
knowing, without a receptive dependence on sensible intuition. In the next chapter we shall see 
how Schelling takes issue with this limitation, by claiming an intellectual intuition into the 
source of subjective awareness.  
 
(4.4) Ontology through subjectivity after Kant 
The predicament of self-knowledge, as seen from a Kantian perspective – as always a matter of 
indirect awareness in empirical appearance – is taken up in post-Kantian aesthetics, in an 
attempt to overcome what was perceived as Kant’s epistemological dualism of phenomenal and 
noumenal aspects of reality.
258
 As we saw in chapter one, romantics such as Wackenroder think 
that such a metaphysical holism is achievable through the manifestation, in aesthetic intuition, 
of the infinite ground of the phenomenal self through the indeterminate meaningfulness of 
absolute, or purely instrumental music, regarded as a language over and above the verbal 
language of finite, conceptual determinations.
259
 Like Wackenroder, Schelling, (as we shall see 
in the next chapter), and Coleridge, (as we shall discover in chapters six and seven), regard 
aesthetic creativity as capable of bringing about an awareness of an infinite, creative ground of 
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selfhood through finite consciousness, an aesthetic disclosure of the eternal, or trans-temporal 




It is in acknowledgement of Kant’s claim that it is impossible for the understanding to know its 
own ground determinately, that idealist and romantic claims for the ontological significance of 
aesthetic, indeterminate intuition come to be put forward by Kant’s immediate successors. 
Accordingly, Fichte and the early Schelling postulate an act of intellectual intuition (as we have 





That a practical postulate is made to serve as a highest metaphysical principle is highly 
significant, since it headlines the new, post-Kantian basis on which ontological thought is to be 
constructed.
262
 After Kant’s critique, metaphysics is no longer possible as an objective, 
theoretical statement of the nature of ultimate reality, into which the subject must be fitted. 
From now on any metaphysic will only be possible as a mode of seeing the world: as 
channelled through subjectivity. This practical basis for metaphysics does not mean, however, 
that ontology is dissolved into a mere question of relative subjective preferences and opinions 
by post-Kantian thinkers, but that one’s active mode of relation to reality through time becomes 
inseparable from any metaphysical claims which might be made.
263
 Ontological truth, for 
romantics, as for Kierkegaard, the father of existentialism, becomes intrinsically connected to 
criteria of personal authenticity and commitment. After Kant, any metaphysical account will 





(5) Summary and Prospect 
 
We have just learned that in certain varieties of what may broadly be described as romantic 
thought, a claim is made for an aesthetically or imaginatively mediated participation in 
ontological truth. We have seen in this chapter that such a claim is built on three, related 
Kantian theses, namely, (a), the opaqueness of the transcendental source of the self from the 
empirical perspective of conceptually mediated experience, and (b), the intrinsic temporality of 
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the self, and (c), The productive role of imagination in enabling experience. These issues will 
loom large in chapters ahead. 
 
As we have also learned, however, for Kant himself, transcendental subjectivity, as a condition 
for the possibility of the subject-object relation, is only signalised by the apperception ‘I think’ 
that must be able to accompany any empirical experience.
265
 The representation ‘I’ is what Kant 
suggests as a signpost for interpreting his position on the issue of a fundamentally necessary 
and transcendental subjective unity, a unity that can only be apperceived in a thought of self 
lacking all conceptual determination.  
 
We have seen, with Kant, that if experience is to be possible at all, it cannot flow in multiple 
streams; experience, as a unity of thought and intuition, if it is to exist at all, can only do so as a 
focused connectedness in time, and something actual and more than empirical must be thought 
to enable this possibility as its noumenal condition: this thought of a self-in-itself is symbolised 
by the ‘I’ which must be able to accompany any possible experience. However, for Kant, 
nothing may be determinately known of this extra-experiential condition. But even on Kant’s 
terms, as discussed above, the criterion of experience, the condition of its possibility, is not so 
much the thought, ‘I’, which must be able to accompany any human experience; rather it is the 
always prior, but conceptually indeterminable, act of unifying the manifold which makes such a 
reflective thought of self possible.   
 
We shall soon see, in addressing Schelling’s Transcendental Idealism, that it is this very act that 
becomes the focus of an intellectual intuition, through which imaginatively mediated insight 
into the temporal process of the ground of selfhood’s emergence into consciousness becomes 
possible. Such is, at least, Schelling’s claim. With such a move, metaphysics is not so much re-
instated as placed on a transcendental and dynamic footing, its principle no longer to be found 
in theoretical pseudo-objectivity – Kant’s dogmatism – but in the practically postulated, 
intuitive demand, to which attention was drawn at the end of the last section.  
 
We have learned that certain post-Kantian thinkers try to move beyond Kant’s position in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, as addressed in this chapter, while engaging with his findings. We are 
about to learn that, for Schelling, this involves turning to Kant’s third critical work, The 
Critique of Judgement. As indicated already, the perceived inadequacy of Kant’s account of 
time to grasp a vitally creative, dynamic ground of existence is also noted by Henri Bergson. 
Like Schelling, as we are about to see, Bergson claims the need for a personal, philosophical 
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intuition of genuine temporal movement, as opposed to the linear, spatially-translated 
conception of time that the Kantian, calculative understanding abstracts from real becoming.  
 
Therefore it is to the thought of Bergson and Schelling, in relation to Kant’s account of 
aesthetics and teleology in the Critique of the Power of Judgement that I now turn, as a 
comparative analysis of the way Kant’s findings are handled and criticised by Schelling and 
Bergson will lead us towards a philosophical criterion concerning the incalculability of 
temporal process. This philosophical criterion will, in turn, enable us to discriminate between 
aesthetic accounts of transcendence, in terms of their compatibility with Kierkegaard’s 
theological position concerning the paradoxical incalculability of Christian revelation. Through 
this procedure I thus approach the goal of my thesis: the theoretical reconciliation of 










Time as Creative Process 
 
Introduction: Kant, Bergson and Schelling; metaphysical time as organically meaningful 
 
In this chapter it will be shown that Kant’s analysis of organic phenomena or ‘natural purposes’, 
in his Critique of the Power of Judgment,
266
 is centrally related to the theme of imaginatively 
participative insight into the polar structure of reality in strands of post-Kantian metaphysical 
thought. We have already met an example of polar, or dialectical thinking in addressing 
Hegelianism in chapter one.  
 
Organisms, as defined by Kant,
267
 share the same essentially polar structure as the dynamic, 
holistic explanatory model on which varieties of romantic and idealist metaphysics depend.
268
 
Mechanical explanation is, for such metaphysicians, relativised by Kant’s insight into the 
mutually constitutive, co-dependency of whole and parts in organic structures, since such 
intrinsic purposefulness cannot be accounted for in terms of causal necessity alone.
269
 
Organisms thus defy complete explanation in terms of Kant’s transcendental categories of the 
understanding, which we saw in the last chapter to be for Kant the conceptual conditions of any 
possible knowledge. It will become clear that organic structure, as Kant sees it, demands a more 
holistic and interpretative approach.  
 
I will be showing how Kant’s account of organic teleology relates to his aesthetic thinking, and 
how such Kantian themes are resorted to by later thinkers such as Schelling and Bergson in the 
interests of a more holistic explanatory model. Elements of Kant’s aesthetic account are of 
crucial importance to the goal of this thesis, because of Kant’s reading of the non-determining 
or logically indeterminate role of concepts when set into ‘free play’ with the imagination, in 
aesthetic perception and production.
270
 Such meaningful logical indeterminacy, or the 
intimation of meaning through aesthetic perception, is what we must look to for the kind of 
aesthetic account of transcendence capable of harmonisation with Kierkegaard’s concept of 
paradoxical faith. 
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This chapter aims to show, in relation to Kant’s account of organic teleology and aesthetics, that 
Bergson’s vitalist metaphysics follows earlier patterns of romantic thought in building on 
Kant’s insights into organic process and aesthetic judgement.271 Focusing on Bergson and 
Schelling in relation to Kant, I propose to show that post-Kantian metaphysical thinkers accept 
Kant’s limitation of human conceptual understanding, but offer their own forms of 
‘transcendental deduction’ of a qualitatively different, intuitive mode of knowing on which the 
determinate conceptuality of empirical knowledge is shown to depend for its possibility.
272
 
Kant’s conception of knowledge is thus expanded from within his own epistemological 
framework. I explain that in the thought of both Schelling and Bergson, such intuitively 
grounded knowledge is itself deemed a participation in a dynamic act of ontological 
becoming.
273
 Bergson and Schelling, in their own ways seek to access the qualitatively rich 





We will discover as this chapter progresses that for Bergson and Schelling, in their different 
ways, imaginatively mediated intuition overcomes the Kantian distinction of phenomena and 
things in themselves to reveal creative, temporal process to be the ground both of Kant’s 
phenomenal objects, and the empirical understanding which apprehends them.
275
 In Schelling’s 
terms, phenomenal subjectivity and objectivity inter-depend organically, as stemming from a 
common productive root: nature is ‘invisible mind’, mind’s own otherness, while mind is 
‘invisible nature’, nature’s own otherness.276 
 
In relation to Bergson, especially, it will be suggested that Kant’s understanding of time is 
found wanting, as a mere abstraction from the actuality of the living process Bergson’s 
philosophy sets out to describe.
277
 Bergson contends that the true nature of temporal duration 
can only be grasped through an imaginative and intuitive participation in its actual flow, as the 
ground of one’s own subjectivity.278 I show that through a similar act of aesthetic intuition, 
Schelling claims to discover the activity that makes Kant’s transcendental subjectivity (as 
described in the last chapter) possible: a self-positing activity through which space and time 
come to be as forms of inner and outer sense.
279
 Accepting Kantian strictures against dogmatic 
metaphysics, epistemology thus becomes the frame through which Schelling and Bergson, each 
in his own way, discover an ontologically productive, organic process. But it will be the 
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conclusion of this chapter that Schelling offers an unsuitable model of dynamic creativity, at 




It will be suggested that only a Bergsonian, aesthetically mediated conception of metaphysical 
truth might accord with Kierkegaard’s concept of paradoxical revelation, and thus that any 
aesthetic encounter with transcendence – as that which we are seek throughout this thesis – 
must measure up to such a Bergsonian criterion if it is to harmonise with Kierkegaard’s 
theology. We have discovered grounds to regard the Kierkegaardian account as in need of such 
aesthetic completion, and the discovery of a suitable aesthetic of transcendence is the ultimate 
goal of this work, as made clear in chapter two. 
 
Thus it is with Bergson’s criticism of the Kantian or ‘spatialised’ temporality which we met 
with in the last chapter that I will begin, as Bergson’s findings provide a metaphysical rationale 
for the kind of ontologically dynamic and aesthetically indeterminate accounts that I will be 
addressing in following chapters. It is through the critical examination which I shall be offering 
in this chapter of accounts of metaphysical process that we will be guided in the remainder of 
this thesis towards a suitably open-ended, or romantically intimative understanding of the 
aesthetic encounter with transcendence; an understanding that can be shown to accord with a 
Kierkegaardian or paradoxical concept of revelation. 
 
(1) Bergson: The difference between movement and concepts of movement 
 
It has been shown in chapter three that time, or the form of inner sense, as Kant understands it, 
can never be directly intuited. A representation of permanence in spatial outer sense is 
necessary if there is to be awareness of alteration as contained in one time. Moreover, Kant 
shows that we can only thus represent time by imaginatively constructing a line in the form of 
outer sense, geometrically. This line must in principle be continuable ad infinitum. We have 
seen that, as a geometrical construct in outer sense, we always know how to keep the line going 
on which our understanding of time depends, since spatial relationships are formal, a priori 
conditions of awareness. Awareness of time, for Kant, is thus a matter of addition of 
homogeneous marks according to a method, and it was shown that this numerical method 
constitutes a spatial schema of the pure concept of quantity. Empirical awareness of time is 
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We will see Bergson insisting that such a quantitative assessment is a mere conceptual 
translation of real experiential time, which as a concrete and growing, qualitative whole can 
never be adequately accounted for as cut up through determinate conceptual analysis. Truly 
productive or synthetic process is distorted by the conceptuality that seeks to contain it, delimit 
it, and thus reduce it to conceptual measure. Bergson thus holds that Kant offers us a spatialised 
and quantified conception of time that itself depends on a more original, qualitative assessment 
of productive metaphysical process, which he labels ‘duration’.282  
 
Bergson objects to the Kantian account that in knowing that the spatial ‘time-line’ is infinitely 
extendable, we always know, in principle, exactly how it can be determined in advance.
283
 Time 
is thus necessarily pre-determined, with no room for real qualitative growth or novelty, for true 
creativity. Put simply, there is no account offered by Kant of the actual movement of which his 
‘time-line’ is merely a tracing of positions already passed through: there is no Kantian account 
of the passing-through, which Bergson regards as the essence of time, and as such, the motive 
principle of reality, both material and ideal.
284
 More will be said of the nature of such reality in 
our final section. 
 
Bergson would in fact agree that as a practical adaptation, or simplification of reality for 
purposes of efficient action, conceptually determined knowledge must be blind to the genuine 
novelty and freedom made possible by duration, which he holds to be in itself a creatively 
dynamic process.
285
 Such freedom is lost in the conceptuality of causal accounts in terms of 
determinate empirical knowledge. Such accounts can only collect past moments, or conceptual 
‘snapshots’286 analytically incised from time’s ever-changing movement.287 Such finite 
conceptual judgements are abstracted from the actual flow of experience in order to be re-
arranged, re-connected like beads on a string: the string of the Kantian time-line laid out in 
terms of space.
288
 But over and above the abstract skeleton of Kant’s quantitative, spatially 
translated time, (and Bergson contends, as its condition of possibility), Bergson insists that real 
temporal duration just is a dynamic and content-forming, organic process of growth.
289
 Bergson 
points out that the act of connecting points on Kant’s spatialised time-line takes time, as we 
undergo transition in the progress from point to point.
290
 Kant’s concept of time abstracts from 
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In his ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’,292 Bergson looks at the difference between a qualitative 
intuition of consciousness as a process of becoming, and the same process as conceptually 
quantified through empirical psychological analysis, in which pure durational wholeness is 
spatially translated in terms of extensive, and thus measurable, ‘states’.293 Bergson imagines 
himself conducting such a psychological, conceptual reconstruction of conscious process out of 
supposedly elementary atomic units or states, as linked together and measured according to a 
spatial understanding of time; but he does so only in order to point out the philosophical 
inadequacies of this essentially reductivist, mosaic procedure. Bergson aims to show that static, 
abstracted parts of experience cannot be reconstructed to account for the seamless, yet 
qualitatively rich diversity of conscious experience: 
My analysis [into quantitatively discreet psychological states]...easily resolves the 
inner life into states each of which is homogeneous to itself; only since the 
homogeneity spreads out over a definite number of minutes or seconds, the 
elementary psychological state does not cease to have duration, though it does not 
change. But who does not see that that the definite number of minutes and seconds 
I attribute to the elementary psychological state has no more than the value of an 
indication meant to remind me that the psychological state, supposedly 
homogeneous, is in reality a state which changes and endures? The state, taken in 




Here Bergson is indicating a move beyond the sphere of determinate empirical knowledge, as 
quantified or spatialised consciousness dissolves, in the light of what he claims to be 
‘philosophical intuition’,295 to reveal its own flowing and fertile source. Bergson suggests that 
the empirical psychologist abstracts a certain quantitative average from a moving whole of 
undivided and unique qualitative relations, and that this extract is then identified in terms of a 
general and invariable concept, by the investigator. A static state has thereby been artificially 
constituted and made to ‘stand for’ a qualitatively seamless process, through the activity of the 
psychologist. To measure the duration of such a state, and thus, in effect, to translate a real 
duration into something other than itself, empirical time-consciousness, or a becoming ‘in 
general’, has been extracted or abstracted: ‘a becoming that would no more be the becoming of 
this or that, and this is what [has been] called the time the state occupies’. Such abstract and 
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spatialised time ‘is as immobile for me as the state I localise in it’.296 Bergson contends that 
what is distorted by the positing of a conceptual state actually flows as a continuous 
diversification of quality. Without its intrinsic qualities, such a quantified state is immobilised 
and thus falsified.  
 
Bergson suggests that the homogeneous time of measurement is only a tool with which to 
compare actual concrete durations. It permits us ‘to count simultaneities and to measure one 
flowing of duration in relation to another’.297 While analysis can only deal with immobility, 
Bergson claims that the philosophical intuition on which he bases his own account is literally 
‘located in’ concrete duration as a participative raising to consciousness of what always 
underlies ordinary empirical awareness.
298
 The difference between analysis and Bergsonian 
intuition is the difference between empirical investigation and metaphysics, between the clock-
time to which we are habituated and a focused attention on the flowing nature of experience 





Bergson contends that what is decomposed for purposes of analysis can never be reconstructed 
into its original flowing wholeness. No more can actual duration be intuited through static 
concepts than a mosaic image of a swimmer could ever be mistaken for the actual experience of 
swimming.
300
 No matter how small the mosaic tiles, no matter how fine the grain of the printed 
image, or how high the definition on the television or computer screen achieved through sheer 
multiplication of pixels, the qualitative wholeness of moving reality can never be re-manifested. 
The problem as Bergson sees it is that the moving whole of temporal activity is not composed of 
parts in the first place: what did not start out as an assemblage of components cannot be re-




Simple duration, a concrete or content rich productivity, is the essence of reality in itself as 
Bergson sees it, can be subdivided to infinity by conceptual procedures, but is in itself purely 
qualitative. Finite, abstract concepts cannot deal with living wholes, as was noted by the 
Parmenidean philosopher, Zeno of Elea. Zeno’s paradox states that Achilles could never catch 
up with a tortoise no matter how fast he ran, since to the quantifying, conceptual understanding, 
there would always be an infinite divisibility in the distance that still had to be covered before 
overtaking. This measurement of time, as if with a ruler the gradations of which would have to 
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be sub-divided to infinity, spatialises the essentially non-spatial reality of living movement. 
While Zeno thought that he was demonstrating the illusory nature of becoming, Bergson 
suggests that such paradoxes for thought indicate the incompetence of the spatialising 




External viewpoints on an ever-changing continuum are all that the empirical understanding can 
cope with, unless its natural, external direction – as evolved for the utilitarian manipulation of its 
environment – has been reversed to subserve the metaphysical aim of philosophical intuition.303 
It is to this epistemological principle of Bergson’s philosophy that I now turn. 
 
(2) Bergson’s philosophical intuition, its content and its need for aesthetic communication  
 
In writing on Bergson I shall be continuing to draw on aspects of his thought to be found in his 
Time and Free Will, Creative Evolution and Creative Mind. I intend in this section to offer no 
more than an initial and brief orientation to the imaginative or conceptually indeterminate nature 
involved in Bergson’s practice of communicating his philosophical intuition of time as universal 
duration, or ontological process. This will afford sufficient contextualisation as we move in 
section three to address the Kantian sources of such dynamically conceived metaphysics, as 
found in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement.  
 
The initial foray into Bergson’s thought in this and the previous section will also provide 
contextualising material for comparison with the earlier post-Kantian metaphysics of Schelling, 
which will be introduced in what follows next, but which will be focused upon more fully in 
section four. This latter informed comparison is necessary to the progress of my thesis, as I 
intend to return to Bergson in more depth at the end of this chapter, to show that his criticism of 
Kant’s quantified translation of time extends also to the Kantian concept of teleology, which 
will be addressed in section two, and on which Schelling can be shown to depend. I shall be 
arguing in chapter six that it is just this teleological problem that makes Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s systematic account of the role of imagination in relation to our awareness of God 
inadequate from a Kierkegaardian theological perspective. I shall be going on to argue, in 
chapter seven, that other aspects of Coleridge’s purely aesthetic thought do not fail this 
theological test when held up to such a Bergsonian philosophical criterion. The reasons for such 
an inadequacy of post-Kantian teleology from a Kierkegaardian theological perspective will be 
made clear in the course of this chapter. 
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Bergson’s critique of Kantian teleology, and thus of a Schellingian dynamic philosophy (which 
his own so closely resembles in other respects), will thus provide us with an important criterion 
to guide us later in this thesis towards an account of aesthetically intimated transcendence that is 
truly open-ended, or uncontainable within a finished conceptual scheme, and which is thus at 
least potentially in accord with Kierkegaard’s concept of paradoxical revelation. 
 
(2.1) Bergson and Schelling: philosophical intuition as the epistemological entry into 
metaphysics of process 
Due to the inadequacy of concepts to recapture durational wholeness, Bergson suggests that an 
intuition of duration as an ontologically creative process is needed, which each one must 
perform and experience for himself, and which can only be indirectly communicated through 





Bergson resembles the earlier thinker, Schelling, as will be seen, in postulating an act of 
intuition into durational process as a practical basis for philosophical investigation.
305
 Bergson’s 
content-rich duration is essentially un-objectifiable, since an objectification is a halt posited 
where in truth there is only continual creative movement.
306
 True duration can only be non-
objectively or participatively intuited.
307
 Indirect, aesthetic language can point and prompt 
suggestively, but ultimately the true ground of philosophy is not a ‘dogmatic’ metaphysical 
principle, in the sense we have seen criticised by Kant, such as would lead to a conceptually 
determined, deductive account.
308
 Philosophical intuition, the key by which the significance of 
Bergson’s philosophy is unlocked, can only be accessed through a personal act of intuiting.309 
The notion of such a personal act, or practical postulate, as foundational for philosophy is 
shared by Schelling,
310
 (and, as will be seen later in this thesis, also Coleridge). I will briefly 
indicate why such an act is regarded by these thinkers as essential to any possible metaphysical 
account. 
 
Speaking very generally, I suggest that such post-Kantian metaphysical thinkers take note of the 
findings of the Critique of Pure Reason, (as addressed in the last chapter), taking account of 
Kant’s argument for epistemological perspectivism, in order to surmount that Kantian limitation 
from within. Thus metaphysics no longer aims to reveal an external arche or logos. Rather it 
seeks to use the privileged insight into our own reality that is self-awareness, in order to access 
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some living truth or productive principle which can then be discovered to be active ‘within’ 
objective phenomena, creatively enabling them.
311
 The aim of this procedure is to reunite 
consciousness with what Kant dubbed the unknowable ‘thing in itself’, but conceived as an 
implicit consciousness, or formative intelligence at work in nature.
312
 Such a metaphysical 
reunion is variously discovered in accounts of an ontologically productive, dynamic identity of 
subject and object, as the ground from which phenomenal subjectivity and objectivity (as 
addressed by Kant) develop in polar or organic relation, as we shall see as we progress in this 
chapter. The creative source of the empirical order is thus reconceived by post-Kantian thinkers 
such as Schelling, and, in his own distinctive way, by the much later Bergson, in terms of 
temporal process and organic growth. It is to this end that Bergson, like the Schelling of the 
Transcendental Idealism before him, makes an appeal to intellectual or philosophical intuition 
as the means of access to metaphysical truth, as noted above.  
 
One way – but not a way offered by Bergson – of approaching the concept of intellectual 
intuition is to regard it as a non-conceptual ‘seeing’, which is thus neither knowing nor sensing 
purely, but rather an insight into the identity of active and passive poles of the mind, of 
subjectivity and objectivity, in which the intuiter and intuited are one. For Schelling, the 
philosopher creatively participates in the transcendental condition or source of his own self-
consciousness, as reconceived in polar, dynamic terms, and which is thus also the condition of 
all possible objectivity.
313
 This intuiting is regarded as light shed on the very activity through 
which self-consciousness is conditioned; but it should be recognised that as a participation in 
that ontologically constitutive activity, the philosopher’s intuition must also be thought, in 
another sense, as the dynamic source of reality and ideality bringing itself to light, such that the 
created and the creating need to be understood as a differentiated identity, or polarity. For 
Schelling (and also Coleridge), drawing on insights into electricity and magnetism, such 
metaphysical polarity is conceived as the manifestation of one power through two mutually 




The summary just given of philosophical intuition is drawn from Schelling, whose account we 
will look at in more detail later on. Bergson is far less forthcoming, holding that no exact 
description can be given of philosophical intuition, but only of an aesthetic ‘mediating image’ to 
which the philosopher constantly turns in order to communicate his pre-conceptual intuition: 
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What is the intuition? If the philosopher has not been able to give the formula for 
it, we certainly are not able to do so. But what we shall manage to recapture and to 
hold is a certain intermediary image between the simplicity of the concrete 




So Bergson suggests that philosophy is constructed by the philosopher ‘from within’, in 
accordance with a governing intuition in the form of a participative insight into duration’s 
seamless growth as he experiences it.
316
 Durational process is a continuous emergence of 
qualitative novelty as glimpsed before its quantification, (or before Kant’s categorical 
schematisation), which cuts it up into conceptual moments to be ‘necessarily’ connected by a 
concept of causality.
317
 Such causal determinism belies the continual emergence of qualitative 
novelty, which transforms perception of the past as much as that past can be said to influence 
the perception of what emerges from it.
318
 Bergson holds that a philosophy that is awake to the 
progressive and retroactive emergence of continually unique qualitative change will reflect this 
awareness in the intrinsic co-implication of its diverse aspects within an overarching wholeness: 
‘thus the various parts of the system will interpenetrate, as in a living being’.319 But how can 
earlier and later aspects of experience as it flows be conceived as mutually influencing each 
other? For the moment I will suggest a relevant comparison, which will itself be followed up 
more fully in section two, as indicated in the introduction to this chapter. 
 
A pointer to such co-dependency of parts is found most obviously in the structure of the natural 
organism, as we will see shortly when we come to Kant.
320
 Organic parts depend on the whole 
which they make up, as much as that whole pre-supposes its constituent elements. Organism, as 
Kant notes, cannot be adequately explained in terms of causal mechanism, since the parts of 
which, in one sense, it may be said to consist are also intrinsically adapted to the purpose of the 
whole which they subserve. Such purposive functionality of the whole must consequently be 
held to be ‘prior’ to its parts, as an architect’s plan is the prior intelligibility of a whole edifice, 




But most importantly for illumination of Bergson’s concept of time, an organism’s parts must 
themselves be understood as mutually dependent.
322
 For example, each organ of the human body 
is what it is and acts as it does because each other part of the body is as it is and acts as it does. 
                                                                        
315 Bergson, The Creative Mind, p. 109. 
316 Bergson, The Creative Mind, pp.  162-6. 
317 Bergson, The Creative Mind, pp. 184-5, 188. 
318 Bergson, The Creative Mind, p. 181. 
319 Bergson, The Creative Mind, p. 118. 
320 Kant, ‘Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgement’, in Critique of the Power of Judgment, §§ 61-91. 
321 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §§ 64-66. 
322 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 66. 
100 
 
The impairment of one organ impairs each of the others on which it is therefore reciprocally, or 
systematically, dependent. More will be said of these matters when we turn to Kant’s account of 
teleology in section three, the term ‘teleology’ referring to an account of the appearance of such 
intelligible ordering in nature.  
 
For the moment, though, enough has been said to orient the reader to the organic nature of 
Bergson’s concept of time: Bergsonian duration is a paradox to the conceptual understanding, 
since the earlier, as well as creatively informing the later, is reciprocally related to it, and itself 
transformed by that to which it has given birth.
323
 Metaphysical intuition can see into the truth of 
continuous transformation, both progressive and retroactive. At present, I intend only that the 
reader note that Bergson regards time as similarly organic in qualitative structure to a natural 
organism. We have learned that a special intuition or mode of insight into organic duration is 
required, according to Bergson, since the logic governing standard conceptual accounts is uni-
directional. Just as the natural organism cannot be adequately explained in the uni-linear terms 
of mechanistic causality, so the uni-directional, or spatialised logical order of determinate 
conceptuality is blind to the qualitative interaction, ‘backwards and forwards’ – thus 
conceptuality drives one into spatial metaphors – of durational flow.  
 
For Bergson, what was influences what can become, but in the light of that becoming, what was 
takes on a new qualitative aspect. In a real sense, the past can be said to be altered by the 
future.
324
 But Bergson contends that insight into time as a current continuously pouring forth 
unique qualitative changes is lost when time is conceptualised, or cut up into moments of 
‘before’ and after’.325 Much more clarity should be shed on Bergson’s account of time in my 
final section, which is designed to show a crucial difference between his conception of organic 
duration, and the Kantian concept of teleology.  
 
(2.2) Bergson and the need for aesthetic communication of the philosopher’s intuition 
We have discussed Bergson’s concept of philosophical intuition into durational flow, and now 
turn to his conception of the philosophical communication of such intuition. We take this step 
since it constitutes a stage in the uniting, in our thinking, of the issue of aesthetic perception 
with the thought of a kind of open-ended, or intrinsically unpredictable creative process. Such 
creative activity – and, as retroactively operative, re-creative or perhaps redemptive activity – 
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may be aesthetically intimated, but can never be conceptually controlled or contained, and thus 
might be said to accord with the objectively unknowable structure of the Kierkegaardian 
revelation of salvation in Christ. 
 
Bergson’s philosophical construction and communication is an essentially poetic process, since 
he holds that only an aesthetically indeterminate use of language can transgress the limits of 
logical order so as to gesture, suggestively, towards what he holds to be the seamless continuity 
of qualitative temporal transformations.
326
 Like the iridescence of light on oily water, such 
transformations in the qualitative content of experience as it flows are intrinsically gradual and 
thus elude the reticulations of any conceptual net.  
 
For Bergson, concepts are obstacles: the necessarily abstract mosaic tiles, or the pixels, with 
which he hopes to externalise as justly as possible the uniquely holistic insights into creative 
process that he has glimpsed in his intuition. For Bergson, therefore, imagination must mediate 
conceptuality. Imagination plays a crucial, mediating role in communicating the durational 
insights of philosophical intuition.
327
 Bergson contends that the philosopher must first express to 
himself his strictly un-translatable intuition through a central, semantically rich image. 
Philosophical communication is then said to proceed from a dynamic, non-conceptual intuition 




The philosopher’s guiding focal image – the reflection of intellectual intuition in imagination – 
is described by Bergson as  
almost matter [i.e. material] in that it still allows itself to be seen, and almost mind 
[i.e. ideal] in that it no longer allows itself to be touched – a phantom which haunts 
us while we turn about the doctrine and to which we must go in order to obtain the 
decisive signal, the indication of the attitude to take [with reference to the pure 
intuition] and of the point from which to look.
329
   
Here Bergson is close to Schelling’s polar concept of the philosophical intuition, which we met 
earlier, as neither ideal nor real solely. More will be said of Schelling’s conception later.  
Bergson’s contention that it is the imagination’s ability to hold matter and form in productive, 
and in a sense, polar, tension recalls what we discovered at the heart of Kierkegaard’s concept 
of imaginative activity in chapter one. It will be important in light of arguments later in the 
chapter to remember that Kierkegaard, according to Ferreira, speaks thus of imaginative 
mediation in terms of a productive tension of opposites, while Schelling’s polar dialectical logic 
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would resolve oppositions into a determinable higher third term. In this his procedure would be 
subject to the same Kierkegaardian critique as we found levelled at Hegelianism in chapter one. 
 
For Bergson, philosophical communication is a poetic process organised from within, 
organically. Bergson sums up his position thus: ‘[...] philosophy resembles an organism rather 
than an assemblage, and it is better to speak of evolution in this case than of composition’.330 
For Bergson, in intellectual intuition, it is as if the power of understanding were turned inwards, 
against its natural tendency, in order to establish a ‘contact’,331 a participative unity with its own 
essential becoming, as rooted in the flow of universal duration. In his choice of terms, we can 
see that Bergson stresses the tactile intimacy of philosophical intuition. He does however 
invoke the visual figure of an ‘image’ to interpret the mediating role of imagination in guiding 
philosophical composition.  
 
We have seen that imaginative imagery, perhaps inchoately, guides philosophical thought 
which is itself conceived as a temporal continuity or process. In this role of mediating between 
readily available concepts and the uniqueness of a durational intuition, Bergson speaks of the 
philosopher’s guiding ‘vision’.332 In Bergson’s thought, therefore, it would be inadequate to 
describe phenomenal objectivity as constructed out of basic elements, since his intuition 
relativises the empirical standpoint. As with material objects, so it is with Bergson’s own 
process of philosophical communication. Reading without a sympathetic intuition,
333
 one thinks 
that conceptual components have been assembled like a police ‘identikit’ picture, or a jigsaw 
puzzle. A non-participative understanding of Bergson’s position can utilise and perceive only 
ready-made concepts, that have to be assembled into a mosaic picture. But this is only a 
translation of the real philosophical labour. Of course, ready-made language is utilised by the 
philosopher, but only as adapted, even transformed, in the service of philosophical intuition, in 
the attempt to develop imaginatively unique conceptual structures. The imaginative image 
guides an aesthetic activity, as the philosopher seeks to turn around the understanding, to adapt 





In this process, it is the imaginatively guided intuition that enables a unique concept, tailoring 
static forms to a living movement.
335
 Of course the tailoring image breaks down, as must all 
conceptual translation of living durational wholeness, precisely at the point where one’s 
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understanding, led by its ‘at-home-ness’ in the spatial ‘natural habitat’ of concepts, wants to 
literalise the image, to force duration onto its spatial home-ground. One would like to say that 
the intuition is clothed in concepts cut to its unique shape, but duration has no spatial shape. 
Therefore the concept, ‘shape’, must be taken as part of the imagery of tailoring.  
 
We have now learned that Bergson sees the need for his philosophical intuition to be 
imaginatively mediated. However, as already indicated, Bergson can offer no clear account of 
the nature of the philosophical intuition itself, as somehow a pre-conceptual – and thus un-
formulable – act-of-intuiting whose reality can only be verified in its performance by the 
individual thinker, and which, as non-conceptual, cannot be adequately described in objective 
terms.
336
 This is Bergson’s contention, but I shall show reason in the next chapter to suggest that 
his philosophical intuition can be adequately described simply as an aesthetic act tout court, or 
in other words, in terms of indeterminate, as opposed to determinate, conceptuality.  
 
When we return to Bergson in section five below, it will be in light of what is covered in the 
intervening sections on Kantian teleology and aesthetics, and Schelling’s romantic/idealist 
utilisation of Kantian teleological and aesthetic themes. We will then be in a position to see that 
Bergson’s thinking is importantly different to both Kant and post-Kantian idealism (as 
represented by Schelling), in that Bergson’s critique of Kant’s spatialisation of time as blind to 
process, as addressed earlier, extends to Kant’s account of organic teleology, or creative 
development. Bergson’s organic time will be shown to be following courses that cannot be 
predicted.  
 
In a nutshell, it will be found that just as Kant draws a timeline, so Schelling plots a trajectory 
which has for its presupposition the Kantian linear reconstruction or spatialisation of originally 
durational temporality. It will be suggested that because of the Kantian temporality which he 
assumes, Schelling cannot address himself to the actual flow of progressive activity. It will 
emerge that the dialectical thinking through which Schelling hopes to explain the organic nature 
of creative process misses its true nature by seeking to impose upon it yet another form of 
logical net.
337
 Schelling turns metaphorical or aesthetic insights into dynamic movement, in 
terms of organic polarity, into the means for constructing a determinate account of creative 
metaphysical process. It is the refusal by Bergson, in his own account of ontological process, of 
the ‘time-line’ of Kantian teleology that will offer us the first important criterion to distinguish 
between metaphysical accounts involving concepts of imagination and process that do and do 
not accord with a Kierkegaardian or paradoxical notion of transcendent revelation. These 
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discussions will thus advance the aims of this thesis, as laid out towards the end of chapter two, 
above. 
 
(3) Aspects of Kant’s Aesthetics and Teleology  
 
I have been drawing attention in the last section to the aesthetic nature of philosophical 
communication, (as distinct from the ‘mysterious’ intuition itself), as Bergson himself 
understands it. I have addressed Bergson’s account of such communication’s necessary 
conceptual indirectness. I have also noted Bergson’s need to write imaginatively, in order to 
prompt the reader’s self-intuition of the durational reality grounding his own experience. In this 
section I shall be showing that Kant himself unwittingly provided the impetus for such an 
understanding of the role of indeterminate conceptuality in the perception of reality-as-process. 
It will be shown that it is Kant’s treatment in the Critique of the Power of Judgement of 
aesthetics and organic teleology in terms of indeterminate conceptuality which prompts 
Schelling’s romantic/idealist metaphysics at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as well as 
Bergson’s vitalism, albeit indirectly, at the turn of the twentieth. I only intend to indicate 
features of Kant’s aesthetic and teleological accounts that are of direct relevance to the 
discussions of Schelling and Bergson which follow. 
 
In his Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant’s thinking discloses the incapacity of logically 
determined, empirical understanding to explain mechanistically important swathes of human 
experience. It is to the aesthetic aspect of Kant’s thought that I shall turn in the next two 
subsections. In that which follows I shall give some indication of Kant’s teleological account. In 
further sections I shall show that it is through attention to such areas of experience that post-
Kantian thinkers seek to re-open a door to metaphysical thought. It will be shown then that the 
issues introduced in this section on Kant – teleological process and imaginative creativity and 
judgement – are central to the renewal of metaphysical thought in the century after Kant. It is to 
certain aspects of aesthetics as dealt with in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement that I 
now briefly turn. 
 
(3.1) Aspects of Kant’s Aesthetics: Judgements of Taste 
As a purely formal, disinterested judgement (one that takes no interest in the existence of the 
object contemplated either to know, desire, or use it),
338
 the feeling of approval of a beautiful 
presentation is related to our cognitive faculties, which, as we have learned from the Critique of 
Pure Reason, are responsible for all formal, or intelligible factors in the constitution of the 
objective pole of possible experience. But this feeling of approval cannot amount to something 
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empirically known, in the precise sense of objective knowledge which Kant has analysed in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. This is because the appreciation of pure beauty involves a 
disinterested relation to an object, while any act of empirical knowledge expresses the fulfilling 
of our cognitive interests, knowledge being the purpose of our cognitive equipment.
339
   
 
Judgements of taste, or of aesthetic beauty, will not bring a cognitively determining concept to 
bear, as in empirical knowledge on the Kantian model, but will seek for a concept to determine 
the exact nature of the pleasure-arousing appearance, and yet will necessarily fail to find a 
single one that is adequate to the beautiful experience, although interpretation will employ 
many concepts indeterminately to deepen engagement and appreciation of the beauty 
enjoyed.
340
 A judgement of beauty is thus indeterminate, that is, nothing will actually be known 
through such a judgement. But that rational judgement can be sought at all in such a situation is 
due to the fact that an appearance’s formal (i.e., cognitively related) qualities awaken the 
disinterested, and therefore undetermined, activity of the faculty of cognition. Judgement is thus 
invoked in the consideration of a disinterested pleasure that has been awakened in the 
understanding; a feeling of free play, as Kant describes it, deriving primarily from the open-
ended, responsive excitement of the imagination in relation to the form of the presentation it 
engages with, but also involving the understanding’s conceptual capacity.341  
 
Thus the two formal factors involved in knowledge, the imagination and conceptuality, are set 
free by beautiful forms to flex themselves, or resonate with one another, thereby evoking a 
purely mental feeling of satisfaction or pleasure.
342
 The imaginative and conceptual factors 
involved in the act of understanding are thus stimulated to exercise and awareness of their own 
nature and purpose – which is to know.343 And yet nothing is known through the aesthetic 
judgement. In the appreciation of beauty, imagination alerts conceptuality to undertake an 
inventory of its stock, seeking to suggest solutions, to reach out for a determining answer to the 
conundrum of a beautiful formal purposiveness that is, however, completely redundant as far as 
any utilitarian considerations are concerned.
344
 In seeking for a concept, the understanding is led 
not towards determination, but into the potentially inexhaustible process of interpretation 
through suggestive, imaginatively indeterminate conceptuality.
345
 As empirically purposeless, 
such imaginative conceptual interpretation can lead to no conceptual resolution. For example, in 
the appreciation of the beauty of an artwork, concepts try to account for an aesthetic idea that is 
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itself beyond conceptual encapsulation, which resists conceptual closure.
346
 An aesthetic idea, 
as Kant understands it, is not just any theme that a painter, writer or musician might elaborate, 
but has a specific significance which links aesthetics to the ground of nature itself: its 
noumenal, or supersensible substrate, as we will see shortly.
347
 This concept of the ‘aesthetic 
idea’ refers to a particular and contingent formal arrangement of beautiful appearances, in so far 
as such patterning is manifest in artworks.
348
 But only artistry of genius manifests the 




I move in the next subsection to address the issue of aesthetic ideas of genius, because an 
understanding of Kant’s account of such aesthetic ideas, (in their relation to the noumenal or 
creative ground of phenomena as this itself is linked to the manifestation of true originality in 
artworks of genius), is key to an understanding of the romantic aesthetic of the sublime, as 
construed in terms of the intimation of transcendent creativity. This romantic notion of 
sublimity will loom large in the final chapter, devoted to Coleridge. It is for this reason that I 
will be addressing, at some length, relevant aspects of Schelling’s Transcendental Idealism, in 
which this romantic aesthetic is given metaphysical foundations, the discussion of which will 
serve to illumine discussions later on. The particular romantic aesthetic which I have in mind is 
thus formulated not with reference to Kant’s own notion of sublimity, but in connection with 
the kind of aesthetic experience which I am going to describe next. 
 
(3.2) Aesthetic ideas of genius as ‘supersensibly’ inspired 
We have found that Kant considers phenomenally manifested beauty in terms of the sensible 
presentation to the imagination of purely gratuitous or contingent, formal patterns of 
organisation. Beautiful forms are, as it were, in the phenomenal order but not of it, since they 
cannot be accounted for in causal terms.
350
 This is because beautiful form, as literally useless or 
utterly contingent, cannot be caught in the transcendental net which conditions empirical 
experience, as we learned in the last chapter. However, as just seen, Kant suggests that rational 
judgements of beauty are possible on the basis of a purely intelligible, subjective pleasure that is 
set in motion in and as the appreciation of beautiful form. This pleasure takes the form of an 
appreciative ‘free-play’ of conceptuality and imagination. Such imaginatively interpretive 
conceptual reflection can open the mind towards potentially infinite vistas of aesthetic insight. 
Intellectual pleasure thus constitutes the immediate ground of a judgement of taste or beauty. 
This means that, while unable to determine the nature of a beautiful presentation objectively, or 
in terms of finite, empirical truth, such aesthetic judgements can be granted a conditional or 
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‘subjective’ rationality. While the ascription of beauty constitutes no knowledge, the potentially 





But to guarantee the rationality of an aesthetic judgement of beauty, Kant insists that there 
must, in principle, be one right interpretation or explanation of the nature of the beautiful; some 
non-phenomenal truth which would ground the meaningfulness of the imaginative 
interpretations which it excites. In this way, the inter-subjective rationality of judgements of 
beauty is thought to be ultimately grounded in that which is for us intrinsically unknowable: the 
supersensible substrate of reality.
352
 I shall explain further.  
 
Our knowledge is finite by virtue of its sense-based orientation, which renders intellectual 
intuition of any overarching metaphysical knowledge impossible for us, according to Kant’s 
position in the Critique of Pure Reason. This responsive nature of our finite cognitive faculties 
means that any rationally objective ground of conceptually indeterminable, phenomenal beauty, 
can only reside in the ultimate condition of all empirical knowledge, in what Kant describes as 
the supersensible substrate, or ground of phenomena. This, as literally unknowable according to 
Kantian tenets, is referred to also as the ‘noumenon’: a concept that serves as no more than a 
‘place-marker’ for a trans-empirical creativity about which we can know nothing; a cognitive 
line drawn at the point where our knowing necessarily gives out.
353
 But the fact that we can 
know nothing of the supersensible substrate of experience does not imply that there is nothing 
to be known for an infinite, intellectual and creative intuition; for a putative divine 
intelligence.
354
   
 
So, for Kant, the idea of beauty – as also that of teleological purposiveness, as we shall see later 
– is merely ‘regulative’;355 that is to say, such an idea cannot be regarded as giving us actual 
knowledge of any putative, noumenal Godhead that might be thought to be creativity enabling 
beautiful and providential appearances within experience. Such purely intellectual ideas serve 
only to regulate or guide aesthetic and teleological judgements without conveying anything of 
definite cognitive import concerning the ultimate ground of the sensible appearances in relation 
to which they are invoked.
356
 For Kant, that which is supersensible remains unknowable in 
principle. 
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I have been suggesting, in section one, how Schelling and Bergson move beyond Kant’s 
position concerning an intellectual intuition of a creative metaphysical principle. As we will see 
further in section three, in relation to Schelling’s Transcendental Idealism, Kant was to be 
countered over possible intellectual intuition by an appeal to his own transcendental premises. 
In order to effect this strategy, Schelling turned to the account of aesthetic ideas of genius in the 
Critique of Judgement.
357
 Thus on the basis of what we have discovered so far, I now turn a 
discussion of the beauty that manifests itself in artworks of genius. 
 
An aesthetic idea of genius is a beautiful formal arrangement of striking originality, such that its 
interpretive possibilities are deemed inexhaustible.
358
 Kant defines artworks which make 
manifest such interpretive inexhaustibility as works of genius, since they disclose a truly 
original level of creativity.
359
 Recalling what has just been said of the supersensible substrate of 
experience, we have learned that Kant attributes the ultimate source of beautiful appearances to 
this unknowable ground.
360
 Concerning the production of works of genius, Kant suggests that 
the creative yet noumenal power which unveils itself phenomenally, for example in natural 
beauty, is also at work, albeit unconsciously, through the activity of the truly original artist.
361
 
That which confers genius on the artwork, that which leads to the apprehension of an aesthetic 
idea, is thus held to be the noumenal ground of nature manifesting itself independently of the 
artist’s conscious technical activity (i.e., the application of his musical or painterly technique, 
for example, to the work at hand).
362
 Unconsciously, the artist is inspired by the supersensible, 
creative power which manifests itself through his work: the same power that grounds our 
apprehension of the natural order.
363
 Thus it is that in works of genius displaying an aesthetic 
idea in the Kantian sense, it may be said that nature gives the rule to art.
364
 It should be noted 
here that this discussion of a natural power that grounds nature and which discloses itself in art 
of genius leads us towards the territory of Kant’s teleology, which will be dealt with in the next 
subsection, since it is the same noumenal power which is thought to inspire aesthetic genius that 




An aesthetic idea of genius, as has been described above, is held to be exhibit a purposiveness 
of truly unique originality, whose interpretive possibilities are inexhaustible. Moreover, in the 
potentially infinite spiral of hermeneutical activity which the artistic presentation of genius 
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generates, an aesthetic idea is said to evoke moral consciousness.
366
 It is in their connection to 
the noumenal ground of nature that Kant invokes the possibility of a moral interest supervening 
on judgements of unique beauty in nature and art. Kant thereby suggests that the appearance of 
conceptually indeterminable purposiveness in nature and works of genius, in which ‘nature 
gives the rule to art’,367 leads one to regard nature as a realm ultimately amenable to our moral 
goals. The grounding of this claim is to be found in Kant’s moral arguments for the existence of 
God, as found in the Critique of Pure Reason
368
 and the Critique of Practical Reason.
369
 I shall 
now examine this important connection of the ethical to the aesthetic in more detail. 
 
We have seen it to be Kant’s contention that what is presented by the true artist to sensory 
awareness intimates an un-manifest-able truth: an infinite, unconditioned principle.
370
 The only 
constitutive or objectively valid unconditional principle, for Kant, is the moral imperative.
371
 
We have learned that the beauty apparent in original artistry – as the same literally 
indeterminable beauty that can manifest in nature – must be attributed to the noumenal ground 
of all phenomena, and thus of all nature, as its productive source. Thus it follows that the 
productive activity manifest in an artwork of genius, unlike an unoriginal or derivatively 
‘academic’ work, is governed by no merely determinate or finite set of aesthetic criteria or 
rules. It is in this way that nature is said to give the rule to art of genius.
372
 Unlike the 
‘academic’ painting, for example, which merely follows in the footsteps of genius, as a 
derivative work assignable to the tradition embodied in a great painter’s school, the 
interpretative apprehension of the beauty of the truly original artwork is unconditioned, or 
infinitely resistant to conceptual closure.  
 
In the whole Kantian critical project, such literally infinite significance as is held to be disclosed 
in natural beauty and art of genius, is shared only by the ethical imperative. Only this Kantian 
moral imperative is also deemed to be inexhaustible in its significance, through its 
unconditional right to demand certain causes of action.
373
 Thus Kant can arrive at the 
conclusion that the supersensible source of goodness and natural beauty works through the great 
artist’s innate genius, unconsciously.374  
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The concept of a productive role for the imagination, as opposed to the limited role of 
imaginative schematism has already been met in the context of Kant’s epistemology in chapter 
three. For Kant, the vehicle of true artistic originality is this same, productive imagination, 
mediating between the supersensible ground of reality and the consciousness of the artist thus 
inspired.
375
 Kant has in effect put forward a critically informed version of the ancient theme of 
poetic inspiration (always remembering that for Kant, such insights always carry with them a 
regulative ‘as if’ status). In section three it will be shown how Schelling builds on Kant’s 
thinking in this regard.  The development of such post-Kantian metaphysics cannot be 
adequately addressed, however, without some understanding of what Kant has to say about 
conceptually indeterminate, teleological judgements.  
 
(3.3) Aspects of Kantian teleology 
An organism, or in Kant’s terms, a natural end, displays a purposive form of causality, and its 
existence cannot be accounted for according to blind necessity, that is, in purely mechanical 
terms. It must therefore be judged teleologically, as if it were a product of intelligent design.
376
 I 
shall attempt to develop my account of teleological judgement by contrasting it with what is 
involved in an aesthetic judgement of taste, or pure beauty, which has just been discussed.  
 
Teleological judgement concerns the internal, or integral purposiveness of a natural object: its 
intrinsic structure. Such a purposive structure is organic: the object cannot be adequately 
explained in terms of mechanical causation alone, and it must therefore be judged as a natural 
purpose or end. One cannot conceive such an object as having come about without an intelligent 
design, and yet one knows that it is not a human artefact. Although, considered in detail, 
mechanical causality is at work throughout the object, it cannot but be thought that this 




Because we know of no causal process in nature that could account for what is to us the sheer 
contingency of the organic object’s intrinsic structure, we cannot make an objective, 
determining judgement that the organism is a natural end. The particularity of the organism’s 
arrangement, the sheer un-likeliness of its complex organised integrity, leads us to reflect and 




Unlike a determinate judgement, in which empirical knowledge is ascertained, teleological 
judgements, like aesthetic judgements, are reflective, leaving their objects conceptually 
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undetermined. No knowledge therefore accrues through teleological judgement, which is 
nevertheless a fully rational mode of appraisal. We cannot rationally avoid making the 
judgement that an organism appears intelligently planned, but since we can have no knowledge 
of the supersensible ground of reality (given the findings of the Critique of Pure Reason), we 
cannot claim actually to know that any super-human intelligence is at work.
379
 We know that 
the organism is not man-made, however, and we also realise that to describe the intelligible 
structure as purely a work of chance is simply to admit that we have no conceptually objective 
or determinable explanation of such more-than-mechanical order. Although nothing is actually 
known through the teleological judgement, at least, and unlike an attribution chance, it remains 
within the realms of reasonable explanation, as based on a perceived analogy between human 
intentional agency and organic structure.
380
 Organic phenomena suggested to Kant that if such 
parts of nature can only be judged as if they were rationally planned, then it would be irrational 
not to assume that the whole of nature is not providentially guided. But again, such a reflective 




Mechanical causality is a method of understanding through straightforward causal analysis, and 
organisms do certainly submit themselves to this sort of treatment, up to a point. Basic organic 
constituents can be isolated and the method of their necessary combination will give an 
understanding of material interactions within the organism. But that such a complex inter-
dependency of organised activity exists at all, that such material interactions sub-serve a formal 
or intelligible unity of design, is beyond the scope of blind mechanism to explain.
382
 Therefore 
the understanding can never explain organic phenomena fully, which demand holistic as well as 
analytic interpretation. Conceptually indeterminate judgement must supplement empirically 
determined knowledge, if such knowledge is not to lose itself in detail, unable to see the 
meaningful shape of the wood because it cannot stop looking at the individual trees which make 
it up.
383
 For Kant, however, teleological or final causality, while supplying subjectively valid 
maxims to regulate or guide empirical investigation, cannot supplant mechanical or efficient 
causality as an objectively more adequate explanatory model.
384
 Rather, an organism must be 
approached in terms of both models, efficient and final.  
 
Kant cites the example of a tree to demonstrate his definition of an organism as cause and effect 
of itself, both in terms of the species that propagates itself through individual instantiations, and 
in terms of an individual tree considered in different aspects. The tree persists over time, and 
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thus the nourishment taken up from the soil and the sunlight by the tree yesterday is the cause of 
the existence of the tree today. More subtly, Kant notes how upon grafting one part of a leaf to a 
different tree, the whole leaf will propagate itself from the part. It draws sustenance parasitically 
from the alien organism, and as an organ in its own right, has the power to determine itself in 
terms of a holistic plan: the whole leaf is virtually present in the part.
385
 Kant suggests that in 
organic phenomena, the part exists for the sake of the whole and equally the whole is the 
condition of possibility for the part. There is a mutuality of dependence between parts and 
whole, as well as between parts and parts.
386
 An organ is a unity in its own right, it exists for the 
sake of the body which would malfunction without it, and its existence depends on the right 
functioning of neighbouring organs. The whole is an interlocking system of mutually 
constitutive parts.
387
 This is the difference between a human artefact and a natural end, in fact: 
while the parts of a pocket-watch are designed to function to the mutual benefit of each other, 
the parts do not produce each other. In an organism, on the contrary, not only do the parts 
enable each other’s possibility while both conditioned by and conditioning the possibility of the 
entity’s existence of the whole, but an ensemble of parts can also compensate for the failure of 
one of their number by working together, as if from a centrally integrating plan, both to repair 





To say that an organism is both cause and effect of itself is to say all these things, but I believe 
that the primary feature to note is that there is mutual part-whole dependency in an integrally 
self-organising system of systems, (since not only the whole but its parts are organs). There is a 
maximum of self-sufficiency and productivity of the whole combined with a maximum of 
systematic independence in each part. Teleological explanation is thus holistic, as guided by an 
intelligible whole in its assessments of parts: it is a ‘top-down’ causality, as it were, as  opposed 
to the reductive ‘bottom-upwards’, atomistic model of mechanical explanation.389  
 
This very brief outline of selected Kantian aesthetic and teleological themes should suffice to 
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(3.4) The metaphysical re-direction of aesthetics and teleology after Kant 
Kant’s insights into teleology are applied to aesthetics, by Schelling, giving artistic productivity 
and a metaphysical role.
390
 An organism, for Schelling, is like a centrally fusing aesthetic idea, 
an holistic and intelligible, imaginative expression manifested in a mutual consistency and 
balance of qualities, as if according to a conceptually undeterminable rule.
391
 It will be recalled 
that according to the Kantian account of artwork of genius, on which romantics such as 
Schelling build, natural genius only utilises as tools the technical rules of art through which a 
higher order of holistic causality is made manifest. Going beyond Kant, Schelling holds that in 
natural beauty and art of true originality it is the productive, teleologically ordering and 
supersensible ground of nature itself, which is demonstrably at work. And for Schelling, in his 
Transcendental Idealism, it is the work of art itself, rather than any philosophical argument, 
which demonstrates the organic identity of the metaphysical poles of subjectivity and 
objectivity; ideality and reality.
392
 The ground of nature’s own creativity is seen as working, 
unconsciously, through the artist’s conscious, technical accomplishment.393  
 
Thus romantic writers such as Schelling give an extremely high role to art in their metaphysics. 
As Frederick Beiser writes, this is due to the role of the Kantian concept of teleological 
judgement at work in their Naturphilosophie, or metaphysically dynamic explanations of 
nature.
394
 Indeterminate and reflective judgements of aesthetics and teleology serve in such 
accounts to relativise the role of empirical, causally determined knowledge in such post-Kantian 
philosophy. The philosophical combination of teleological and romantic insights, after Kant, 
involves the development of an organic model of aesthetic production, which features 
prominently in the work of Schelling and Coleridge (as we shall see). 
 
M. H. Abrams discusses this organic model of artistic expression, to suggest that a conception 
of artistic beauty as the expression of an organically integrating, creative imagination 
transforms the neo-classical model of beauty that had held sway in the eighteenth century and 
before. While the traditional or classical model has its roots in Aristotelian mimesis
395
 – art 
perceived as imitating or ‘holding the mirror up to nature’ – the organic model of beauty, as 
favoured in romantic theory and practice, and which is markedly influenced by Kant’s teleology 
and aesthetics, ‘bear[s] a resemblance to the aesthetic qualities that were collected, in the course 
of the eighteenth century, under the rubric of the sublime’.396  
                                                                        
390 Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, pp. 84-7. 
391 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 228. 
392 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 217-18. 
393 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 222-3. 
394 Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, p. 86. 
395 The concept of artistic sublimity has ancient roots in the thought of Longinus. If Aristotle can be thought as the ancient 
champion of mimesis, then Longinus champions expressivism; see Monk, The Sublime. 




I noted earlier that the romantic notion of sublimity, or the aesthetic intimation of transcendence 
with which I am concerned in this thesis, draws on Kant’s aesthetic of beauty rather than his 
treatment of judgements of the sublime. Following Abrams, therefore, I suggest that Kant’s 
concept of beauty, as expressed through his theory of the aesthetic idea,
397
 has, ironically, far 
more in common with the romantic concept of the sublime, than his own stoical and somewhat 
austere and moralising account of sublimity. Thus I have passed over Kant’s theory of sublimity 
in the last section, and will be treating the romantic conception of beauty as expressive, sublime 
intimation in chapters six and seven, in connection with my analysis of Coleridge’s thought.  
 
(4) Imagining temporal process in Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism   
 
I shall now show how Schelling’s thinking builds on Kant’s aesthetic and teleological insights, 
while to some extent paralleling Bergson’s account of an organically creative and processive 
source of the empirical order. 
 
(4.1) Schelling, imaginative productivity and holistic, teleological explanation 
Frederick Beiser suggests that Schelling sees Kant’s account of teleological causality as 
affording the opportunity to reunite mind and the ‘thing in itself’ on which it depends. Such a 
holistic explanatory model would unite the opposites of activity and passivity, reality and 
ideality, a task beyond the power of mechanically determining causality. The imaginative 
mediation of sense and understanding would be reconceived as a mutually constitutive and 
indeed interpenetrative polarity of related opposites, subject and object being the conditions of 
one another.
398
 In Schelling’s terms, ‘Nature should be Mind made visible, Mind the invisible 
Nature’.399  
 
For Schelling, the position Kant elaborates in the Critique of Pure Reason cannot adequately 
account for the mediation of active and passive elements in knowledge. Nevertheless, Schelling 
suggests that a transcendental deduction of the organic, polar inseparability of such elements, in 
terms of the mutually related, yet differentiated identity of active and passive poles of 
experience, as necessary for the possibility of empirical knowledge, would not only turn the 
idea of organism from a regulative to a constitutive principle, but would also drastically 
relativise Kant’s mechanistically causal model of experience.400 Quantitative calculation would 
be seen to be a mere abstraction from an interactive and organic, qualitative wholeness. It is 
                                                                        
397 The aesthetic idea features not only as ‘nature giving the rule to art’, as the unconscious manifestation of genius through 
imaginative production, but also in his conception of natural beauty as expressing aesthetic ideas, as if the work of divine art. 
398 Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, pp. 73-87. 
399 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, p. 42. 
400 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, pp. 8-9, 41-2, Beiser, The Romantic Imperative, p. 138. 
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important to note that Schelling does not return to a pre-Kantian, dogmatic metaphysics. 
Schelling presents a metaphysic based on an intellectual intuition of the transcendental subject 
in the very act of self-othering, in order thereby to know itself as self-consciousness.
401
 Such 
intuiting constitutes a practical demand, rather than a theoretical principle: a postulated 




Thus to account for the assumption of an external and independent reality is not to justify such a 
belief, but to make conscious that which remains unreflected in empirical awareness.
403
 Kant’s 
thought of a transcendental subject must become an intuition into the dynamic activity of that 
metaphysical subjectivity as it rises from unconsciousness to consciousness in the postulated 
demand of intellectual intuition. The task of philosophy is then to retrace, through participation, 
the course which the metaphysical subject has unconsciously travelled with consciousness. 
What is brought up into the light is a process of world constitution. Philosophical intuition 
comes to know that in surveying the world set empirically before it, it is in fact surveying its 
own otherness. As Schelling writes On the History of Modern Philosophy, ‘philosophy is, as 
such, nothing but an anamnesis, a remembrance for the I of what it has done and suffered in its 
general (its pre-individual) being’.404 The organic, teleological conditions of possible 
knowledge reveal that a radical division of ideality from reality is simply an unreflective 




For Schelling, at the start of this journey into philosophical self-awareness, a principle of 
knowledge, an indubitable certainty, must be found. The principle of transcendental philosophy 
must be an immediate or un-mediated certainty, since all other knowledge is mediated, and if 
this were the case of its principle, there would be an infinite regress.
406
 But this certainty cannot 
be merely logical. Analytic logic gives identities in mere thought, and therefore logical 
principles cannot serve as the principle of transcendental philosophy, which must be both 
synthetic and analytic, as both indubitably real,
407
 and also the principle of systematic form.
408
 
As both formal and real, what is sought is an identity of reality and ideality, something within 
knowledge that is the condition of possibility of subjectivity and objectivity as they are found in 
empirical awareness.
409
 What in the System of Transcendental Idealism is recognised as the 
ground of transcendental subjectivity is also recognised as natura naturans, or the active, 
                                                                        
401 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 27-8. 
402 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 33. 
403 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 8-9. 
404 F. W. J. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, Andrew Bowie (tr.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
p. 110. 
405 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 9. 
406 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 15-17. 
407 Real as distinct from ideal is intended here. 
408 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 19-21. 
409 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 21-4. 
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formative source of empirical reality. This concept has a long philosophical pedigree, going 
back to John Scottus Eriugena,
410
 but Schelling is mainly influenced by Spinoza in thinking of 
nature as primarily a productive intelligence whose product – natura naturata – is the empirical 
world.
411
 Unlike empirical reality, or natura naturata, the bi-polar, dynamic source of 
subjectivity and objectivity – natura naturans – cannot be explained in mechanical and 





The only absolutely certain knowledge (as opposed to a mere logical identity in thought) is of 
the existence of the self.
413
 Subjectivity enacts a knowing affirmation of its own reality. 
According to Schelling indubitable knowledge is found in the affirmation ‘I am’, or rather in the 
act of affirming, the act in which self-consciousness is born, a self objectifying act.
414
 This 
knowledge loses its objective certainty, however, when considered in abstraction from the 
context of the activity of self-affirmation in inner sense.
415
  The self – thus understood as a self-
productive act – can only be an object for itself, and is nothing apart from its self-propagating 
activity. As not originally objective but a self-objectifying act, such knowledge is not sharable 
through a universal, or determinate concept, hence it has no public certainty, and therefore does 
not belong to theoretical philosophy. Self-certainty is thus held to be a practical or moral (in the 
sense, perhaps, of ‘existential’) certainty, and not a theoretical conceptual determination.416 
 
So the principle of knowledge – as self-insight, or insight into self-activity as the originating yet 
continuous birthing of the self, its bringing of itself into the light of knowledge – is thus 
rational, but not theoretical. This principle is what has been meant with reference to the term 
‘practical postulate’, a term that we have come across in section one in relation to the discussion 
of philosophical intuition. Schelling’s philosophy is founded on such a practical knowing, on 
intellectual intuition. Such non-sensory intuiting is held to be a knowing which has no meaning 
in abstraction from the act of self-certainty.
417
 Such a concept of self-awareness must also be 
distinguished from empirical self-awareness, since, as insight into the creative ground of the 
empirical, it manifests as intrinsically limitless activity.
418
 Such transcendental self-certainty is 
conceptually indeterminable in the sense that its own coming to be is its coming to be known. 
Selfhood is thus not a being, something finite and determinable,
419
 but an unending becoming, 
                                                                        
410 See John Scottus Eriugena, Periphyseon, (Montreal: Les Editions Bellarmin, 1987).  
411 See Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Andrew Boyle (tr.) (London: J. M. Dent, 1993). 
412 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 6, 12 , 17. 
413 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 24-6. 
414 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 24-9. 
415 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 29. 
416 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 28, 31. 
417 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 15-31. 
418 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 25. 
419 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 32. 
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and the act of becoming is indistinguishable from its own philosophically intuited self-
awareness: the ‘being’ of the transcendental self is its own knowing.420 Such a non-conceptual, 
non-sensible act of knowledge which enacts, in bringing to light, the existence of what it knows 




Schelling points out that this act of self-objectification is present, albeit unconsciously, in all 
conscious knowledge. It is raised to consciousness in philosophical intuition.
422
 As Kant 
demonstrated, (as we have seen), transcendental subjectivity, or self-consciousness, must be 
able to accompany all possible knowledge. But Kant’s transcendental subjectivity cannot 
function as a constitutive principle of knowledge, as he only suggests that the thought ‘I think’ 
must be able to accompany all possible knowledge. Schelling suggests that such a static thought 
of self is derivative from a dynamic and intuitable self-activity, a self-constitutive and thus 





Philosophical, like geometrical intuition is of timeless, or eternal truth.
424
 ‘Selfing’, as timeless 
activity,
425
 therefore must actively constitute inner sense, and thus create time, in the course of 
its own self-objectification. Inner sense dynamically becomes, just as the transcendental self’s 
own objectifying activity constitutes the possibility of external reality in Kantian outer sense, or 
space.
426
 In some ways like Bergson, therefore, it could be argued that Schelling introduces a 
genuine becoming a creation of time or temporal-ising that grounds Kant’s derivative and 
‘spatialised’ account of time as adapted to the condition of empirical knowledge. Ideality and 
reality are thus linked as a differentiated identity, or self-othering: phenomenal reality is the 
primordial subject’s own otherness.427 As a non-theoretical foundation for transcendental 
philosophy, the dynamic act of self-intuition of the eternal birthing of the self, is simultaneously 
the philosopher’s own self-intuiting and that which is intuited. Therefore the ‘organ of 
philosophy’, or mode of philosophical construction which Schelling is to utilise must itself be a 
sustaining of opposites in tension.
428
 Here we are reminded somewhat of the Kierkegaardian 
model of imagination, as addressed in chapter two.  
 
                                                                        
420 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 27. 
421 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 27. 
422 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 25. 
423 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 26. 
424 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 28-9. 
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426 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 98. 
427 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 35-6. 
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Schelling sees that, as communicating indeterminate or ‘non-objective’429 knowledge, the 
conceptual translation of intellectual intuition that is needed for the communication of his own 
philosophy must be mediated by aesthetically indeterminate judgement, which he says is born 
of the productive imagination’s ‘wavering’ between the active and passive poles of self-




Schelling draws on Kantian insights into organic structure to advance his position. As a 
dynamism that institutes its own existence, selfhood, in its self-objectifying activity, is cause 
and effect of its own polar structure.
431
 This is to say that in becoming objective, transcendental 
subjective activity enacts its own passivity.
432
 I shall now try to consolidate what has been 
learned in this section so far. 
 
Unconscious imaginative productivity, as unlimited and spontaneous self-creation, is an enabler 
of its own otherness.
433
 As a movement of self-determination, primordial subjectivity is an 
imaginatively productive unity, a sustaining in tension of related opposites.
434
 Like Heraclitus’s 
Logos
435, Schelling’s first principle is a productive, moving unity of opposites: it is both real 
and ideal.
436
 It is an implicitly intelligent, or unconscious activity growing towards its own self-
consciousness. Thus it is that imagination not only mediates between activity and passivity, 
between intuition and that which is intuited, in philosophical construction. Imagination’s role is 
not solely epistemological, in this way. Rather, such imaginatively indeterminate, philosophical 
insight is itself ontologically productive, or more accurately, the intuiting philosopher 
participates in imagination’s ontological productivity.437 The intuitive activity of philosophical 
imagination is itself the raising to consciousness of an originally unconscious productivity, 
through which eternal subjectivity comes to exist as temporal process.
438
 Imaginative 
productivity is, paradoxically, not only a medium of epistemic insight into the integral 
relatedness of subjectivity and objectivity, but also the ontologically constitutive condition of 
possible temporal process, or unfolding self-objectification.  
 
The imagination’s dynamic, productive activity thus enables the temporal existence of active 
and passive, or subjective and objective poles of being.
439
 We shall come to see as this thesis 
progresses that this theme of productive imagination will be developed by Coleridge, as we 
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have seen it already to be radically challenged by Kierkegaard, in his focus on the un-
resolvability of subjectivity and objectivity, the two poles which must, for him, be held in a 
creative tension by the imagination.  
 
(4.2) Schelling and the endlessness of metaphysical revelation through art 
We have found that both Schelling’s post-Kantian metaphysics and Bergson’s account of 
organic, ontological process proceed by taking into account Kant’s insights into the temporal 
situation of the thinker, to offer an ontological vista that is only accessible on the basis of a 
shared commitment in interpretation between the reader and the philosopher. This commitment 
takes divergent forms in various styles of thought, but I would suggest that such apparently 
diverse strategies as Schelling’s grounding intuitive demand or practical postulate, and 
Kierkegaard’s appeal to authentic selfhood through indirect communication share this 
essentially post-Kantian turn. Schelling’s transcendental philosophy, we have found, is 
grounded not in theoretical cognition, but in an imaginative vision which is nevertheless 
thoroughly thought through with an exacting use of logical argument. To be convinced of 
Schelling’s insights, his readers must intuit along with him, participating in the philosophical 
self-activity which ‘sustains, as it were, the speculative flight’, as Schelling himself puts it.440 
An original subjectivity, an infinite, unconscious and primordial ground of conscious and free 
activity is thereby raised to the level of philosophical consciousness in the act of non-objective 
knowledge. This self-intuition is, as a conscious participation in grounding movement, the 
unconscious ground’s own illumination.441 Unconscious intelligence thus grounds reality and 
ideality; the phenomenal world, in polarity with our empirical knowledge of it, is the result of a 





But Schelling insists that, to be complete, transcendental philosophy has to exhibit the identity 
of unconscious and conscious productivity outwardly, in the ‘real’ pole of the real-ideal 
polarity, and so not merely within the participating consciousness of the philosopher. Infinite, 
unconscious productivity must be seen to emerge from a finite product of consciousness in the 
‘external’ order.443 Schelling builds on Kant’s account of genius as the source of artistic beauty 
in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. We have seen above that for Kant, nature itself gives 
the strictly ineffable and indeterminate rule to truly original art as creatively manifest in an 
aesthetic idea. The artist’s planning and technique is thus considered a merely instrumental 
cause. Schelling goes further, and considers truly original art to be the true fulfilment of 
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philosophy, as the objective revelation of the primordially creative unity of subjectivity and 
objectivity. An infinite, divine source of mind and matter inspires the artist’s labours, driving 




Thus Schelling builds firmly on Kant’s aesthetic account, as previously addressed in section 
two: aesthetic ideas, shining through the artist’s work, reveal an infinite meaningfulness that 
provokes imaginative interpretation, but which can never be conceptually contained. Schelling’s 
transcendental philosophy follows the underground dynamism of natura naturans
445
 of which 
Kant’s empirical phenomena are the mechanical deposits, like embankments heaped up by a 
river. Philosophy re-traces the unconscious flow and brings it to light.
446
 But transcendental 
subjectivity, or from a converse perspective, natura naturans, only flowers in the open through 
imaginatively mediated works of artistic beauty.
447
 Unconscious metaphysical productivity is 
the creative source of genuine ‘poesis’, or (literally) original artistic expression.448 A concept of 
expressive beauty is thus developed by Schelling that is very different from the more 
traditional, or ‘classical’ aesthetic of Aristotelian mimesis.449 Schelling represents a movement 
among romantic writers and artists to re-conceive beauty in terms of the sublime intimation of 
conceptually uncontainable transcendence, drawing on Kant’s insights into self-developing 
organic process. In their work, such artists and thinkers aim to evoke an infinite yearning, an 
impossibility of finding interpretive and existential closure, which yet feels like a return, or 
homecoming; a yearning for an infinitely distant home imbued with a sense of ‘déjà vu’, a 
quality of recollection or anamnesis.
450
 I shall be arguing that such a feeling of paradoxically 
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‘Not in entire forgetfulness,   
And not in utter nakedness, 
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And yet: 
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revelation in its own right, nature’s creation already being an act of divine grace. I shall be addressing such theological problems 
later in this work. J. Robert Barth’s work will be of service here. 
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perfect, and yet perfectly unattainable belonging may have some genuine theological 
significance, as a prefiguration or perhaps premonition of the possibility of genuine redeemed 
selfhood, a freedom which is possible granted through divine grace. 
 
(5) Bergsonian duration or romantic teleology? 
 
In the final section of this chapter, I am returning to the thought of Bergson in light of what has 
been learned about creative process through Schelling’s appropriation of Kant’s teleological 
and aesthetic thinking.  
 
(5.1) Bergsonian and post-Kantian concepts of process compared 
It is has been shown above the Bergson criticises Kant’s ‘spatialised’ conception of time.451 We 
can now see that Bergson’s concept of duration shares notable structural similarities with 
Schelling’s re-conception of the Kantian ‘thing-in-itself’ as a transcendental source of 
subjectivity and objectivity.  
 
We have found Bergson’s concept of philosophical intuition, like Schelling’s, reveals the need 
of an imaginative mediation of metaphysical insight into creative process. After Kant’s analysis 
of indeterminate judgements of aesthetic and organic forms, metaphysics is no longer a 
dogmatic exercise in spurious conceptual objectivity. Ontological insight becomes a matter of 
imaginative intuition into the universal life and development which is common to subjectivity 
and the objective world alike. In Bergson, as in Schelling, aesthetic discrimination and 
subjective participation in nature’s organic movement are the medium and source of such 
philosophical intuition. But a key difference between process as conceived by Bergson on the 
one hand and in its romantic, teleological form on the other will be shown to have important 
implications for the course of my thesis.  
 
We are now in a position to see that the postulate of a primordially creative, yet unconscious 
duration relates to empirical reality, for Bergson, as the concept of natura naturans relates to 
natura naturata, for Schelling. For Bergson, empirical reality only ever approximates to the 
geometric perfection mapped out for it by the understanding. But that we do in fact succeed in 
our calculations indicates that matter and understanding are conformed to one another, as 
sharing the same spatialising trajectory.
452
 Bergson regards materiality as having evolved in 
polar or organic complementarity with ideality, and the course of their evolution is the track of 
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the descent or deflation of an ontologically prior dynamic intensity.
453
 The time that we 
habitually work with is a scale of measurement: very useful for practice, as itself a perfection of 




As we learned in section one, Bergson holds that we can transcend the Kantian limits of the 
understanding by going to the original root of Kant’s spatialised conception of time with an 
intuition into concrete becoming as the fruitful source of our own, actuality, as of that of the 
empirical world around us. Bergson calls such intuition ‘supra-’, or ‘ultra-intellectual’, perhaps 
to distance himself from idealist conceptions of intellectual intuition.
455
 But this Bergsonian 
intuition does utilise the intelligence or understanding in the process of transcending its 
limitations. The understanding is turned around in Bergsonian intuition of the ground of 
empirical selfhood.
456
 While the understanding is adapted to further the external aims of life, it 
can, nevertheless, can be turned around, as it were, or trained participatively to endure its own 




However Bergson does differ importantly from his romantic predecessors in denying the 
metaphysical originality not only of mechanical, but of final or teleological causality, such as 
we have seen Schelling’s (and, earlier on, Hegel’s) accounts to rely upon.458 This is the key 
difference between Bergsonian and idealist concepts of process to which I have referred in the 
introduction. By following Bergson’s criticism of the spatialised concept of time on which he 
finds teleological thinking to depend, we will have discovered a criterion by which to test and 
recognise a truly open-ended – in the sense of conceptually incalculable – account of the 
aesthetically intimative encounter with transcendence. This means, that by following this 
Bergsonian criterion, we shall be guided towards the kind of aesthetic account that can be 
shown to accord with a Kierkegaardian or epistemologically paradoxical concept of revelation. 
 
(5.2) Bergson’s critique of Kantian teleology 
Bergson builds on Kant’s recognition in the Critique of the Power of Judgement that we derive 
our concept of final causes from human productive activity.
459
 Human making can only ever be 
a regulative model for the appearance of intelligent purposes in nature, for Kant: we can only 
ever think of organisms as if they were designed intentionally, as we saw above. Bergson wants 
to transcend Kant’s regulative restrictions so as fully to recognise a universal source of value 
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459 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 48-50. 
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and freedom, while distancing himself from the distortions which he believes would arise from 
a traditional teleological solution.
460
 Unlike the traditional model of final causality, Bergson 





Creation is intrinsically unpredictable, for Bergson, whereas explanation in terms of final causes 
always presupposes a goal to be arrived at through premeditated planning.
462
 Teleological 
planning has evolved in human beings as a requirement for successful adaptation to the 
obstacles inherent in our environment. We calculate our course through life by utilising what 
we find lying around us arbitrarily as means for projected ends. Teleological causality thus 




The ability to project plans implies that we are working practically and habitually with a 
spatialised conception of time, one that sees time as laid out all at once, like a cloth over a table. 
Just as the tablecloth is woven to a uniform pattern from one material, such that one end is 
homogeneously continuous with the other, so our spatialised conception of time is a ‘schema’ 
or instrument, abstracted from the reality of an essentially heterogeneous and concrete 
productive flow.
464
 The next moment can never be a repetition of its predecessor, as 
intrinsically modified by it.
465
 What is quantitatively repeatable in calculative abstraction is 




Bergson, like the romantics before him, seems to have an affinity with the thought of 
Heraclitus, who famously held that one cannot step into the same, flowing river twice.
467
 Insight 
into qualitative uniqueness that cannot be contained in the conceptual net of mechanistic 
Enlightenment thought is claimed by Bergson and the romantics alike, so I finish this chapter on 
by recalling what we have learned of Bergson’s key innovation in this regard. For Bergson, no 
point of time is a repetition of its predecessor, and it will be modified by what has gone before, 
as well as modifying it.
468
 But is this not exactly what Kant’s analysis of organisms seen as final 
causes, traditionally conceived, shows? Kant focuses on a mutually constitutive and thus 
creative interdependency of whole and parts.
469
 However, I suggest that Bergson deepens 
Kant’s analysis of an organism as productive of itself over time. For Bergson, the organically 
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creative flow of Kant is more radically transformative: what existed yesterday takes on a new 




It is true that in the romantic and idealist model of the ‘self-othering’ odyssey of Spirit,471 (of 
which perhaps the most famous instance is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit),472 what is 
revealed at the culmination of the system, transforms the complexion of the passage that has 
been taken. But this transformation was pre-supposed by the philosopher from the beginning, to 
emerge on cue as the teleological denouement of an artfully planned narrative plot.
473
 The 
ultimate goal is always at the disposal of the thinker, as he constructs the teleological artefact 
that is the philosophical system. The ultimate destiny is in his pocket, as it were. Such is not the 
stuff of truly divine revelation, as that which we could never have given ourselves as we learned 
from Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, I believe this stricture does not apply to the truly open-ended 
nature of romantic aesthetic practice, as distinct from any philosophical theorising upon such 
creative activity. 
 
It will emerge in chapter seven that Bergson’s more radical, as non-teleological, concept of 
durational process serves as a criterion to distinguish between the systematic philosophy of 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and his more informal aesthetic and religious reflections. The latter 
will be found to comprise an aesthetic account that is conformable to Kierkegaard’s paradoxical 
concept of Christian revelation. This is because Coleridge will be shown to refrain from 
explaining his essentially processive ethico-aesthetic experience in overarching or teleological 
terms, when not conforming his insights to the demands of idealist systematic explanation 
There is a real sense in which the intimative process of through which Coleridge’s aesthetic 
experience is mediated bears a genuinely incalculable, or literally unforeseeable quality. In 
Bergson’s terms, Coleridge’s religiously oriented aesthetic thinking reflects his experience of 
genuinely unpredictable qualitative transition.  
 
As we learned in chapters one and two, the scandal of particularity, the inextricable paradox of 
the Christian revelation of salvation,
474
 as Kierkegaard understands it, is precisely what one 
could not always already have thought possible. It is on the basis of this theological criterion 
that I aim to show, in chapter seven, the genuine possibility of an artistic-experiential 
adumbration of a revelation only made fully actual in Christ, by grace, as beyond the 
transcendental possibilities of the finite human understanding. This chapter, through a critical 
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comparison of the durational thought of Bergson with the teleological post-Kantianism of 
Schelling, has provided us with a philosophical criterion by which to judge the theological 












































Building on the first four chapters, I will be suggesting now that Kantian aesthetic tenets from 
the Critique of Judgement can helpfully elucidate Bergson’s claim for an intellectual intuition 
of dynamic temporality. Kant does not analyse in precise terms what he means by the ‘free 
play’ of imagination and conceptuality involved in the judgement of taste. He simply utilises a 
musical metaphor to describe an intellectual interaction: conceptuality acts in ‘harmony’475 with 
the imagination’s free activity. But what is the precise nature of such free imaginative activity? 
What is its bearing on durational creativity, and thus on Kant’s own conception of time? My 
twofold contention in this chapter can be summarised as follows.  
 
In section two, we return to the issue of Kant’s productive imagination to examine its relation to 
Bergson’s account of metaphysically productive time. This discussion will importantly inform 
and advance the argument of section three. In sections three, I shall argue that Bergson’s 
concept of metaphysical intuition,
476
 as it was left in the last chapter, stands in need of rational 
clarification. Durational intuition can, I suggest, best be understood in terms of Kant’s 
conception of aesthetic purposiveness without purpose, or end,
477
 as discerned in the 
conceptually reflective, and thus non-determining, judgement of taste (as discussed in chapter 
four). I suggest that Kant’s free play of the imagination is the instrument of Bergson’s intuition 
into duration, and, moreover, is of the same dynamic nature as the fundamental temporality in 
which it participates, and from which Kant’s own mathematicised or spatialised time is an 
abstraction. This is to say that the creativity of durational process is identifiable with the 
productive imagination.  
 
The relevance of discussions in this chapter will bear fruit in chapter seven. By accounting for 
dynamic, creative process in terms of Kantian productive imagination and aesthetic reflection, 
rather than in teleological terms, an understanding of the intimation of transcendence through 
art may be discovered that is acceptable from the viewpoint of Kierkegaardian paradoxical 
revelation. In chapter seven, and in relation to Coleridgean aesthetic thought, I shall be arguing 
that just the kind of ‘Bergsonian’ aesthetically suggestive reflection that will be analysed in this 
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chapter is also characteristic of an ethically receptive, conceptually indeterminate apprehension 
of transcendent creativity, as mediated through art and natural beauty.  
 
So, in light of findings from this chapter, in the final chapter I will be able to present an account 
characterising artistic imaginative activity in terms of ethical receptivity. Thus I will be 
advancing an aesthetic that is compatible with Kierkegaardian theological requirements, as laid 
down in my first two chapters. In this way, I will achieve the goal of my thesis: to present an 
account of poetic activity that can harmonise Kierkegaard’s aesthetically indirect 
communicative strategy with the understanding of Christian faith which it subserves. 
 
(1) Kant and Bergson: understanding the issues 
 
We have seen that while Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, regards experience as structured 
according to unchangingly general and determinate categories, Bergson’s thinking discerns a 
creative flow of unique and unforeseeable qualitative distinctions. Thus it would be fair to 
suggest that while Kant views possible objective knowledge in terms of conceptually 
determinate judgement, Bergson – alive to the role of imagination in interpreting mechanically 
irreducible particularity – sees the possibility of another kind of philosophical knowledge only 
expressible in terms of conceptually reflective judgement. We saw in the last chapter that such 
reflective judgement is characteristic of Kant’s aesthetic or subjectively rational judgements of 
taste. Thus I have suggested above that Bergson’s thought might be profitably examined in 
Kantian aesthetic terms.  To this end we will now need to look more closely at Bergson’s 
concept of philosophical intuition. What exactly is such intuition? This is left very unclear by 
Bergson, and presents considerable logical difficulties, which might find their resolution in a 
Kantian, aesthetic understanding of his philosophical intuition.  
 
In chapter four, we found that metaphysical intuition, as Bergson understands it, is a reversal of 
the natural tendency or direction of the human understanding. As a biological adaptation, the 
understanding is oriented towards activity in the external world.
478
 Understanding is a highly 
developed form of consciousness which enables a degree of choice among options. The 
understanding is thus a means of promoting and achieving the practical aims of life; a means of 
negotiating and instrumentalising the resources of the environment for the achievement of 
positive goals and for the avoidance of danger.
479
 According to Bergson, the philosopher can 
train this faculty to reflect on the nature of his own existence, the fluid continuity of growing 
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479 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 146. 
129 
 
life, the qualitative growth of ‘mind energy’,480 in which the individual participates as a 
dynamic cosmic principle. 
 
But it must be admitted that the nature of such intuition is obscure. Bergson argues that an 
inability to define intuition is due to its nature, as resistant to conceptual determination.
481
 The 
flow of life is durational; it cannot be encapsulated in the conceptuality of an understanding that          
is conditioned by the demands of the spatial terrain which it must navigate.
482
 The 
understanding distinguishes and labels the seamless flow of a durational time, a flow which it 
necessarily divides into abstract or ‘spatialised’ moments.483 Such artificial divisions, as we saw 
in the last chapter, cannot be re-composed to give direct insight into the continuity of which 
they are a practical analysis.
484
 Again, we saw that in demanding that the reader must himself 
perform an act of intuition in order to understand the philosopher, Bergson is following in the 
footsteps of his early nineteenth century romantic forebears. We saw that Schelling’s 
Transcendental Idealism is similarly conditioned by a ‘practical postulate’, or regulative 
stipulation, that the reader can only gain insight by personally participating in the metaphysical 
intuition of the philosopher, accompanying him on his path, as it were. 
 
Bergson responds to critical suggestions that his philosophical intuition amounts to no more 
than a feeling or hunch by arguing that ‘intuition is reflection’,485 which can only be 
asymptotically approximated through discursive concepts. Nevertheless, as Frederick Copleston 
points out, ‘this sounds like a contradiction in terms’.486 Philosophical intuition, according to 
Bergson, ‘signifies first of all consciousness, but immediate consciousness, a vision which is 
scarcely distinguishable from the object seen, a knowledge which is contact, and even 
coincidence’.487 Such immediacy would seem to be incompatible with a process of reflection.  
 
I suggest that what we have learned about aesthetic imaginative activity from Kant may help to 
shed light on Bergson’s elusive philosophical intuition. We have seen, in chapter three, that 
Bergson’s intuition is said to be mediated by an ‘image’, which he says is itself the unfolding of 
a ‘schematic idea, whose elements interpenetrate’.488 The intuited scheme or schema, a simple 
integrity grasped ‘as a musician grasps a chord’, holds in ‘reciprocal implication’ what the 
                                                                        
480 Henri Bergson, Mind-Energy, H. Wildon Carr (tr.) (London: Macmillan & Co., 1921), pp. v - viii. 
481 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, p. 109. 
482 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 209-10, 214-15. 
483 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 209-10. 
484 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 285. 
485 Bergson, The Creative Mind, p. 109. 
486 Frederick Copleston, 19th and 20th Century French Philosophy, in A History of Philosophy 11 vols. (London: Continuum, 2003), 
vol. IX, p. 181. 
487 Bergson, The Creative Mind, p. 32. 
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image will ‘evolve into parts’, giving rise to imagistic or aesthetically suggestive language.489 
Concepts can never contain the philosophical content of the intuition, but may indeterminately 




We have seen that Kant’s aesthetic ideas also combine unity in variety, perceived as an 
indefinitely expanding halo of significance, as the manifestation of a dynamic source of artistic 
productivity.
491
 Could Bergson’s philosophical intuition therefore be a form of aesthetically 
creative insight? If such were the case, then Bergson’s claim that ‘intuition is reflection’492 
could be interpreted in terms of the process of interaction between imagination and 
indeterminate conceptuality that Kant ascribes to artistic aesthetic judgement. 
 
Moreover, we shall see that Bergson’s descriptions of the organic nature of durational 
experience strongly echo the nature of Kant’s productive imagination in its fundamental role in 
conditioning possible experience, as introduced in chapter three. We must shortly readdress this 
key aspect of Kantian epistemology in more depth, in order to draw attention to the intrinsically 
organic structure of the productive or transcendental imagination, as suggestive of lines of 
advance towards a solution to the problem of the logical status of Bergsonian philosophical 
intuition. In re-addressing Kant’s transcendental deduction from the perspective of productive 
imagination as an organically conceived, epistemological structure, we will discover that Kant’s 
transcendental imagination interacts with conceptual categories in terms of mutual grounding or 
causality.  
 
So, in order fully to understand the thinking in terms of which we can discern the coherence of 
Bergson’s necessarily conceptual account of intrinsically non-conceptual philosophical 
intuition, we need to contextualise it; we will need to return to the complex issue of the Kantian 
imagination. In thus meditating on aspects of Bergsonian and Kantian thought, I will be 
forwarding the aim of the thesis, since the insights thus gained into imaginatively productive 
temporality will cast significant light on the problem of artistic creativity and its relation to faith 
and freedom, as Kierkegaard understands it, as we re-focus upon these issues in chapter seven. 
Thus we will have made progress in addressing the central problem of this thesis: the 
reconciliation of key practical and theoretical aspects of Kierkegaard’s approach to aesthetics. 
In section two I will analyse Kantian productive imagination as an organic structure. In section 
three I will address Bergsonian intuition in terms of Kantian aesthetic ideas. 
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491 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 49. 
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(2) Kant’s polar imagination as a theoretical model for Bergson’s philosophical intuition 
 
In the course of our earlier investigation of Kantian productive imagination, in chapter three, we 
confronted the issue of the imagination’s vital role in construing the sensible manifold, thereby 
conditioning the very possibility of any subsequent conceptual interpretation, transcendental or 
empirical. But we must now go over this ground again in more depth, in order to show, in light 
of chapter four, what will emerge as the intrinsically organic structure of Kant’s transcendental, 
or productive imagination.  
 
It shall be argued that insight into the organic nature of Kantian imagination sheds light on the 
problem which confront us concerning the logical coherence of Bergson’s claims for a non-
conceptual philosophical intuition. With Kantian imagination, we uncover a framework that can 
account for the apparent incoherence of Bergson’s claim for an imaginative, pre-conceptual 
intuition of a creative process, which yet can only be communicated in conceptual terms. Kant’s 
account of the deduction of the categories presents the related problem of a claim for 
imaginative, pre-conceptual construal of the sensible manifold – which yet, and again, can only 
be accounted for conceptually. The organic structure of the answer which I shall offer to this 
Kantian issue suggests a homologous solution to the similar problem arising in an acute form in 
relation to the coherence of Bergson’s account of ontologically creative, dynamic process, 
before its flow is cut up into concepts by the calculative understanding.  
 
Just as is the case concerning a distinction that must be made, in relation to Kant, between a 
pre-conceptual ‘imaginative construal’ and ‘conceptual interpretation’ proper,493 so also 
Bergson’s claim for an intrinsically non-conceptual intuition will remain purely nominal, a 
mere flatus vocis, unless there is some account – again, necessarily conceptual – to justify non-
conceptual discernment, and in so doing, prove capable of justifying itself as a conceptual 
account of the intrinsically un-conceptual nature of imagination, as it opens up a world to us.  I 
suggest that attention to the solution of this explanatory dilemma which shall be offered in the 
case of Kant can help unravel the same problem in regard to Bergsonian intuition. The solution 
at which I will arrive, regarding Kant, can be summarised preliminarily by saying that the 
Kantian productive imagination acts as a grounded ground. By this I mean that while enabling 
the application of conceptual conditions of experience, transcendental imaginative activity, 
paradoxically, is also directed by those same conceptual forms. Kant’s productive imagination 
will thus be shown to display an organic structure, as addressed in the last chapter. 
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As organically structured, it will be argued, Kantian imaginative construal cannot itself be 
disambiguated in terms of any straightforward causal account, because of the conceptually 
paradoxical or irreducible nature of organic structure, as analysed in chapter four. By showing 
that Bergson’s intuition is also such an imaginative productivity, we will be able to see that his 
intuition is indeed intelligible or accountable, but in organic terms, and thus as causally 
irreducible. It will be argued, later in this chapter, and in chapters to come, that the same kind of 
organically active-receptive, or ethico-aesthetic intrinsic, imaginative structure as is found in 
Kant’s account of productive imagination, must also be characteristic of any aesthetic of art and 
nature which may be reconcilable with Kierkegaardian paradoxical theology. Such an active-
receptive structure has already been shown to characterise Kierkegaard’s ‘imagination of 
inwardness’, in chapter two. Bergson has already provided us with a related criterion for such 
an organic aesthetic of transcendence, through his account of genuinely un-foreseeable – as 
conceptually paradoxical – creative process, as we saw in the last chapter. It is to elucidate 
Bergson’s conceptually paradoxical philosophical intuition of such process that we now turn, 
once more, to Kant’s account of transcendental imagination. 
 
(2.1) The organic nature of imagination: a causally ambiguous productive process 
We learned in chapter three that Kant distinguishes a transcendentally productive imaginative 
capacity – as an epistemological condition of possible experience – from empirical imagination. 
By virtue of its creative, transcendental role, the productive imagination is the same power that 
works unconsciously to guide aesthetic production in works of genius, as discussed in chapter 
four. Kant identifies the productive imagination, epistemologically, as responsible for all 
synthetic activity, cognitive and aesthetic: ‘synthesis in general is...the mere effect of the 
imagination, of a blind though indispensible function of the soul without which we would have 
no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious’.494 I will discuss the aesthetic 
aspect of the productive imagination later. The point to be grasped here is that Kant 
distinguishes between empirical image-production and an interpretive, synthetic activity 
assigned to the productive imagination, in rendering any and all experience possible.
495
 
Productive, or transcendental imagination gives a temporal construal to the synopsis of the 
manifold – sense data – in temporal inner sense.  Imagination thus enables an awareness, or 
formal intuition of the manifold as temporally ordered.
496
 It is the productive imagination that 
occupies Kant’s thought, in its epistemological and aesthetic bearings, in the Critique of Pure 
Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgement.  
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In the Critique of Pure Reason, Paton suggests that the crucial imaginative synthetic activity in 
the transcendental deduction is what Kant describes as a combination in accordance with 
affinity, which is analysed as involving both spatial and temporal aspects of connection.
497
 
Transcendental combination through affinity thematises sensibility in spatio-temporal terms, 
establishing the pattern to be followed by all empirical imaginative activity, since such a 
transcendental thematic continuity serves as a hermeneutical framework according to which 
spatial patterns or imaginative arrangements can be associated with one another through time. It 
is only as a thematic continuity, or by their referential affinity, that successive patterns of 
representation can be referred to a single object.
498
 Kant himself says: ‘the ground of the 
possibility of the association of ideas, so far as it lies in the object, is called the affinity of the 
manifold’.499 Thus it becomes clear that the activity of productive or transcendental imagination 
is not concerned with the making of images, but rather with the construal of fluctuating sensible 
appearances in terms of spatio-temporal patterning; an interpretation that connects together the 
shifting moments of a changing sensory manifold according to a thematic unity, whose 




It has been shown in chapter three that transcendental imagination mediates the conceptual 
categories that form the armature of the transcendental unity of apperception through the 
activity of schematism.
501
 What has just been discussed as an activity of imaginative synthesis 
according to thematic affinity, as guided by conceptual rules of temporal order, is just this 
imaginative creation of schemata, or modes of imaginative construal serving to guide pure 
conceptual categories in temporal combination. This is what has been referred to above 
concerning the organic nature of transcendental imaginative structure as a grounded-ground. 
Without such imaginative combination, pure concepts of the understanding could not be 
brought to bear on appearances to give them the categorical structure of objectively sequential 
experience.
502
 Imaginative mediation thus presents us with a logical paradox. While it is true to 
say that imagination is guided by conceptual rules in the construal of ordered affinity among the 
manifold of sense, it is no less true to say that imagination guides a faculty of pure 
understanding, and that without the imaginative activity on which pure concepts depend for 
their applicability to sense data, categorically structured experience could not occur. 
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On this basis, we can see that no experience would be possible without the conceptually 
paradoxical, imaginative coordination of sense data and concepts. Productive imagination 
mediates between the active and passive parts of experience. Productive imagination, through 
its transcendental, or pure, productive activity,
504
 both enables, and is enabled by, a 
categorically structured, focal unity of objective consciousness.
505
 Moreover, this transcendental 
unity of consciousness itself displays a similarly ambiguous structure. It is to the imagination’s 
relation to this latter ambiguity, or rather polarity of structure that I now turn.  
 
As seen in chapter three, transcendental subjectivity, or the unity of transcendental 
apperception, is the condition of transcendental objectivity as its own polar correlate, an 
objectivity manifesting through judgements or acts of unification for transcendental subjectivity 
according to pure conceptual categories.
506
 All consciousness is ‘intentional’ or referential, 
which is to say no more than that all consciousness is ‘consciousness of’ something: all 
subjectivity exists as such only in relation to an object. Kant can only identify this necessary, 
conceptually structured objective correlate and focus for transcendental apperception as ‘X’,507 
as a consciousness of... something: transcendental objectivity cannot have any more informative 
definition than is contained in describing it as that of which transcendental subjectivity is 
conscious, as that focus of attention without which there could be no transcendental unity or 
singleness of consciousness.  
 
The objective structure of experience is thus a categorically structured objectivity for a subject, 
which is logically prior to all consideration of any empirical objects which this polar, 
transcendental subject-object structure makes possible. The two poles of transcendental 
subjectivity and objectivity, as structural correlates, are mutually defining: they only make 
sense in relation to one another. They are polar concepts, and thus mutually constitutive, and I 
suggest that the transcendental or productive imagination is the ground of both.  
 
Paton writes of representations in Kant as imaginatively apprehended,
508
 that such 
representations ‘would be described more accurately, if they were said to be neither subjective 
nor objective, since for mere apprehension they are certainly not modifications of a subject 
which is distinguished from objects’.509 In a footnote Paton suggests that ‘as apprehended, ideas 
[representations] are modifications of the mind or events in mental history. We do not, 
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however, know them to be such except by inner sense and reflexion’.510 Kant describes the 
imaginative synthesis of apprehension as the ‘apprehension of the representations, as 
modifications of the mind in intuition’,511 and thus as the imaginatively enabled formal intuition 
by which all objective knowledge is mediated. This leads Paton to point out that the imaginative 
synthesis of the temporal manifold is neither subjective nor objective, since  
it is through thought, and not through mere apprehension, that [representations] are 
recognised to be ideas of an object; and it is only when they are recognised to be 
ideas of an object that they are recognised to be themselves modifications of the 
mind. Knowledge of an object and knowledge of a subject are for Kant correlative 
terms, as the one always implies the other’.512 
The apprehension of various sense data through their imaginative combination is a necessary 
part of experience, to be distinguished from the necessary conceptual components that structure 
fully objective experience.  
 
Thus there is a necessary aspect of any objective experience which is imaginatively constituted. 
Through imaginative apprehension, the bringing to bear of transcendental concepts is made 
possible. But, as we have just seen from Paton’s analysis, such imaginative apprehension cannot 
itself be described as either objective or subjective. Or stated more forcefully, imaginative 
apprehension cannot be either subjective or objective, since the productive imagination grounds 




I suggest on this basis, therefore, that there is thus a complex, polar relationship involving the 
transcendental imagination. The imagination is a source of the two poles of objective 
knowledge on the one hand, and, on the other, it is itself subordinate to the pure understanding 
whose concepts it schematises, whose rules it follows in synthesising the manifold. Thus I 
suggest that there is a mutuality, or epistemological inter-dependency of grounding and 
groundedness at work here. While there is no transcendental apperception without imaginative 
synthesis, there is no synthesis without necessary conceptual structure. Recalling what was 
learned in the last chapter with regard to Schelling’s transcendental idealism, we can see that it 
is just this organic shape of reciprocal causality manifested by the activity of the transcendental 
imagination that post-Kantian thinkers were to pick up on in ‘going beyond’ Kant.  
  
Looking back at what we have learned on the whole about Kant’s conception of imagination, 
and especially in the light of the last three paragraphs, it becomes clear that this mutual or 
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reciprocal grounding of the objective unity of apperception on the one hand, and transcendental 
imagination on the other to which I have just been drawing attention, is responsible for the 
peculiar epistemological position accorded to the imagination by Kant. Imagination is said to be 
a component of the mind’s spontaneity, since all synthesis belongs to the imagination. And yet 
as a mode of intuition, imagination is intrinsically located within sensible receptivity, which it 
can only synthesise on the basis of the conceptual, categorical forms to which its schematising 
activity is subservient. But again, such categorically structuring conceptual features could be 
said to depend on this same imaginative schematic activity, as a mode of hypotyposis, or 
presentation of concepts, on the basis of which concepts are introduced to sensible 
representations. The transcendental imagination is thus both conceptual guide and conceptually 
guided.  
 
As organically structured, there can be no unambiguous priority of conceptuality over 
imaginative construal, or vice versa. Consequently, there can be no possibility of 
disambiguating the foundations of human experience: our status as responding to reality 
through imaginative apprehension. The situation or context becomes meaningful in light of our 
creative interpretation, and our interpretation can only find its meaningfulness from within a 
pre-supposed situation. We have already seen, (in addressing Kierkegaard’s ‘inward’ 
imagination, in chapter two), that ethically motivated attention to a given situation involves a 
tension of imaginative activity in receptivity. Chapter seven will further illumine the insights 
just gained concerning the nature of imagination: that it is at once both active guide and 
receptively guided in the construal of a given context; that imaginative discovery and invention 
are interfused.  
 
On the basis of this difficult argument, and in light of Bergson’s account of conceptually 
irreducible process, as offered in chapter four, we can say the following. That which enables 
Kantian, categorically structured time is the same transcendental imaginative process whose 
structuring activity in relation to the form of inner sense is enabled by the pure understanding. 
The transcendental imagination is both guide and guided. So we conclude that there is an 
organic process of reciprocal causality at work deep in the imaginative substructure of Kant’s 
transcendental deduction. But this means that Kant’s organically-structured, transcendental 
imagination can be thought of as itself the kind of causally irreducible productive process to 
which Bergson draws attention. Transcendental or productive imagination, as that which 
enables but is irreducible to a schematic or causally ordered experience of time, may thus be 
understood as a causally irreducible, organically ordered productive process, or in Bergson’s 
terms, a ‘durational’ activity. But conversely, and importantly, we are now confronted with the 
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possibility that this productive, temporalising process to which Bergson draws attention as 
‘duration’ is, as paradoxically or organically ordered, a causally irreducible imaginative 
activity.  
I am stating this latter conclusion in a merely preliminary way at this point. As we look more 
deeply into the nature of Bergsonian intuition – and of that which is intuited – in the next 
section, a firmer identification of Bergsonian metaphysical time and Kantian imagination will 
become possible. Not only will these findings concerning Kantian imaginative process and 
Bergsonian duration inform discussion in the next section of the rational status of Bergson’s 
philosophical intuition, but they will be seen to bear fruit in the final chapter, in relation to 
Coleridge’s aesthetics, as we build on findings regarding Kierkegaardian imagination in chapter 
two. 
 
(3) Bergsonian intuition and Kantian aesthetic ideas 
 
The possible identification of Bergsonian duration and Kantian productive imaginative process, 
can be justified on the basis of an investigation into the epistemological status of Bergsonian 
philosophical intuition. The problem to be faced with regard to Bergsonian intuition is that, in 
his descriptions of intuited duration, Bergson would seem to be imparting conceptual 
knowledge about that which is the non-conceptual condition for conceptual determination 
(durational ‘life’). I would suggest that the Kantian account of reflective judgement, as 




 suggests that Bergson’s durational thinking in fact arose out of a 
nineteenth century ‘semi-Kantian’515 school of French philosophy, represented by thinkers such 
as Ravaisson and Renouvier. It is on this basis of a community of philosophical motivations 
that I will now attempt to show how Kant’s aesthetic theory can justify the rationality of 
Bergson’s use of conceptuality in relation to his intuitive metaphysics in general, and 
specifically in his account of such intuition in Creative Evolution.  
 
It will be contended that Bergson’s metaphysic can be best accounted for not as irrationalism, as 
suggested by Bertrand Russell,
516
 among others, but in terms of the subjective rationality of 
Kantian reflective judgement. I submit that Bergson’s philosophical practice is to write about 
duration by employing a non-determining use of concepts. In Kant’s terms, this means that 
Bergson brings an imaginatively mediated, reflective mode of judgement to bear in seeking to 
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communicate the conceptually indeterminable meaningfulness and directedness of duration.
517
 
These developments will open up the possibility of identifying the content of Bergson’s formal 
concept of duration in terms of imaginative productivity. 
 
According to Kant’s account in the Critique of Judgement, as we discovered in the last chapter, 
aesthetic imagination leads conceptuality in free reflective interpretation of the ordered content 
presented in the aesthetic idea.
518
 As we saw, the imaginative activity that gives rise to 
judgements of taste differs significantly from the productive imaginative activity that is 
analysed in the Critique of Pure Reason, in that imaginative synthesis in the aesthetic relation to 
an object is not geared towards objective cognition. This means that the aesthetic imaginative 
synthesis of the manifold is not determined by concepts of the understanding, and that the 
imagination is therefore in free play.
519
 This freedom is not random, however, since 
imagination, although not determined by the conceptual faculty, is still oriented towards 
cognitive activity through its harmonious interaction with the understanding, but not towards 
specific acts of knowledge. Imagination’s free synthesis excites the whole cognitive faculty, or 
the capacity to understand in general, to harmonise with its activity, without any determinate 
knowledge ensuing. The feeling of harmonious ‘rightness’ that this free interpretive activity 




To say ‘x is beautiful’ is to say that a harmonious and open-ended interpretive interaction is set 
up between the imagination and the understanding in response to x. In the judgement of taste, 
the powers of imaginative spontaneous receptivity and conceptual spontaneity that must come 
together in any judgement, (as an activity in which a concept is predicated of an imaginatively 
synthesised sensible representation), generate a wealth of interpretation without the possibility 
of arriving at any predicate that would be adequate to determine the meaningfulness of the 
aesthetic presentation. The judgement of taste is thus grounded ultimately in the twofold power 
of judgement itself,
521
 as both imagination and conceptuality generate the pleasurable feeling on 
which the judgement depends.   
 
However, the judgement of taste is only subjectively rational, since no object is determined 
through imaginative reflection. The subjective feeling of rational approval can, nevertheless, be 
justifiably expected of anyone experiencing the same aesthetic representation, since the same 
subjective cognitive structure, the same twofold constitution of the power of judgement, can be 
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assumed to pertain amongst any normally functioning rational subjects.
522
 The rationality or 
universality of the judgement of taste would perhaps, therefore, be more appropriately described 
as inter-subjective, than subjective. When one says ‘x is beautiful’, one assumes a universal 
voice,
523
 since any person possessed of the same cognitive faculties of imagination and 
conceptuality could be reasonably expected to arrive at the same judgement in relation to the 
same aesthetic presentation.  
 
Imagination and conceptuality, in aesthetic reflective judgement, resonate with one another in 
free interpretive play.
524
 Imagination holds up a particular intuition – an aesthetic idea – to the 
faculty of concepts, stimulating reflection as an activity of comparison and connection of 
concepts. No one concept is adequate to the aesthetic representation.  
 
In relation to art, imagination presents a particular symbolic intuition, an aesthetic idea, to the 
conceptual faculty, whose concepts are inadequate to determine the symbolic presentation.
525
 A 
symbol is the imaginative representation of a theme, in such a manner that another ‘concept’526 
– an intrinsically un-intuitable rational idea – is suggested or intimated through the 
imaginatively enriched subject matter of the aesthetic idea.
527
 Imagination presents the aesthetic 
idea to the understanding, provoking and awakening conceptual activity, and thus generating a 
surplus of conceptual reflection, of interpretive meaningfulness, that tends to expand 
indefinitely. This potentially infinite expansiveness of indeterminate meaning evokes or 
awakens an awareness of ideas of reason, themselves indefinite, and un-represent-able in any 
finite intuition.  
 
But the artist utilises or conforms to his imaginative idea the learned, technical skills of his art 
to achieve his aims.
528
 The artist utilises these skills to inform a subject matter or content in 
accordance with an overarching aesthetic meaningfulness that cannot be reduced to any single 
interpretation; that surpasses, indeterminately, the technical perfection, or merely academic 




The hearer, reader or viewer of such aesthetic ideas manifesting in literary, plastic, pictorial or 
musical art-forms finds his own imagination stimulated to disinterested activity.
530
 Free from 
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the schematising role which it performs in an enabling the mind to come to determining 
judgements, the imagination freely construes an indefinable meaningfulness pervading the 
whole work. This is the aesthetic idea, the informing principle of the meaningfully ordered 
work, a meaningful whole, organically informing and transforming the empirical elements 
portrayed or set forth in the work contemplated, be they words, tones, or visual representations. 
What the constituent parts of the work can be interpreted as, taken individually, is not identical 
to what they become in light of their overarching imaginative, organising principle: the artist’s 
aesthetic idea. Even the artist himself would not be able to determine the content of his idea, but 
productive imagination ‘bodies forth’ its meaning unconsciously. The artist’s consciousness 
exerts a measure of regulative direction, his empirical awareness managing and applying the 




By recurring to Kant’s aesthetics, we have found that in producing a symbol pregnant with 
infinite or indeterminate meaningfulness – an aesthetic idea – the imagination unconsciously 
enables the disinterested purposiveness without determinate purpose that is an art-work’s 
aesthetic significance, as opposed to its significance as an empirical artefact, or conscious 
purpose of human activity.
532
 The infinite fruitfulness or significance embodied in an aesthetic 
idea cannot be determined in concepts of the understanding.
533
 The appreciative listener, reader, 
or beholder finds his own imagination set in motion by this uncontainable significance, and his 





We have seen that Bergson comes to a very similar conclusion about the nature of his intuition 
of creative process, its independence from the determining judgements of the empirical 
intelligence.
535
 Bergson maintains that life, or the élan vital, is intrinsically alien and 
inaccessible to discursive cognition. It is claimed that intuition of living duration is 
untranslatable into discursive knowledge,
536
 and yet Bergson uses concepts to report or 
communicate this discursively untranslatable intuition. I suggest, therefore, that Bergson is 
using concepts in a poetically indeterminate manner; in Kant’s terms, he describes his intuitions 
through the conceptuality of aesthetic reflection, or indeterminate judgement.
537
 Only on such a 
basis can he avoid the charge of self-contradiction. Support for such an interpretation is 
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534 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 49. 
535 Bergson, The Creative Mind, pp. 199-200. 
536 Bergson, The Creative Mind, p. 189. 
537 See, for example, Bergson, The Creative Mind, pp. 199-200: I suggest that the intuitive grasp of a central moving principle in a 
mass of collected information here described suggests the apprehension of a dynamic aesthetic idea, in Kant’s (and even more so, as 
we shall see, also Coleridge’s) sense. 
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suggested by Bergson himself. In Creative Evolution, he compares the intuition of durational 
life to the mode of seeing of an artist. 
Intelligence, by means of science, which is its work, will deliver up to us more 
and more completely the secret of physical operations; of life it brings us, and 
moreover only claims to bring us, a translation in terms of inertia. It goes all 
round life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, 
drawing it into itself instead of entering into it. But it is to the very inwardness 
of life that intuition leads us, – by intuition I mean instinct that has become 
disinterested, self-conscious, and capable of reflecting on its object and of 
enlarging it indefinitely. 
  That an effort of this kind is not impossible is proved by the existence in man 
of an aesthetic faculty along with normal perception. Our eye perceives the 
features of the living being, merely as assembled, not as mutually organised. 
The intention of life, the simple movement that runs through the lines, that 
binds them together and gives them significance, escapes it. This intention is 
just what the artist tries to regain, by placing himself back within the object by a 
kind of sympathy, in breaking down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier that 
space puts up between him and his model.
538
  
Bergson goes on to distinguish, as differentiated modes of one and the same kind, between 
aesthetic and philosophical intuition: 
It is true that this aesthetic intuition, like external perception, only attains the 
individual. But we can conceive an inquiry turned in the same direction as art, 
which would take life in general for its object, just as physical science, in 
following to the end the direction pointed out by external perception, prolongs 




Thus I maintain – in light of the foregoing discussion, and on the basis of what we have seen in 
the last chapter concerning Kant’s reflective judgement – that Bergson is utilising an aesthetic 
style of thinking, explicable in terms of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, to take issue with – and 
limit the applicability of the findings of – Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. And in view of this, I 
do not find Bergson guilty of the charge of irrationalism, as levelled against him by Bertrand 
Russell.
540
 A. D. Lindsay  quotes Bergson in distinguishing between two varieties of 
intellectualism;
541
 one sort is what Kant, in full agreement, might have derided as a rigid, 
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539 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 186-7. Bergson’s italics. 
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541 A. D. Lindsay, The Philosophy of Bergson, (Montana: Kessinger, 2010), pp. 18-19. 
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rationalistic dogmatism (to be discouraged), while the other is the fluid, organic thinking which 
stays close to the source of things: 
You are quite right to distinguish between thought drawn from its profound sources 
and superficial thought, which is ready to fix itself in formulas. Automatism is the 
enemy. That is true of the intellectual life, as of the physical and moral life. There 
are two kinds of intellectualism, the true, which lives its ideas; and a false 
intellectualism, which immobilises moving ideas into solidified concepts to play 
with them like counters.
542
 
Thus in spite of his lyrical style – a style born of an aesthetic mode of reflective rationality, 
familiar to us from Kant’s third Critique – Bergson’s philosophical intuition is as distinct from 
merely irrational ‘gut feeling’ as it is from narrow rationalism. 
 
It is important, therefore, to recognise that by interpreting Bergsonian intuition in terms of 
Kantian aesthetic judgement, we are enabled to fix the rational status of Bergson’s metaphysics, 
freeing him from charges of irrationalism. His metaphysic might be classified as subjectively 
rational, (to use the Kantian term as applied to aesthetic judgements of taste), or not capable of 
verification in the same manner as the empirical sciences, but nevertheless issuing in 
judgements with which anyone sharing in the same, or a similar, intuiting relation could be 
expected to agree. Bergson’s somewhat opaque doctrine of intellectual intuition can thus be re-
construed in terms of Kantian aesthetics as the free-play of imagination and understanding. 
Imagination in free play, and aesthetically reflective conceptual interpretation (as the 
appropriate means of its elucidation), are in effect given the task by Bergson of showing the 
durational conditions of possibility of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. Through 
aesthetic, imaginative reflection, Duration is shown to be the more ultimate condition of an 
objectively determined, transcendental imaginative synthesis that quantifies the qualitative 
movement of reality. Bergson uses imaginative description to draw attention to an essentially 
un-objectifiable and unpredictable temporal process.
543
 And here we can regain contact with 
findings from the earlier parts of this chapter.  
 
A key theme that emerged earlier is something we first discovered in relation to Kierkegaardian 
aesthetics: the imagination is always both active and passive.
544
 Through analysis of Kant’s 
conception of the imagination, the reason for this dual or ambiguous identity became clear. We 
saw that, in relation to Kant’s transcendental deduction, a mutual or reciprocal grounding of the 
objective unity of apperception on the one hand, and transcendental imagination on the other, is 
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responsible for the peculiar epistemological position accorded to the imagination by Kant. The 
transcendental imagination is both guide and guided, we discovered. So we concluded that there 
is an organic, reciprocal causality at work deep in the imaginative substructure of Kantian 
temporality. Time itself is rooted in organic, imaginative process. 
 
We have just been discovering that Bergsonian duration, a primordially active and temporal 
metaphysical principle, gains rational elucidation in terms of Kantian reflective judgement. 
Moreover, as we saw in a preliminary way at the end of the last section, Bergsonian duration 
ceases to be a merely formal concept, if its content is indeed identifiable in terms of productive 
imagining. In what follows, I shall analyse this possible identification of Bergson’s dynamic 
metaphysical process with Kantian imaginative productivity.  
 
As Douglas Fawcett points out – thinking in terms of an imaginal ground of reality: a living 
creative process – the problem with Bergson’s account of duration or creative temporality is 
that it bases in a purely formal concept, the élan vital, which Fawcett regards as one 
which recognises indeed creative evolution, but leaves its content unread...An 
‘imperious impulse to create’ [Bergson’s description] is no more instructive 
than would be the derivation of change from psychical ‘force’ – a word.545 
If such a ‘force’, on analysis, could be shown to be identifiable with the Kantian productive 
imagination as a creative process, this criticism is answered. Such an identification was 
suggested at the end of the last section. On the basis of what has been learned so far in this 
section, the elements are now in place to justify that identification. In what follows I will bring 
these elements together, affording an understanding of Bergsonian duration as an imaginal 
ground, a temporalising creative medium. A similar account of imaginative productivity, as we 
saw in the last chapter, is offered through Schelling’s account of philosophical intuition; 
Bergson’s non-teleological account, however, as I have indicated previously, is more 
theologically acceptable, on the Kierkegaardian grounds laid down in my first two chapters. 
 
We saw in the last section that Kantian productive imagination is an organic reciprocity of 
grounding and groundedness, irreducible to either subjective or objective terms, as conditioning 
the very possibility of the bi-polar structure of objective experience.
546
  Imagination thus leads 
conceptuality by following its rules. But what, exactly, is it about the imagination by which it 
leads, and which is not reducible to the conceptual understanding? This is to ask, what is the 
status and nature of that active or synthesising element in productive imagination that is not 
itself conceptual?  
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Kant cannot answer this question. As we have seen, he says that we are ‘blind’ to the ultimate 
nature of imaginative activity: ‘synthesis in general [...] is the mere result of the power of 
imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no 
knowledge whatsoever’.547 We have seen how Bergson responds to Kant concerning the 
ultimate ground of possible experience in terms of an élan vital, or organically structured  
metaphysical process. We have also seen, in section two, that such an organic structure also 
characterises Kantian productive imagination. The possible identification of Kant’s productive 
imagination with Bergson’s durational process was thus made at the end of section two, in a 
preliminary way. But before we could fully acknowledge Bergson’s insights into dynamic 
metaphysical process, we had to justify his epistemic access to such a pre-conceptual 
productivity. We then found that Bergson’s productive intuition can be analysed in terms of 
Kant’s account of imagination’s role in aesthetically reflective judgement. An identification of 
Bergsonian duration and Kantian imagination thus becomes justifiable, as Bergson’s intuition 
can now be understood as an imaginative process that has been raised to philosophical 
consciousness, delivering insights into its own activity through aesthetically reflective 
judgement. On this basis we are now able to answer the question posed in the last paragraph 
explicitly: Kant’s imagination productively synthesises experience as that metaphysical 
productivity to which Bergson points, as an élan vital. 
 
The very term ‘pre-conceptual’, as used to describe such a productive imaginative intuition of 
durational process, is misleading, as implying a uni-directional temporal order for organic, 
imaginative action-in-passivity. We learned from Kierkegaard, in chapter one, that we are 
always already interpreting reality around us and our place within it;
548
 that existence is always 
in media res. In this light, and in view of the foregoing paragraphs, one might suggest that 
Bergson’s participative intuition of a dynamic ‘ground’ of conceptual awareness must itself be 
always already in process of mediation. In Bergsonian intuition, and thus through the 
indeterminate conceptuality of aesthetic engagement, we participate in our own enabling source 
as imagination brings its own nature as a mediating process into the light. Imagination thus 
intuits itself as essentially an organically productive, durational élan vital.  
 
In light of the paradoxically organic structure of the imagination as both cause and effect of 
itself, a significant distinction, with regard to my overarching and cumulative argument, can be 
drawn between the roles of the imagination in knowledge and in aesthetic interpretation. I have 
been suggesting that Bergson’s merely formal concept of a durational élan vital can be reunited 
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with its own, proper content: the activity of the transcendental imagination, as it conditions 
possible experience. On the other hand, Kant’s transcendental objectivity will itself be 
relativised or contextualised, as it is seen to mask – while actually being enabled by – the 
organic creativity of the productive imagination, understood in terms of durational freedom.  
 
Thus, building on findings from the last chapter, I suggest that Bergson is right to regard 
Kantian ‘spatialised’ time as far from fundamental to human experience. By amplifying and 
clarifying Bergson’s account of durational ‘intuition’ in terms of Kantian, subjectively rational, 
aesthetically reflective judgement, we have found that the nature of Bergsonian duration is 
imaginal: what Kant calls the productive imagination is a fundamental and organic temporal 
process.  
 
(4) Conclusion: The Rationality of a Creative Mystery 
  
By analysing Bergsonian intuition in terms of Kantian imaginative conceptual reflection, the 
apparently objective language which Bergson uses can be justified as an aesthetically 
suggestive and non-determining use of concepts. I shall be arguing, in relation to the aesthetic 
thinking of Coleridge, in chapter seven, that just this ‘Bergsonian’ kind of aesthetically 
suggestive reflection is characteristic of an ethically receptive, conceptually indeterminate 
apprehension of transcendent creativity, as mediated through art and natural beauty. 
 
Bergson argues, as we learned in the last chapter, that time, at a more fundamental level of 
engagement with our own reality than that adapted to calculative pursuits in dealing with the 
external world, is never truly predictable in advance. However, throw a spatialising web over 
such intrinsically unpredictable freedom and it is lost among the necessities of calculative 
thought. The spatialising construct, while useful at a certain practical level, nonetheless 
alienates us from the imaginative openness to transformation which is our own-most possibility. 
We are not determined things, our ‘basis’ is freedom as opportunity and invitation to creative 
response, as Kierkegaard shows us. Through this chapter we have learned that the roots of 
Kierkegaard’s position as laid out in chapter one are found in a Kantian concept of imaginative 
productivity, and Bergsonian duration has given us a open-ended and dynamic temporal model 
through which to relate Kierkegaard’s thought to the romantic imagination, to the post-Kantian 
insights into organically creative process from which Kierkegaard is alienated, and on which he 
nevertheless relies in his creative mode of communication. 
 
We have seen that an analysis of the nature and rational status of Bergson’s philosophical 
intuition, interacting with Kant’s account of the aesthetic and theoretical roles of productive 
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imagination, brings to light what romantic writers have referred to as an unsuspected dimension 
of ‘depth’ that is fundamental to our ability to engage with reality on a more accustomed, 
empirical level. This mysterious depth is, of course, given a thoroughly rational analysis by 
Kant in terms of a transcendental act of imaginative synthesis on the one hand, and an account 
of unconscious imaginative activity in the vision of the world that is brought to life in art. This 
Kantian analysis enables the inherent intelligibility of Bergson’s thought to be clarified by 
assigning imaginative content to its sinuous and elusive formality. But nevertheless, even 
Kantian analysis finds the mystery of transcendental imaginative process to be irreducible to 
straightforward, uni-dimensional and uni-directional causal determination. And this organically 
irreducible aspect of real and only partially accountable creative process has come across, I 
hope, in the course of our engagement with Bergson. Further light will be shed on this 
ultimately theological mystery of Creativity, in relation to the romantic vision of Coleridge 






Coleridge, dialectics & Christian theology549 
 
Introduction: a Statement of Aims for this Chapter 
 
Coleridge’s thinking is to be addressed at this point for two main reasons to which I shall 
shortly draw attention. Firstly, however, a note about the complexity of Coleridge’s religious, 
theoretical and artistic positions needs to be made, and borne in mind through what follows.  
 
At a first appraisal, and in relation to the concerns of this thesis, we can distinguish two 
‘Coleridges’: a romantic poet and a philosopher. But looked at more deeply, I will be arguing 
that an intimately experienced, philosophical or metaphysical vision – as integral to his personal 
make-up –  and an urge to express this vision in a diversity of forms is a prime motivation 
behind both his early poetic successes and his later theoretical explorations.
550
 Thus the poetry 
and the philosophy were deeply intertwined in Coleridge’s worldview. As is witnessed through 
his less formally systematic critical, aesthetic and poetic insights, Coleridge’s philosophising 
and his aesthetic experiences and activities cannot be rigidly compartmentalised because they 
are organically, rather than accidentally, combined as equally expressive of the rich unity-in-
diversity of the man’s extraordinary personality.551  
 
However, I shall suggest that, as a whole, Coleridge’s formally systematic thinking, though 
inspired as it is by high religious, ethical and poetic ideals, faces insurmountable difficulties 
because of a basic incompatibility between his aesthetic, ethical and religious insights and 
commitments on the one hand, and the philosophical conceptuality through which he seeks, 
and, I submit, fails, to do them justice on the other. Coleridge the religio-philosophical poet and 
aesthetician will be dealt with in the next chapter. Here I focus on Coleridge the systematic 
dialectician. 
 
Coleridge was drawn to Kantian and post-Kantian thinking because he believed he saw there a 
means to reconcile his poetic faith in the experienced presence of God as intimated through the 
natural world, with his Christian faith in a personal freedom that, while ethically fallen, is yet 
potentially open to redemption through the abiding love of an incarnate God.
552
 However, the a 
priori necessitarian tendency of post-Kantian idealism leads to a Spinozistic denial of personal 
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freedom, the basis of Kierkegaardian faith and ethical commitment, just as it is the source of the 




Moreover, I will suggest that the revealed reality of salvation in Christ, a gift that one could not 
attain for oneself, least of all by mere thinking, as we found in chapters one and two, is 
thoroughly compromised by the overarching teleological trajectory of idealist metaphysics such 
as Coleridge’s, as has been demonstrated already in chapter four in connection with the thought 
of Kant and Schelling. I would suggest, therefore, that Coleridge faced a theoretical and ethical 
impasse. I conclude that this intellectual and emotional unrest – possibly exacerbated by his 
acute personal problems
554
 – caused him to exert himself untiringly (but, I shall argue, to no 
avail in his systematic output) in the attempt to reconcile his poetic intimations of the ‘one life, 
within us and abroad’, as he himself expressed it in verse,555 with a life lived in faithful 




Having established this as the framework through which I will address Coleridge’s thought in 
what follows in this and the subsequent chapter, I will now suggest just why he is to be 
addressed at all in this thesis, and moreover, why he is a unique focus for my thinking, as 
uniting different strands. I have already drawn attention to Coleridge’s quest for reconciliation 
between two, equally compelling personal commitments: to theologically and philosophically 
pregnant aesthetic insights on the one hand, and, on the other, a living faith in both personal 
freedom and the need for ethical salvation. Such a reconciliation is the overall goal of my own 
thesis, as declared already in chapter one. The project aims at a reconciliation of the perceived 
truth of Kierkegaardian existential theology with Kierkegaard’s own need to express this 
theology through aesthetically indirect forms of communication. Therefore I too am seeking a 
rapprochement between the paradox of Christian faith and the insights of human aesthetic 
discernment.  
 
Yet it is all too easy, as is evident from much of Coleridge’s writing, to account for natural and 
artistic beauty and sublimity in terms of an overarching neoplatonic or idealist a priori 
conceptuality.
557
 But then, as we know from Kierkegaard, one does not even begin to touch the 
edges of the responsibilities – as also of the sober joy – of a life of genuine relationship to 
Christ; a life that surely one can never feel comfortable in calling one’s own, no matter how 
long and hard one seeks it. But I it will emerge on the basis of this chapter, in the next, that  
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analysis leads to the suggestion that Coleridge’s verse and aesthetic contemplation does indeed 
enact what he seeks –  and I will argue, fails – to account for theoretically through his 
systematic work.  
 
In this chapter I suggest that in the long run, Coleridge was hindered rather than helped by the 
panentheistic post-Kantian conceptuality through which he sought to reconcile aesthetic 
experience and ethical faith.
558
 It has already been argued (in chapter four) that Kant’s 
transcendental conceptual determinism, leading as it does to a ‘spatialisation’ of time, is 
incompatible with genuine revelatory novelty, and the thought of Bergson was put forward as a 
potential corrective of such schematised time in the post-Kantian tradition. I will show in this 
chapter that the same problem of a priori teleology is greatly responsible for the failure of 
Coleridge’s systematisation of his aesthetic and religious insights and commitments.  
 
The elucidation of this latter claim will advance the theological aims of my thesis by drawing 
further attention to the deficiencies of idealistic teleology to accommodate a genuinely un-pre-
thinkable revelation, such as we have seen to be the essence of faith as Kierkegaard understands 
it. I will thus point towards the next chapter by suggesting that Coleridge’s aesthetic theory, his 
poetic activity, and his experience of the irreducibly qualitative significance of nature is better 
understood when seen in a Bergsonian light, than through the Platonic and Kantian prisms that 
diverted its aesthetic – and ethical – import. I further suggest that such a durational re-
contextualisation of Coleridge’s project allows us to see the direction in which a theoretical 
reconciliation of aesthetics and Kierkegaardian faith could be achieved. Such is the ultimately 
frustrated goal of Coleridge, as I intend to show here; such also is the need of Kierkegaard, as I 
have established already. Firstly, I must give an analysis of certain focal distinctions that are 




(1) A critical survey of Coleridgean Metaphysical Conceptuality 
 
A critical survey of Coleridgean philosophical positions will now be undertaken, in order to 
draw attention to the systematic and organic nature of Coleridge’s metaphysical thinking as a 
whole, and by so doing, to highlight areas that are open to criticism along the lines indicated in 
my statement of aims for this chapter, above.  
                                                                        




I propose to show that Coleridge proposes a kind of aesthetically indeterminate, metaphysical 
insight, through metaphysical ideas, or archetypal forms, mediated by the power of imagination, 
conceived as having an overarching and primarily epistemological role.
559
 Such metaphysical 
insight is conceived as inaccessible to the empirical understanding, although the transcendental 
categories governing the function of the understanding are themselves seen as constitutively 
dependent on the illuminative power of metaphysical ideas, and thus also on the 




(1.1) The distinction between reason and understanding 
Building on the transcendental epistemology of Kant that we addressed in chapters three and 
four, Coleridge distinguishes between reason and understanding.
561
 Reason, as one and 
indivisible, pervades and endows all other functions of the mind, while manifesting originally 
and primarily as conscience. Conscience, or the effective immanence of a transcendent and 
ontologically constitutive reason, plays a crucial epistemological role for Coleridge, as we shall 
see.
562
 As the immanence of a transcendent and creative, constructive or constitutive principle, 
reason is thus not regarded by Coleridge as itself a function of the individual mind, as is the 
case with the understanding, will, and feelings. Reason is rooted in God, transcending the 
individual mind’s participation of it.563 Coleridge fully embraces Kant’s distinction between 
reason and understanding. As we have seen, Kant regards concepts of the understanding, in 
union with sensibility, as that which gives objectivity to experience. On the other hand, reason 
for Kant has a merely regulative role, and does not add to the content of actual knowledge. 





In his objective metaphysical thought, Coleridge allows that the concepts of the understanding 
may subserve a higher norm than the Kantian transcendental categories (e.g., cause and effect) 
proper to their usual function. Such a higher norm is found in the authority of metaphysically 
constitutive ideas of reason, from which, like Schelling and, in his own way, Hegel, (as saw in 
chapter 1), Coleridge derives a bi-polar or organic logic of differentiated identity, over and 
above the Aristotelian logic of non-contradiction suitable only to the work of the empirical 
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understanding. Thus in metaphysical connection and determination, the logic of ‘either/or’ is 
replaced by that of ‘both/and’.565  
 
In the long run, as I intend to show in this chapter, it is Coleridge’s use of an idealist logic of 
differentiated identity – a mere thought-mechanism or instrumentality through which 
imaginatively indeterminate and thus incalculable polar oppositions are pre-conceived and 
artificially harmonised – which I find responsible for the failure of his metaphysics from the 
standpoint of a Kierkegaardian theological norm, as set out in the first two chapters.
566
 I shall 
argue later in this chapter that in constructing a logical model of imaginative process through 
which conceptually irreducible and imaginatively co-dependent oppositions are progressively 
harmonised, and thus distorted.
567
 It will be suggested that Coleridge must implicitly be 
working to a schematically linear, or empirically causal temporal schedule. Such a Kantian 
understanding of time, as analysed and criticised earlier, is unable, intrinsically, to do justice to 
the organic or conceptually non-linear processes that Coleridge seeks to explain. I shall argue 
that, while seeming to offer the possibility of a non-dogmatic or properly transcendental 
metaphysic, Coleridge’s reliance on a concept of time reduced to a Kantian transcendental 
schematism of originally durational process blinds him to the organic nature of that temporal 
process; blinds him to duration’s irreducibility to the empirically calculable terms which govern 




G. N. G. Orsini suggests that Coleridge re-construes Kant’s dialectical antinomies of reason – 
the self-refuting ability of reason to argue both for and against any given metaphysical 
propositions which equal logical correctness – as a dialectic of the understanding.568 Thus it is 
not reason that is at fault, for Coleridge, but the understanding, when it tries to use its concepts 
beyond their transcendentally assigned, empirical remit. Thus Coleridge writes in his Logic: 
follows. 
When from two premises, both of which are affirmed by equal right by the 
understanding, the understanding itself by legitimate deductions can arrive at two 
contradictory conclusions, the only possible solution of the difficulty is found in 
assuming that the understanding has been applying its own forms and functions, or 
those which it has borrowed from the sense, to objects which do not fall under its 
cognisance; as when, for instance, the understanding applies the forms of time and 
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566 See Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, pp. 26-40. 
567 See for example, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘Theory of Life’, in Shorter Works and Fragments, part 1, pp. 481-557. 




space, of quantity, quality and relation, to the idea of the Supreme Being, or of 
things themselves contradistinguished from phenomena.
569
 
What for Kant rules out the possibility of metaphysical knowledge only serves to show, for 
Coleridge, the inadequacy of the logic of the understanding for dealing with metaphysical 
issues. Metaphysics has its own, proper logic involving, as we shall see, aesthetic insight into 
the structure of imaginatively mediated metaphysical ideas, or ideas of reason. 
 
(1.2) Primary and secondary imagination: imagination as an epistemological source and 
medium of experience in general, also as a source and medium for metaphysically 
intimative ideas of reason 
Imagination, as envisaged by Coleridge, has two, distinct, epistemological roles. In addition to 
mediating ideas of reason in its secondary or artistic role, primary imagination, (on which the 
secondary role is dependent), acts in a similar way to Kant’s transcendental imagination (as 
already discussed in some detail in chapter three).
570
 Primary imagination is fundamental to any 
possible experience for Coleridge, as it is for Kant.
571
 The primary epistemological role of 
imagination for Coleridge, as conditioning in relation to conscience the possibility of any 
experience, will be dealt with in later in this chapter, and, through other aspects, in the next. 
 
Imagination, in both its roles, is characterised as a unifying function, mediating the possibility 
of subjective and objective distinctions, and thus of possible experience.
572
 Furthermore, as an 
ontologically constitutive unifying function, imagination is the principle of all synthetic 
organisation,
573
 or of all organisation that, while it may be analysed in terms of cause and effect 
through the instrumentalisation of reality made possible by the calculative understanding, 
cannot be reduced to an empirical causal account.  
 
Given this understanding of the imagination (both primary and secondary or artistic), and 
building on the Kantian conception of the regulative, symbolic function of aesthetic ideas 
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570 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria 2 parts, James Engell and W. Jackson-Bate (ed.), The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, part 1, pp. 293-4, 304. 
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572 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, pp. 80-4, 168-71. 
573 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, pp. 80-4, 168-71; Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, pp. 76-7. 
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(which we met in chapter four), Coleridge gives to such Kantian ideas a constitutive role as 
quasi-Platonic archetypes or metaphysical forms, while retaining their Kantian aesthetic 
indeterminacy, or metaphysically intimative character;
574
 a characteristic more guardedly 
acknowledged even by Kant, as we saw, in his Critique of the Power of Judgement. It is this 
overarching or organic relationship between parts to form a whole irreducible to the sum of 
those parts, considered merely as empirical causes acting upon one another, which is meant by 
their organic form, as we learned from Kant with regard to natural organisms and aesthetic 
symbols in chapter four. The organic form is in effect the final causality which has to be 
considered, at least regulatively, by Kant, and constitutively by Coleridge, as that which 
constitutes the natural organism or which is constitutive of aesthetic significance, while 
transcending the possibility of an empirical explanation in terms of cause and effect. 
 
So the pattern of unity in terms of both content and form of the Coleridgean idea, thus 
conceived as an aesthetic metaphysical symbol, is imaginatively mediated. Imagination is held 
to be the guiding power through which ideas of reason are organised, and through which a 
conceptually indeterminate metaphysical significance supervenes upon the explicit significance 
of all the various contents of the idea. The contents portrayed in an idea of reason are formally 
organised in such a way as to elicit a significance transcending the content displayed when 
considered analytically and outside of an aesthetic relationship between perceiver and 
perceived, which is to say, without due attention to the relationships through which the contents 
are organised.
575
 Poesis is Coleridge’s technical term for what is discussed here. The 
significance of poesis will be addressed as we proceed in this and the following chapter. For the 
moment I will indicate briefly that for Coleridge, following Kant and Schelling, poesis concerns 
an organisational principle in all art (whether poetry, painting, sculpture or music) through 
which the intrinsic significance of the artwork is manifested. Poesis could thus be described as 
the transcendent imaginative creativity which works through the artist, as irreducible to the 
empirical techniques which he employs. 
 
On this basis, Coleridge is able to assert that such ideas of reason are directly or univocally 
inexpressible by concepts of the understanding, which are fully competent only in the empirical 
sphere, in the determination of sensible intuitions. Crucially, however, concepts may give 
insight into metaphysically constitutive ideas through an indeterminate and imaginatively 
suggestive use of them. That is to say, for Coleridge, metaphysical ideas may be communicated 
with least distortion aesthetically, rather than determinately, via concepts of the understanding. 
                                                                        
574 Coleridge, The Statesman’s Manual, pp. 24-5. 50-1, Appendix C, pp. 69-70.  
575 See Lecture 13, ‘Lectures on the Principles of Judgement, Culture and European Literature, 1818’, in Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
Lectures on Literature, 1808-1819, 2 parts, R. A. Foakes, (ed.), The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 16 vols. 
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Hence Orsini’s recognition, referred to above, that Kant’s dialectic of reason – which would 
rule out speculative metaphysics – is understood by Coleridge in terms of a dialectic merely of 
the empirical understanding.  
 
For Coleridge, metaphysical truth in itself can only be intimated indeterminately through 
aesthetic ideas, which he re-casts as creative archetypes proceeding from the divine mind, and 
which can only be manifested through artistic activity, which is to say, through the medium of 
the imagination considered in its secondary or artistic role. Here already we can see the high 
valuation which Coleridge accords to the role of artistic imagination, conceived as poesis, in the 
intimation of metaphysical truth. It is to this secondary or artistic imaginative role that I turn 
soon (1.5), after an initial methodological warning (1.4). 
 
(1.3) Imagination, organisation, and conditions of possibility: a problem of conceptual 
presentation 
Remembering our earlier look at the Kantian conception of organic structure, and its overall 
philosophical importance in post-Kantian thought, this is the place to mention, once again, the 
intrinsically organic nature of Coleridge’s thought. It is difficult to explain any one of the 
guiding concepts of his system without pre-supposing others not yet fully analysed. Such is the 
strength of an overarching wholeness of significance that guides and organises the pattern of the 
parts in his thinking, that it would be true to say that organic connection forms both the content 
and the form of Coleridge’s system.576 In both a primary epistemological mode and a related 
secondary role (through art as a means of metaphysical insight) – this secondary role forming 
the focus of the current subsection – Coleridge employs a concept of imagination which takes a 
similar form to that which we have already met in discussing Kant, Schelling and, with notable 
differences, Kierkegaard.  
 
Transcendental imagination thus takes a central role in Coleridge’s thought, and, to a greater 
extent than met with in discussions of these other thinkers, it is responsible for the irreducibly 
organic structure of his metaphysical enquiries. For this reason I have already had to anticipate 
a full and differentiated understanding of the concept of imagination – mentioning it briefly and 
anticipatively in connection with Coleridgean concepts of reason and understanding. Such 
anticipation is unavoidably involved in the explanation of all the other terms with which 
Coleridgean imagination is organically and thus systematically bound up, and of which it is in 
fact the transcendental epistemological condition of possibility, (as we shall find in a fuller 
analysis of primary imagination later and in the next chapter). The position reached so far 
                                                                        
576 See, for example, Coleridge’s ‘Essays on the Principle of Method’, in The Friend part 1, pp. 509-512; Coleridge, Statesman’s 
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demands a fuller discussion of imagination in its secondary, or artistic-epistemological role 
next, reserving an appreciation of primary imagination’s role in Coleridge’s overarching ethical 
epistemology for later in this section. Thus equipped the reader should be in a position to 
appreciate the critical discussion of Coleridgean metaphysics that I shall advance in section 
three, in accordance with the plan set out in section one.  
 
(1.4) Transcendence through art: ideas of reason and the secondary or symbolic role of 
Coleridgean imagination 
Following on from the nature of the distinction between reason and the understanding addressed 
above, and in relation to the organising role of secondary imagination in conveying ideas of 
reason aesthetically, or with conceptual indeterminacy, a distinction arises in Coleridge’s 
thought between symbols and signs.  
 
A sign indicates without participating in the reality of that to which it points. A symbol, on the 
other hand, is a creation of the secondary or artistic imagination working with concepts (e.g., in 
poetry) and other phenomenal materials (e.g., in music or painting) to intimate, indeterminately, 
a metaphysically constitutive idea or creative principle, through the mode of combination of the 
materials involved.
577
 A symbol can only be apprehended through the aesthetic relation to 
phenomenal reality, as it is through the power of imagination that the poet and his audience can 
participate in the transcendent order of meaning and being to which his symbols point, as 
themselves intimative embodiments of such transcendence.
578
 Outside of such aesthetically 
participative relationship, all that is discernible is finite empirical objectivity, where the 
calculative understanding holds sway. 
 
Coleridge distinguishes what, for him, is true poetry from imaginative, but primarily descriptive 
prose (e.g. novels), on the basis of an acute analysis of the unique role poetry performs, and the 





Let us look closely at Coleridge’s meaning in the following quotation, as we will find that in 
this densely packed passage Coleridge combines together materials of aesthetic and 
metaphysical significance, showing the crucial role of imagination as a productive, combining 
power in the aesthetic intimation of transcendent, ontological significance. Coleridge writes of 
the distinguishing mark of a true poem thus: 
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It is that pleasurable emotion, that peculiar state and degree of excitement, which 
arises in the poet himself in the act of composition: and in order to understand this, 
we must combine a more than ordinary sympathy with the objects, emotions, or 
incidents contemplated by the poet, consequent on a more than common 




Here, in his ‘Definition of Poetry’ at the beginning of his Lectures on Shakespeare,581 we see 
Coleridge thinking of the nature of a poem in terms of the imagination conceived as a power 
organising a polarity of opposing forces. Hence Coleridge’s reference to a ‘more than ordinary 
sympathy’ indicates the passive, sensory pole of perception, which the imagination, as a unitive 
structuring power, integrates with an active polar correlate, ‘a more than ordinary activity of the 
mind’. Thus Coleridge points to a polar, or organic complex of experiential attentive-
receptiveness. The interaction of these polar experiential opposites is productive, opening 
insight out dispossessively or uncontrollably, as an aesthetic activity of receptiveness is 
permeated with a heightened emotional tone, or ‘more than common sensibility’.  
 
Coleridge continues: 
Hence is produced a more vivid reflection of the activity modifying and correcting 
these truths by that sort of pleasurable emotion, which the exertion of all our 
faculties gives in a certain degree, but which can only be felt in perfection under 
the full play of those powers of mind, which are spontaneous rather than voluntary, 
and in which the effort required bears no proportion to the activity enjoyed.
582
  
Coleridge here draws attention to the source of this heightened emotional tone, and we find that 
he is following Kant’s account of the conditions of aesthetic experience in terms of the ‘free 
play’ of the faculties of intuition and conceptuality as transformed in interaction with the 
organising power of imagination.  
 
Imagination, for Coleridge as for Kant,
583
 ‘modifies’ the perceptive contents, and the conceptual 
interpretations which are never adequate to account for the imaginative patterning, but which it 
suggestively provokes. This interactive play of faculties, circling and mediated by the 
imaginative focus, gives a feeling of ‘pleasurable emotion’,584 unique to the particular aesthetic 
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event and activity in which it arises. Kant’s and Coleridge’s polar harmony is thus more than a 




However, elsewhere Coleridge indicates that this supervening significance cannot be reduced to 
the emotion that it elicits. Rather, as he makes clear in his essay On Poesy or Art, what is 
definitive of true poetry is the imaginative evocation of the creative principle indwelling the 
empirical objects that the artist seeks to interpret.
586
 Coleridge sometimes conceived of this 
distinction in terms of the contrast of forma formans and forma formatum,
587
 otherwise, as in 
On Poetry and Art, he described the same metaphysical distinction in terms of natura naturans 
and natura naturata,
588
 a formulation which we have already met in chapter four, in relation to 
the thought of Schelling. Both formulations serve to distinguish between a dynamic or 
empowering formative or structuring principle and the empirical realities so informed. Thus 
these metaphysical formulations point to a transcendent significance which is reducible neither 
to objective nor subjective terms exclusively, but which is awakened by the imaginative 
interaction of subjective and objective poles of experience; such is a Coleridgean idea of 
reason,
589
 as introduced above. A genuine poem will enlighten aesthetic experience in a 
conceptually irreducible manner, offering a trans-empirical significance for one in a proper 





The imaginative nature of the apprehension of the Coleridgean idea means that through a 
flexing or tension of active and passive, objective and subjective elements, concepts are 
combined dynamically in a free play or imaginatively interactive relationship, and thus not 
determined through logical necessity.
591
 This flexing or tensile role of imaginative discernment 
– ‘it dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate’592 – will be shown in the next chapter to  
be at work Coleridge’s own aesthetic thinking and insight. I will be suggesting this kind of 
imaginative activity is related to the subjective imaginative mode, described in chapter two, 
through which the transcendent Kierkegaardian Christological paradox is entertained, as 
elucidated helpfully by Ferreira in terms of the logically irreducible processes of metaphorical 
and gestalt transformations. The difference to be found between Kierkegaard and Coleridge in 
this regard is that Coleridge will seek to explain, theoretically, such a supervention of logically 
                                                                        
585 For Hegel, see chapter 1 section 3.1. 
586 Coleridge, Lecture 13, ‘Lectures on the Principles of Judgement, Culture and European Literature, 1818’, in Lectures on 
Literature, 1808-1819,  part 2, pp. 217-225. 
587 Coleridge, The Friend, part 1, p. 467n. 
588 Coleridge, Lecture 13, ‘Lectures on the Principles of Judgement, Culture and European Literature, 1818’, in Lectures on 
Literature, 1808-1819, part 2,  pp. 217-225. 
589 Coleridge, Statesman’s Manual, appendix C, pp. 69-70. 
590 See Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, p. 76; Modiano, Raymonda, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, (London: Macmillan, 
1985), p. 127. 
591 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, p. 304. 
592 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, p. 304. 
159 
 
transcendent insight, as embodied in his aesthetic writings, by invoking a higher, deductive 
logic, a transcendental metaphysical logic, based upon the concept of polarity. I shall be arguing 
later on in this and the subsequent chapter that it is through his attempt to tame imaginative 
activity through a polar conception of logic that Coleridge falls short of his theological mark in 
his systematic thought. 
 
Considered purely aesthetically by Coleridge in his ‘Definition of Poetry’, and thus not in 
relation to his wider metaphysical project,  there is no suggestion of this logical or conceptual 
closure in relation to a poetically mediated idea of reason; no attempt, through logical 
deduction, to dissolve the creative suggestiveness of the metaphysical insight as imaginatively 
intimated rather than known. This is why Coleridge distinguishes between the roles of poetry 




But it emerges as the quotation continues that this distinction between poetry and science is 
itself subsumed under a logic of productive, or synthetic polar opposition. Coleridge elsewhere 
more explicitly distinguishes the contrary from the opposite: poetry is not the contrary of 
science, but is opposed to it as knowledge’s own otherness, its polar correlate. Both poetry and 
science involve the interplay of subjective and objective elements, but whereas empirical 
knowledge arises through objective synergy (as we learned from Kant in chapter three), 
aesthetic awareness emphasises the subjective pole of the subject-object relation through 
imaginative, conceptual indeterminacy. This latter  
is the state which permits the production of a highly pleasurable whole, of which 
each part shall communicate for itself a distinct and conscious pleasure....Poetry is 
a species of composition, opposed to science, as having intellectual pleasure for its 
object [...] – but distinguished from other species of composition....by permitting a 
pleasure from the whole consistent with a consciousness of pleasure from the 
component parts – and the perfection of which is, from each part to communicate 




Here we see Coleridge drawing attention to the organic nature of the aesthetic perception of a 
poetic idea: a prior dynamic, imaginative whole of meaning is passively mediated by, yet 
paradoxically also actively structures, the interdependence of the parts which manifest ideal 
significance as a unity of power and meaning which is greater than and irreducible to the sum of 
those parts. As source of both dynamics and form, or power and significance, imagination 
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grounds the polarity of reality (power) and ideality (meaning), as also of activity and passivity, 
of subjectivity and objectivity: as their source, imagination enables such ontological polarities, 





For Coleridge, such a concept of poesis informs all true artistic activity,
596
 and thus it may be 
found in prose as much as verse, in music as much as painting. Poesis is characterised by a 
particular, imaginatively mediated, governing pattern of significance calling forth an 
imaginative response. This imaginative patterning combines the active and passive faculties of 
the reader or hearer into the form of an attentive receptivity to the poet’s communication.597 
This imaginative pattern is a symbol, an aesthetic idea, in the Kantian sense: conceptually 
indeterminate, and thus neither subjective nor objective purely, the symbol is organically rather 
than mechanically organised, the meaning of the symbolic or ideal whole being causally 




The imaginatively mediated aesthetic idea is conceived metaphysically by Coleridge in terms of 
a dynamically constitutive idea of reason – and thus as natura naturans or forma formans. As J. 
Robert Barth suggests,
599
 such an imaginatively intimated idea enables the reader’s 
participation
600
 in the poet’s glimpse, or intimation, of a transcendent order of being and 
meaning, as bound together by imagination in a productive tension, irreducible to either 
subjective or objective terms, and from which issue all such ontologically structuring polarities 
as those of activity and passivity, subjectivity and objectivity. In such an organically focused 
intensity of significance, imagination combines all the faculties of response ‘existentially’ or 
holistically, as imagination, itself neither a subjective nor objective power exclusively, is a 
unifying power, awakening, guiding and honing an attentive receptivity in relation to a 
particular, but conceptually indeterminate aesthetic pattern, in which universality is thoroughly 




Such a pattern of meaning, as we have now learned, is an aesthetic idea in the Kantian sense we 
met in chapter four – a symbol through which the reader participates in the poet’s imaginative 
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vision. But for Coleridge, it has a metaphysical significance in a fuller sense that that which 
Kant allowed to it merely regulatively, or as a guide for ethical contemplation. Regarded as of 
genuine metaphysical import by Coleridge, the aesthetic idea is as an ontologically constitutive 




The aesthetic symbolism involved in the apprehension of an idea of reason should be familiar 
from our investigation of Kantian aesthetics in chapter four. Since the imagination combines 
empirical materials and conceptual forms in the apprehension of transcendent symbolic 
significance, it is known by Coleridge as the ‘Unitive’ power.603 Coleridge also coins the terms 
‘coadunitive’ and ‘esemplastic’ to describe the activity of imagination (thus offering alternative 
Latinate and Greek neologisms). The meaning of both terms involves the thought of ‘shaping 
into one’ (= esemplastic, from the Greek, eis en plattein; Coleridge was here influenced by a 
false etymology of the German term for imagination, Ein-bildung).
604
 The role of imagination 
so conceived is to unite the disparate, allowing a higher, organic mode of connection between 
phenomena to supervene on ordinary awareness. As imaginatively mediated through an 
aesthetic representation evocative of transcendent principles, an idea of reason is analytically 
irreducible to terms of causal, mechanical connection. Thus the ideal transcends the power of 
the empirical understanding, which is based upon the Kantian categories which inform 
determinate or empirical sensory perception.  
 
Coleridge writes of the evocation of imaginative symbols of ideal transcendence through poesis 
thus:  
The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, 
with the subordination of its faculties to each other... He diffuses a tone, and spirit 
of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and 
magical power, to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of 
imagination. This power [...] reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of 
opposite or discordant qualities.
605
 
Thus the imagination unites polar oppositions, mediating ideas of reason that are principles of 
ontological identity in difference. This metaphysical expression signifies that the creative and 
informing origins of phenomenal appearances are constitutive ideas of reason, unities 
manifested through the differentiated phenomena that participate in them. Such ideas can be 
evoked in an  imaginatively mediated aesthetic apprehension.
606
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Imaginative activity, then, holds opposites together in creative tension: the subjective and the 
objective, the active and the passive, the ideal and the phenomenal, the universal and the 
individual. The aesthetic role of imagination is to combine phenomena in such a way as to 
display the prior, ideal and organic unity in which they participate, from which they derive.
607
 
In genuine artistic poesis, imagination reunites, or suggestively re-combines empirical 
appearances to intimate a qualitatively unique, and as such conceptually indeterminable and 
ontologically constitutive whole. Imaginative activity thus manifests organic, ontologically 
creative ideal unities.
608
 Coleridge often emphasises the distinction between distinguishing 
metaphysically in qualitative terms, and dividing empirically in quantitative terms.
609
 Human 
empirical discursivity can only apprehend qualitatively distinct metaphysical forms through 
quantitative determination, as the empirical understanding divides sense data into finite 
phenomena to be analysed and re-combined mechanically by empirical science. The 
understanding thus translates ideal qualitative distinctness into quantitatively finite phenomenal 
entities, appearing through the sensible forms of Kantian space and time, the formal intuition of 
which, as we learned in chapter three, is itself conceptually constructed in terms of the finite 
transcendental categories of possible empirical experience.  
 
(1.5) The distinctions within Coleridgean imagination: primary imagination, secondary 
imagination and fancy 
Coleridge distinguishes the imagination into primary and secondary roles, as we have seen, and 
moreover, differentiates both from mere fancy.
610
 Fancy is the principle of empirical association 
of parts of remembered experience, sensory and conceptual, as dealt with by authors such as 
Hartley and Hume, in the British empirical tradition to which Kant responded.
611
 As a principle 
of empirical association, fancy allows a merely quantitative or aggregative form of 
combination,
612
 as distinct from the qualitatively unique or trans-empirical level of insight 
afforded by the secondary imagination, as just addressed in the previous subsection.  
 
As we have now seen at some length, secondary imagination, by virtue of the insight it affords 
into ideal structures of experience, is at work in the aesthetic production and appreciation of art, 
as well as in the imaginative appreciation of natural beauty. The power manifesting in 
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secondary imagination is derived from imagination’s primary function. Primary imagination, as 
we are about to discover, is deemed foundational of all possible experience. 
 
Primary imagination thus takes on the role of Kant’s transcendental imagination in the Critique 
of Pure Reason.
613
 As such, the primary imagination is the ultimate condition of any possible 
experience, as that which enables the empirical awareness of spatio-temporal continuity, of 
phenomenal identities enduring through change, as discussed in chapter three in relation to 
Kant.
614
 As indicated above, for contextual reasons that will then become apparent, I will only 
enter fully into a discussion of some aspects of this epistemologically ‘primary’ function of the 
imagination in the next chapter. But the current context of affording the reader a grasp of the 
overall structure of Coleridge’s systematic thought demands that some initial probing of this 
primary function of the imagination is now called for, to enable us gradually to increase our 
basic insight into Coleridge’s metaphysics before moving on to address his position critically.  
 
What I offer now, taken in relation to what has preceded it, should offer the reader a sufficient 
grasp of Coleridge’s metaphysics to illumine a first foray into the ethical dimension of 
Coleridge’s epistemology in section two, below. There I intend to situate Coleridge’s 
metaphysic in its ethical bearing, as a basis for further discussions in the next chapter. After 
that, in section three, I will offer a critique of Coleridgean metaphysics from a theological 
standpoint, in accordance with the plan outlined above in the introduction to this chapter. 
 
(1.6) Primary imagination and epistemology 
We learned above that Coleridge’s secondary imagination transcends whilst empowering the 
provinces of subjectivity and objectivity, in our analysis of the apprehension of ideas of reason. 
Imaginative activity is thereby shown to be irreducible to either of the poles of experience that it 
constitutes. Thus we can say that far from being a finite faculty, the imagination, whether 
considered in its primary or its secondary aspects, has an empirically transcendent and organic 
structure. On the basis of what we learned in chapters four and five of organic, polar structure, 
we can see that Coleridgean imagination is thus resistant to any analysis in terms of determinate 
empirical causality. I will now show how, in its primary aspect or role, the imagination, far 
from being a merely subjective faculty, is conceived by Coleridge as the ultimate principle of 
any possible empirical awareness in terms of mechanical combination. Primary imagination can 
thereby be shown to be the condition on which our everyday awareness ultimately depends.
615
  
As such, Coleridge’s imagination is related to Kant’s concept of the transcendental imagination, 
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as we shall see more fully in the next chapter. Indeed, as we have just learned, it is only fancy, 
the aggregating mechanism at work in the voluntary or unconscious re-combination of finite 
memories, that has a merely subjective status and role. It should not, therefore, be confused 
with imagination in either of its aspects.  
 
Concerning the foundational epistemological role of the primary aspect of imagination, then, 
Coleridge writes as follows: ‘The primary imagination I hold to be the living Power and prime 
Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of 
creation in the infinite I AM’.616 This means that everyday experiencing is enabled by our 
participation in the ontological structure of reason, through the primary transcendental power of 
imagination. Coleridge builds on Kantian foundations. As we saw in chapter three, Kant 
similarly shows how the transcendental unity of apperception – that by which there may be 
objects of empirical experience for its subject – is constructed primarily through the activity of 
transcendental imagination. For Coleridge, primary imagination’s enabling of possible self-
consciousness, and thus objectivity, suggests that its activity is an echo or image of the creative 
activity of God.  
 
We will see further on that such Coleridgean, imaginatively enabled self-consciousness is itself 
made dependent on conscience, as Coleridge gives an ethical turn to Kantian epistemology.
617
 
Importantly, this ethical turn involves an organic relationship between conscience and 
imagination which appears ultimately paradoxical to the understanding. But can this ethically 
empowering relationship be shown to harmonise with a Kierkegaardian concept of 
imaginatively mediated, revelatory paradox? In order for this to be the case, Coleridge must be 
shown to offer an account which is conceptually irreducible, even to the terms of his dialectical 
logic of polarity. I shall be drawing predominately negative conclusions in this regard later on 
in this chapter, but a more positive account will emerge in chapter seven, when we look into the 
issue more deeply, and from a different perspective. 
 
(1.7) The nature of the relationship between primary and secondary imagination 
Similarly to Coleridge’s secondary function of imagination, Kant showed us, in chapter four (in 
his Critique of the Power of Judgement), that ‘nature gives the rule to art’ of genius.618 We 
found this to mean that the same transcendental imaginative power that enables conscious 
apprehension of the phenomenal order of nature (in the Critique of Pure Reason) works 
unconsciously – yet through the conscious activity of the artist – in the imaginative ordering of 
symbolic forms, (aesthetic ideas, which Coleridge renders metaphysically constitutive), as 
                                                                        
616 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, p. 304. 
617 Coleridge, ‘Essay on Faith’, in Shorter Works and Fragments part 2, pp. 833-844. 
618 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §57. 
165 
 
intimative of the creative ground of phenomena. Thus Coleridge, as a systematician, can be 
seen to work in a Kantian aesthetic and epistemological tradition, while dispensing with the 
merely regulative status Kant accords to the metaphysical intimations mediated by the artistic 
imagination. Coleridge writes: 
The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former [primary 
imagination], co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the 
primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of 
its operation. It dissolves diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this 
process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealise and to 
unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are fixed and dead.
619
 
Coleridge then adds that the fancy, as discussed above, ‘has no other counters to play with’ but 
such empirical ‘fixities and definites’.620 
 
(1.8) Summary of section one 
We have learned, in the course of discussions in this section, that according to Coleridge, an 
overarching polarity conditions our ordinary experience of the distinction between subjectivity 
and objectivity, and that this experiential polarity is enabled by the primary imagination. We 
have seen also that in its artistic or secondary role, imagination transcends while re-uniting 
objective and subjective aspects of experience in a qualitatively distinctive appreciation of ideas 
of reason, as the metaphysically constitutive conditions of phenomenal experience. In relation 
to the organic nature of imagination, we learned again from Coleridge what we had met before 
in relation to the thought of the early Schelling, that nature can be regarded as both productive 
and produced, as empirically finite product, and also as the dynamic, transcendental source of 
finite experience. In both cases this is explained in terms of a logic of polar or differentiated 
identity: a logic of reason supervening the logic of the empirical understanding. Coleridge 
follows Schelling in designating the creative power at work in nature, and that works 
unconsciously through the activity of artistic imagination natura naturans.
621
 The phenomenal 
order is in turn designated natura naturata by Coleridge, (as also by Schelling, as we have seen 
in chapter four). Both writers can be clearly seen to work in a Kantian tradition, while also 
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(2) Coleridgean Epistemology in its Ethical Bearing: an initial look at the relation of the 
will and conscience to imagination, on the basis of metaphysical concepts now gained  
 
A final set of distinctions with regard to the will and conscience will be enough to enable an 
appreciation of my argument in section three of this chapter, in which I move to a critical 
discussion of Coleridge’s metaphysical system from a broadly Kierkegaardian theological 
perspective.  
 
(2.1) Conscience as an ethico-epistemological, and thus theological principle in 
Coleridgean metaphysics 
We have learned so far that reason is an ontological principle manifesting through nature and all 
the faculties of mind. All uses of the mind involve reason and would be impossible without it. 
Reason’s most important function according to Coleridge is ethical, and this importance is both 
epistemological and theological.
622
 But, as we have seen, for Coleridge, there is metaphysical 
distinction but not division between the mental functions. Thus conscience, while being an 
ethical imperative, and indeed on the basis of its ethical position, as we shall see, is also 





It is this combination of epistemological and ethical roles which makes the ethical demand of 
fidelity to conscience of intrinsic theological significance for Coleridge, as on this 
epistemological and ethical basis, he can move to a definition of faith as a function or structure 
of practical reason.
624
 Moreover, as Coleridge can envisage no division between reason’s 
practical and theoretical applications, this move allows Coleridge to offer a systematic account 
of specifically Christian faith in terms of his overarching polar conception of logic.
625
 Since 
reason also grounds the understanding, empirical knowledge would thus also be shown to 
depend for its possibility on ethical and ultimately theological criteria.  
 
On the basis of what we have learned in previous subsections, we can now see that imagination 
is essentially the same structure as natura naturans: a formative, transcendental principle 
enabling both subjectivity and the objective phenomenal order.
626
 What is to be suggested in 
what follows is that both in aesthetic discernment of transcendent structure and equally in 
response to the voice of conscience, imagination may reveal the ethical metaphysical structure 
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of reality only though a correct alignment of the will with subsistent reason, as mediated 
imaginatively.
627
 We can now see how for Coleridge, ontologically constitutive, or subsistent 
reason, may be equated with the Logos itself, a theological principle through which divine 
creativity is manifested.
628
 The transcendent (or more properly, transcendental) Logos is 
symbolised (and thus participated in) by the conscience, which means that the conscience 
indwelling each one of us is an indivisible ontological participation (pars pro toto) in the divine 
mind.
629
 As there are no divisions within metaphysical reason, but only distinctions, it follows 
that conscience is one unified activity. There are not different consciences for each individual, 
but different individualities in ethical relation to the divine will, whose living symbol is 
conscience. Conscience is thus the immanence of the Logos: the indivisible presence of God to 
the conscious mind, as mediated by imagination, as distinct from that same imagination’s 




It should now be apparent on the basis of our discussion of the aesthetic nature of ideas of 
reason, as imaginatively apprehended, that it is imagination, as well as working unconsciously 
as natura naturans, that mediates our consciousness of that formative activity in the aesthetic or 
conceptually indeterminate awareness of constitutive ideas of reason, as structures belonging to 
the divine mind: the Logos, or formative principle of reality. Through mediating a conscious 
relationship to the divine mind through the conscious indwelling of the Logos in the symbolic 
form of conscience, it could be said that imagination makes self-consciousness possible.  
 
And yet we have just found that it is conscience that is said to make self-consciousness possible 
(and thereby, empirical perception). So what is the relation between conscience (to which the 
will owes fidelity) and imagination, which, along with conscience, is said to condition the 
possibility of self-consciousness? As with Kantian imagination, in chapter five, we have come 
across a paradox or conceptual aporia, in which imagination acts as a grounded ground. As will 
emerge more clearly in the next chapter, conscience and imagination can be thought of as 
mutually conditioning. 
 
(2.2) The ethico-poetics of secondary imagination 
Conscience is the voice of reason, the immanence of the divine will as manifest in the Logos. It 
is the Logos, the Father’s own otherness as mediating his ethically creative will, which 
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symbolically and indivisibly indwells each one of us as conscience.
631
 We have learned in a 
previous subsection that imagination is esemplastic, a unifying power.
632
 We have also learned 
that it is the whole human being, in the existential unity of all his powers and functions, that 
owes fidelity to conscience through the will, as the dynamic principle of rational life in 
action.
633
 Therefore imagination, as a unifying power, must be the vehicle that can bring 
together the diverse functions of (potential) self-consciousness in order to enable self-
consciousness in an act of recognition of, and subordination to, the epistemologically 
constitutive voice of conscience.
634
 J. Robert Barth envisages the relation between faith, 
conscience and consciousness as portrayed by Coleridge as follows:  
The making and perceiving of symbols, in Coleridge’s view, always involves a 
union of subject and object. If there is to be a union of a thinking and willing 
subject with someone or something outside itself, there must be a commitment of 
self, involving trust and love as well as knowledge – an act of faith.635 
This is because faith is a union of the whole man: will, intellect and feeling.
636
 Thus Barth, in 
addressing the poetic practice of Coleridge and Wordsworth in the Lyrical Ballads (1798),
637
 
can describe the imaginatively mediated participation of the romantic poet’s experienced vision 
of reality, an aesthetic participation in which his audience can share, in terms of what Barth sees 
as Coleridge’s fiducial conception of epistemology.638 Barth writes, quoting Coleridge: 
... If symbols ultimately “partake of the reality which they render intelligible” – 
God – then the only acceptable response to them is a commitment of one’s whole 
self, bringing “the whole soul of man into activity”. [Symbol] is a response to 
sacrament in an act of faith, and therefore an encounter of the human person with 
God. There is at work here what in scholastic philosophy is called “mutual 
causality.” The perception or creation of a symbol [...] depends wholly on the 
acceptance of the consubstantiality (in Coleridge’s sense) of all things [which I 
have drawn attention to in referring to Coleridge’s appeal to metaphysical 
distinctions which should never be confused with empirical divisions], especially 
the consubstantiality of God and creation. Only if one accepts, by a kind of act of 
faith, this consubstantiality, can one create or even perceive a sign that truly 
partakes of the reality it represents. The commitment of self in faith in this way... is 
necessary for the perception of symbol as symbol, for the creation of symbol as 
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symbol. At the same time, the reverse is true; perception of the symbol is necessary 
in order for one to make such a commitment of faith and love; one can commit 
oneself only to what one somehow already knows.
639
 
Barth notes this paradoxical mutual dependency of faith and symbolic insight in connection to 
Coleridge’s poetic practice, which will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter. But what he 
says is, I suggest, rooted in the original paradox of the epistemological relation between 
imagination and conscience, as I have described it. My contention is that each mutually 
conditions the other: there can be no consciousness without subordination of the will to 
conscience; there can be no recognition of conscience without the activity of imagination in 
enabling such a recognition by the bringing together of intellect and feeling, in an act of willed 
subordination in order to a holistic response. Intellect, will and feeling are in a causally 
unaccountable or organic relationship with conscience, as a condition of possible consciousness 
which depends on a conscious recognition of its authority to be effective. Much more will be 
said on this paradoxical epistemological relationship of mutual grounding in the next chapter.  
 
We have found that, for Coleridge, the primary imagination is the condition of the distinction 
between the self or ‘I’ and the ego’s own alterity, this latter being conscience as the immanence 
of the Logos, its living symbolic presence to the mind.
640
 This initial, ethical polar distinction is 
foundational of conscious selfhood, as conditioned by the imaginatively mediated unity of 
mental functions – understanding, will, and feeling.641 This ‘fidelity to our own being’642 (the 
act of recognition of conscience) must be an imaginative act, unifying mental functions as self-
consciousness, and thereby enabling a personal response to the conscience as the ethical ground 
of all awareness, as that to which the imaginatively mediated unity of selfhood responds.
643
 The 
imagination is the vehicle of reason, as the medium uniting the self to its own otherness, (i.e. 
conscience, as the immanence of the Logos, the presence of divine reason to the mind). In this 
way imagination is seen to be the organ of polar productive power (one power manifesting in 
two forms).
644
 The imagination is thus the medium of organic creativity, uniting that which may 
be distinguished but never divided (the differentiated identity of bi-polar reality). 
 
The primary imagination enables all possible finite perception, by simultaneously 
distinguishing and relating opposites, as the medium of polar creative process.
645
 As secondary, 
the imagination indeterminately reunites finite oppositions by forming symbols of creative 
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ideas, thus mediating those ideas to consciousness through aesthetic awareness.
646
 In this way, 
artistic creativity is an echo of divine creativity.
647
 In conditioning possible consciousness, 
imagination mediates awareness of the differentiated identity of self in polar relation to God as 
the indwelling voice of conscience.
648
 The epistemologically primary act of fidelity to 
conscience is thus an imaginative act, as an act of the whole person,
649
 uniting knowledge, will 
and feeling in recognition of the authoritative voice of conscience. In this way faith grounds 
knowledge non-fideistically, because the primary meaning of faith is adherence to practical 
reason, which is the immanence of personal, subsistent reason, or the Logos,
650
 as testified 
through conscience.
651
 The relation of self to conscience as the symbolic immanence of divine 
alterity could thus be conceived as an ‘I-thou’ relation in its existential bearings,652 as an act in 
which the whole man is related to a divine otherness as the condition for him knowing himself 
and experiencing a world outside him as conditional upon his self-consciousness.  
 
Due to the inextricable way in which conscience and imagination are bound together as a 
condition of possible self-consciousness, it may be said that conscience is thus aesthetic in so 
far as it is ethical, ethical in so far as it is aesthetic. But in light of criticisms I shall being 
making later in this chapter of Coleridge’s ethico-epistemology, it will be found that this 
statement needs considerable qualification. It will emerge in section three that there is a crucial 
flaw in Coleridge’s presentation of ethico-epistemology, both on philosophical and theological 
grounds. This issue will be addressed further in the next chapter, in which I will attempt to 
reclaim the original aesthetic context which gave birth to his theory of imagination. This will 
involve unfolding the epistemological promise already inherent in Coleridge’s original concept 
of imagination (which he was later to dub ‘secondary’), as applied to the context of his ethico-
epistemology.  The ethical nature of Coleridgean imaginative activity, as originally conceived, 
will be shown in the next chapter to be central to my reconciliation of Kierkegaardian 
theological concerns with romantic aesthetic activity.  
 
We have learned that at the level of secondary imagination, an act of faith in the 
meaningfulness of a symbol is crucial for the possibility of its discernment. Coleridge’s 
secondary imagination emerges as fundamentally an attentiveness to otherness, acting 
receptively in order to discern justly. Ethically oriented imaginative construal is thus found to 
be at the heart of symbolic awareness, and its proper functioning is dependent on the 
responsible comportment of the percipient.  
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As we discovered in chapter four, Kant had already seen artistic practice and perception as 
related to ethical activity through the disinterestedness of judgements of beauty, the demand 
that they be uninfluenced by the self-indulgent desire for sensible or emotional self-
gratification. With Coleridge we have come to see that an ethical dimension is fundamental to 
the proper functioning of imagination in both its primarily epistemological and secondarily 
aesthetic tasks. We have, moreover, seen that the ethical imaginative energy envisioned by 
Coleridge as at work in the enabling of empirical and artistic experience alike is significantly 
related to a Kierkegaardian, existential model of ethical activity: the whole man –  thought, 
feeling and will – uniting through an imaginative response to the authority of conscience. 
 
It should be noted that Coleridge also says that the creation and perception of symbols through 
secondary imagination occurs when the imagination is set in motion by the will and 
understanding.
653
 And yet it is imagination, as the esemplastic, or unitive power that is alone 
able to unite different polarities of awareness, such as will and understanding. Again, we are 
confronted with the irreducible paradox of the imagination’s organic structure, and thereby its 
status as a grounded ground of experiential possibilities: as inextricably both active and passive. 
The imagination, in spontaneous or active receptivity, is both follower and leader intrinsically.  
 
We found, similarly, in chapter one that Kierkegaard views human experiencing, or ‘inter-esse’, 
as fundamentally a hermeneutical process. We saw in that first chapter that for Kierkegaard, the 
imaginative mediation or construal necessarily at work in actual experience, as situated between 
reality and ideality, is in a sense a circular procedure, as subjective and objective facets of 
experience mutually enrich each other, real life becoming imaginatively ‘permeated with 
consciousness’ as possibilities for personal growth or hitherto unperceived options (for 
example) are discerned, the familiar being made strange by imagination, and glimpsed in a new 
light.  
 
Similarly, we have seen earlier in this section the suggestion that, for Coleridge, what is 
presented poetically in a given work can radiate symbolic depth through an act of faith or 
interpretive commitment. Barth, as we saw, suggests that in Coleridge’s romantic poetics, the 
percipient is enriched by what is symbolically intimated, while the intelligibility of the symbol 
is contingent upon an imaginative act of faith, in the form of an interpretive openness to the 
possibility of symbolic insight: an ethico-aesthetic, attentive trust.  
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Coleridge writes in the Statesman’s Manual that the imagination acts in symbolic perception by 
making the discursive understanding intuitive.
654
 The understanding’s competence in the 
categorical sorting and conceptual labelling of superficies, of the sensible surfaces that appear 
and interact in space and time, is supplemented or given depth in the creation and reception of 
poetry by an imaginative penetration of linguistic forms, giving them the fullness or ‘plenitude 
of sense’: breathing life into them.655 In this way a poem is only truly read when significant 
connotations are discovered by imaginatively reading between the lines, as it were. The ethical 
dimension of imaginative activity again emerges when we realise that such reading between the 
lines must not be an act of eisegetic distortion of the poetic communication, but rather a trustful 
and unbiased openness to the possibility of discovering new meaningfulness in attentive 
contemplation of the poem. Only by attentive receptivity can imagination attain to the activity 




(2.3) Consolidation of findings so far in sections one and two 
We have found that conscience is conceived by Coleridge as a living symbol of the creative 
Logos, manifesting the ethical authority of the Father’s will, and grounding the symbol-making 
activity of the secondary imagination. However, we have also found that Coleridgean 
conscience, as the ground of possible finite perception (an ethicised and therefore constitutive 
form of Kant’s transcendental subjectivity) serves the role provided by intellectual intuition in 
Schelling’s Transcendental Idealism, as an imaginatively mediated principle and vehicle of the 
identity in difference of ideality and reality (Divine reason and human will), as of its 
philosophical explanation in terms of the polar logic of Coleridge’s metaphysical system. For 
theological reasons, drawn from chapters one, two and four, we have found that such a 
totalising scheme of logical determination is incompatible with a genuine account of Christian 
revelation. 
 
The possibility of self-consciousness and objective awareness is shown by Coleridge to be 
rooted in the relation of two wills, human and divine, as conceived in terms of an all-
encompassing, bi-polar or dialectical logic of identity in difference. On the basis of what has 
been found out so far, we can begin to see that this logic of differentiated identity implies that 
Coleridge’s system, like that of Hegel (as we found in chapter one, as addressed from a 
Kierkegaardian theological perspective), can be described as panentheistic. This means that 
Coleridge’s system is transcendentally conceived in terms of the overarching conceptual 
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mediation of polar distinctions, which will be shown in section three to be based upon an all-
encompassing and impersonal concept of reality, rather than according to Kierkegaard’s 
conception of an infinite gulf or division between infinity and finitude.  
 
The Kierkegaardian gulf is made by human sinfulness, and is thus an existential gulf pervading 
every aspect of life as we actually live it, a gulf that is manifest in the very way we exist and 
relate to the world around us, and that cannot therefore be bridged within thought by the 
conceptual manipulations of polar logic. Such an existential gulf can only be bridged by a 
subjective response to the saving grace of a revelation conceived as an absolute paradox, and a 
stumbling block to reason.  
 
However, we have also seen, through Ferreira, that Kierkegaard’s subjective relation to this 
unthinkable paradox does involve imaginative activity from the side of human receptivity, and 
that while logic cannot bridge the gulf between human and divine, there is at work in the 
appropriation of the fruits of revelation a paradoxical or conceptually irreducible imaginative 
order which can never be adequately accounted for in logical terms, but which shows the 
needfulness of aesthetic activity to the human reception of Christ’s paradoxical revelation. In 
the next and final chapter it is this theme from chapter two that will be picked up once again, in 
relation to the non-systematic aesthetic thought and poetic practice of Coleridge. In addressing 
the ethical nature of Coleridge’s aesthetic practice, I hope to reconcile Kierkegaard to the 
artistic implications of his own practice of indirect theological communication, which is the 
primary intention running through the development of my whole thesis. 
 
Firstly, though, I must turn to the negative findings just high-lighted, in order to engage 
critically with Coleridge’s systematic philosophical theology according to the Kierkegaardian 
theological criteria that are normative for this thesis as a whole. 
 
(3) A Critique of Coleridgean Metaphysics According to Temporal-Philosophical and 
Theological Criteria: the impossibility of genuine revelational alterity within a totalising, 
systematic metaphysical construction 
 
At the end of our survey, it should be evident that concepts of dynamic process, qualitative 
significance and imaginative polar productivity are closely interrelated, for Coleridge, while the 
tendency of his systematic presentation  is towards a panentheistic position, such as we saw 
Kierkegaard attacking on theological grounds in chapter one. In light of these findings, I now 





In this section, I will be taking Thomas McFarland’s approach as a general guideline,656 but 
relating his argument to my own criticisms of Coleridge’s overarching conception of reality in 
terms of a dialectic of actuality and potentiality, or the reality of relative non-being, in an 
Aristotelian sense.
657
 In his Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, McFarland argues 
convincingly that finite freedom is impossible within a pantheistic system, of which I shall 
show Coleridgean panentheism to be a variant, as should become clear as we proceed in this 
final section. I shall argue that in Coleridge’s metaphysical system, the genuine personal 
freedom of God and human being is in effect denied because of Coleridge’s use of a 
meontological dialectical logic, based upon a doctrine of potential or relative non-being (Greek: 
me on), as shall be explained below.  
 
I argue that such a meontologically grounded divinity, as one supposedly creating extra-divine 
reality out of his own eternal potentialities – which are given the systematic status of a 
conceptual a priori – is not a God able to bring about genuinely new events, and that in such a 
situation, genuine revelatory alterity or ‘un-pre-thinkability’ – as that which one could not in 
principle have given to oneself, from immanent human resources – becomes impossible.658 This 
is because of the nature of Coleridge’s systematic logic. I submit, on the basis of my findings in 
chapters four and five, that such a transcendental logical scheme is implicitly dependent on a 
Kantian or ‘spatialised’ conception of time. It is this teleological pre-setting of the path and 
outcome of thought that serves as the true originating principle or arche of the system which it 
drives. Coleridge’s systematic account of God is in effect a mere logical construct, subordinated 
to the logic governing his speculative thought.   
 
(3.1) Coleridge, teleological time and the process of transcendent aesthetic intimation 
It will emerge in the rest of this chapter and the next that I hold the genuineness of any given 
metaphysical insight of Coleridge’s to be assessable according to the extent to which he does 
not achieve a fully-rounded, systematic completeness of form in its presentation. I shall remind 
the reader of why this is the case, as based on my reasoning in chapters four and five. 
 
A link between the Coleridgean romanticism to be addressed in the next chapter and 
Kierkegaardian thought, will be shown to be the shared sense of a more-than-empirical, but less 
than complete intimation of a fullness of metaphysical or theological significance.   I suggest 
                                                                        
656 Thomas McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969). 
657 Technical terms will be explained as they arise in the course of treatment. 
658 The literal incalculability of genuine revelation, as that which one could not in principle have given oneself has been signposted 
as a prominent theme in earlier chapters, notably in addressing Kierkegaardian paradoxical revelation in chapters one and two, and 
in relation to a theologically oriented critique of Kantian organicism and temporality in terms of Bergsonian temporal process 
conceived as duration, in chapter 4. 
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that such romantic or existential ‘metaphysics’ – whatever other differences there may be – 
always remains a perspective: an aesthetically mediated, as conceptually indeterminate, 
intimation of ungraspable wholeness. I suggest further that the confidence with which such self-
confessedly tentative or temporary positions are put forward discloses a crucial awareness of 
the centrality of time in conditioning human experience. As we exist, time is both our limitation 
and our field of possibility. This temporal dimension will be important to bear in mind in 
reading the rest of this chapter, as my argument is motivated by the distinction between a kind 
of qualitatively evolving ‘lived time’, that we have already learned about from Bergson, and a 
mode of a priori systematic philosophical thought working to a pre-set schedule, in the form of 
a teleological trajectory: a discontinuous, since essentially spatial, reconstruction of time for the 
sake of its calculative usefulness for explanatory completeness, as we learned in the last two 
chapters.  
 
I will be claiming, in the next chapter, that Coleridge, as a poet and in his aesthetic 
contemplations, achieves the kind of incomplete metaphysical vision I have just been speaking 
of: the partial vision or intimation of an overarching context of creativity over and above, yet 
pulsing through, the empirical, mechanical order. Coleridge the philosophical poet entertains 
such a vision through the openness to insight of imaginative receptivity, but does not try to 
claim it as a possession, or absolute purchase-point. Such a demonstrable arche amounts to the 
existentially impossible ‘view from nowhere’ which Coleridge claims in his systematic 
presentation, as we saw earlier, and shall investigate further below, in the light of my current 
remarks. Moreover, I will argue that Coleridge, even as a systematic philosopher, had this same 
vision before him. As primarily a creative thinker, he worked on the basis of a guiding 
intimation of the result at which he aimed, as afforded to him aesthetically, through faith. But I 
submit in what follows that this imaginative insight could not survive his attempt to reduce it, 
teleologically, to the strictly objective terms of a priori conceptual determination.  
 
I thus interpret Coleridge as a thinker who spent his activity as an a priori systematician vainly 
trying to play ‘catch-up’ with his aesthetically indeterminate vision. But nevertheless, even if he 
did fail as a systematician, Coleridge never shied away from, or attempted to fudge his 
conceptual dilemmas. He remained as true to his faith in personal freedom as to his belief in the 
power of philosophy to accommodate this commitment. I suggest, however, that the conceptual 
resources available to him necessarily led – albeit unintentionally – to a compromised 
presentation of his Christian faith. I argue, in short, that the very systematicity of Coleridge’s 
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thinking is structurally inappropriate to the theological ends for which it is directed and set in 




I would suggest, on the basis of arguments in previous chapters, that this theoretical impasse is 
fundamentally rooted in the question of time. Coleridge is, perhaps unwittingly, trying to 
translate his ‘durational’ imaginative experience into the logical trajectory of a post-Kantian, 
spatialised teleology. This amounts to a distortion of the very experience to which Coleridge 
seeks to do justice, leading to his perception of a fissure between Christian faith and poetic 
vision. While both these aspects were organically linked in his life, Coleridge struggled to 
formalise their dynamic inter-play in philosophical terms, owing to his repeated attempts to 
translate or schematise an aesthetically dynamic and evolving vision into objectively systematic 
teleology.  
 
Thus the argument in what follows is informed by the reading of Kierkegaard earlier in this 
thesis. It is based on the notion that by pre-setting a theoretical agenda through the schematic 
reconstruction of aesthetic experiential process in terms of polar logic, Coleridge tries to pin 
down the living, creative processes in nature; processes that are for him intimative of divinity.  
Coleridge tries to plot this free creativity, or divine grace, on a spatialised and thus essentially a-
temporal map through the use of dialectical logic. He thus works with a teleological plan, 
involving the projection of a threefold pattern or schematic template of ‘development’ that 
cannot evolve qualitatively, being, by its very nature, a schema quantifiable or calculable in 
advance. Thus I argue that Coleridge’s systematic thinking could not truly be reconciled with 
his faith or with his poetic vision, as both were born of a unique human freedom in relation to 
the unpredictably spontaneous love of a personal God 
 
 (3.2) The theological problem of Coleridge’s systematised epistemology 
As Kierkegaard points out, and as we saw in chapters one and two, a truly divine revelation is a 
personal encounter with the one who alone can save us existentially, which must inevitably take 
the form of a conceptual paradox to determinate conceptual thought, as a revelation of the one 
who gives us what we cannot always already have given to ourselves, from out of our own 
conceptual resources. The true ‘god’ of such a system as Coleridge’s,660 is the logic 
empowering it, which must thus be regarded as a thought-idol from a Kierkegaardian 
theological perspective. I suggest that only a doctrine of creation ad extra out of absolute non-
being (or ouk on) safeguards an account of divine creative and redemptive freedom. Coleridge 
                                                                        
659 I owe much of the insight in this paragraph to McFarland’s meditations throughout his Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition. 
660 Coleridge’s system, like Hegel’s – as criticised by Kierkegaard – aims in effect to ground a conception of divinity within a 
systematic worldview, or theoretical product of the human mind, and thus what is ultimate in such a project is the standard set by 
human logic, not any putative revelatory encounter. It is in this sense of false ultimacy that I apply the term ‘thought idol’ in the text 
at this point. 
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seeks to do justice to two conflicting impulses in his systematic work: the impulse to a totally 
reticulated explanatory scheme, which involves the thought idolatry I have been referring to, 
and a deep personal commitment to human ethical freedom of response to a personal divine 
approach. McFarland, as I shall now illustrate, provides cogent reasons for the necessary failure 
of Coleridge’s project to argue consistently for divine and human freedom within the terms of a 
logically necessary, or a priori scheme of metaphysical explanation. 
 
McFarland points out that objects are always found only in epistemic relation to a knowing 
subject.
661
 Subjectivity and objectivity are thus always in polarity, but the ‘I am’ position 
always has actual epistemological priority over the ‘it is’: the thinker over his thought.662 To 
illustrate the particular impasse facing the objective metaphysician, McFarland points out that 
even Spinoza’s metaphysical substance – an objectively conceived pantheistic totality that 
swallows up all difference within itself, or to which all otherness, including human being, can 
be reduced through the logical steps of a geometrically modelled procedure – is, existentially, 
still the freely willed conception of substance of the man, Spinoza, existing and acting 
intentionally and independently of the closed system of the thought that he originated.
663
 This 
means that the thinker whose starting point is metaphysical objectivity will always confront the 
insurmountable difficulty – in any consistent and rigorous argument, at least – of accounting for 
his own status as an intentional thinker and agent. There can be no place for the philosopher’s 
own personal experience of free agency and independent thought within the rigid reticulation of 
his metaphysics.  
 
Coleridge, as McFarland documents in some detail, was himself aware of this situation, and 
consciously strove to ‘place existence before being’ in light of his commitment to personal 
freedom.
664
 However Coleridge was unable to find a way consistently to achieve systematic 
explanatory completeness while preserving ethical freedom, and thereby do full justice to his  
contradictory motivations. 
 
Within the epistemological relationship of thinker and thought, subject and object, philosophers 
can either choose to start their conceptual development from the objective side, like Spinoza, in 
which case personal freedom will be lost, or from a conception of subjective freedom, in which 
case systematic closure will not be possible. The subjective theoretical aporia is illustrated by 
                                                                        
661 McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, p. 244. 
662 Coleridge himself perceived this in a letter of the 10th March, 1815, as McFarland documents: McFarland, Coleridge and the 
Pantheist Tradition, p. 244. 
663 Spinoza tries to ‘soften the blow’ by attributing to individual entities a certain conatus essendi, or ability to persevere in a 
relative distinctness and cohesive integrity of being. How far this is in accord with his aim for strictly geometrical deduction, 
however, is certainly at least open to question. See Spinoza’s Ethics, Andrew Boyle (tr.) (London: J. M. Dent, 1993), pp. 52-3, 90-
1,123, 144-5, 153-6, 174-5, 272, 276, 278, 281-3. 
664 McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, p. 244. 
178 
 
Descartes’ need to invoke a deus ex machina to ensure the independent reality of thought-
objects. While selfhood is dissolved in objective constructions, both physiological and 
metaphysical, solipsism is a looming spectre for the subjectively grounded metaphysician. The 
solipsistic problem can be avoided only by the acceptance of a dualistic split between subject 
and object that cannot be conclusively bridged through logical deduction, and which demands 





It is in this latter sense that systematic completeness is deemed impossible for the thinker whose 
starting point is subjectivity, according to McFarland. We have seen in the previous section that 
according to Coleridge’s ethicised epistemology, the subject’s self-awareness, and thus his 
awareness of objective reality, depends on a self-‘other-ing’ that is the ego’s freely willed self-
subordination, in recognition of the authority of conscience over its activities. Coleridge thus 
wants to commence his thinking on what McFarland dubs the subjective side of the overarching 
epistemological relation. Coleridge would appear, as we saw above, to be arguing from the 
initial postulation of a human freedom actualised through personal relatedness to a freely 
creating divine otherness. The conscience is held to be the active symbol whereby a morally 
responsible creature participates in the divine creative intention. It is in and as this participative   
response, as the recognition of the authority of that ethical intention as intrinsic to, but not 
straightforwardly identical with one’s sense of self, that self-consciousness is enabled. But it is 
just this dialectical relationship – this differentiated identity linking self and conscience – that is 
problematic from a theological point of view, and now I will show how. 
 
According to Coleridge’s ethical epistemology, the ego responds to conscience as a ‘thou’: the 
subject’s own otherness. In this relationship, as Coleridge points out in his Essay on Faith, 
sameness, or straightforward identity, is negated in the subject’s recognition of an authoritative 
otherness immanent within consciousness – the divine immanence of reason in the form of 
conscience. Coleridge explains his complex ethico-epistemology as follows. He writes that the 
intimate personal pronoun, ‘thou’, is conditional to the possibility of objective self-
consciousness, because 
[...] the third person could never have been distinguished from the first but by 
means of the second. There can be no He without a previous Thou. Much less 
could an I exist for us, except as it exists during the suspension of the will, as in 
dreams; and the nature of brutes may be best understood by considering them as 
somnambulists. This is a deep meditation, though capable of the strictest proof, 
namely that there can be no I without a Thou, and that a Thou is only possible by 
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an equation in which I is taken as equal to Thou, and yet not the same. And this, 




Here Coleridge is pointing to the internal relatedness, the intrinsic mutual inseparability that is 
simultaneously the condition for reciprocating diversity within any polarity. Negativity derives 
its significance in the relationship of contrast with positivity, just as light is inconceivable 
without darkness, or north without south. These are polarities, and the paradigmatic exemplar of 
polarity, for Coleridge, is self and other, but the otherness must be in the form of another 
selfhood, not the third person relation, in which another self is merely the object for a subject’s 
thought. Only another ‘I’ can make personal demands upon selfhood. It is only with another self 
that a moral relation directly pertains. Only it is not yet the selfhood of another human being 
that is referred to by Coleridge as decisive for the possibility of self-awareness, as is the case in 
Martin Buber’s thinking;667 rather it is the far closer relationship of self and conscience (in Latin 
con-scientia – the knowledge which I know together with another, a mutual knowing).  
 
Already we can see that on the one hand, Coleridge, like Buber is deeply concerned about the 
possibility of true ethical relationship, while on the other, we can see that his utilisation of the 
logic of polar relationship, or differentiated identity, will mean that the relationship between self 
and other – remembering that in this epistemologically primordial case, the otherness concerned 
is the immanence of God himself, as the authority with which conscience is imbued – is 
logically calculable. It has been a theme throughout my thesis, and in relation to Coleridge’s 
systematic thought, that any theology which subsumes God under a conceptual scheme denies 
ultimacy to God’s freedom reveal himself in salvific judgement, and thereby effectively places 
its real faith in the power of human thought. One might suggest that this is more a wish-
fulfilment strategy than a genuine theological response to revelation.  
 
In order to explain the possibility of self-consciousness, and thus also an objective knowledge of 
the world, Coleridge, as we have just seen, makes selfhood and the divine authority of 
conscience polar opposites, or correlates. His account continues by explaining how the 
underlying identity of the two correlates – ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ – is noted and yet qualified by the ego: 
In order to this, a something must be affirmed in the one, which is rejected in the 
other, and this something is the will. I do not will to consider myself as equal to 
myself, for in the very act of constructing myself I, I take it as the same, and 
therefore as incapable of comparison, that is, of any application of the will. If then, 
I minus the will be the thesis; Thou plus will must be the antithesis, but the 
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667 McFarland’s ‘Prolegomena’ in Coleridge, Opus Maximum, p. cxli. 
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equation of Thou with I, by means of a free act, negativing the sameness in order to 
establish the equality, is the true definition of conscience. But as without a Thou 
there can be no You, so without a You no They, These, or Those; and as all these 
conjointly form the materials and subjects of consciousness, and the conditions of 
experience, it is evident that conscience is the root of all consciousness –, a 
fortiori, the precondition of all experience, – and that the conscience cannot have 
been in its first revelation deduced from experience.
668
  
Coleridge thus defends a concept of ethical freedom in response to an authoritative ethical will. 
The two wills, finite and infinite, are conceived in a relation of differentiation or mutual 
antithesis, as predicated upon underlying identity.  
 
(3.3) The theological problem of Coleridge’s systematic meontology 
In the Opus Maximum, Coleridge extends this initial postulation of moral freedom. This 
extension is in order to deepen, while making explicit, the grounding of human ethical freedom 
in a creaturely relation to divine omnipotence, about which more will be said later.
669
 As 
ethical, relationship to the creator thus conceived ought to be freely willed, with the divine 
freedom to create in love on the one hand, and the human freedom to respond to divine love on 
the other. 
 
As we have seen, McFarland holds that any such metaphysic as Coleridge’s intends to be, as 
one which takes its starting point in subjective freedom in relation to a freely creating and 
loving God, should be necessarily dualistic in form, if argued consistently.
670
 Similarly, Colin 
Gunton writes that any attempt to elide this dualism of God in relation to a separate creation ad 
extra, and thus any attempt to move away from a traditional and orthodox scheme of creation ex 
nihilo (where ‘nothing’ is conceived in terms of absolute non-being or ouk on), cannot but 
collapse the real alterity implied and respected in all genuinely ethical personal relationships.
671
 
We have just seen that Coleridge trespasses on the existential integrity of the ‘I’/‘Thou’ 
relationship by translating both ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ into objective counters within an overarching 
scheme of logical mediation.  I shall next be arguing that Coleridge is indeed logically 
consistent, but that in conceiving the relation between transcendent creator and creation in terms 
of conceptual mediation, he is in effect consistent with McFarland’s objective metaphysical 
starting point. Creation ex nihilo thus becomes the mediation whereby a concept of reality – 
which is conceived as common to both creator and creation – is mediated through a polar 
account of actuality and potentiality, or relative non-being.  
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I offer the following quotation from his Opus Maximum as evidence that Coleridge utilises a 
concept of dialectical or merely relative non-being, (me on). Here non-being is not absolute, but 
is conceived as potentiality, or the reciprocal pole or antithesis of actuality, as mutually related 
through an underlying and all-encompassing concept of reality:  
I [...] refer to the false division which has so long prevailed in the methods of 
philosophy under the name of Dichotomy, in which the position always begins 
with two, a thing and its opposite. Thus we should have the real, and as its opposite 
and co-ordinate the un-real or non-entity, that is, an opposition in which there can 
be no opposite. If, on the other hand, we took the real as the pregnant uninvolved 
point and the identity of both opposites, and these opposites again as the two poles 
of the line into which the point produces itself, or into which it unfolded in order to 
manifest its being, we should see clearly that both alike are forms of that point, and 
that, therefore, under the idea reality we have to find two opposites, both of which 
are reality, though each a form opposite to the other. These forms, these opposite 
poles of reality, are the actual and the potential [...].
672
 
Here it is clear that Coleridge’s works from a logically nuanced and objective concept of reality, 
that is capable of conceptual determination through the related antitheses of polar logic. Reality, 
evolving through a dialectic of actuality and potentiality, is the principle of Coleridge’s 
philosophy, and not the free self-revelation of the God of Christianity. 
 
Coleridge would doubtless object that his ‘reality’ is not a concept, but a Platonic form or idea 
of reason. But it is clear that Coleridge, on his own evidence (as we are about to see), 
necessarily has no choice but to utilise concepts of the understanding in the so-called ‘higher’ 
or productive logic of dialectical reason. And this is simply because there just is no other way 
to express oneself linguistically – except, of course, through imaginative conceptual 
indeterminacy, or as Kierkegaard practices it, communicative indirection. Coleridge, however, 
as well as being a poet and aesthetician, has a powerful drive towards systematic metaphysics; 
and if he is to be a systematic metaphysician, then he must use logic; and logic, whether 
dichotomous or dialectical, can only forge conceptually determinate chains of linguistic 
argument.  
 
Coleridge is, of course, thoroughly aware of this: 
The Practical Reason alone is Reason in the full and substantive sense. It is reason 
in its own sphere of perfect freedom; as the source of IDEAS, which Ideas, in their 
conversion to the responsible Will, become Ultimate Ends. On the other hand, 
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Theoretic Reason, as the ground of the Universal or Absolute in all logical 
conclusion is rather the Light of Reason in the Understanding, and known to be 
such by its contrast with the contingency and particularity which characterise all 
the proper and indigenous growths of the Understanding.
673
 
The logical method of determining the ideal – a term which is used in an improper sense in such 
a theoretical context, according to Coleridge’s own testimony just cited – is utilised throughout 
Coleridge’s more systematic writings, but often contrasts strongly with his approach to the ideal 
in relation to aesthetics, as shall become apparent in chapter eight, below. Moreover, Coleridge 
in the passage just quoted will allow that only practical or ethical ideas are manifestations of 
reason in the ‘full and substantive’ sense of the term, ascribing to them a sphere of ‘perfect 
freedom’. This also harmonises with what we shall learn of Coleridge’s poetic insights, which 
always move towards the ethical, but unlike what Kierkegaard would chastise as the illusory 
movement of Coleridge’s theoretical dialectic, such movement takes the form of a real and 
progressive development through the felt duration of living experience. We shall also see that 
when treated aesthetically, in poetry and commentary, receptivity to the ideal demands 
imaginative interpretation through an indeterminate use of concepts of the understanding, in 
response to a quasi-Kantian free-play of the imagination.  
 
On the basis of the passage of ontological dialectic cited above, I am claiming that a dialectical 
concept of reality functions as the true ultimate principle in Coleridge’s system, and not the 
trinitarian God made known through a tradition of theological reflection on the Christian 
community’s revelatory experience, as constitutive of the life of the church. Coleridge has 
replaced a traditional theological concept of divine creation from absolute non-being (ouk on) – 
a safeguard of freedom, divine and human – with a dialectically driven account of the 
actualisation of creatures from the prior reality of potentiality, conceived as divine power. As 
We have seen that this procedure is inconsistent with any philosophy or theology that would 
remain rooted in freedom. But, we have also seen that Coleridge has already elided or 
compromised his account of freedom, through the dialectical logic of his epistemological 
starting point. Coleridge’s elision of freedom is thus homologous with his elision of the 
distinction between transcendence and creation. Infinite divine actuality and finite creation, or 
divinely actualised potentiality, are merely degrees of differentiation along an identical and 
underlying continuum of reality, common to both poles, and this underlying reality is a concept 
as objective and all inclusive as Spinoza’s substance. This is apparent in Coleridge’s account of 
creation through dialectical non-being in his Opus Maximum:
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Then, contemplating the power not indeed as the [divine] Will but yet as a power 
of the Will, and therefore as a causative power, we give birth in our minds to an 
idea which is not the same as that which we express with the verb substantive “Is”, 
though it is implied in the great I AM and it is that which we express by the word 
“Have” [...]. For who would hesitate to admit that God hath an infinite power, and 
that in the fullness of his Wisdom and Love, he produces what could not be save in 





[T]herefore we speak of the ground or the nature of the Deity [the ground is the 
manifestation, as potentiality, of the continuum I speak of above as an underlying 




The ground [i.e., potentiality in God: the power that God has, the condition for his 
essence, but not identical with it] is not to be called God, much less God the Father; 
it is the abysmal depth (βυθοϛ ἀβυσσοϛ) of the eternal act by which God alone as 
the causa sui affirmeth himself eternally.
677
 
The difference between Spinoza and Coleridge is that the latter works with a dynamic rather 
than a static concept of logic. But we have seen, in chapter one, in Kierkegaard’s criticism of 
Hegelian dialectical logic, that while polarities undoubtedly exist in nature, the logical 
extrapolation from such antitheses,
678
 far from driving the reality of movement, merely 
introduces a certain fluidity into thought.  
 
Coleridge longs to retain freedom, divine and human, and have total explanatory clarity, but he 
ends by compromising both freedoms, infinite and finite, in terms of an underlying and polar 
logical necessity. In sum, as McFarland contends, Coleridge loses hold of the ethical 
relationality which he so prizes for the sake of the explanatory completeness of a conception of 
the divine-human relationship in terms of a polarisation of being through related difference. 
Thus in Coleridge’s thinking, finite and infinite personhood become two poles – active and 
receptive, creating and created – of the one overarching reality. That concept of reality is then 
itself polarised, potentiality being conceived in primordial relationship to its polar antithesis: 
actuality. Creation is thus thought in terms of divine omnipotence, or the creative power that 
God has, as distinct from the self-existent actuality which God is.
679
 God thus creates 
‘otherness’ out of his own omnipotence or relative non-being, (me on), which is conceived by 
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679 Coleridge, Opus Maximum, pp. 231-2. 
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Coleridge in the Opus Maximum as the condition of possibility for any existence extrinsically 
related to divine self-subsistent actuality.  
 
As Colin Gunton points out, given a monistic logical scheme such as Coleridge’s, in which 
polar or dialectical logic serves as the ultimate principle and unifying vehicle of all further 
conceptual developments, creation will not have any genuine alterity from the Creator, as 
lacking a requisite space of freedom from, and for, God.
680
 Any genuine ethical relationship, 
and by extension, any truly revelatory, and thus ethically transformational communication 
between creator and creature will become impossible, as that which is existentially salvific, that 
which we truly need to be revealed to us, must necessarily be beyond our human conceptual 
resources, as we have discovered Kierkegaard to have perceived in chapters one and two.  
 
(4) Concluding Remarks and Forecast 
 
In the last section I have suggested that Coleridge, by means of his dialectical logic, has 
surrendered ultimate theological criteria in the form of concepts of divine and human freedom 
in exchange for a scheme of logical mediation. 
 
I have reason to argue, however, on the strength of evidence that I shall be presenting in the 
next chapter, that Coleridge might well have a genuine claim to aesthetic insight into what he 
terms ideas of reason, but rather in the form of creative structures somehow irradiating an 
appropriately receptive imaginative discernment, than in the form of structures of metaphysical 
logic. Thus I shall be suggesting that the true theological value of Coleridge’s thought should be 
sought in his aesthetic output, rather than in his systematisation of these fragmentary insights or 
intimations of transcendence, as translated into the logical determinations of post-Kantian 
transcendental metaphysics.  
 
In chapters four and five, we found that Bergsonian duration provided us with a framework 
through which to assess the possible genuineness of any such claims to aesthetic revelatory 
insight. We found that only a philosophy taking account of the intrinsically qualitative nature of 
temporal flow (rather than the habitual experience of quantitative or ‘spatialised’ clock-time) 
might guide us in an analysis of the conditions under which any theologically significant, 
genuinely revelatory discernment might arise. I aim to show in the next chapter that the 
aesthetic comportment under which such an experience of time may be entertained, as discussed 
in chapter five, is in fact also an ethical, existential comportment. If such an evolving 
experience can be genuinely associated with Coleridgean poetic and aesthetic experience, then a 
                                                                        
680 Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, pp. 23-5, 202-3. 
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reconciliation of Kierkegaardian existential faith and artistic activity, or what was referred to in 
chapter two as ‘outward imagination’, may be possible.  
 
Such a reconciliation would achieve the aim with which I set out in chapters one and two, 
namely, to provide an ethico-existential model that might account for Kierkegaard’s theological 
poetics of indirect communication in terms acceptable to his conception of the existential sphere 
of paradoxical faith, in which I could find no opening provided for the outward imaginative 






Coleridge’s biblical romanticism and Kierkegaardian faith 
 
Introduction and Recapitulation 
 
In the last chapter, we were able to build on the position arrived at earlier in relation to 
Bergson’s criticism of Kant’s ‘spatialised’ conception of time. At bottom, it is this distinction 
between a dynamic as opposed to a static conception of time, as we shall see in more detail as 
we proceed towards a conclusion, that justifies my distinction between Coleridge the 
philosopher-poet, and Coleridge the systematician. Since this current chapter will need to build 
on the findings of the last, this may be a good point at which to pause and re-trace the path that 
has been followed in reaching this important, temporal criterion.  
 
In chapter four, we saw that Bergson’s concept of duration shares notable structural similarities 
with Schelling’s post-Kantian re-conceptualisation of the Kantian ‘thing-in-itself’ as a dynamic 
principle to be philosophically intuited. Bergson’s concept of philosophical intuition, like 
Schelling’s, reveals the need of an imaginative mediation of metaphysical insight. In Bergson, 
as in Schelling, aesthetic discrimination through imaginative participation in nature’s organic 
process is the medium and source of such philosophical intuition. But a key difference between 
ontological process as conceived by Bergson on the one hand – intrinsically unpredictable both 
progressively and retroactively – and its idealist, teleological interpretation on the other was 
emphasised, and said to have important theological implications for the course of my thesis.  
 
We have now seen the application of those implications in the results of the last chapter. There 
we utilised those earlier findings to provide the criterion by which Coleridge’s theologically 
significant poetic and critical insights, which I shall be introducing in what follows, could be 
separated from the procrustean teleology of his systematic philosophy, which, I have suggested, 
tends effectually to cancel out the real significance of Coleridge’s aesthetic thinking, as lost 
sight of through the tendency of his systematic work to pre-determine the ontologically ideal as 
a fixed, pre-set goal.  
 
In this chapter I intend to put forward the other half of the story by showing how the full 
theological promise of Coleridge’s focal philosophical thoughts only emerges under the very 
different light which his less formally deductive contemplations in notebooks, poetry, and 
aesthetic writings shines upon them. My contention is that, freed from the straitjacket of an 
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post-Kantian systematic framework that seems ultimately alien to his personal religious 
convictions and creative outlook, these same philosophical models are transformed.  
 
I suggest that the theological possibilities inherent in Coleridge’s central terms, as introduced at 
the beginning of the last chapter – (for example, the essential temporality and thus ‘unfinished-
ness’ of the manifestation of an aesthetic idea, as an imaginatively mediated event) – were often 
frustrated and under-exploited, owing to the inevitable strain imposed by his attempt to master a 
conceptual system that always tends to panentheism in his search for an overarching 
viewpoint.
681
 I submit that the pretentions of such metaphysical ‘hubris’ hold Coleridge’s best 
thoughts captive; in a sense, it is as if the richness of Coleridge’s thinking as regards 
imagination and symbolism could only come into full play when he wrote in a more ethically 
receptive frame of mind, taking up an imaginative and willing receptiveness in relation to the 
objects of his contemplation.  
 
We saw that while Coleridge-the-systematician prioritises an organic dialectic of progressive 
and polar interactivity over a merely mechanical concept of causality, his concept of the 
organic, derived from Kant, leads him to explain the manifestation of aesthetic ideas according 
to a predetermining, dialectical pattern of final causality. This teleological interpretation has 
been shown in chapters four and five to be dependent on an inadequate account of time, long 
prevalent in the tradition, but made explicit by Kant.  
 
By following Kant, Coleridge the system-builder’s conception of time does not account for 
time’s central property: that it flows. As shown in discussing Bergson, determinate 
conceptuality fails to account for time itself, translating its essential movement into a static 
enumeration of stopping-points along a line, a pathway drawn by the mind in terms of space.
682
 
This conceptual spatialisation of time literally excludes the reality of change – the reality of the 
mind’s evolving experience that enables it to draw the ‘time’-line at all. Any measurable 
‘succession’ of fixed points along a line is, in itself, as immobile as the individual frames in a 
strip of film without the motion leant them by the extrinsic spooling of a film projector.
683
 The 
experienced quality of change entirely eludes such a quantifying conceptual procedure, which, 
as essentially deterministic, is powerless to deal with the dynamics of free volition. With the 
reality of freedom excluded from systematic conceptual accounts, the possibility of any genuine 
distinction between right and wrong vanishes: if there can be a theoretical accounting only of 
                                                                        
681 See Kathleen Coburn’s concluding remarks, quoting Barfield, in Coburn, Experience into Thought, pp. 84-5. The import of these 
pages is that Coleridge’s subtle and acute awareness of the poignant reality of his own existential contradictions means that his 
metaphysical concern for a unitive view of diversity in terms of living, healing wholeness  is far more to him than merely a 
theoretical conundrum; that what his philosophical investigations are motivated by is primarily a profoundly intimate and often 
painful, yet creative self-questioning – infinite in its implications – of what it means to be a human being. 
682 For further elucidation of my thinking with regard to the dynamics of time, please see appendix three, below. 
683 Bergson, Creative Evolution, 320-23. 
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what has to be, questions of what should or should not be are relegated to a category of illusory 
appearances.  
 
Coleridge believes himself to be saved from such a Schellingian/Spinozistic denial of genuine 
human freedom only by a personal theological interpretation of the significance of conscience, 
which he postulates as the foundation of his system. Yet following McFarland, this foundation 
has been shown to be unconvincing, as dependent on an overarching and pre-determining 
logical principle. But I have suggested that Coleridge’s personal faith does genuinely guide the 
imaginatively driven philosophical reflection of his aesthetic work, to be addressed in the course 
of this chapter.  
 
The contrast between the kind of imaginative philosophical reflection just touched upon, and 
Coleridge’s deductive, systematic approach becomes apparent in his discussions of ideas of 
reason.
684
  Insofar as the apprehension of creative ideas is mediated by the poetic or secondary 
imagination, Coleridge depends on poetic insight and uses concepts reflectively, in the Kantian 
aesthetic sense with which we have become familiar. It may be recalled that such aesthetic 
conceptual reflection involves the subordination of conceptual activity to imagination’s 
dynamically receptive mode of construal. In aesthetic reflection, intrinsically static concepts 
thus take on an open-ended, interpretive flexibility, surrendering the fixity of their determining 
or defining activity as merely static snapshots, extracted from an ever-moving reality. In dealing 
with ideas of reason, therefore, Coleridge’s insights are romantic in the sense of eliciting an 
intimation of mystery that can never be fully grasped through concepts and instrumentalised. 
However, the overarching and aprioristic conception of organic process under which 
Coleridge’s creative ideas are subsumed pre-determines their manifestation according to a  
superimposed conceptual grid of final causality: a spatially bounded plan artificially delimiting, 
and thus falsifying, temporal movement.  
 
This chapter will now continue on the course that has been emerging through this thesis, and 
which has just been summarised, as I go into more detailed analysis of the theological 
significance of Coleridge’s particular strand of romantic poetry and criticism, in order to show 
the biblical inspiration of such artistic endeavour, and its compatibility with a Kierkegaardian 
understanding of paradoxical faith. The compatibility of both authors will be shown to hinge on 
the compatibility of their views with a Bergsonian conception of time.   
 
                                                                        
684 See chapter 6 section 1.3. 
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In the first part of the previous chapter, I have introduced, defined, and analysed the key terms 
around which Coleridge constructs his systematic thought,
685
 so in what follows I will largely 
assume a conceptual grasp of their basic nature and admittedly complex inter-relations. I will, 
however quote from Coleridge’s own analyses and definitions to some extent for the sake of 
clarity. I would like to underline what I stated earlier, that what I hope will emerge in this 
chapter, as I move, gradually, to re-address these same philosophical foci in terms of 
Coleridge’s reflections upon aesthetic symbols of transcendence, is the radically different, and 
more theologically exciting directions to which these self-same concepts can lead us. It must in 
all fairness be acknowledged that this treatment is to a great extent facilitated by the depth of the 
conceptual analysis evidenced in Coleridge more systematic work. The main contention in this 
regard is simply that the aprioristic nature of Coleridge’s deductive/systematic approach – 
especially in relation to time, as just discussed – works against his insights; that the riches 
Coleridge uncovers through the rigours of systematic analysis will only bear theological fruit in 
relation to another mode of approach, as represented by his poetically motivated, faith-based 
aesthetic reflection.  
 
(1) Coleridge’s imagination: distinguishing systematic theory from aesthetic and poetic 
practice 
 
I have been drawing attention to Coleridge’s imaginatively reflective approach to symbols of 
transcendence, which, as will be seen, demands an existential participation in the creative ideas 
he seeks to elucidate in receptive ethico-aesthetic terms, as imaginative activity unites thought, 
feeling and will in a personally involving, ethical response. What unfolds in this section should 
serve to guide interpretation of the following two sections, as I distinguish and try to build upon 
Coleridge’s imaginatively reflective approach. In favouring an approach through imaginative 
conceptual indeterminacy over Coleridge’s strictly deductive thought, I aim to show the 
compatibility of faith-centred Coleridgean aesthetics with Kierkegaard’s thought on the role of 
ethical imagination in receptivity to Christological revelation, as set out in chapter one. 
 
The relation between subject and object to be described as a ‘Coleridgean aesthetic relation’ in 
this chapter is not to be conceived as a conceptual unity, an abstraction, such as the conceptual 
sublation of Coleridge’s post-Kantian system, which is supposedly not merely describing, but 
really enacting a metaphysical development and revelation of the ultimate, ideal nature of 
reality. Coleridge’s systematic distinction between ideas of reason and concepts, like Hegel’s 
theory of the ‘concrete universal’, contends that conceptuality passes through a real unfolding 
process of triadic logic, that is independent of, and informs, the thinking subject. The logically, 
                                                                        
685 See chapter 6 section 1. 
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and also metaphysically developing idea which emerges is deemed the creative source of 
empirical phenomena. We discovered earlier that Kierkegaard’s writing is stimulated by the 
need to point out, in relation to the thought of Hegel, that such metaphysical claims are illusory, 
that the Hegelian (or Coleridgean) systematician never leaves the realm of hypothetical thought, 
achieving only the thought or mere concept of real movement, while no actual movement takes 
place.  
 
While the metaphysical elements of Coleridge’s aesthetics are indeed called ideas, I suggest that 
in his aesthetic reflections they display a very different character to their logical translation in 
his systematic thought. Coleridge is adamant concerning the total difference between concepts 
and imaginatively intuited ideas of reason, which he holds to be dynamically effective, super-
phenomenal organising powers, only very imperfectly approximated by concepts, as, indeed, 
necessarily involving conceptual contradiction. I will suggest that while Coleridge’s systematic 
translation of ‘ideal’ insights cannot be supported, as presented in the ‘polar-logical’ terms of 
the Opus Maximum and elsewhere, those same aesthetic insights into a super-phenomenal 
creativity are of considerable theological value within the context of Coleridgean faith-based or 
ethical aesthetics.  
 
(1.1) Critique of Ferreira’s generalisation concerning Coleridgean ideas: biblical 
imagination 
Ferreira, from whose book, Transforming Vision we drew nourishment in chapter one in relation 
to Kierkegaardian imagination, also considers the Coleridgean imagination in the course  of the 
same work, but does not make my distinction between Coleridge the Christian metaphysical 
poet and Coleridge the systematic metaphysician. This leads him to generalise about 
Coleridgean imagination, claiming that Coleridge’s concept of imagination is intrinsically 
confused and self-contradictory. Ferreira claims that Coleridge vacillates between a ‘Hegelian’ 
conception of imagination’s role in mediating subjectivity and objectivity and descriptions of 
imaginative activity that are more in line with Kierkegaard’s position.686 
 
One kind of emphasis in Coleridge’s view of imagination is illustrated in the references to it as a 
faculty ‘at once both active and passive’, and to the role of imaginative ‘balance’ of opposite 
qualities. This sounds at first hearing like a reference to the role of imagination in maintaining 
elements in tension, which I have described as suspension and found to be central to 
imagination in the Climacus account.
687
 These descriptions, then, indicate a way in which 
                                                                        
686 The same charge of vacillation was levelled by Coleridge’s amanuensis, Joseph Henry Green, although with an opposing motive, 
Green being committed to strict systematic logic: see J. H. Green, Spiritual Philosophy (2 vols.) (London: Macmillan and Co., 
1865), vol. 1, pp. 252-60. 
687 See chapter 2 section 1. 
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imagination is understood to transcend a dichotomy between activity and passivity and to 
sustain a genuine tension. At other times, however, a quite different emphasis can be detected in 
Coleridge’s thought – namely an emphasis on the imagination as that faculty which ‘fuses’ and 
‘blends’. Coleridge is at one with a Hegelian notion of synthesis when he writes of the 
reconciliation of opposites as achieved when ‘the two component counterpowers actually 
interpenetrate each other, and generate a higher third including both the former, “ita tamen ut sit 
alia et major”’.688 
 
I shall argue now that such generalisation is unfounded, and that the distinction which I have 
been making between a self-consistent aesthetic account of imagination and a theoretical 
context in which it is often set, only to be distorted, can illumine Coleridge’s view of 
imagination in its aesthetic role as genuinely independent of his systematic thinking. 
 
Firstly, I suggest that Ferreira works with a distinction which is misplaced. The claim of an 
ambiguity within one account between two models of imaginative unification, opposed to one 
another in terms of imaginative tension on the one hand, and imaginative sublation on the other, 
can be shown not to have force.
689
 Attention to the actual development of Coleridge’s thought as 
evidenced in the sequence of his texts will justify the distinction I have been drawing between 
Coleridge’s systematic philosophy as one case and his ethical, aesthetic and critical reflection 
on the role of imagination as another. Where Ferreira posits an ambiguity within one account, I 
find grounds to suggest a single imaginative vision submitted to two mutually antithetical 
accounts or modes of presentation: the one conceptually indeterminate and imaginatively 
driven, the other driven by a priori conceptual determination. Undermining Ferreira’s 
assessment is that both the terms ‘fusion’ and ‘balance’ tend to be used in reference to a 
tensional model of imaginative creativity in Coleridge’s aesthetic writings: the very model 




As an example of this claim for an incalculably creative tension between fusion and balance, 
such as I focused on in chapter two, I will quote shortly from Ina Lipkowitz, who writes on the 
development of Coleridge’s thought concerning the distinction between imagination and fancy. 
Lipkowitz suggests this latter distinction is motivated by Coleridge’s need to find a ground of 
difference between Hebrew, scriptural poetic sublimity and Greek literature’s imagery of 
polytheistic gods.  
 
                                                                        
688 M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 93. Ferreira quotes from a MS note of Coleridge’s cited in James V. Baker, The 
Sacred River: Coleridge’s Theory of Imagination, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana, 1957), p. 200. 
689 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, pp. 91-6. 
690 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 96. 
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According to her reading, Coleridge came to see pagan poetry as essentially allegorical, 
combining forms and images merely associatively, and working at the merely conceptual level 
of the instrumental understanding which for him, as we have seen in chapter six, merely re-casts 
static images of sense through the concepts drawn from them, the result being as lifeless as a re-
articulated skeleton. In assigning this empirical and mechanistic mode of procedure to the fancy, 
as distinct from imagination, Coleridge was able to develop his dynamic view of imagination as 
a living and organising force,  that in Kant’s terms could ‘give the rule to art’ as a more than 
phenomenal organising power, uniting contraries into living aesthetic symbols.
691
 Coleridge 
came to this position around 1802, and according to Lipkowitz, the meanings assigned to fancy 
and imagination respectively ‘remain fairly consistent throughout his life’ from then on.692  
 
There is an important point to note here, with reference to the distinction between systematic 
and aesthetic approaches that I am arguing for, as against Ferreira’s charge of conceptual 
incoherence in Coleridge’s writing on imagination generally. It is not only that Coleridge’s 
aesthetic position remained constant from around 1802 onwards.
693
 It is also that Coleridge’s 
aesthetic position developed and was maintained subsequently on the basis of ‘speculations and 
conclusions about the Bible’, which Lipkowitz suggests are confined to the informal media of 
‘letters, notebook entries and marginalia’.694 In short, Coleridge’s Christian aesthetic, as distinct 
from his system, was shaped by the concerns of his Christian faith from 1802 onwards. 
Importantly, overarching, conceptual closure is not Coleridge’s aim in the less formal aesthetic 
reflections to which Lipkowitz refers. 
 
Lipkowitz cites a letter written by Coleridge, just a few months after the Dejection Ode in 1802, 
to show how he had grown to conceive the sublimity that Lowth had found in Biblical literature 
not in terms of specific phenomenal images (as prohibited by the injunction of the second 
commandment concerning idolatry),
695
 but instead as a creative energy or power, of which the 
imagination is both matrix and vehicle. Lipkowitz writes that Coleridge sees the ‘ideal poet not 
as one who merely borrows sublimity from scriptural imagery but who, by virtue of the 
                                                                        
691 Ina Lipkowitz, ‘Inspiration and the Poetic Imagination: Samuel Taylor Coleridge’, Studies in Romanticism 30: 4 (1991), p. 616. 
692 Lipkowitz, ‘Inspiration and the Poetic Imagination’, p. 615. 
693 Indeed, against any charges that there is an orthodox ‘trinitarian’ Coleridge divorceable from an earlier ‘German’ romantic-
idealist I have, in the last chapter, singled out his late, great unfinished work, a self-professed Christian philosophy (the incomplete 
Opus Maximum, dated between 1819-1832) as exemplifying Coleridge’s systematic philosophical approach. See for example 
Coleridge, ‘Proposed Preface to the First Volume’ in Opus Maximum, p. 4 and footnote 3, p. 4, where Coleridge refers to his work 
as a ‘System of Faith and Philosophy: or Catena Veritatum de Deo, Homine et Natura’. The latter, Latin description especially 
emphasises the rigorously deductive, systematic intention of Coleridge’s project, meaning ‘Chain of Truths concerning God, Man 
and Nature’. 
39 Ina Lipkowitz, ‘Inspiration and the Poetic Imagination’, p. 614. 
695 See Robert Lowth, Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews, (London: Thomas Tegg, 1839), pp. 147-188. 
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“shaping spirit of Imagination”, unites “the passion and the life, whose fountains are within”696 
with the life of nature: 
Nature has her proper interest: & he will know what it is, who believes & feels, that 
every Thing has a life of it’s [sic] own, & that we are all one life. A Poet’s Heart & 
Intellect should be combined, intimately combined and unified, with the great 
appearances in Nature – & not merely held in solution & loose mixture with them, 
in the shape of formal Similies.
697
 
Within the framework of his aesthetic thought, therefore, Coleridge uses strong expressions of 
unity, such as ‘intimately combined and unified’, which we have seen Ferreira to associate only 
with Coleridge’s more systematic thinking, in order to express a tension at the heart of the work 
of the poetic imagination. This tension is embodied in the insight (in the same quoted letter) that 
‘everything has a life on its own’, on the one hand, and yet paradoxically, ‘that we are all one 
life’. Coleridge asserts what is for him, in this context, an aesthetic and thus conceptually 
irresolvable paradox concerning imaginative activity, on the basis of a biblically mediated 
poetic insight into the divine creativity manifesting in all creatures, and thus on theological 
grounds springing from faith. This insight into the role of imagination in intimating divine 
creativity is in itself an important finding in terms of theological epistemology. However, as we 
are about to see, such insight was distorted by the idealist context in which Coleridge would go 
on to situate it. 
 
Having made this distinction between imagination and fancy on the basis of faith – as evidenced 
by the biblically inspiration of his aesthetic meditations just addressed – Coleridge would go on 
to make a further distinction within imagination itself in his Biographia Literaria, as he tries to 
use his aesthetic insight in the service of a more philosophically over-arching, or systematically 
oriented context.
698
 In making this further distinction between primary and secondary 
imagination in relation to a systematic idealist account, Coleridge thus adjusts his theologically 
based epistemological claim that divine creative activity is discernible through faithfully 
receptive, imaginative activity, by assigning to the imagination an epistemologically ‘primary’ 
function over and above its aesthetic – and thus now ‘secondary’ – role. Coleridge in effect tries 
to derive the epistemological insights gained through aesthetic symbolisation from a more 
fundamental, transcendental principle of the possibility of any experience, conceived in terms of 
imagination, but within the context of an overarching polar logical account.
699
 It has emerged in 
the last chapter that I have reason to suspect the apriorism of Coleridge’s epistemological work, 
                                                                        
696 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘Dejection’, in Ernest Hartley Coleridge (ed.), Coleridge’s Poetical Works, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), p. 365, l. 46. 
697 Earl Leslie Griggs (ed.), Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 6 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956-71), vol. 
2, p. 864, Coleridge’s italics; Lipkowitz, ‘Inspiration and the Poetic Imagination’, p. 615. Coleridge’s italics. 
698 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, p. 304-6. 
699 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, pp. 296-300. 
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but I shall be arguing, in section two, that Coleridge’s ethico-epistemological insights can be re-
focused upon his earlier, theologically motivated conception of imaginative activity, as 
discerned by Lipkowitz. I will argue that the concept of a fundamental epistemological role for 
the imagination is already present and adequately accounted for within Coleridge’s original, 
biblically inspired model of imagination. 
 
I have been giving grounds to suggest that Ferreira makes an unwarranted generalisation in 
assigning conceptual incoherence to Coleridge’s views on imagination. He fails to make the 
distinction between Coleridge’s aesthetic and systematic positions as I have described them in 
terms of a personal, rather than philosophical ambiguity, expressive of a conflict of tendencies 
in the context of faith and its poetic expression on the one hand, and that of a philosophical 
drive towards an objectively systematic expression for that faith, on the other. In the previous 
chapter, I have argued that Coleridge is incoherent, but within the context of his systematic 
philosophy as distinct from his poetics, aesthetics and informal reflections, which I am arguing 
embody an approach which is consistent in its own right.  
 
Coleridge’s further systematic conceptualisation of the relation between Creator and creature, in 
his Opus Maximum, places them in differentiated identity, on the basis of a meontological 
understanding of divine and human willing, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter.
700
 This 
meontological thinking bears considerable similarity to the later thought of Schelling, as 
expressed in his Treatise on Human Freedom.
701
 But in the Biographia Literaria of 1817,  
written before composing the surviving fragments of the Opus Maximum, (dated roughly 
between 1819 and 1832),
702
 Coleridge was already setting the distinction between primary and 
secondary imagination within an earlier Schellingian context, actually utilising, verbatim, whole 
pages from Schelling’s Transcendental Idealism of 1800, a work discussed in chapter four of 
this thesis.  
 
Coleridge famously never finished the presentation of Schelling’s earlier systematic position in 
Biographia Literaria (publishing in its place a ‘letter’ from a ‘friend’ – which in fact he wrote 
himself – ‘advising him’ against this on various prudential grounds).703 Instead, Coleridge then 
proceeds directly to what he intends to derive as the conclusion of his version of what is largely 
Schelling’s argument: his own distinctions between primary and secondary imagination and 
fancy.
704
 We have just seen that the distinction between poetic (secondary) imagination and 
fancy derives from Coleridge’s faith and biblical poetics, owing nothing to Schelling. We have 
                                                                        
700 Coleridge, Opus Maximum, pp. 226-33. 
701 F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, pp. 27-30. 
702 See McFarland’s editorial note in Coleridge, Opus Maximum, p. xx. 
703 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, pp. 300-4. 
704 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, pp. 304-6. 
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also seen, with J. Robert Barth in the last chapter and with Lipkowitz in this, that Coleridge’s 
biblically inspired conception of imagination performs an important, theologically motivated 
epistemological role in its own right, through the creation of aesthetic symbols. However, it is 
also evident that Coleridge goes on to translate his Christian aesthetic/epistemological insight 
into the Schellingian context of transcendental logic in which Biographia Literaria is 
conceived, as we saw in our analysis of primary imagination in the previous chapter. Thus, and 
as I suggested in the first section of this chapter, Coleridge’s own use of his theologically 
promising aesthetic-epistemological insights can do them less than justice.   
 
Conceivably, it was some sense of the incongruity between his Christian faith and its idealist 
philosophical interpretation which led Coleridge to ‘fudge’ or cut short the systematic 
development of the Schellingian argument in Biographia Literaria, thus leaving undeveloped 
the monistic and deterministic tendency of the Schellingian conceptual mechanics through 
which he would have tried to reach a conclusion concerning the role of imagination in enabling 
the possibility of experience in general.
705
 In view of this explicit un-connectedness of 
Coleridge’s conclusion concerning primary imagination with the Schellingian context in which 
it is presented, in this section I aim to explore the ethico-epistemological implications of 
primary imagination’s experientially conditioning role, when re-addressed in terms of 
Coleridge’s earlier conception of poetic imagination’s role in receptivity to sublime 
symbolisation: his biblically based and paradoxically tensile model of poetic imagination. Thus 
freed from what I have been suggesting is a procrustean post-Kantianism, I contend that 
Coleridge’s epistemological doctrine of a ethical, transcendentally conditioning imaginative 
function – as already latent in his earlier, poetic imaginative account –  represents a 
theologically fruitful development of Coleridge’s thinking in an ethico-aesthetic direction. 706 
 
(2) The aesthetic will: Coleridge’s a reconsideration of Coleridge’s ethical epistemology, as 
introduced in chapter six 
 
As a theoretical setting for all further issues to be introduced in this chapter, we must now start 
building on some of the concepts introduced in the last by exploring the dynamics of 
imagination’s relation to the will, on the basis of aspects Coleridge’s systematic ethical 
epistemology. Although theologically objectionable as it stands, as I have suggested, 
                                                                        
705 Shawcross, Introduction to Biographia Literaria, pp. lxx-lxxi. 
706 In the Opus Maximum Coleridge evidently believed that he had taken a sufficiently, and theologically critical stance towards 
Schelling’s thought, and could claim to derive his meontology straight from the mystical or theosophical tradition of Jacob Boehme 
(Coleridge, Opus Maximum, p. 232, and n59), from whom both he and Schelling had drawn inspiration, (see Coleridge, Biographia 
Literaria, p. 95, and Shawcross’s note, pp. 242-243; see also the passages of Boehme’s ‘Mysterium Pansophicum’ in Schelling, 
Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, p. 85 ). In the previous chapter I have suggested otherwise, on the 
grounds of the post-Kantian teleological, or calculative understanding of time that undergirds Coleridge’s approach in this later 
work. This consideration led to my theological judgement in that chapter that owing to the teleologically oriented polar logic of his 
systematic work, Coleridge fails to do justice to the genuine inconceivability of revelation. 
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nevertheless I will now show that basic elements of that epistemology can be resituated 
fruitfully in the context of Coleridge’s earlier, biblically inspired and tensional – as opposed to 
polar – model of imagination, as discussed in the last section.  
 
We have seen that there are two distinct sets of distinctions that are developed by Coleridge. 
Firstly, a distinction is made between imagination and fancy. Then Coleridge goes on to 
distinguish two functions within that same, biblically inspired concept of imagination, in order 
to subserve his systematic aims in the Schellingian context of Biographia Literaria. Coleridge 
thus systematically distinguishes a symbolic, aesthetic function from an overarching and 
transcendental epistemic function of the imagination. The two functions are then labelled 
secondary and primary imagination, respectively.  
 
In what follows I suggest that the transcendental, or primary function, as developed in 
Biographia Literaria, is a damaging modification of the ethico-aesthetic epistemological 
insights already latent in Coleridge’s earlier, biblical model of imagination, which I will attempt 
to draw forth. My contention is that the earlier, biblically based model of imaginative 
productivity can achieve, through an ethically receptive conceptual indeterminacy, what the 
later development of primary imagination seeks to achieve through logical determination. I  
argue, on theological grounds, that Coleridge’s later systematic distinction of the primary from 
the secondary or artistic imagination is the result of the subordinating of his earlier imaginative 
concept to a polar logical determinism, resulting in the loss of a genuine account of ethical 
freedom. I suggest that the resultant polarising of the imagination into primary and secondary 
roles deforms the ethico-aesthetic epistemological promise of the earlier formulation in terms of 
biblical sublimity. I will show, in short, that what the primary imaginative model seeks to 
accomplish systematically – to be a transcendental condition of possible self-consciousness – 
can more adequately be thought from within the resources of Coleridge’s earlier imaginative 
model, as not invoking a teleological logic which dissolves ethical freedom.  
 
For the sake of clarity, in the rest of this section I will reserve the term ‘primary imagination’ 
for the polar logical model (together with its polar correlate, ‘secondary imagination’). The term 
‘creative imagination’ will be used to denote Coleridge’s earlier, biblical model of imagination. 
I suggest that creative imagination, in this latter sense, can accommodate both the 
transcendental and the poetic roles later distinguished by Coleridge. Both roles will be shown to 
be essentially related in terms of a logically irreducible and ethico-aesthetic, organic 





According to Coleridge’s ethical epistemology, as we saw in chapter six,707 human self-
consciousness participates in divine reason, an ontological structure imbuing nature and all the 
subsidiary faculties of the mind – emotion, sense, and understanding. The will, as the intelligent 
and dynamic principle of human life is the subjective pole of human participation in reason, its 
conditioning polar contrary being the conscience. All the activities of the mind involve reason 
and would be impossible without it. As reason illumines the mind through the response of will 
to conscience, it is essentially ethical. Any form of objective consciousness would be impossible 
without reason, and since the rationality of the will resides in its living response to the 
illumination of conscience, it follows that conscience must be the condition of all possible 
objective consciousness.  
 
We also learned in the last chapter that what Coleridge dubs the primary imagination, in 
Biographia Literaria, is the vehicle of reason, as the medium uniting the self to its own 
otherness, (i.e., conscience as the immanence of the logos, the symbolic presence of divine 
reason to the mind). In this way imagination is also said to be the subjective manifestation of 
natura naturans, the organ of polar productive power (one power manifesting in two forms).
708
 
The primary imagination is thus found to be a medium of organic creativity, uniting that which 
may be distinguished but never divided (the differentiated identity of dynamic, bi-polar reality). 
So we can say that the primary imagination enables all possible finite perception by 
simultaneously distinguishing and relating opposites, as the medium of polar creative process. 
Yet we have also learned that what truly governs Coleridge’s systematic account is a polar 
logic, meaning that if there is a role for imaginative activity in this mediation of polar opposites, 
it will not be a freely creative role. 
 
But as I pointed out at length in the last section and in the previous chapter, this systematic style 
of thought fails the Christological test of Kierkegaard’s thinking, as discussed in the first two 
chapters. A governing a apriorism of dialectical logic, such as Coleridge’s, is in effect an 
attempt to bypass Christological paradox, evading the saving possibility of Christ’s absolute 
challenge to all our pre-conceptions. As Kierkegaard shows in his Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, dialectical idealisms such as Coleridge’s never emerge from the hypothetical realm 
of conceptual mediation into the life-contexts where existing subjects might confront the 
paradoxical revelation of the divine incarnation.
709
 As I showed in the last chapter, Coleridge 
situates his theology within an overarching philosophical trajectory, an account of the process of 
redemption of which the end is always teleologically foreknown and prefigured in terms of a 
projected logical scheme. My criticism is that human thinking is the sole initiator and completer 
                                                                        
707 See chapter 6 section 1. 
708 See chapter 6, section 1; for more on the concept of natura naturans, see chapter four, below. 
709 See, for example, Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, pp. 190-193. 
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of this scheme. On this teleologically closed conceptual basis, there is no experiential 
opportunity, no experiential time to open ourselves to the possibility of genuine revelation, no 
time for the possibility of a living encounter in which we might learn about ourselves that which 
we could not always already have been capable of discovering for ourselves, without the need 
of a saving revelation. 
 
With this theological argument in mind, I will now try to relate Coleridge’s systematic ethico-
epistemology, as addressed in the last chapter, to the context of his biblically based account of 
creative imagination, from which I hold his insights into the ethical nature of imaginative 
activity to derive. As discussed above with reference to Lipkowitz, Coleridge’s imaginatively 
tensile epistemological model – creative imagination – is completely free of the all-determining 
apriorism just criticised. Importantly, we can also see on the basis of Lipkowitz’s account that 
systematically construed secondary imagination, as discussed in chapter six, corresponds in 
indeterminate conceptual structure to the creative imagination. Henceforth I shall therefore 
cease to distinguish secondary from creative imagination, and shall identify the two, referring in 
what follows only to creative imagination, in contrast to systematic primary imagination.  
 
Creative imagination uses concepts reflectively or suggestively, or, as in the Kantian account of 
aesthetics (chapter four), in the free play of imaginative vision.
710
 So unlike the primary 
imagination, creative imagination does not harmonise contraries by mediating their solution in 
polar logical terms. Rather, creative imagination holds opposites up to one another in an 
aesthetically productive tension. The creative imagination mediates ideas symbolically through 
a conceptually indeterminate, or intimative, aesthetic awareness.
711
 It is in this aesthetic manner 




But here we should pause to reflect that in Coleridge’s ethical epistemological account, the 
ego’s relation to the alterity of conscience, as what Coleridge describes as a ‘testifying state’, 713  
is itself also conceived as an imaginative mediated symbolic state as the immanent, relational 
manifestation of the Logos; the embodiment, as participated divine reason, of divine ideal 
creativity: the father’s own otherness.714 I suggest, therefore, that this response to conscience, as 
imaginatively mediated, can plausibly be conceived as of the same, conceptually reflective and 
fiduciary order as the discernment of all other aesthetic symbols of the creative imagination. 
                                                                        
710 See chapter 4 section  3.1. 
711 See chapter 6 subsections 1.3 and 1.6. 
712 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, p. 304-6. 
713 Coleridge, The Friend part 1, p. 159. 
714 Through the ideality of conscience, the logos indwells us as that to which the will responds  in order to self-consciousness. As 
ideal, conscience is no concept to be understood, but a symbolic manifestation of divine reason to be engaged with through 
imaginative activity; see Coleridge, The Statesman’s Manual appendix C, pp. 66-70; Coleridge, ‘Essay on Faith’, in Shorter Works 
and Fragments part 2, pp. 833-44; Barth, The Symbolic Imagination, p. 41. 
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Thus, re-conceiving Coleridge’s ethical epistemology in terms of his account of the creative 
imagination, (in place of his account of the primary imagination), we can say that the will’s 
imaginatively mediated relation to the symbol of conscience is only truly ethical only in so far 
as it is aesthetic, as a manifestation of the act of faith demanded by all conceptually 
indeterminate, reflective interpretation. On this basis it can also be said that only in so far as a 
response to conscience demands the interpretive freedom to reflect imaginatively – thus only in 
so far as it is an aesthetic activity – can that response be deemed truly ethical, since we have 
found such imaginative activity to be inseparable from a trusting openness in the discernment of 
alterity. 
 
I suggest that Coleridge’s ethical epistemology, thus understood in terms of his earlier 
imaginative concept, (or creative imagination, as I have been describing it), is capable of further 
elucidation in organistic, or conceptually irreducible and thus paradoxical terms. What 
Coleridge describes as the act of fidelity to conscience occurs as an imaginative response to a 
symbol, and we have seen in chapter six that such symbolic perception is organically structured. 
Thus neither aspect – the symbol or the response of the will – can be said to take precedence, 
one over the other. The relation between conscience and will is thus not a linear or causally 
mechanical development. J. Robert Barth, as we saw, describes just such an organic relationship 
between a subject’s willingness to see poetic symbols, and the necessary presence of such a 
symbol ‘already’ in order for one to be able to respond to it.715 An organic, imaginatively 
mediated, mutual causality is thus in play here, in the case of conscience just as much as in the 
case of poetic symbolisation and response. Subjective response and the imaginatively mediated 
symbol to which it responds – the conscience – must be thought of as interdependent, 
interpenetrating ‘poles’. But now we can see that such an epistemological polarity is not of the 
determinate logical order which Coleridge’s systematic interests foisted upon it; rather it is the 
intrinsically open-ended polarity of a hermeneutical circle, a polarity of creative aesthetic 
interpretation. As irreducible to either a linear, causal order or a polarised, transcendental 
logical order, such ‘interpenetration’ is in no way to be thought of in terms of the Hegelian-style 
conceptual sublation that we saw criticised by Ferreira, above. 
 
Here we are reminded of our positive findings concerning the role of transcendental imagination 
in the work of Kant and Schelling in earlier chapters. In spite of the theologically motivated 
reservations which have led me to judge negatively the logical chains which they suspended 
from it, we have seen that each of them shared an insight into the conceptually irreducible 
nature of imagination. Recalling accounts of Kantian and Schellingian imagination as analysed 
in chapters four and five, the alternative account of Coleridgean epistemology which I have just 
                                                                        
715 Barth, The Symbolic Imagination, p. 41 
201 
 
offered, as stripped of its procrustean logical framework, leads us once again to a view of 
transcendental imaginative activity as displaying the organic structure of a ‘grounded 
ground’716.  
 
By acting thus receptively (i.e., by being both active and passive at once), the imagination, as 
Coleridge originally conceived it in the interest of his theological poetics, can also be seen to 
fulfil the transcendental epistemological role which Coleridge realised was essential for the 
perception of the symbol of conscience. It does so without the subsuming of imaginative 
activity under a polar logical scheme, a logical hegemony leading both to the denial of divine 
revelatory freedom and of human freedom to respond to divine grace. Coleridgean creative 
imagination, as thus originally conceived, as we learned from Lipkowitz, can thus be shown to 
mediate a polar and conceptually paradoxical tension between activity and passivity: between 
conscience and the will in the case of imagination conceived as the transcendental medium of 
possible self-consciousness; between aesthetic discernment and symbolic intimations of 




(3) Temporal, Organic Symbolism: Coleridge’s secondary imaginative activity as 
perspectival, durational and corrigible 
 
I have just been reassessing Coleridge’s epistemology in conceptually indeterminate terms 
through focusing on the organic nature of Coleridgean imaginative activity in response to 
symbols, including that of the conscience. I found that, removed from an a priori framework, 
Coleridge’s ethical epistemology can take on a more ‘existential’ cast, echoing Ferreira’s 
account of Kierkegaardian imagination in chapter one. I now turn to the way in which 
Coleridge’s conception of aesthetic productivity – secondary imaginative activity – thrives on 
just such an organic conceptual indeterminacy, as displaying a non-linear (non-causal) 
productive structure that is irreducible to conceptual resolution. 
 
According to Coleridge’s account, as we have seen, the creation and perception of poetic, 
symbolic meaning through secondary imaginative activity, demands an ethical element of 
fidelity or commitment. Poetic composition demands a willingness to participate in, or open 
oneself out towards a poetic intimation of the omnipresence of God.
717
 Put in terms of 
Coleridge’s aesthetics (as provisionally outlined with relation to Lipkowitz earlier in this 
                                                                        
716 This concept was explained in chapter 5 section 2. 
717 Barth, The Symbolic Imagination, pp. 40-3, 45. 
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chapter) through secondary imaginative activity, subject and aesthetic object imaginatively 
interact, in such a way that neither pole can claim a logical or temporal priority over the other. 
Rather, subjective construal and objective content interact in the production of a poetic symbol 
of transcendence.
718
 The symbol per se also gives poetic-participative access to the poet’s vision 
for the reader: access to a vision wholeness. But this vision is, unavoidably only a perspectival 
and temporal disclosure: an intimation only of divine significance.
719 
 
In his Lines: ‘Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey’,720 Wordsworth found, on 
revisiting Tintern Abbey, that the memory of his previous symbolic experience was enriched 
and transformed by being disconfirmed as his perspective had necessarily expanded and 
changed through the passage of time and personal maturing.
721
 In just this way, Coleridge’s 
symbols are conceptually indeterminate and only intimative. They are thus intrinsically open-
ended and corrigible, as there is always room for temporal growth and challenge to expectation 
and memory through the re-visiting of symbolic disclosures. Symbolic meaning is thus always 
open to unanticipated and indeed unanticipatable transformations, in line with the Bergsonian 
concept of time that we have analysed in prior chapters, and to which we will return towards the 
end of this.  
 
Furthermore, we have seen, both in the last chapter and the previous section, that in its 
experientially conditioning epistemological role, the creative imagination, as I have dubbed it in 
the previous section,
722
 enables possible perception, for Coleridge, by uniting the whole human 
life in an ethical act of receptivity to conscience, as the condition of the self-differentiation that 
is self-consciousness. Thus we have found that both the primary and secondary forms of 
imaginative activity, conditioning ordinary empirical experience and symbolic-artistic 
experience respectively, are intrinsically ethical in orientation. At the level of secondary 
imagination, an act of faith in the meaningfulness of a symbol is crucial for the possibility of its 
discernment, just as empirically objective experience of the world is conditioned by the 
imaginatively mediated act of willed subordination in recognition of the authoritative voice of 
conscience, enabling self-consciousness.  
 
                                                                        
718 Barth, The Symbolic Imagination, pp. 74-76 
719 See Colin Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 143-4. Gunton writes 
of the corrigibility of apprehension of Coleridgean ideas, conceived as dynamic and sublime intimations of a final truth towards 
which one may move in a process of ever-deepening engagement, retro-actively transforming one’s prior interpretive appreciations. 
720 William Wordsworth, The Collected Poems of William Wordsworth, pp. 241-44. 
721 I base my interpretation of Wordsworth here on Stephen Prickett’s Words and the Word, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986); see chapters 3 and 4 (under ‘The Book of Nature’ and ‘The Paradoxes of Disconfirmation’) especially pp. 139-40 and 
pp. 162-3, in relation to the diachronic and synchronic interplay of poetic typology and symbolism, as potentially leading to the 
disconfirmation of symbolic expectation, as interpreted along the lines of the interpretive ‘leaps’ involved in ‘Wittgensteinian’ 
aspect-seeing, as already featured in this thesis  in relation to Ferreira’s discussion of imaginative receptivity to transcendence in 
Kierkegaard, in chapter 2.1. 
722 That is, the concept of imagination founded on biblical symbolisation of the sublime, which, as I argued in the last section, 
encompasses both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ roles in an aesthetic, conceptually indeterminate – rather than a priori –  manner. 
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In both functions, and with due qualification with regard to the mode of conceptuality through 
which primary imagination is understood, (as addressed in the last section), the imagination 
emerges as fundamentally attentive to otherness, acting receptively in order to discern justly. 
Imaginative construal is thus at the heart of both ordinary and symbolic awareness, and its 
disclosures are dependent on the responsible and disinterested comportment of the percipient. 
That imagination is at the heart of ordinary phenomenal perception indicates, I suggest, that our 
everyday engagements with the world, even the most trivial, are implicitly symbolical 
encounters with transcendence, for a suitably receptive and faithful attitude. Following John 
Coulson,
723
 Barth writes that Coleridge’s symbolic doctrine re-animates the 
sixteenth/seventeenth century tradition in English poetics in which the ‘one life within us and 
abroad’724 is discernible for a unified and trusting sensibility.725 I suggest that, both 
epistemologically and aesthetically, this ethical and imaginative stress on personal comportment 
in relation to experience has interesting implications for one’s habitual outlook on daily life, 
suggesting that the world may literally become an entirely different place, depending on the 
gestalt, or mode of imaginative connection, through which it is discerned. Something similar to 
Heidegger’s reflections on ‘attunement’ in Being and Time seems to be echoed here, (how one’s 
mood or manner of approach lights up one’s life-world),726 just as this Coleridgean 
epistemological ‘comportment’ echoes Ferreira’s discussion of the Kierkegaardian imagination 
in the turn to paradoxical faith in chapter one. 
 
As we discovered earlier, Kant had already seen artistic practice and perception as related to 
ethical activity through the disinterestedness of judgements of taste, in his demand that they be 
uninfluenced by the self-indulgent desire for self-gratification.
727
 With Coleridge we have come 
to see that an ethical dimension is fundamental to the proper functioning of imagination in both 
its primarily epistemological and secondarily aesthetic tasks. We should add, moreover, that the 
ethical imaginative energy envisioned by Coleridge as at work in enabling empirical and artistic 
experience is significantly related to a Kierkegaardian, existential model of ethical activity: the 
‘whole man’ –  thought, feeling and will – uniting through an imaginative response to one’s 
environment, ethical, empirical and aesthetic. 
  
Secondary, artistic imagination, as a power mediating polar energies, is described by Coleridge 
as ‘first put in action by the Will and Understanding’.728 Again, Coleridge displays a 
                                                                        
723 John Coulson, Newman and the Common Tradition: a Study in the Language of Church and Society (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1970), pp. 3-13. 
724 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘The Eolian Harp’, in E. H. Coleridge (ed.), Poetical Works, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969 ), 
p. 101. 
725 Barth, The Symbolic Imagination, p. 27. 
726 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (tr.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), pp. 172-3. 
727 See chapter 4 section 3. 
728 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 2, pp. 16-18. 
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Kierkegaardian awareness that human life is more than just objective thinking; that just as a 
truly ethical stance or comportment to life implies an integrity or wholeness of response to the 
demands of moral consciousness, so also, in the disinterested honesty required for true aesthetic 
production and perception, Coleridge holds that the imagination responds through the united 
activity of practical and theoretical elements of consciousness.
729
 Both the poet’s creative 
discernment and a reader’s appreciative participation in poetic symbols must be set in motion by 
the whole person, through an integral response to a dawning awareness of transcendence. But in 
addition to this, I suggest that Coleridge’s formulation draws attention to what by now should 
be a familiar ambiguity. 
 
Coleridge says that the creation and perception of symbols occurs when the imagination is set in 
motion by the will and understanding.
730
 And yet it is imagination, as the ‘esemplastic’, or 
unitive, power that alone is able to unite different polarities of awareness, such as will and 
understanding.
731
 Again, we are confronted with the irreducible paradox of the imagination’s 
organic structure, and thereby its status as a grounded ground of experiential possibilities: as 
inextricably both active and passive. The imagination, in spontaneous or active receptivity, is 
both follower and leader intrinsically. As a tensile power productive of causally irreducible 
differences, the imagination is, in itself, indeterminable, or conceptually irreducible. We found, 
similarly, that Kierkegaard views human experiencing, or ‘inter-esse’, as fundamentally a 




We saw in the first chapter that for Kierkegaard, the imaginative mediation or construal 
necessarily at work in actual experience, as situated between reality and ideality, is in a sense a 
circular procedure, as subjective and objective facets of experience mutually enrich each other, 
real life becoming imaginatively permeated with consciousness as possibilities for personal 
growth or hitherto unperceived options are discerned. The familiar is made strange by 
imagination, and glimpsed in a new light. Barth similarly suggests that, for Coleridge, what is 
presented poetically in a given work can radiate symbolic depth through an act of faith or 
interpretive commitment.
733
 In Coleridge’s romantic poetics the percipient is enriched by what 
is symbolically intimated, while the intelligibility of the symbol is contingent upon an 
imaginative act of faith, in the form of an interpretive openness to the possibility of symbolic 
insight: an ethico-aesthetic, attentive trust. The organic relationship between poles of 
experiencing is thus conceptually circular, rather than linear and causal. 
 
                                                                        
729 Coleridge, The Statesman’s Manual, appendix C, pp. 69-70. 
730 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 2, pp. 16-18. 
731 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, pp. 168-70. 
732 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript vol. 1, p. 314. 
733 Barth, The Symbolic Imagination, p. 45. 
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Coleridge writes in the Statesman’s Manual that the imagination acts in symbolic perception by 
making the discursive understanding intuitive.
734
 In an aesthetic context, this means that the 
understanding’s competence in the categorical sorting and conceptual labelling of superficies, of 
the sensible surfaces that appear and interact in (Kantian) space and time, is supplemented or 
given depth in the creation and reception of poetry by an imaginative penetration of linguistic 
forms, giving them the fullness or ‘plenitude of sense’: breathing life into them. In this way a 
poem is only truly read when significant connotations are discovered by reading between the 




The ethical dimension of imaginative activity again emerges when we realise that such reading 
between the lines must not be an act of eisegetic distortion of the poetic communication, but 
rather a trustful and unbiased openness to the possibility of discovering new meaningfulness in 
attentive contemplation of the poem.
736
 Only by attentive receptivity can imagination attain to 
the activity of symbolic discernment, creative invention and patient discovery thus being 
organically co-implicated. It is to explore further the nature of such ethico-aesthetic honesty that 
we now move. 
 
(4) Cassirer and Coleridge: aesthetic self-expression as objective honesty  
 
Through an analysis of what constitutes ethically honest art, we can arrive at grounds for 
discerning the difference between genuine expressivity in art and merely self-centred expressive 
self-indulgence. By pursuing this course in what follows, we should be able to gain insight into 
the possibility of a genuinely ethical form of romantic artistic expression, capable of intimating 
a revelation transcending the limits of conceptuality. It is as displaying just such a form of 
aesthetic openness that I am going to argue for Coleridge’s aesthetic insight and poetic 
orientation. Such an ethico-aesthetic form of romantic poetics and poetic expression would also 
accord with Kierkegaard’s existential concerns, thus opening up a framework of understanding 
in which justice could be done, in compatible ethico-aesthetic terms, to Kierkegaard’s own need 
to communicate his religious message through an artistic indirection of language, which, 
problematically, he can find no place for in his own account of the role of imagination in the 
religious life. Such was the goal we set ourselves in chapter one. These ends will be arrived at 
through a highly relevant detour: the insight of Ernst Cassirer into romantically expressive 
aesthetics. 
 
                                                                        
734 Coleridge, The Statesman’s Manual, appendix C, p. 69-70. 
735 Coleridge, The Statesman’s Manual, appendix C, p. 69-70. 
736 Barth, The Symbolic Imagination, p. 45. 
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Cassirer suggests that true art can be neither subjective expression nor objective imitation, 
solely: 
It is not enough to lay the stress on the emotional side of the work of art. It is true 
that all characteristic or expressive art is ‘the spontaneous overflow of powerful 
feelings’. But if we were to accept this Wordsworthian definition without reserve, 
we should only be led to a change of sign, not to a decisive change of meaning.
737
 
Here Cassirer is making the point that if expressive art, as typified by lyrical poetry, is only 
concerned with the subjective side of the relationship between work and artist, content and 
form, then in fact the inadequate one-sidedness of a purely objective theory of art as imitation 
has not been overcome. Rather, that which is being objectified and imitated or described 
becomes the content of the artist’s emotion. A psychological imitation is just as one-sided, and 
as much of an objectification, as the imitation of objective nature. As Cassirer puts it: 
In this case art would remain reproductive; but, instead of being a reproduction of 




Furthermore, he adds: 
This is just as true of the specifically expressive arts as of the representative arts. 
Even in lyrical poetry emotion is not the only and decisive feature. It is of course 
true that the great lyrical poets are capable of the deepest emotions and that an 
artist who is not endowed with powerful feelings will never produce anything 
except shallow and frivolous art. But from this fact we cannot conclude that the 
function of lyrical poetry and of the arts in general can be adequately described as 
the artist’s ability ‘to make a clean breast of his feelings’.739 
Crucial elements of genuinely expressive art are therefore bound up with formative 
interpretation, which will involve an emotional response as intrinsic to the interpretive and 
formative work, but which is not itself to be turned into an object of description. In focusing 
solely on subjective emotion, the artist or poet fails to express honestly the relationship in which 
he stands to his subject matter, and falls into mere sentimentality, which, in essence, is the 
potentially  unethical enjoyment of one’s own feelings for their own sake.740 Good art 
...is not simply [emotional] expression; it is also representation and interpretation. 
Not even a lyric poem is wholly devoid of this general tendency of art. The lyric 
poet is not just a man who indulges in displays of feeling. To be swayed by 
emotion alone is sentimentality, not art. An artist who is absorbed not in the 
                                                                        
737 E. Cassirer, An Essay on Man, (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 141. 
738 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 141. 
739 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 142. 
740 See Roger Scruton, Modern Culture, (London: Continuum, 1998), pp. 55-67. 
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contemplation and creation of forms but rather in his own pleasure or in his 
enjoyment of ‘the joy of grief’ becomes a sentimentalist.741 
 
Cassirer suggests that far from being mere self-indulgence, truly expressive art is concerned 
with what Jacques Maritain has described as ‘the good of the artwork’:742 
Art is indeed expressive, but it cannot be expressive without being formative. And 
this formative process is carried out in a certain sensuous medium.
743
 
Therefore, in truly expressing the relationship in which he stands to his subject-matter, the artist 
must combine both subjective and objective poles of experience in an imaginative balance, not 
allowing one to override the other. The focus thus expressed is the work of subjectively 
expressive art. Not the paint and canvas, or isolable words on paper (themselves part of the 
objective pole of the artistic or poetic relationship), but rather the interpretive whole, as subject 
and objective focus interact imaginatively, emerges as the imaginative unity that is an artwork. 
It should be noted here that an artwork is not a sublation or dissolving of subjective and 
objective aspects in a ‘higher third’, but an imaginatively sustained interaction of those aspects. 
It is not itself the sensuous medium (e.g. the paint and canvas), but exists in the imaginative 
relationship between artist and subject-matter, to be brought to life again in the aesthetic 
relationship of imaginative openness between viewer and sensory medium (e.g. painting on the 
gallery wall). In production and appreciation, therefore, the artwork is not reducible to either 
subjective or objective factors, but is sustained in the interaction of subjectivity and its object 
that is enabled through and as imaginative openness. The artwork in both cases is the fertile 
relation between the two poles of experience.  
 
It is to just such a conception of the artwork that Kant points in his analysis of the aesthetic 
judgement or judgement of taste.
744
 Such a judgement will not be objective (determining 
something about an object), but neither will it be merely subjective (saying something with no 
inter-subjective authority, but merely personal opinion). The Kantian judgement of taste is 
subjectively rational, and is thus accorded a conditional universality, such that whoever is led to 
experience the artwork under the appropriate interpretive conditions can be expected to come to 
the same judgement for himself. The value of the artwork, like the artwork itself, is thus an 
                                                                        
741 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 142. Sentimentality is looked at as an ethical danger in appendix 1. In what follows I will be using 
the term ‘pseudo-romanticism’, as introduced in chapter one, and as coined by Charles Williams in The Figure of Beatrice, 
(Berkeley: Apocryphile Press, 2005), to mark the essential contrast between a metaphysically intimative aesthetic creativity and 
emotional self-indulgence. This distinction is analysed in considerable depth in appendix 1. It will be recalled that the term has been 
applied in the same sense in the course of this thesis, with relation to the aesthetic position of the early Friedrich Schlegel, who, in 
my interpretation was shown to drew the criticism of both Hegel and Kierkegaard for the unethical implications of his romantic 
irony. 
742 See, for example: ‘...Art operates for the good of the work done, ad bonum operis, and everything which diverts it from that end 
adulterates and diminishes it’,  J. Maritain, ‘Art and Scholasticism’, in Art and Scholasticism with Other Essays, J. F. Scanlan (tr.), 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1930), p. 12. 
743 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 141. 
744 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 141. 
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interplay of subjective and objective factors, and exists only within such a relationship of 
subject to object, whilst being reducible to neither. 
 
Summing up, then, the work is not the picture as an empirical object, or the words per se, 
independently of their organisation, in which the poet delivers his insights; rather, just as it is 
the relation between artist and ‘object’ that comes to imaginative fruition in the artwork, so the 
appreciation of that artwork is also a relational occurrence, not a thing: it is, or rather it emerges 
as a process, an imaginatively interpretive interaction between reader (or listener, or beholder) 
and what is read, heard or seen.  
 
Cassirer contrasts Croce’s purely subjective understanding of artistic significance with his own 
conception of the artwork as a maintenance of imaginative tension between subject and object, 
(whether the artist and his subject matter, or the ‘audience’ and the empirical medium through 
which the artwork, as a dynamic relational imaginative event can be accessed): 
In [Croce’s] theory the whole spiritual energy is contained and expended in the 
formation of the intuition alone. When this process is completed the artistic 
creation has been achieved. What follows is only an external reproduction which is 




So the artwork is reduced by Croce to the subjective pole of experience, and the objective 
element is discounted by him in its essential role of cooperation in ‘co-forming’ the aesthetic, 
inter-relational expression which is the work of art as an intangible yet real, imaginative event. 
Moreover, in Cassirer’s reckoning Croce has also mistaken the identity of the objective aspect 
he discounts, by confusing an objective aspect of aesthetic experience with an empirical object, 
with the physical picture, for example, or the words (simply regarded as general terms), through 
which the painter’s or poets aesthetic insight is recorded for potential, and relational, 
imaginative mediation to a viewer/reader/listener. Cassirer writes on the objective element in art 
thus: 
Like all the other symbolic forms art is not the mere reproduction of a ready-made, 
given reality. It is one of the ways leading to an objective view of things and of 
human life. It is not an imitation, but a discovery of reality. We do not, however, 
discover nature through art in the same sense in which the scientist uses the term 
‘nature’.746 
The difference between an empirical and an aesthetic approach to reality, according to Cassirer, 
follows, I would suggest, the distinction between the reality of conceptually irreducible 
                                                                        
745 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 141. 
746 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 143. 
209 
 
qualitative significance and determinable or quantitative aspects of reality, as I have sought to 
draw this distinction in previous chapters, and especially with regard to the essentially 
qualitative nature of time, as distinct from its calculable, or quantitative, translation. ‘...[B]eauty 
as well as truth’, writes Cassirer, 
may be described in terms of the same classical formula: they are a ‘unity in the 
manifold’. But in the two cases there is a difference of stress. Language and 
science are abbreviations of reality; art is an intensification of reality. Language 
and science depend on one and the same process of abstraction; art may be 
described as a continuous process of concretion.
747
  
Cassirer thus distinguishes between modes of unification that pertain to qualitative and 
quantitative, or aesthetic and determinate approaches to nature, respectively.  
 
This recalls to mind the distinction I have been making in this and the last chapter between 
Coleridge’s drive towards systematic conceptual completion as a metaphysician, and the uneasy 
relation that arises between this and his other, equally powerful, aesthetic insight into the 
conceptually irreducible or ‘esemplastic’ unity of a work of art, as achieved through the 
symbolically formative, but causally incalculable, activity of the imagination. Cassirer 
continues: 
In our scientific description of a given object we begin with a great number of 
observations which at first sight are only a loose conglomeration of detached facts. 
But the farther we proceed the more these individual phenomena become a 
systematic whole. What science is searching for is some central features of a given 
object from which all its particular qualities may be derived... But art does not 
admit of this sort of conceptual simplification and deductive generalisation.
748
 
Rather than searching out the causes of things, 
[Art] gives us the intuition of the form of things. But this is by no mere repetition 
of something we had before. It is a true and genuine discovery.
749
 
This discovery is essentially relational: 
For the artist does not portray or copy a certain empirical object – a landscape with 
its hills and mountains, its brooks and rivers. What he gives us is the individual and 
momentary physiognomy of the landscape.
750
 
This is to say, that the artist seeks the imaginative unification of the particular quality of an 
event of encounter within which he is related to his environment. The particular formative 
aspects thus evoked in imaginative relation to nature ‘are brought into the open and take on a 
                                                                        
747 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 143. 
748 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 143. 
749 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 143. 
750 Cassirer, An Essay on Man, p. 144. 
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definite shape’. Cassirer suggests that ‘the revelation of this inexhaustibility of the aspects of 
things is one of the great privileges and one of the deepest charms of art’.751 
 
As has become clear, Cassirer points out the distinction between an aesthetic and an empirical 
object in the Kantian terms with which we have become familiar; in terms, that is, of 
conceptually indeterminate, imaginative construal, as opposed to the conceptual determination 
of phenomena in terms of abstracted general features.  
 
Compared to such a generalised empirical skeleton, reality as it is beheld aesthetically is 
interpretively open-ended: an indefinite richness of experience emerges through the encounter 
of subject and object, which is thus a process of construal to which no possible upper limit can 
be set, and which is therefore potentially infinite in insightful possibility. Such, as we have seen, 
is Kant’s, and Coleridge’s characterisation of the conceptual irreducibility of an aesthetic idea. 
As an emerging event of encounter between subjective and objective poles of experience, 
aesthetic reality is reducible neither to subjective nor objective terms of definite description.  
 
In line with the argument I have been building throughout this thesis, I suggest that such an 
aesthetic event is an unfolding of metaphysical significance reducible neither to subjective nor 
objective terms exclusively, but an imaginatively mediated participation in the originating 
source of both subjectivity and objectivity. As an ongoing process, such aesthetic metaphysical 
insight is always intimative, and never final; which is to say that such insight cannot be 
encapsulated in determinate conceptual form, as the traditional teleological understanding in 
terms of final causality would suggest. Rather, as I have been arguing, such metaphysical 
intimation must be understood in terms of Kant’s regulative ‘aesthetic judgement’, as distinct 
from his conception of regulative judgement in terms of teleology. Coleridge built on this 
Kantian basis in arriving at his conception of the transcendent idea, that it ‘comes forth’ through 
‘the moulds of the understanding’ (empirical and transcendental concepts) ‘in the disguise of 
two contradictory conceptions’, but is in itself determinately ‘inconceivable and inexpressible’. 
An idea can thus only be intimated or suggested through linguistic or poetic indirection. 
 
As has been argued with reference to Coleridgean metaphysics, a teleological approach to 
creative origination in terms of final causality, whether in its ‘dogmatic’ or ‘critical’ post-
Kantian forms, is blind to the dynamic nature of temporality, regarding time as intrinsically 
calculable, in terms of results that can be adequately predicted or determined in advance. I have 
been suggesting that divine creativity cannot be reducible to human instrumentality in this way. 
As has been established through attention to the work of Kant, Coleridge and Bergson, any 
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conception of the divine that so seeks to ‘have God in its pocket’ could only be idolatrous, as 
reducing the Creator to the level of the creature, or rather, and more accurately, by substituting a 
finite conceptual creature of the mind for a truly originating and transcendent, personal Creator.  
 
In light of Cassirer, and in relation to Coleridge’s own writings, I will be building in the rest of 
this chapter on the following conclusions. For Coleridge the poet and aesthetician, the aesthetic 
event of a work of art, as mediated through imaginative symbols, is a conceptually indirect 
communication of metaphysical significance, and as such, emerges through an imaginatively 
productive interaction of subject and object. Such significance is not reducible to either of these 
two poles of experience, as coming to light by an activity of receptive participation in the 
imagination, as the formative power that constitutes both subjectivity and objectivity while 
transcending both. The aesthetic insight is thus a bringing to light through the imagination of the 
transcendent creative process in which we participate as creatures. Any possible communication 
of metaphysical insight will thus be non-objective, or aesthetically irreducible to conceptual 
definition.  Therefore any insight into this trans-empirical creative process will be always in the 
aesthetic form of indeterminable, anticipatory glimpses into ontologically formative, or creative, 
processes, irreducible to Kantian schematised temporality, or to the intrinsically predictable, and 
causally linear teleology that Kant derived from this generalised basis. This conclusion will 
dominate my approach to Coleridgean intimations of transcendence through poetry and 
aesthetic insight as this chapter progresses. 
 
(5) Coleridge and Pond-Life: how Coleridge envisages the productivity of imagination in 
action 
 
The crucial point brought to light by Cassirer, above, is the central role, in artistic production 
and appreciation, of a sustained balancing of subjective and objective aspects in the creation of 
a work of art: the productive, imaginatively mediated unity-in-tension of opposing poles of 
aesthetic experience which has been the focus of analysis in the last section. I now move my 
focus back onto Coleridge, to show how his theory of the nature of true poetry is inextricable 
from his own, more developed, account of just how such a sustained balancing of subjective and 
objective aesthetic elements as Cassirer points towards must be at work in the creative activity 
of any genuine poet. 
 
For Coleridge, a true poem combines: 
A more than ordinary sympathy with the object, emotions, or incidents 
contemplated by the poet, consequent on a more than common sensibility, with a 
more than ordinary activity of the mind in respect of the imagination. Hence is 
212 
 
produced a more vivid reflection of the truths of nature and the human heart, united 
with a constant activity [i.e. a unifying activity of imagination] modifying and 
correcting these truths by that sort of pleasurable emotion, which the exertion of all  
our faculties gives in a certain degree; but which can only be felt in perfection 
under the full play of those powers of mind, which are spontaneous rather than 




Here Coleridge is analysing the relation pertaining between subjectivity and objectivity in the 
course of aesthetic production. The conceptual faculty interacts with external nature through a 
highly stimulated sensibility under the unifying influence of imagination, imaginative activity 
both exciting and directing the understanding and the sensibility and responding to their various 
inputs. Imagination is thus the condition for, and medium of, a fruitful communion of subjective 
and objective elements of experience interacting in ‘full play’ (a metaphor related to 
imaginative activity derived from Kant’s account of aesthetic experience in terms of the ‘free 
play’ of imagination and conceptuality, as seen in chapter three).753 Coleridge is describing an 
imaginative process of incremental and mutual stimulation of opposites poles of experience 
(subjective and objective), which following in the wake of Kant’s account of the transcendental 
imagination, is regarded as essentially organic, rather than mechanical, in structure.  
 
The role of the productive imagination, for Coleridge as for Kant, is seen in terms of the 
unification and mediation of opposing poles, each contributing to the production of a whole 
which is reducible to neither. Importantly, in relation to my argument dissociating Coleridgean 
aesthetic insights from his systematic metaphysical programme, the imagination’s unifying 
productivity is regarded by Coleridge as a living tension of opposites in continuous interaction, 
not as a quasi-‘Hegelian’ sublation of opposites, that is, not a resolution in which the 
particularity of each is dissolved in a greater third (thesis/antithesis/synthesis). Rather, 
Coleridge’s position requires the continued particularity of character of each pole of experience 
for the production of a qualitatively distinct order of insight, reducible to neither subjective nor 
objective terms, while partaking of, but distinct from both. 
  
In a fascinatingly original image to be found in chapter seven of his Biographia Literaria,
754
 
Coleridge provides an instructive emblem of the imagination. 
Most of my readers will have observed a small water-insect on the surface of 
rivulets, which throws a cinque-spotted shadow fringed with prismatic colours on 
                                                                        
752 Coleridge, Lecture 3, ‘Lectures on Shakespeare and Milton in Illustration of the Principles of Poetry, 1811-12’, in Lectures on 
Literature, 1809-1819 part 1, pp. 217-18. 
753 Coleridge, Lecture 3, ‘Lectures on Shakespeare and Milton in Illustration of the Principles of Poetry, 1811-12’, in Lectures on 
Literature, 1809-1819 part 1, pp. 217-18 
754 S. T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, pp. 124-5. 
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the sunny bottom of the brook, and will have noticed how the little animal wins its 
way up against the stream, by alternate pulses of active and passive motion, now 
resisting the current, and now yielding to it in order to gather strength and a 
momentary fulcrum for a further propulsion. This is no unapt emblem of the 
mind’s self-experience in the act of thinking.755 
In Ferreira’s analysis of this passage, three elements are discerned.756 Two of these seem 
accounted for by Coleridge: a voluntary movement and a passive utilisation of the backward 
motion of the current which provides a launching-off point for a further propulsion: ‘reculer 
pour le mieux sauter’. But what of any third element in the overall movement that is to 
symbolise the operation of the mind? We shall find out through what follows. 
 
Coleridge in the same passage uses another example of the same tri-form process at work, in 
terms of what happens when we remember a name. Elsewhere, in a notebook entry, he describes 
that activity of recollection in terms of three components, and in the course of distinguishing 
‘mind’ from ‘consciousness’ he suggests 
there is a mystery in the sudden by-act-of-will-unaided, nay more than that, 
frustrated recollection of a name. I began with the Letters of the Alphabet – ABC 
&c. – and I know not why, felt convinced it began with H.757 
Having ‘run through all the vowels in combination with an initial ‘H’, and then in permutation 
with changes of consonants, Coleridge ‘had completely given up’. Suddenly –  
The name, Daniel, at once started up, perfectly insulated, without any the dimmest 





 (and echoing Schelling), the only conclusion Coleridge can draw to account 
for this, as a success that was paradoxically both sought for and entirely unintended and 
unexpected, is that mental activity cannot be limited to consciously directed acts alone, but must 
involve unconscious processes. We have seen in a recent quotation that Coleridge characterises 
such un-purposed, purposive activity as ‘by-act-of-will-unaided’, and he suggests, in reflecting 
on the mystery of recollection, that ‘Consciousness’ is merely ‘the narrow neck of the bottle’ of 
mind’.760 All his conscious willing to remember, he suggests, served no other purpose than to 
stifle the desired recollection. In retrospect, Coleridge sees his striving after the name as:  
uneasy motions...the craving to recollect it – but the very craving led the mind to a 
reach [in which] each successive disappointment (= a tiny pain) tended to contract 
                                                                        
755 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, pp. 124-5. 
756 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, pp. 98-99. 
757 S. T. Coleridge, ‘Mind Distinguished from Consciousness’, in Kathleen Coburn (ed.) Inquiring Spirit: a new presentation of 
Coleridge from his published and unpublished prose writings, (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1951), pp. 30-1. 
758 Coleridge, in Coburn, Inquiring Spirit, pp. 30-1. 
759 As we saw earlier, Coleridge’s thinking is here congruent with Schelling’s construal of unconscious intelligence at work in the 
natural world, in the wake of Kant’s characterisation of aesthetic activity as ‘purposiveness without purpose’. 
760 Coleridge, in Coburn, Inquiring Spirit, pp. 30-1. 
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the orifice or outlet into consciousness. Well – it is given up – and all is quiet – the 
Nerves are asleep, or off their guard – and then the Name pops up, makes its way, 
and there it is! – not assisted by any association, but the very contrary – by the 
suspension and sedation of all associations
761
. 
As in the case of Ferreira’s analysis of the movement of the water-insect, three elements in the 
phenomenon of remembering are discernible here, and can guide us in discovering the third 
element in the movement of the little insect, that Ferreira also discerns.  
 
Firstly, we have the fraught and purposive activity in which Coleridge sets his consciousness to 
work. Secondly, we have the postulation of an unconscious activity of mind, that as 
unconscious is unintended, as far as the will is concerned, but which, as purposive, or as tending 
towards the desired recollection, cannot be regarded as wholly undirected by intelligence. 
Thirdly, we have the name ‘popping up’ by pleasant surprise, catching him unawares, thus 
definitely unintentionally. The first element we could label as active, and as corresponding to 
the ‘leap’ of the water insect. The third element seems to correspond with the passivity in which 
the water-insect goes with the flow. The second element, however, is ambiguous, a purposive 
activity that is not purposed by the conscious will, and which might be described, therefore, as 
an active-passivity, or intelligence working without the conscious direction of the ego.  
 
On Ferreira’s reading of the ‘water-insect’ passage, just such an active-passivity is discernible, 
acting in the same way as the third element alongside activity and passivity in the analysis of 
remembering just given. A corresponding and paradoxical active-passivity is to be found in the 
insect’s letting or allowing itself to succumb to the influence of the stream’s current.762 
 
In a similar image of Coleridge’s, when a man leaps, gravity is at first resisted, and then utilised 
in landing at a further position.
763
 The active-passivity of letting go here, as an intentional 
suspension of active resistance, completes the action of the leap. This sought-for third element, 
in all three of the Coleridgean images just discussed, corresponds to the nature of imagination 
that we have been discerning over the course of previous chapters. Remembering Ferreira’s 
account of the role of imagination in Kierkegaard’s writing, we now find the same features in 
Coleridge’s conception of imagination as itself neither active nor passive, purely, but rather, in 
its ‘suspension and sedation’ of conscious willing, forming a productive medium that 
orchestrates the interaction of voluntary and mechanical aspects of thinking and perceiving.
764
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762 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, pp. 98-99. 
763 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, pp. 124-5. 
764 Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 99. 
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The Coleridgean ‘leap’ of imaginative insight is thus structured similarly to the Kierkegaardian 
‘leap’ of faith, as discussed in chapter one in terms of imaginative gestalt shifts. 
 
According to Coleridge, the productive imagination thus works through a combining of opposite 
poles of experience, (subjective and objective, active and passive) that recalls the maintenance 
of an organism through the diastolic and systolic activity of a heart, each required by and 
intrinsically related to the other. As Coleridge puts it, the activity of imagination is ‘voluntary in 
part’765 and yet ‘by-act-of-will-unaided’.766 Similarly, at an earlier stage of this thesis, we 
discovered Kant’s artist of genius purposefully at work, and yet supremely receptive, ‘as if’ 
inspired by the creativity unconsciously active in nature.
767
 Coleridge’s thinking on the subject 
of unconscious mentation also recalls Schelling’s conception of nature as unconsciously 
intelligent in its productive aspect or natura naturans,
768
 as discussed in chapter three. So the 
Coleridgean creative imagination
769
 – like the insect’s allowing itself to stop resisting the 
current as part of its strategy of moving against it – mediates the active and passive poles of the 
mind, while being reducible to neither. Discussing the empirical and mechanical faculty of 
association, Coleridge comments: ‘Fancy on the other hand has no counters to play with but 
fixities and definites. The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated from 
the order of time and space [...]’.770 
 
In artistic creativity, therefore, this same productive imagination which is the transcendental 
condition of all self-conscious awareness, functions as the activity-in-passivity, or purposive 
receptivity to the artist’s subject-matter, which, as I shall argue in the next section, provides 
Coleridge with a key to the artwork’s potential to intimate transcendence to an ‘audience’ that 
must be equally attentive and receptive in its aesthetic appreciation. I have argued in this section 
and the last that an ethical element connecting the will and the imagination is essential to the 
difference between sentimentality and Coleridgean romantically expressive art.  
 
We learned from Cassirer and Coleridge that all serious art is formative/interpretive as well as 
expressive, that the subjective pole of expression should not be allowed to eclipse the object of 
aesthetic regard – that which is to be expressed. This aesthetic tenet distinguishes Coleridge’s 
romanticism from that of Friedrich Schlegel, as implicitly criticised by Kierkegaard in 
Either/Or, as we discovered in chapter one. Kierkegaard saw the ethically relativist – indeed, 
nihilistic – implications of the kind of unbridled subjective expression of which Schlegel’s 
                                                                        
765 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria part 1, pp. 124-5. 
766 Coleridge, in Coburn, Inquiring Spirit, p.30. 
767 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 46 
768 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, for example, pp. xxix-xxx, pp. 49-50, 75, 215-228. 
769 In the sense distinguished in section 2 of this chapter, as covering both aesthetic and wider epistemological roles. 
770 Coleridge Biographia Literaria part 1, p. 304-6. 
216 
 
romantic irony is paradigmatic. Tested against such a paradigm, in light of Kierkegaard’s 
criticism, Coleridgean symbols have now been shown to retain their integrity, emerging from 





We have now seen how Coleridge’s ethical approach to aesthetics accords with Cassirer’s 
critical insights. For Coleridge, that which is expressed as an aesthetic representation or 
interpretation – remembering this is the artist’s work, as distinct from the object to which the 
work is an aesthetic response – must be the focus of subjective expression. I have argued that 
such should be the criterion of any genuine (as opposed to sentimental and ultimately nihilistic) 
aesthetic. Kierkegaard’s animosity to all purely artistic aesthetics is thus shown to be justifiable 




We have learned, then, that one should not wallow in one’s own emotional enjoyment of what is 
imaged, but that attention should be fixed on the intrinsic compositional demands of the artwork 
itself, that which Maritain similarly characterised as the ‘good of the artwork’773 (building a 
Christian aesthetic in the light of Thomas Aquinas’ Aristotelianism).  Paradoxically, building on 
the last two sections, I shall next be arguing that in an ethically genuine romantic-expressive art, 
as opposed to sentimental and purely subjective accounts of romanticism, what is figured or 
present to the artist or poet may often yield its deepest significance in terms of the 
transcendence whose absence it intimates. 
 
 
(6) An ethical aesthetic of transcendence: a dialectic of imaginative presence in empirical 
absence 
 
I suggest in what follows that Coleridge’s theory of symbolism is formulated in line with what I 
shall label a dialectic of aesthetic presence in empirical absence. I argue that, in Coleridge’s 
view, a finite symbol is able to mediate infinite, divine creativity, as itself participating in that 
transcendence through the ethical nature of the imaginative, aesthetic activity which gave birth 
to it. I hope in this way to analyse the nature of Coleridgean aesthetic symbolism in terms other 
than the platonic doctrine of ontological participation often implied in his own accounts.  
 
                                                                        
771 In Charles Williams’ The Figure of Beatrice, (see appendix one), an exegesis of Dante’s Comedia Divina, the poetic symbol of 
Beatrice can lead Dante to God on account of his genuine loving attentiveness towards her. Beatrice matters to Dante precisely for 
and as herself, in her indelible uniqueness. Beatrice retains her integrity as the focus of Dante’s pilgrim vision, and only by his 
lovingly attending to her can Beatrice become a luminous figure pointing Dante towards divinity and, correlatively, to his own true, 
redeemed selfhood. I suggest that Coleridge’s symbols similarly retain their otherness in the aesthetic relation of subject and object. 
772 See chapter 1 section 2. 
773 Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 6. 
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The symbol mediates transcendence, for Coleridge, as pars pro toto: through the participation of 
the finite phenomenon in a metaphysical form or idea. But this does not mean that the artist or 
his audience can regard the symbol as a mere instrument, as a convenience. Rather, in line with 
the insights of Coleridge and Cassirer as discussed in the last sections, the symbol’s ability to 
mediate transcendence demands an imaginative attitude of will: an attitude of attentive 
receptivity,
774
 or in other words, an ethically specific stance of openness; a hospitable 
receptivity of the subject in relation to the object, whether that subject be the poet seeking 
symbolic insight through his subject matter, or the reader who would try to participate in the 
insight thus gained by the poet.  
 
My argument in this section is that an ethical and imaginative ‘condition of possibility’ (as it 
were) is intrinsic to such aesthetic, symbolising activity and that it is only through attention to 
the present object that an intimation both of its own and its attentive perceiver’s transcendent 
origins and ‘goal’, may supervene. Such a dawning of trans-empirical awareness would thus be 
dependent upon, yet irreducible to this imaginatively mediated interaction between an aesthetic 
focus or ‘object’ of subjective regard and an ethically disinterested personal act imaginative 
attention. 
 
Thus I begin to set forth, in this and the next section, a process of argument through which I 
shall arrive at the stated aim of my thesis: the discovery of an aesthetic of transcendent 
intimation that meets Kierkegaard’s paradoxical theological criteria. In doing so, I will be 
building on the Kantian framework laid out in chapters three and four, as this is the context to 
which Coleridge’s thinking responds. As such, I submit that this is also a theoretical context (as 
duly criticised in terms of Bergsonian temporality) which can offer the possibility of a genuine 
reconciliation of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic practice with his own theological aims. 
 
As seen in the last chapter, Coleridge writes in response to the Kantian ban on direct theoretical 
access to transcendence via the conceptuality of the understanding, and whole-heartedly 
embraces Kant’s insight into the subject’s active but transcendental role in the construction of 
self-conscious awareness. Kant writes to counter Hume much as Coleridge is at odds with the 
prevalence of the whole British empiricist tradition, as virtually universally accepted in the 
English intellectual environment in which he dwelt. So, Coleridge is pursuing his own aims 
through Kantian terminology, in reaction to and in terms of Kantian conceptuality.  
                                                                        
774 In this regard, I would cite William James on his perception of the relation between will and decision, on asking the rhetorical 
question ‘in what does a moral act consist’ James declares ‘you can make only one reply. You can say that it consists in the effort of 
attention by which we hold fast to an idea [James’s italics] which but for effort of attention would be driven out of the mind by the 
other psychological tendencies that are there’, and further on, he writes: ‘Our acts of voluntary attention, brief and fitful as they are, 
are nevertheless momentous and critical, determining us, as they do, to higher or lower destinies’. William James, Talks to Teachers 




Kantianism (and developments from it) is also the broad framework or environment through 
which Kierkegaard met and responded to romantic and Hegelian thought. Thus I am aiming to 
re-interpret the relationship between romanticism and existentialism through two key 
representatives of these movements, respectively, using Kantianism as a conceptual frame of 
reference that is common to both as a means to mediate a rapprochement between them. 
Kierkegaard’s position as I understand it has been laid out in chapter one, to which the argument 
now presented is a response. It is important above all to recognise, in relation to what follows, 
that Ferreira’s interpretation of the Kierkegaardian response to faith, as analysed in the second 
chapter, has equipped us with a  model argument for the rational, or non-fideistic nature of a 
subjective faith-commitment, as imaginative activity, while in tension with the understanding, 
does not abolish or ride rough-shod over its logical authority. Rather the imagination is shown 
to follow a discernible pattern of activity, an intelligibility of its own, which we have seen in 
subsequent discussions to be organic in nature. On this basis, I argue that an imaginatively 
driven, or aesthetic perception which intimates transcendence through a Coleridgean 





Once again, (as I would like to be as clear as possible at this important juncture), I am 
suggesting that focal attentiveness to an object of aesthetic regard, in the imaginatively 
mediated interaction of objective properties with subjective faculties –  (following Kant’s 
aesthetic) through suggestive or indeterminate conceptuality –  enables the indefinite, supra-
phenomenal ‘more’ of the object to be communicated, (or, in terms of Coleridge’s Christian 
faith, its createdness), since such imaginatively mediated interpretation is intrinsically open-
ended, as conceptually indeterminable. As imaginative, and so resistant to finite determination, 
participative interaction of the subject in the aesthetic manifestation of the object tends to the 
infinite, so that the object reveals indefinitely more to the aesthetic gaze than its merely 
empirical presence.  
 
In the aesthetic relation thus established, therefore, imaginative and thus intrinsically open-
ended interpretation of the object, as that which is phenomenally present – as an appearance, 
therefore – allows aesthetic but indeterminate insight into that phenomenon’s supra-phenomenal 
basis, or in the terms of Christian faith through which a Coleridge would approach that 
phenomenon, its creative origins, on the basis of faithful attentiveness. What becomes available 
to imaginative vision, therefore, is aesthetic insight into the object as a creature. Indeed, through 
                                                                        
775 In Alvin Plantinga’s epistemological terms (although with no relation to his argumentation) I am suggesting that an aesthetically 
symbolic intimation of transcendence through sublimity can be ‘properly basic’. See Alvin Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’, 
in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (ed.), Faith and Rationality, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
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the mutual and imaginative interaction of the subject with the object, it emerges that both object 
and subject are united in a shared origination, that both are creatures. 
 
As has been shown, a rational account of imaginative activity is offered by Kant, and developed 
by Coleridge. Also we have seen with Ferreira, in chapter two, how imagination never loses 
touch with rationality in Kierkegaardian faith’s ‘surrender of the understanding’, while at the 
same time playing a unique but intelligible role of its own in relation to a rationally inscrutable 
‘object’ of revelation. I suggest on this basis that an interpretation such as I have just outlined 
does not represent mere relativism or fideism. In Kant’s terminology, we could describe such an 
intimation of transcendence through the phenomenal as subjectively rational: given the 
appropriate frame of interpretive reference, anyone could be expected to share in such an 
aesthetic encounter. However, the association of phenomenal transcendence with createdness 
would be dependent on a prior Christian faith. Thus, as we learned from Kierkegaard and 
Ferreira, its recognition would be dependent on a prior commitment to an objectively 
paradoxical revelation, wholly beyond the reach of reason. But Ferreira has shown grounds for 
the rationality of the role of imagination in the faith-relation, from the perspective of 
revelation’s subjective reception. Indeed, an imaginatively interpretive stance to the world 
around one is seen by Ferreira as a key condition to Kierkegaard’s second immediacy, as one 
perceives the ordinary world from the perspective of faith, and thus in its aspect of createdness.  
 
In the Coleridgean aesthetic relation, imaginative symbols intimate a transcendence that cannot 
be grasped in either the subjective or objective terms per se whose dynamic interaction, in 
which each pole of consciousness retains its integrity, is nevertheless a process leading to the 
symbolic insight. Through such sustained imaginative activity, a view of the world is made 
available that would suggest, aesthetically, that this world is not the value-free or neutral and 
atomistic order that an empiricist positivism would suggest. Under a certain ethical condition of 
focussed and faithful subjective attentiveness to the present object – an ethical as aesthetic 
condition – that same object is revealed as created, as indirectly intimating its transcendent 
origins through its infinite aesthetic interpretability.  Under the ethico-aesthetic conditions in 
which the present object appears in this aspect, the world ceases to seem a value-neutral order, 
but appears a living creature.  
 
The object cannot reveal this aspect unilaterally, as the holy, the creative, is accessible only to a 
certain, ethically and imaginatively receptive mode of subjective approach. Both subject and 
object, as the aesthetic interpretation would reveal, are creatures, and thus share a common 
source, a common ‘life’, while each has its own, particular value and inherent organisation, (as 
we have seen Coleridge affirm earlier in this chapter). Each is thus also an integrity, a unity in 
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its own right. It is only through their aesthetic relationship that this deepening of the subject’s 
perception of himself and his objective environment is possible. Each pole, subjective and 




Next we must investigate the precise nature of this symbolism as envisaged by Coleridge, in 
order to locate it philosophically. It will be found to pertain to a central aesthetic concept for 
Coleridge: the sublime. In addressing the specifically ethical nature of aesthetic sublimity as 
Coleridge understands it, we will arrive at a deeper appreciation of the theological importance 
of the Coleridgean symbol. It was suggested in chapter six that the symbol-making function of 
imagination is responsible for the aesthetic perception of the ideal, as Coleridge understands it, 
and to this, Raymonda Modiano would add that the perception of ontologically creative, divine 




Modiano writes on Coleridge’s symbols in relation to the topic of the sublime in the context of 
Coleridge’s aesthetics. Importantly, Modiano equates sublimity, as Coleridge understands it, 
with his theory of symbolism, which we have been addressing in this chapter in relation to our 
concern with a concept of ethico-aesthetic experience.
778
 Thus, by focusing on Modiano in this 
regard at this point, we will learn that Coleridge’s understanding of the nature of imaginative 
symbolism is drawn from the kind of ethico-aesthetic experience that has been under discussion 
in this chapter, and which Coleridge himself deemed sublime. An important step will thus be 
gained, since we will be able to see that the kind of ethico-aesthetic experience capable of 
intimating transcendence, which has been under discussion, can be aesthetically evaluated and 
conceptualised in terms of the sublime. Moreover, it will be discovered that Coleridge’s 
experience-based conception of sublimity, as thus an intrinsically ethical aesthetic concept, is 
importantly non-Kantian, and represents an authentic and distinctively Coleridgean 




Unlike Coleridge, Kant bases his concept of sublimity on the failure of imagination in 
downright and violent confrontation with appearances in nature and art threatening to 
                                                                        
776 Recalling Colin Gunton’s view of the nature of the relationship within the Trinity, and that of the world to the trinity, one might 
say that each phenomenal individual or unity, as described in this paragraph, is a unity in dependence, each receiving its own, 
genuine identity through its relationship to otherness, or perichoretically. This expression signifies that being is communicated 
mutually, that individuals genuinely exist, but only through and by their relation to others. For Gunton, The life of the Trinity is 
itself perichoretic and the same theological concept of mutually responsive individuation through ontological relationship suggests 
the nature of extra-trinitarian creativity: the world exists only through grace, or in and through the love which enables that world by 
granting it, through its human representatives, the freedom to respond in love: the perichoretic love which, as self-giving, is 
paradoxically the source of all true, personal identity, human or divine. Such a model of ontological participation is, I suggest, 
preferable, both theologically and philosophically, to Coleridge’s tendency to express his insight into aesthetic ideas in quasi-
platonic terms, and certainly preferable to his systematic vision of the metaphysical unity of individuals in terms of a panentheistic, 
differentiated identity of Being. See Colin Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp. 152-3, 163-79. 
777 Raymonda Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, (London: Macmillan, 1985). 
778 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 117. 
779 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 114. 
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undermine its empirical, schematising power.
780
 The Coleridgean sublime, on the other hand, is 
in a qualitative or aesthetic unity with his concept of beauty, and not opposed to it (as is the case 
with Kant).
781
 In the manifestation of aesthetic ideas of genius, which was discussed in chapter 
four, Kant identifies a symbolic mode of what he labels imaginative ‘hypotyposis’ with the 




Hypotyposis is the process though which concepts are rendered or construed as representable in 
sensory terms by the imagination. Hypotyposis thus takes two forms: the schematic and 
conceptually determinate, (with which we are familiar from chapter three and subsequently), 
and the symbolic, or conceptually indeterminate mode of imaginative mediation of beautiful 
aesthetic ideas in great works of art, as discussed in chapter four.
783
 However, unlike Coleridge,  
Kant confines the symbolising function of imaginative hypotyposis to judgements of beauty 
exclusively, contrasting this role with the failure of imagination in its non-aesthetic, or 
empirically schematic mode of hypotyposis, in the apprehension of the sublime. The Kantian 
sublime is a failure of imagination’s schematising power when confronted by appearances 
suggestively leading the imagination towards the incalculable. The Kantian sublime is thus that 
which quantitatively transcends imagination’s power of empirical schematism, as essentially a 
mode of uniting sensory materials through comparability in quantitative terms (as we found in 
relation to Kant’s schema of number in chapter three).  
 
A Kantian judgement of sublimity is thus based on an imaginative activity, but as a thought, an 
ethically oriented, but non-aesthetic comparison, born of the self-awareness of the ethical 
subject in his relation to a moral absolute or categorical imperative: the thought that his or her 
status as a moral being infinitely transcends and overcomes the empirically un-processable 
phenomena which lead the imagination towards a rationally inassimilable abyss threatening to 
engulf the finite, phenomenal ego.
784
 As against this collapse of the imagination in the face of 
the quantitatively transcendent and paradoxical, Coleridge offers an aesthetic of sublimity as the 
imagination’s journey into qualitative self-transcendence, whilst remaining in harmonious 
continuity with an appreciation of aesthetic beauty.
785
 It will be seen that the Coleridgean 
sublime is an intimation of transcendence through a progressive and deepening awareness of 
aesthetic beauty, or of the trans-empirical profundity that enables the beautiful, in nature and 
art.
786
 This apprehension of sublimity may be entertained through imaginative symbolism, but 
remains conceptually ungraspable or indeterminable. So, we will see that Coleridge’s doctrine 
                                                                        
780 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 108, 124. 
781 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 114. 
782 Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, pp. 231-2. 
783 Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, pp. 231-2. 
784 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 23, § 27. 
785 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 114. 
786 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 114. 
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of symbolism is born of an imaginative apprehension of an intrinsically unclassifiable quality of 
sublimity, which, as thus conceptually unclassifiable, is therefore of the same order as 
Kierkegaard’s imaginatively-fuelled existential relation to the paradox of the unobjectifiable 
God-man, as discussed in chapter two. 
 
Modiano suggests that Coleridge re-thinks the aesthetic of the sublime in faith-based, non-
Kantian terms. She claims that Coleridge re-assessed the relationship between beauty and 
sublimity, which are totally distinct for Kant, on the basis of faith, and that he came to see the 
two terms as continuous. Coleridge writes: 
We call an object sublime in relation to which the exercise of comparison is 
suspended: while on the contrary that object is most beautiful, which in its highest 
perception sustains while it satisfies the comparing power [...] though a beautiful 
object may excite and be made the symbol of an Idea that is truly [sublime].
787
 
A sublime object could be beautiful in its own right and a beautiful object appear sublime, since 
objects are envisaged by Coleridge primarily in terms of their created status, on the basis of his 
Christian faith.  This implies that the beauty of an object properly pertains to that object, as 
distinct from perhaps that same object under conditions in which it excites the feeling of 
sublimity, remembering that the experience of sublimity involves the object’s relationship to a 
subject through a symbol of transcendence, reducible to neither term. As a judgement related to 
and proceeding from faith, the sublimity of an object is attributed to it by the subject. ‘[T]he 
difference of the Sublime and the Beautiful is a diversity [...] I meet, I find the beautiful – but I 
give, contribute, or rather attribute the Sublime’.788 
 
I would suggest that the difference in one object between the perception of beauty and the 
attribution of holiness resides in the emphasis, or direction of focus, either subjective or 
objective, within the imaginative relation. This in turn suggests that the ‘fusion’ of which 
Coleridge speaks with reference to the subject and the aesthetic object is not to be conceived as 
one of complete identification, or Hegelian sublation, since each term must be sufficiently 
distinct for a shift of emphasis between the two to be possible. An object might be perceived as 
beautiful, but seen through the eyes of faith it might also – in the transforming medium of 
imagination, and in relation to an attentive subject – become a symbol of holiness, and thus 
sublime. One might say that Coleridge re-conceives the sublime in terms of the symbolic 
manifestation of the beauty of holiness.  
 
                                                                        
787 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 118. 




As was suggested above, subject and object may be experienced as sharing in one life and yet 
also as particulars in their own right precisely on this foundation of faith in a Creator. Modiano 
holds that it is on the basis of his faith and, as we have seen from Lipkowitz, it is in relation to 
his interest in the issue of biblical poetics, that Coleridge constructs his symbolic theory. To 
place more clearly before the mind the meaning of a symbol as Coleridge understands it, I will 
quote from his work, The Statesman’s Manual: 
It is among the miseries of the present age that it recognises no medium between 
the literal and the metaphorical. Faith is either to be buried in the dead letter, or its 
name and honours usurped by a counterfeit product of the mechanical 
understanding, which in the blindness of self-complacency confounds symbols 
with allegories. Now an allegory is but
 
a translation of abstract notions into a 
picture-language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the 
senses; the principal being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike 
unsubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot. On the other hand a symbol (ho 
estin aei tautegoricon) [‘which is always tautegorical’, meaning here, that the 
symbol is a finite, aesthetically mediated participation in the infinite creativity of 
an Idea] is characterised by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the 
general in the special, or of the universal in the general; above all by the 
translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal. It partakes of the reality 
which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a 




According to Coleridge’s theory, as we stated it in chapter six, a symbol is mediated through the 
imagination’s activity of uniting subject and object, while maintaining an awareness of the 
distinctness of each. Lipkowitz suggests that this is why Coleridge regards the symbol as 
occupying a position between the literal and the metaphorical or allegorical.
790
 Modiano’s 
nuanced account further suggests that ‘the sublime, like the Coleridgean symbol, is a relational 
term, which, like a discreet ray of light, merely maps out a path of travel, a point of destination, 
not one of arrival’.791 This is important as suggesting the kind of intimation which I am arguing 
to be of the essence of Coleridge’s romantic poetic insight into transcendence. Modiano writes: 
‘for Coleridge, the sublime object appears to be an invitation to an experience of 
transcendence’.792 Conceptual indistinctness, and indeed the visual indistinctness of the object 
are crucial to such an intimation of transcendence. Coleridge noted an awareness of sublimity 
on visiting a cathedral as possessing just these conditions: 
                                                                        
789 Coleridge, The Statesman’s Manual, appendix C, p. 30. 
790 Lipkowitz, ‘Inspiration and the Poetic Imagination’, pp. 618-19. 
791 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 121. 
792 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 116. 
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On entering a cathedral, I am filled with devotion and with awe; I am lost to the 
actualities that surround me, and my whole being expands into the infinite; earth 
and air, nature and art, all swell up into eternity, and the only sensible impression 
left is, ‘that I am nothing’.793 
But as Modiano writes, citing Wlecke, this feeling of nothingness is in fact itself a fulfilment of 
the subject’s true identity: 
The term ‘nothing’ does not ‘deny the existing reality of the “I”, but merely 
indicates that the self ‘now lacks the means to define itself as any precisely limited 
“thing”’.794  
 
This, I would suggest, signifies that as well as the boundaries of the object (in this case, the 
surrounding cathedral) the boundaries of the self have become ill-defined through the sublime 
intimation of a transcendent origin or horizon towards which both subject and object are 
moving, or from which they came, or both. And as Modiano suggests, the intimation of 
transcendence is incremental, gradual.
795
 An intensification of the indistinct awareness, not in 
terms of clarity, but depth, is implied. The dawning awareness of transcendence is therefore 
processive, and never an accomplishment. Coleridge writes that the sublime experience ‘tends 
to expand indefinitely, seeking a unity which it [the mind] feels but cannot perceive, until it is 
lost in a sort of pleasing bewilderment in intuitions of endless power and greatness’.796 This 
awareness of incalculable process suggests that Coleridge’s aesthetic is imbued with a 
‘durational’ understanding of time, as distinct from the spatialised understanding that pervades 
his systematic work. I shall return to this issue of the processive nature of symbolic perception 
soon, but for now I will mark the importance of this dynamic, temporal dimension to the 
Coleridgean aesthetics of transcendence, by attempting to situate it, in a short summary 
paragraph of progress so far, before deepening my line of argument for an aesthetic dialectic of 
the intimated presence of transcendence in its empirical absence in Coleridge’s thought, through 
closer attention to its theological implications, in a new section.  
 
To sum up progress so far at the end of this section, I am suggesting that in Coleridge’s 
aesthetics, the attitude of will manifest in an imaginative tension of active and passive poles 
must hold both subjective and objective poles of expression and expressed in a tensile unity: a 
unity of opposites, but not an identification such as would dissolve the difference between 
subject and object in a higher resolution. Such resolution, the resolution of absolute idealism, 
can achieve no genuinely transcendent insight, as it can only be brought about on the conceptual 
                                                                        
793 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 122. 
794 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 122. 
795 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 119. 
796 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 119. 
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level, by forgetting one’s own historical location as a living and necessarily incomplete human 
being, whose selfhood is not ideally closed in or finished. As Kierkegaard also suggests, such 
merely conceptual sublation is blind to genuine otherness, to genuine transcendence, because it 
confuses ideality, infinite human potentiality in thought, for eternal, divine actuality. 
Coleridge’s thinking relating to his experience of the sublime would suggest just such an 
awareness as Kierkegaard’s of unfinished and living process. Through Coleridge’s symbolically 
mediated intimations of sublimity, he understands his own finitude to be engaged, in union with 
the world around him, on an indefinable journey to a goal which is also a source. But this ‘goal’ 
is such that it does not delimit the journey through time, but deepens into an awareness of 
infinity into which even one’s own particularity becomes blurred. Yet such blurring is in effect 
not a negating of the self, but a dawning recognition of its infinite relational significance, as a 
fellow creature. 
 
(7) The time of the aesthetic will: Bergsonian implications of Coleridge’s symbolic process 
as the intimation of the sublime   
 
It may be advisable, before proceeding further, to remind ourselves of the grounds on which 
Bergson criticises traditional teleology. I take this step because it will be found, in what follows 
here, that a dynamic or quasi-‘Bergsonian’ account of time is central to the theological 
importance of Coleridge’s creative stance, according to the account of his aesthetic writings as 
put forward in this chapter.  
 
In chapter four, it was shown that, unlike the model of final causality analysed and utilised by 
Kant, Bergson maintains his thesis of creative duration allows room for genuine novelty to arise 
in the universe. Creation is intrinsically unpredictable, for Bergson, whereas explanation in 
terms of final causes always presupposes a goal to be arrived at through premeditated planning. 
For Bergson, teleological planning has evolved in human beings as a requirement for successful 
adaptation to the obstacles inherent in our environment. We calculate our course through life by 
utilising what we find lying around us as means for proposed ends. Teleological causality thus 
selectively adapts pre-existent matter to suit our plans, and is not ontologically creative.  
 
The ability to project plans implies that we are working practically and habitually with a 
spatialised or Kantian conception of time, i.e., one that sees time as laid out all at once, like a 
cloth over a table. Just as the tablecloth is woven to a uniform pattern from one material, such 
that one end is homogeneously continuous with the other, so our spatialised conception of time 
is a ‘schema’ or instrument, abstracted from the reality of an essentially heterogeneous and 
concrete productive flow. The next moment can never be a repetition of its predecessor, as 
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intrinsically modified by it. What is quantitatively repeatable in calculative abstraction is really 
and in itself an intrinsically an infinitely diversifying growth of qualitative uniqueness.  
 
We have seen both Bergson and the Schelling of the Transcendental Idealism focusing on a 
qualitative uniqueness of experience that cannot be contained in the quantifying, conceptual net 
of mechanistic Enlightenment thought. But we have also seen Bergson going a stage further.  
 
For Bergson, time is not schematically predictable in essence. There are no separate instants in 
the flow of time, (that is, before the instrumental understanding sets to work on it). Rather, the 
future will be modified by what has gone before, as well as modifying what preceded it.
797
 This 
is in line with what we have discovered of the corrigibility and the temporal perspective within 
which Coleridge’s symbols emerge through an imaginatively mediated process. 
 
While Kant’s concept of the organic focuses on a mutually constitutive interdependency of 
whole and parts, I have argued that Bergson deepens this static analysis of an organism, by 
regarding organic form as productive of itself over time.
798
 Wholeness, in Bergson, is always 
emerging through ever wider interconnectedness in the process that is dynamic reality.
799
 Forms 
are never fixed as metaphysical particulars, or atoms, save in the isolating and labelling work of 
the understanding that is imposed on the flow of creativity, or cut out of it for purely practical 
aims. Bergson’s concept of the organic goes far beyond Kant’s by taking time into account, 
becoming the basis of a fundamental ontological process that is radically self-transformative: 





According to the romantic and idealist model of metaphysical process, of which the most 
notable instance is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (as briefly described in chapter one), it is 
true that what is revealed at the culmination of the philosophical system transforms the 
complexion of the passage that has been taken towards it. But the difference from Bergson’s 
durational approach lies in the nature of the transformation envisaged. Hegel’s, or, as we 
discovered in chapter six, Coleridge’s metaphysically transformative process moves according 
to a goal that is pre-conceived by the philosopher before he sets out. The ultimate goal is always 
at the disposal of the thinker, as he constructs the teleological artefact that is the philosophical 
system. This is as if ultimate destiny could be carried around in the philosopher’s head as a 
blueprint, in the form of a conceptual method, regardless of the fact that the thinker is a living 
                                                                        
797 See, for example, Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 1-12. 
798 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 318-19. 
799 Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 10-12. 
800 Bergson, The Creative Mind, pp. 23-4. 
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being with only a limited and transient access to the world around him and, indeed, only an 
ever-approximating understanding of himself, as he grows and changes over time.  
 
Philosophical thinking, however, depends on the philosopher, who is an existing subject. We 
have seen in chapter one how Kierkegaard had the originality to notice what was so close and so 
obvious that it had always escaped philosophical attention: that human existence is a process of 
personal development, an ongoing task that is inscrutable and lost sight of as long it is regarded 
as amenable to objective definition. How much less then, as Kierkegaard understood, can any 
objectively ‘final’ philosophy adequately translate, let alone improve upon (as Hegel 
contended), the process of growth that is personal Christian faith?  
 
Independently of this judgement of Coleridge’s teleological metaphysics, I have also suggested 
throughout this chapter that such strictures do not apply to the truly open-ended nature of certain 
forms of romantic aesthetic practice, such as I have tried here to show Coleridge’s to be (as 
distinct from his ‘totalising’ philosophy that seeks to subsume unique, creative activity within 
the confines of his over-arching conceptual method). Therefore I suggest that the radical 
unpredictability of Bergson’s non-teleological conception of organic process – which in effect 
conceives of living process in terms of Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic judgement, rather than his 
account of teleological judgement
801
 – is a more adequate model of time than Kant’s for 
elucidating the metaphysical implications of Coleridge’s aesthetic intimations of transcendence; 
of the experience of symbols of the sublime. At bottom, this amounts to a recognition that such 
an aesthetic intimation of transcendence is a matter of incalculable or unquantifiable, qualitative 
growth, a movement into relationship, and that such a personal response to the appeal of divine 
love cannot be schematised or controlled. 
 
Therefore I suggest that Bergson’s approach to the issue of temporal dynamics is, theologically, 
preferable to an idealist teleological tendency to pre-judge its subject-matter according to a prior 
conception or aim, deciding what can and cannot count as ontological possibilities from a purely 
conceptual point of view. This is because of what we have learned from Kierkegaard, in 
chapters one and two. There it was found that the ‘scandal of particularity’, the inextricable 
paradox of the Christian revelation of transcendent and personal salvation, is precisely not 
knowledge a priori: not what one could always already have given oneself in advance, and on 
this issue it has emerged that I side with Kierkegaard’s criticism of romantic and idealist 
‘aestheticism’ against the metaphysics of Coleridge.802 
 
                                                                        
801 See chapter 4 section 3. 
802 Although as I have suggested, the aestheticism Kierkegaard attacks might more properly be labelled ‘pseudo-romantic’. 
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(8) Thesis Conclusion 
 
The overall vantage-point in the cumulative argument that we have gained through the last two 
chapters, and in light of the previous five, can be summarised in a few paragraphs as follows. 
 
 Coleridge’s conception of the aesthetic relation is ethical. In his aesthetic writing, he does not 
seek to interpret the relationship between creatures and God through an objectively systematic 
use of conceptuality a priori, an interpretation in which the nature of anything is pre-determined 
by, or in which everything is reducible to the philosopher’s conceptual scheme, a scheme which 
is imposed on his subject matter in advance. In a metaphysical system, logical necessity dictates 
the way in which God, the world and human being may be conceived as one. Coleridge himself 
sees this: 
The inevitable result of all consequent Reasoning, in which the Intellect refuses to 
acknowledge a higher or deeper ground than it can itself supply, and weens to 
possess within itself the centre of its own system is – and from Zeno the Eleatic to 
Spinoza and from Spinoza to the Schellings, the Okens, and their adherents of the 
present day, ever has been – PANTHEISM under one or other of its modes [...]803 
 
...the Dialectic Intellect by the exertion of its own powers exclusively can lead us 
to a general affirmation of the Supreme Reality, of an absolute Being. But here it 
stops. It is utterly incapable of communicating insight or conviction concerning the 
existence or possibility of the World, as different from Deity...
804
 
I suggest that Coleridge, in his systematic work tries to avoid this pantheistic or panentheistic 
result by situating his a priori speculation in the context of conscience, treated as a postulate 
that, as such, cannot be proved, but depends for its acceptance on the introspection of the reader. 
In his Opus Maximum, Coleridge calls the reader to bear an internal witness to his claim for the 
reality of a personal will answerable to conscience, as present to the mind but not of it. I 
discussed this concept of conscience as an immanent divine alterity in chapter six,
805
 but went 
on to criticise the a priori logic in terms of which it is developed systematically.
806
 Coleridge 
asserts it would be irrational on this basis to deny the existence of an infinite ethical will as the 
source of conscience and, concomitantly, of the finite will’s sense of responsibility. This, he 
claims, is on the grounds that to deny the actuality of a possibility, without which the 




                                                                        
803 Coleridge, Opus Maximum, pp. 106-7. 
804 Coleridge, Opus Maximum, p. 104. Coleridge’s italics. 
805 See chapter 6 section 2.2. 
806 See chapter 6 section 3. 
807 Coleridge, Opus Maximum, pp. 20, 54-5. 
229 
 
Unfortunately, I have found reason, in the last chapter, to suggest that Coleridge’s devise of 
situating his systematic speculation in the context of a moral postulate did not achieve the 
freedom from pantheistic implications which he intended. As I have suggested, the problem lies 
not in his ethical postulate, but in the dialectical logic by which he conceives, speculatively, the 
relation of creator to creature. Even the presence of a moral postulate as justification for further 
a priori speculation cannot validate a speculation which departs from this basis by contradicting 
it through its implications of conceptual determinism. Just such a departure, I suggest, is what is 
implicit in the logic of differentiated identity governing the relation of will to conscience.
808
 The 
same dialectic governs Coleridge’s account of God in terms of the development of concepts of 
potentiality and actuality out of an underlying concept of reality.
809
 Dialectical logic thereby 
determines the relation of the created to the divine, as based on an all encompassing ground of 





But what we have found in previous sections of this chapter is that, in his aesthetic thinking, 
Coleridge conceives the aesthetic relation of subject and object in terms of an imaginative 
mediation through which disinterested attentiveness to the object for its own sake, or in its own 
alterity, enables the un–pre-thinkable and corrigible perception of a shared, creative derivation 
of both subject and object.
811
 This intrinsically relational derivation is also an infinitely open-
ended, processive and transcendent ‘goal’, as intimated through aesthetic ideas as symbols of 
the sublime. The aesthetic intimation of such relatedness might be taken as a created echo of 
trinitarian relatedness, as hinted above.
812
 For aesthetic purposes, and as a man of faith, 
Coleridge stops here. Creaturely individuality is here dependent on an ultimately divine process 
of self-giving or empowerment, and is thus irreducible to the kind of pantheistic conceptual 
determination by which beings, divine and human are treated as effectively no more than 
conceptual counters, or mere determinate modes of an all-encompassing and abstract concept of 
reality.  
 
I offer the cumulative argument of this chapter as the basis for a rapprochement between 
Kierkegaardian faith and romantic aesthetics. Kierkegaard had denied a role to artistic 
imagination in the Christian/paradoxical sphere of existence, and yet needed such imagination 
in order to communicate, necessarily indirectly, the possibility of paradoxical faith. My claim is 
that Coleridge’s romantic intimation of transcendence, through aesthetic symbols of the 
                                                                        
808 Coleridge, ‘Essay on Faith’, in Shorter Works and Fragments part 2, pp. 333-44. 
809 Coleridge, Opus Maximum, pp. 226-7. 
810 Coleridge, Opus Maximum, pp. 231-2. 
811 Modiano, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, p. 119. 
812 In light of this possibility, it might be tentatively suggested that perhaps a theology of creation – in terms of perichoretic vestigia 
trinitatis – could be developed on the basis of findings of this thesis in this respect. 
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sublime, embodies the same imaginative practices as the indirect communication utilised by 
Kierkegaard to promote a living encounter with paradoxical revelation in personal life. I have 
shown that there can be discerned a shared ethical shape between the positions of Coleridge and 
Kierkegaard. A pattern of openness to the manifestation of genuine, creative alterity in 
Coleridge’s romantic aesthetic is mirrored by Kierkegaard’s imaginative receptivity to the 
revelation of the God-man. We have seen that Coleridge’s aesthetic receptivity to sublime 
symbols of transcendence is born through a sustained act of attention to objects of imaginative 
regard. Such ethico-aesthetic openness to transcendence is thus an imaginatively productive 
tension of expressive form and content; a process that participates and resonates in the 
unforeseeable flow of time, which is here regarded as the imaginatively apprehended medium of 
divine creativity. This is a far cry from the notional solution of all genuine difference in a 
merely conceptual synthesis, to which Kierkegaard rightly objects. We have found with 
Coleridge that aesthetic reflection expands towards infinity, no conceptual determination being 
adequate to the ethico-aesthetic experience. This expansion allows an object to function as a 
symbol, that is, allows a contemplated object of imaginative empathy to intimate more than 
itself-qua-phenomenon. 
 
I have found reason to make a further, theological, claim in this chapter. To eyes such as 
Coleridge’s, that is, through the eyes of Christian faith, an intimation of transcendence might 
justifiably be interpreted as a glimpse of the everyday world as created, an encounter with the 
familiar and calculable in its own ‘ecstatic’ otherness. Coleridge’s intimative, aesthetic activity 
might allow the everyday world to appear in its own otherness, in its divinely ordained integrity, 
as opposed to what calculative, self-interested determinate knowledge can predict of it, always 
already or transcendentally, in advance.  
 
Over the last seven chapters, I have been constructing a theologically motivated, cumulative 
argument based on the need to find a theologically appropriate aesthetic capable of meeting 
Kierkegaardian criteria regarding the nature of paradoxical faith. Such is needed in order to 
provide a theoretical rationale for Kierkegaard’s own aesthetic practice of indirect theological 
communication, as contradicted, inconsistently, by his theoretical limitations concerning the 
role of imagination in the life of faith. With the biblically inspired, symbolically mediated 
romanticism of Coleridge, I suggest that such an aesthetic of divine intimation has been 
discovered. By virtue of its meeting Bergsonian criteria regarding the qualitative incalculability 
of experiential process, Coleridge’s rich and meditative aesthetic reflection may be regarded as 
open to a genuinely incalculable, and thus truly transcendent divine approach. Coleridge thus 
offers us an illuminating aesthetic framework within which Kierkegaard’s imaginatively 
231 
 















Abrams, Meyer Howard, ‘Coleridge’s “a Light in Sound”: Science, Metascience & Poetic 
Imagination’, in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 116, December, (1972).  
 
____  (ed.), English Romantic Poets: Modern Essays in Criticism, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1975). 
 
____  Natural Supernaturalism, (New York: Norton, 1973). 
 
____  The Mirror and the Lamp, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953). 
 
Alexander, Samuel, Space, Time and Deity 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1920). 
 
Alighieri, Dante, The Vision of Dante, Henry Francis Cary (tr.) (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1913). 
  
Allison, Henry E., Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (second edition), (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2004). 
 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, in Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle 2 vols., 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol 2. 
 
____ Poetics, in Michael Winterbottom (ed.), Classical Literary Criticism, D. A. Russell & 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
 
____ The Rhetoric of Aristotle, Lane Cooper (tr.) (New York: Appleton-Century, 1932). 
 
Athanasius, Archibald Robinson (ed.), Select Writings and Letters of Athanasius, Bishop of 
Alexandria, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1891). 
 
Baker, James V., The Sacred River: Coleridge’s Theory of Imagination, (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana, 1957). 
 
Barfield, Owen, History in English Words, (London: Faber and Faber, 1953). 
 
____ Poetic Diction: A Study in Meaning, (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1973). 
 
____ Romanticism Comes of Age, (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1966). 
 
____ Saving the Appearances, (London: Faber and Faber, 1957). 
 
____ The Rediscovery of Meaning, (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1977). 
 
____ Unancestral Voice, (Middletown, Wesleyan University Press, 1965). 
 
____ What Coleridge Thought, (San Rafael: The Barfield Press, 1971). 
 
____ Worlds Apart, (London: Faber and Faber, 1963). 
 
Barnes, Jonathan, Early Greek Philosophy, Jonathan Barnes (tr.) (London: Penguin, 1987). 
 
Barnes, Samuel G., ‘Was “Theory of Life” Coleridge’s “Opus Maximum”?’, in Studies in 




Barth, J. Robert, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, (New York: Fordham University Press, 
1987). 
 
____ The Symbolic Imagination (second edition), (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2001). 
 
Beer, John, Coleridge the Visionary, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959). 
 
Beiser, Frederick C., German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
Beiser, Frederick C., 
 
____  The Romantic Imperative, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
 
Berggren, Douglas, ‘The Use and Abuse of Metaphor’ 1, Review of Metaphysics, December, 
(1962). 
 
____ ‘The Use and Abuse of Metaphor’ 2, Review of Metaphysics, March, (1963). 
 
Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution, Arthur Mitchell (tr.) (London: Macmillan, 1920). 
 
____ La Pensée et le Mouvant, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1938). 
 
____ Matter and Memory, (New York: Zone Books, 1991). 
 
____ Mind-Energy, H. Wildon Carr (tr.) (London: Macmillan & Co., 1921). 
 
____ The Creative Mind, Mabelle L. Andison (tr.) (New York: Citadel Press, 1992). 
 
____ Time and Free Will, F. L. Pogson (tr.) (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2001). 
 
____ Two Sources of Morality and Religion, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1977). 
 
Beardsley, Monroe C., Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present, (New York: 
Macmillan, 1966). 
 
Berger, John, Ways of Seeing, (London: Penguin, 2008). 
 
Berlin, Isaiah, The Roots of Romanticism, (London: Pimlico, 2000). 
 
Bettenson, Henry and Maunder, Chris (ed.), Documents of the Christian Church, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 
Boehme, Jacob, ‘Of the first principle of the divine essence’, in Robin Waterfield (ed. & tr.), 
Western Esoteric Masters Series: Jacob Boehme, (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2001). 
 
Bossart, W. H., ‘Kant’s Transcendental Deduction’, Kant-Studien, 68: 4, (1977). 
 
Bowie, Andrew, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche, (second edition) 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). 
 




Brown, Robert F., Schelling’s Treatise on the Deities of Samothrace: a Translation and 
Intrerpretation, (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977). 
 
Butcher, S. H., Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, with a Critical Text and Translation 
of the Poetics, (New York: Dover, 1951). 
 
Carlyle, Thomas, Sartor Resartus, K. McSweeney & P. Sabor (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
 
Cassirer, Ernst, An Essay on Man, (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1944). 
 
Caygill,  Howard, A Kant Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). 
 
Charlton, David (ed.), E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings: ‘Kreisleriana’, ‘The Poet and the 
Composer’, Music Criticism, Clarke, Martyn (tr.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989). 
 
Coburn, Kathleen (ed.), Inquiring Spirit: a new presentation of Coleridge from his published 
and unpublished prose writings, (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1951). 
 
____ Experience into Thought, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979). 
 
____ The Self-Conscious Imagination, (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). 
 
Cocking, J. M., Imagination: A Study in the History of Ideas, (London: Routledge, 1991). 
 
Coleridge S. T., John Beer (ed.), Aids to Reflection, in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge 16 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1993), vol. 9. 
 
____ James Engell & W. Jackson-Bate (ed.), Biographia Literaria 2 parts, in The Collected 
Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 16 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), vol. 
7. 
 
____ J. Shawcross (ed.), Biographia Literaria, in S. T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, by S. T. 
Coleridge, edited with his Aesthetic Essays, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1939). 
 
____ Ernest Hartley Coleridge (ed.), Coleridge’s Poetical Works, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969). 
 
____ Earl Leslie Griggs (ed.), Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 6 vols. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1956-71). 
 
____ ‘Essay on Faith’, H. J. Jackson & R. J. de J. Jackson (ed.), Shorter Works and Fragments 
2 parts, in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 16 vols, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), vol. 11, part 2. 
 
____ R. J. White (ed.), Lay Sermons,  in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 16 
vols. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1972), vol. 6. 
 
____ ‘Lectures on Shakespeare and Milton in Illustration of the Principles of Poetry’, R. A. 
Foakes (ed.), Lectures on Literatutre, 1809-1819 2 parts, in The Collected Works of Samuel 




‘Lectures on the Principles of Judgement, Culture and European Literature, 1818’, R. A. Foakes 
(ed.), Lectures on Literature, 1809-1819 2 parts, in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge 16 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1984), vol. 5, part 2. 
 
____ Logic, J. R. De J. Jackson (ed.), in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 16 
vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
 
____ ‘On the Principles of Genial Criticism’, H. J. Jackson & R. J. de J. Jackson (ed.), Shorter 
Works and Fragments 2 parts, in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 16 vols, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), vol. 11, part 1. 
 
____ Opus Maximum, Thomas McFarland (ed.), in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge 16 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) vol. 15. 
 
____ The Friend, Barbara E. Rooke (ed.) 2 parts., in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge 16 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) vol. 4. 
 
____  ‘Theory of Life’, H. J. Jackson & R. J. de J. Jackson (ed.), in Shorter Works and 
Fragments 2 parts, The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 16 vols, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), vol. 11, part 1. 
 
Collingwood, R. D., The Principles of Art, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938). 
 
Collins, James, The Mind of Kierkegaard, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). 
 
Cooper, John M. and  Hutchinson, D. S. (ed.), ‘Timaeus’, Donald J. Zeyl (tr.), in  Plato: 
Complete Works, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).  
 
Cooper, John M. and  Hutchinson, D. S. (ed.), ‘Republic’, G. M. A. Grube rev. C. D. C. Reeve 






 Century French Philosophy, in A History of Philosophy 11 
vols. (London: Continuum, 2003) vol. 9. 
 
____ Greece and Rome, in A History of Philosophy 11 vols. (London: Continuum, 2003) vol. 1. 
 
Coulson, John, Newman and the Common Tradition: a Study in the Language of Church and 
Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
 
Crab Robinson, Henry, Diary, Reminiscences & Correspondence 2 vols. (Boston: Fields, 
Osgood, 1869).  
 
____ Essays on Kant, Schelling and German Aesthetics, (London: Modern Humanities 
Research Association, 2010). 
 
Dahlhaus, Carl,  Esthetics of Music, William Austin (tr.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982). 
 
____ Nineteenth Century Music, J. Bradford Robinson (tr.) (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1989). 
 
____ The Idea of Absolute Music, Roger Lustig (tr.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1989). 
 




Dunning, Stephen M., The Crisis and the Quest, (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2000). 
 
Ehrenstein, Walter, ‘Untersuchungen über Figur-Grund-Fragen’, Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 
117, (1930). 
 
Eliot, T. S., The Waste Land, in The Waste Land and Other Writings, (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2002). 
 
Eriugena, John Scottus, Periphyseon, (Montreal: Les Editions Bellarmin, 1987). 
 
Fawcett, Douglas, ‘Imaginism and the World Process’, Mind 31: 22, (1922). 
____ The World as Imagination, (London: Macmillan, 1916). 
 
Ferreira, M. Jamie, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).  
 
Fiddes, Paul, The Creative Suffering of God, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
 
Frank, Manfred, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2004). 
 
Gardner, Sebastian, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, (Abingdon: Routledge, 1999). 
 
Godwin, Joscelyn (ed.), Harmony of the Spheres: A Sourcebook of the Pythagorean Tradition 
in Music, (Rochester: Inner Traditions International, 1993). 
 
Gokak, Vinayak Krishna, Coleridge’s Aesthetics (first edition), (New Delhi: Abhinav 
Publications, 1975). 
 
Gombrich, E. H., Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, 
(Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1959). 
 
Gordon, George, Lord Byron, ‘Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage’, in J. J. McGann (ed.), Lord Byron: 
The Major Works, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
Grant, Robert M., Irenaeus of Lyons, Robert M. Grant (tr.), in The Early Church Fathers Series, 
Carol Harrison (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1997). 
 
Green, J. H., Spiritual Philosophy (2 vols.) (London: Macmillan and Co., 1865). 
 
Gregory of Nazianzus, ‘Ad Cledonium’, in Select Letters of Gregory Nazianzen, Sometime 
Archbishop of Constantinople, Charles Gordon Brown & James Edward Swallow (tr.) (New 
York: Christian Literature Publishing Company, 1893). 
 
Grimm, Jacob & Wilhelm, Selected Tales, David Luke (intro. and tr.) (Penguin: 
Harmondsworth, 1982). 
 
Gunton, Colin E., The One the Three and the Many, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). 
 
____ The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997). 
 





Hamilton, Paul, Coleridge and German Philosophy, (London: Continuum, 2007). 
 
Hammermeister, K. The German Aesthetic Tradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002). 
 
Hannay, Alastair (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
 
Harpur, Patrick, Daimonic Reality, (London: Penguin, 1994). 
 
Hegel, G. W. F., Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, Bernard Bosanquet (tr.) (London: 
Penguin, 1993). 
 
____ Lectures on Aesthetics, (1818-1820), in E. A. Lippman (ed.), Musical Aesthetics: a 
Historical Reader, 3 vols. (Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1988). 
 
____ Phenomenology of Spirit, A. V. Miller (tr.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
 
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (tr.) (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962). 
 
____ Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Richard Taft (tr.) (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997). 
 
____ What is a Thing? W. B. Barton, Jr. & Vera Deutsch (tr.) (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1967). 
 
Holy Bible (Authorised Version), (London: Collins, 1957). 
 
Holy Bible (New Revised Standard Version), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
 
Hong, H.V. & E. H. (ed.), Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers 7 vols. (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1975). 
 
Horrell, David, An Introduction to the Study of Paul, (London: Continuum, 2000). 
 
Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, Ernest C. Mossner (ed.) (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 
1969). 
 
Iamblichus, De Mysteriis, Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon and Jackson P. Hershbell (tr.) 
(Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003). 
 
Jackson, H. J. (ed.), Samuel Taylor Coleridge: The Major Works, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985). 
 
James, D. G., Scepticism and Poetry: An Essay on the Poetic Imagination, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1937). 
 
James, William, A Pluralistic Universe, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996). 
 
James, William, Talks to Teachers on Psychology, (London: Longmans Green, 1924). 
 




Kant, Immanuel, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Robert B. Louden & Manfred 
Kuehn (tr.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
____ Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (tr.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
 
____ Critique of the Power of Judgment, Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (trs.) Paul Guyer (ed.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 
____ Critique of Practical Reason, in Mary J. Gregor (tr. & ed.), Practical Philosophy, 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996). 
 
____ Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (revised edition), Gary Hatfield (tr.) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 
Karr, Mary, ‘Introduction’ to The Waste Land and Other Writings, (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2002). 
 
Kelly, J. N. D., Early Christian Doctrines (fifth edition), (London: Contiuum, 1977). 
 
Kierkegaard, Søren, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments 2 vols., in 
H. V & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), Kierkegaard’s Writings (XII), (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992). 
 
____ Either/Or 2 parts, in H. V. & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), Kierkegaard’s Writings (IV), 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
 
____ Fear and Trembling, in H. V. & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), Kierkegaard’s Writings (VI), 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). 
 
____ Johannes Climacus, in H. V. & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), Kierkegaard’s Writings (VII), 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
 
____ Papers and Journals: a Selection, Alastair Hannay (tr.) (London: Penguin, 1996). 
Kierkegaard, Søren, Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers 7 vols. H.V. & E. H. Hong (ed. & 
tr.) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975). 
 
____ Philosophical Fragments, in H. V. & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), Kierkegaard’s Writings 
(VII), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
 
____ Repetition, in H. V. & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), Kierkegaard’s Writings (VI), (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983). 
 
____ Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and 
Awakening, in H. V. & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), Kierkegaard’s Writings (XIX), (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983). 
 
____ Stages on Life’s Way, in H. V. & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), Kierkegaard’s Writings (XI), 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
 
____ The Moment and Late Writings, in H. V. & E. H. Hong (ed. & tr.), Kierkegaard’s Writings 
(XXIII), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
 





Langer, Susanne K., Feeling and Form, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953). 
 
____ Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art, (third 
edition) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942). 
 
____ (ed.) Reflections on Art: A Sourcebook of Writings by Artists, Critics and Philosophers, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
 
Le Huray, Peter and Day, James (ed.) Music and Aesthetics in the Eighteenth and Early 
Nineteenth Centuries, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
 
Lewis, C. S., An Experiment in Criticism, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1961). 
 
____ Arthurian Torso, (London: Oxford University Press, 1949). 
 
Lindsay, A. D., The Philosophy of Bergson, (Whitefish: Kessinger, 2010). 
 
Lipkowitz, Ina, ‘Inspiration and the Poetic Imagination: Samuel Taylor Coleridge’, Studies in 
Romanticism 30: 4 (1991). 
 
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Kenneth Winkler (ed.) (Hackett: 
Indianapolis, 1996). 
 
Lonergan, Bernard, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (fifth edition), Frederick E. 
Crowe & Robert M. Doran (ed.) (Toronto: Universtity of Toronto Press, 1992). 
 
Lonsdale, Roger (ed.) The New Oxford Book of Eighteenth Century Verse, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984). 
 
Lovejoy, Arthur O., ‘On the Discrimination of Romanticisms’, Publications of the Modern 
Language Association of America, 39: 2, (1924). 
 
____ ‘Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson’, Mind, vol. 22, No. 88, (1913). 
 
Lowth, Robert, Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews, (London: Thomas Tegg, 1839). 
 
Macquarrie, John, Existentialism, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972). 
 
Magee, Brian, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
 
McGann, J. J., ‘Introduction’ in Lord Byron: The Major Works, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). 
 
Maritain, J., Art and Scholasticism, in Art and Scholasticism with Other Essays, J. F. Scanlan 
(tr.) (London: Sheed and Ward, 1930). 
 
McDonald, William, Sǿren Kierkegaard, in, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Summer 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/kierkegaard/ date accessed: 16/4/2006. 
 
McFarland, Thomas, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969). 
 





Mill, J. S., ‘Coleridge’, in Utilitarianism and Other Essays, (London: Penguin, 1987). 
 
Miller, Craig W., ‘Coleridge’s Concept of Nature’, in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 25: 1, 
(1964). 
 
Modiano, Raymonda, Coleridge and the Concept of Nature, (London: Macmillan, 1985). 
 
Monk, Samuel H., The Sublime, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960). 
 
Mooney, Edward F., Søren Kierkegaard: Dialogue, Polemics, Lost Intimacy and Time, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
 
Morley, Edith J. (ed.), Blake, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Lamb, etc, being Selections from the 
Remains of Henry Crabb Robinson, (London: Longmans, Green, 1922). 
 
Muirhead, John H., Coleridge as Philosopher, (London: George, Allen & Unwin, 1930). 
 
____ The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy: Studies in the History of Idealism in 
England and America, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931). 
 
Murdoch, Iris, ‘The Darkness of Practical Reason’, Encounter, 27, (1966). 
 
Newlyn, Lucy (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Coleridge, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music and The Case of Wagner, 
Walter Kaufmann (tr.) (Toronto: Random House, 1967). 
 
Orsini, G. N. G., Coleridge and German Idealism, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1969). 
 
Otto, Rudolph, The Idea of the Holy (second edition), John W. Harvey (tr.) (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1958). 
 
Otto, Walter F., Dionysus, Myth and Cult, Robert B. Palmer (tr.) (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1965). 
 
Paton, H. J., Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience 2 vols. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936). 
 
Pattison, George, ‘Representing Love: from Poetry to Martyrdom or Language and 
Transcendence in Kierkegaard’s “Works of Love”’, Kierkegaardiana, 22, (2002). 
 
Perkins, Mary Anne, Coleridge’s Philosophy: The Logos as Unifying Principle (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994). 
 
Plantinga, Alvin and Wolterstorff,  Nicholas (ed.), Alvin Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’, 
in Faith and Rationality, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
 
Plato, Republic, in John M. Cooper & D. S. Hutchinson (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
 
____ Timaeus, in John M. Cooper & D. S. Hutchinson (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, 




Prickett, Stephen, Words and the Word, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
 
Raine, Kathleen, Blake and Antiquity, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979). 
 
Read, Herbert, Coleridge as Critic, (London: Faber and Faber, 1949). 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Dictionnaire de Musique, (Paris, 1768; reprint, Hildesheim, 1969). 
 
Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 2004). 
 
Schelling, F.W.J., ‘On the Nature of Philosophy as Science’, in German and Idealist 
Philosophy, Rudiger Bubner (ed.) (London: Penguin, 1997). 
 
____ First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, Keith R. Peterson (tr.) (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2004). 
 
____ Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, Errol E. Harris & Peter Heath (tr.) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
 
____ On the History of Modern Philosophy, Andrew Bowie (tr.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). 
 
____ Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, Jeff Love & Johannes 
Schmidt (tr.) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006). 
 
____ System of Transcendental Idealism, Peter Heath (tr.) (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1978). 
 
____ The Philosophy of Art, Douglas W. Stott (ed., trans. & intro.) (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989). 
 
Schiller, Friedrich, Aesthetic and Philosophical Essays, (Honolulu: University Press of the 
Pacific, 2001). 
 
Schelgel, August Wilhelm, Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, (London: George Bell and 
Sons, 1904). 
 
Schlegel, Friedrich, ‘On Incomprehensibility’, in Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, J. 
M. Bernstein (tr. & intro.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
____ Athenaeum Fragments, in Philosophical Fragments, P. Firchow, (tr.) R. Gasché (intro.) 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). 
 
Schopenhauer, Arthur, The World as Will and  Representation 2 vols. E. F. J. Payne (tr.) (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1969). 
 
Scruton, Roger, Beauty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
 
____ Modern Culture, (London: Continuum, 1998). 
 
____ The Aesthetics of Music, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
 





Shawcross, John, Introduction to Biographia Literaria by S. T. Coleridge, edited with his 
Aesthetic Essays, J. Shawcross (ed.) 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1939). 
 
Spinoza, Baruch, Ethics, Andrew Boyle (tr.) (London: J. M. Dent, 1993). 
 
Stace, W. T., The Philosophy of Hegel, (London: Macmillan, 1924). 
 
Steiner, George, Real Presences, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
 
Stiver, Dan R., The Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, Symbol and Story, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996). 
 
Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
 
The English Hymnal, (London: Oxford University Press, 1933)  
 
Traill, Henry Duff, Coleridge, (London: Macmillan, 1884). 
 
Turner, Denys, Faith, Reason and the Existence of God, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 
 
Wackenroder, Wilhelm Heinrich, ‘The Characteristic Inner Nature of the Musical Art and the 
Psychology of Today’s Instrumental Music’, from Contributions to the Fantasies on Art for the 
Friends of Art together with Ludwig Tieck’s Preface, in Wilhelm Wackenroder’s ‘Confessions’ 
and ‘Fantasies’, Mary Hurst Schubert (tr. & intro.) (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1971). 
 
Walzel, Oskar, German Romanticism, Alma Elise Lussky (tr.) (New York: G. P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1932). 
 
Weatherhead, L. D., The Afterworld of the Poets, (London: Epworth Press, 1929). 
 
Wellek, René, The Later Eighteenth Century, in A History of Modern Criticism 4 vols. 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1955) vol. 1. 
 
____ The Romantic Age, in A History of Modern Criticism 4 vols. (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1955) vol 2. 
 
Wheeler, Kathleen M. (ed.), German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: The Romantic Ironists 
and Goethe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
 
Wicks, Robert, Kant on Judgment, (London: Routledge, 2007). 
 
Williams, Charles, Arthurian Poets: Charles Williams, David Llewellyn Dodds (ed.) 
(Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1991). 
 
____ Poetry at Present, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). 
 
____ Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933). 
 
____ The Descent of the Dove (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2002). 
 




Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations (third edition), G. E. M. Anscombe (tr.) 
(Blackwell: Oxford, 2001). 
 
____ Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuiness (tr.) (London: Routledge, 
2002). 
 
Wordsworth, William & Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, Lyrical Ballads, William Richie & Daniel 
Robinson (ed.) (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002). 
 
____ The Collected Poems of William Wordsworth, (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1994). 
 
Young, Edward, Conjectures on Original Composition, (London, 1759). 
 








Romantic Theology and the Structure of Faith 
 
Introduction: Kierkegaard and Williams  
 
As an appendix to my thesis, I shall show how Charles Williams’ imaginative and theologically 
motivated interpretation of Dante, in his Figure of Beatrice, enacts, manifests, and makes 
concrete just such an ethico-aesthetic inter-dependency of existential and romantic insights, as 
has been found to typify Coleridge’s aesthetic reflection. I suggest that, in this work, Williams 
is offering us genuinely nourishing, theological fruit, through a critically astute and nuanced 
union of the perspectives of Kierkegaard and Coleridge. 
 
I will be comparing the romantic theology of Charles Williams and the structure of 
Kierkegaardian faith. Critical attention to the roles of art and human love in Williams’ thinking, 
and reflection on his distinction between false and true ‘romanticisms’ can, I believe, point 
towards the goal of this thesis, by suggesting a corrective for Kierkegaard’s theoretical inability 
to find a place for the artistry and aesthetic activity which he himself relies on as central to his 
theological practice of indirect communication. Crucially for my overall argument in this thesis, 
I address Williams’ poetic theology in light of my reading of Kierkegaard’s evaluation of the 
importance of imaginative activity within the life of faith. This reading of Williams’ aesthetic 
thought will enable me to challenge Kierkegaard’s own refusal of any theological role for 
artistic imaginative activity. My main contention is that Kierkegaard fails to, but needs to make 
central to the life of faith the kind of artistry which he himself employs so skilfully as an 
indirect communicator of that faith. This is because such faith cannot be objectively mediated, 
and must constantly refuse the temptation of an objectifying or conceptually ‘eternalising’ 
‘infinite resignation’. In the Kantian aesthetic terms of an earlier chapter, Kierkegaardian 
paradoxical faith demands – as intrinsic to its own structural dynamics – a conceptually 
indeterminate imaginative activity. 
 
Thus this appendix is directed towards a plausible correction to the perceived flaw in the 
structure Kierkegaardian thought: the basic incompatibility between Kierkegaard’s practice of 
creatively indirect communication and his theoretical stance towards artistic imaginative 
activity, around which my explorations have been oriented over the foregoing chapters. 
Following on from these earlier findings, I suggest that in delineating the figure of his 
pseudonymous anonym, ‘A’, (who we met in relation to the musical aesthetics of Either/Or, in 
the first chapter), Kierkegaard has wrongly regarded as the norm of romantic aesthetics a 
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pseudo-romantic, misuse of aesthetic images for immediate and exclusive ego-gratification – a 
sentimental and immoral manipulation of experience, and other people. I argue that a basically 
Kantian account of the intrinsically moral shape of the aesthetic relation as ‘disinterested 
interest’ is more in line with the important tradition of romantic artistic thinking and practice 
with which Charles Williams identifies.  
 
The kind of romantic artistry and aesthetic experience that Williams recognises and champions 
are in essence a creative, interpretive response: an ethical engagement of the will with, and for, 
otherness, rather than the anonymous, hedonistic aesthete’s wilful and egoistic manipulation of 
otherness. In suggesting this corrective, I will be building on Williams’ insights into the relation 
between poetic, purely stylistic considerations and the possibility of human receptivity to 
transcendence. In the process I will draw on findings from earlier chapters. What should emerge 
is a model of imaginative, artistic creativity and aesthetic experience that is in keeping with 
Kierkegaard’s own philosophical and theological approach. 
 
(1) Kierkegaard and Williams: A Harmony of Insights 
 
To begin to address these issues, I find a point of entry in Kierkegaard’s critique of ‘Infinite 
Resignation’ in Fear and Trembling. We will need, first, to remind ourselves of the role of 
imaginative activity in the reception of revelation in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, as Ferreira reads it, in response to which I identified and focused the central issue of 
my thesis back in the first chapter.  
 
As we saw in chapter two, an indirectly communicated and imaginatively mediated subjective 
relation to paradoxical truth is uncovered at the heart of the response to paradoxical revelation: 
Kierkegaard’s ‘religiousness B’. Kierkegaard describes the effort of ethical passion – an 
imaginatively sustained tension of activity and passivity – as the driving of a pair of horses as 
quickly as possible, one of which is a Pegasus, while the other is a worn out nag. The art of 
balancing Pegasus and the nag, steering a course with opposite tendencies, represents the 
relation of finitude and infinity, of eternity to time, that is inherent in the passion of paradoxical 
faith. As dependent upon infinite alterity, and therefore not a straightforwardly immanent 
choice, amenable to universal norms, the leap of faith is not a quantitatively discreet act. Rather 
it is a qualitative transition, the decision of faith being an abrupt and passively experienced 
‘gestalt’ shift: a ‘cision’ in consciousness that manifests the dawning of a changed world-




The will can want to see reality in the light of faith, to respond to an infinite personal address, 
but it is not directly capable of the transition. From the purely human side of conversion, the 
new mode of ‘seeing’ will be something passive, something that just does or does not happen to 
one, as when interpreting ambiguous puzzle-pictures. In a situation in which a ‘Wittgensteinian’ 
gestalt shift can occur, initially we can see only one possibility (for example, two facial profiles 
in silhouette); at some point, after concentrated attention, and perhaps coaxing and guidance – 
the kind of indirect assistance that Kierkegaard offers through his indirect authorship – another 
alternative (a chalice between the silhouettes) comes into focus. Through metaphorical 
transformation, as Douglas Berggren suggests, a decisive threshold is crossed due to such a re-
contextualisation of gestalt, transformed meaning emerging in ‘a creative, imaginatively 
sustained interaction between diverse perspectives which cannot be literalised or disentangled 
without destroying the kind of insight, truth or reality which the metaphor provides’. There is 
no univocally communicable way of telling that the quality of faith motivates the actions of a 
person in such an objectively unmediated relationship to God.  
 
Such a person is described as a ‘knight of faith’ in Fear and Trembling. Here, Abraham finds 
himself in the situation of having continuously to refuse the possibility of objective 
intelligibility, or direct communicability, as a surrogate for faith. ‘Infinite resignation’ denotes a 
temptation: it is a refusal of paradoxical transcendence, as the last possible means by which 
Abraham could make his action intelligible to his social peers. When faced with the demand to 
sacrifice his son, Abraham is constantly tempted protect himself socially and emotionally, by 
idealising his relationship to Isaac, and thereby to accept the surrender of his love as a real 
relationship of ethical concern in risk and commitment. But to idealise a love relationship is to 
forego or resign love as an actuality, to infinitise the reality of the loved one as an unattainable 
ideal to which one devotes oneself in thought. By means of such an idealisation, one transfers 
one’s interest to a mere concept of the loved one, whose eternalised status is merely the eternal 
un-changeability of a thought-object. Such infinite resignation of reality is thus the last possible 
way through which one can buy into the illusion of an achieved and communicable 
understanding of one’s existence, through the failure to recognise the intrinsic indefiniteness of 
subjective human becoming. To resist this temptation to objectify oneself in relation to God, to 
make oneself intelligible in terms of prevailing secular norms, is to render oneself open to 
transcendence, to become truly open to unclassifiable, or un-pre-thinkable interpretive 
possibilities in relation to an infinitely transcendent divine approach, on the strength of the 
‘absurd’, as it would appear from the perspective of the objective understanding. 
 
The apparent absurdity of revelation will not cease to be paradoxical when faith has been 
embraced. Faith does not become something assimilable to the life-view prevailing before 
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revelation, described in Fear and Trembling as the ethical ‘universal’. Rather faith transforms 
one’s relation to one’s world. The understanding’s judgement on the absurdity will still stand, 
meaning that the understanding, through imaginative activity, will be simultaneously affirmed 
and suspended, judging and desisting. As in Berggren’s account of metaphor, the understanding 
will be both active and passive in imaginative tension, or suspension. Customary and 
universally intelligible judgemental tendencies are present as suspended. In Fear and 
Trembling, in the context of a teleological suspension of a universally communicable norm for 
ethics, I suggest that this imaginative suspension of the understanding takes the form of a 
persistently repeated refusal of the universal intelligibility of an idealistic ‘infinite resignation’: 
a refusal of what Kierkegaard regards as typical of an objective, conceptually ‘eternalising’ 
approach, and which he identifies as ‘religiousness A’, in opposition to the paradoxical 
Christian faith which is identified in the Postscript as ‘religiousness B’. 
 
The existentialist or Kierkegaardian resonances in Charles Williams’ aesthetic thinking can be 
discerned in Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind.
813
 This similarity emerges, for example, in 
Williams’ recognition that finite verse patterns need interpretation, and that such aesthetic 
interpretation is a basically moral activity, since interpretive acts necessarily involve 
judgemental decision.  
 
Like many thinkers after Kant, Williams suggests that all human experience is formally 
patterned,
814
 or constructed. A poem is a pattern, and is thus homologous or analogous to 
experience. Poetry is truer to human nature than prose because it acknowledges its own finitude. 
Human experience is always from a limited perspective: an awareness mediated by limited 
formal patterning, or formal construction.  
 
Poetry, by virtue of recognising this limitation, in fact transcends it to offer insight into the 
nature of experience as a whole. Poetry can encapsulate insights into the shape of existential 
possibilities, as possibilities for becoming. According to Dunning, this means that poetry 
provides insight into the shape of existence, by enabling a leap out of existence: a leap out of 
time by virtue of the poetic overview of a pattern of becoming as a whole. The potential pattern 
for becoming is therefore itself a-temporal, or ideal – the ideality of existence, a translation of 
existence into ideality – not the actual temporality of existence.815 It is this aspect of Steven M. 
Dunning’s reading which needs qualification and clarification, as I shall suggest as we progress. 
 
                                                                        
813 Charles Williams, Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), pp. 8-9. 
814 Williams, Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind, pp. vi, 1-10. 
815 Stephen M. Dunning, The Crisis and the Quest, (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2000), p. 145. 
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An existential pattern of possibility can thus be discerned through a poetic patterning, 
homologous to existential possibility, due to what Williams regards as an immanent, or 
incarnate Logos structure of reality. One can thus see the significance of temporal process 
through its poetic representation. Without actually having to pass through that process, one 
becomes aware of it as a possibility for personal becoming. One is able to view the completed 
shape of an event, its pattern, its place in an overall pattern of experience. One sees a whole, 
enabling an insightful purchase on action. On the basis of this poetic map one can move more 
effectively to realise a given possibility. The opaqueness of temporal actuality, which is always 
a partial view of process from within process, becomes transparent in a poetic epiphany of the 
nature of process. According to Dunning’s reading, the poem Mount Badon816 vividly identifies 
this structuring power of poetry with the incarnate logos, since the organic wholeness that is the 
human body is an ‘index’, or microcosm encapsulating and pointing out the logos structure of 
the universe.
817
 The poem itself encapsulates the shape of experience, and is thus, in a sense, an 
index to the index, pointing out the nature of existential possibilities. Williams borrows the 
image of the body as an ‘index’ from Wordsworth’s Prelude,818 and on the basis of this imagery 





An example of Williams’ theory at work in his poetic practice may help illustrate my meaning. 
In Williams’ poem, Mount Badon, (from Taliessin through Logres, the first of two series of 
poems making up the Arthuriad), the meaningful rhythm of the Logos, incarnate in temporal 
process, is effectively mediated to the Christian bard, Taliessin, guiding his action through his 
imaginative engagement with the metrical and semantic patterns of Virgil’s Aeneid. A 
poetically mediated communication thus indirectly enables him to act, to know when the critical 
moment arrives, and how to seize it, thus empowering his navigation of time, imaginatively 
schematising the situation unrolling before him: 
Staring, motionless, he sat. 
Dimly behind him he heard how his staff stirred. 
One said: “He dreams or makes verse”; one: “Fool, 
all lies in a passion of patience – my lord’s rule”. 
In a passion of patience he waited the expected second. 
Suddenly the noise abated, the fight vanished, the last  
few belated shouts died in a new quiet. 
                                                                        
816 Charles Williams, ‘Taliessin through Logres’, in David Llewellyn Dodds (ed.), Arthurian Poets: Charles Williams, (Cambridge: 
D. S. Brewer, 1991), pp. 33-34. 
817 Dunning, The Crisis and the Quest, p. 146. 
818 William Wordsworth, ‘The Prelude’, in The Collected Poems of William Wordsworth, pp. 279-281. 
819 See ‘The Index of the Body’, in Charles Williams, The Image of the City, (Berkeley: Apocryphile Press, 2007), pp. 80-87; see 
also Charles Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, (Berkeley: Apocryphile Press, 2005) p. 64. 
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In the silence of a distance, clear to the king’s poet’s sight, 
Virgil was standing on a trellised path by the sea, 
Taliessin saw him negligently leaning; he felt 
the deep breath dragging the depth of all dimension, 
as the Roman sought for the word (...) 
 
Civilised centuries away, the Roman moved. 
Taliessin saw the flash of his style 
Dash at the wax; he saw the hexameter spring 
and the King’s sword swing: he saw, in the long field, 
the point where the pirate chaos might suddenly yield, 
the place for the law of grace to strike....
820
 
As C. S. Lewis writes in his commentary on the Arthuriad,
821
 Virgil’s verse pattern is an 
achievement of order, just as is a decisive, well executed cavalry charge. Taliessin’s 
recollection of poetically just ordering informs his vision of a field of ambiguous strife, the 
Arthurian battle of Mons Badonicus functioning as a poetic image for our existential 
predicament. 
 
Since our knowledge is always epistemologically constructed or patterned (as we learned from 
Kant in an earlier chapter), Williams is suggesting that our knowing is most fully self-aware and 
realised, most fully comes into its own, in the deliberately constructed ostentation of verse 
patterns.
822
 Verse thus displays the nature of human experience better than prose, for Williams. 
But, as  only a finite patterning, any verse is necessarily ambiguous in relation to the infinite 
whole, the Logos structure, which it can, nevertheless, mediate, and this ambiguity in poetry’s 
power to illumine existential possibilities thus calls for decisive commitment in  the interpretive 




According to Williams, such interpretive ambiguity pertains because of the Fall, envisaged as 
an epistemological failing rather than an ontological failing.
824
 Because one can choose good or 
evil, one’s knowledge of the good becomes distorted: rather than being integrated with the 
good, one knows it from outside, or obliquely, as a source of self-division: according to an 
estranged perspective. Thus Williams holds that corporality is not fallen; only our knowledge is. 
Therefore the embodiment of verse, its imaginative patterning of elements of articulated sound, 
                                                                        
820 Williams, Arthurian Poets: Charles Williams, pp. 33-34. 
821 C. S. Lewis, Arthurian Torso, (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 111. 
822 Williams, Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind, p. 5. 
823 Dunning, The Crisis and the Quest, p. 151. 
824 Dunning, The Crisis and the Quest, p. 152; Williams, ‘The Vision of the Empire’, in Arthurian Poets: Charles Williams, pp. 25-
30; C. S. Lewis, Arthurian Torso, pp. 109-110; Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, p. 64. 
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as a physical patterning homologous with our bodies, can at least intimate un-fallen truth, so 
enabling some insight into the incarnate (embodied) Logos structure of reality. Poetry thus 
happens to the reader, as well as demanding his attentive effort in interpretation: an effort of 
embodied will and imaginative patterning, primarily, rather than a matter for speculation and 
theoretical reason. The poetic meaning is not at the disposal of the mind, either of the author or 
the reader, but ‘flows up’, ‘felt in the blood and felt along the heart’, (an image of 
Wordsworth’s utilised by Williams).825 
 
Thus it can be argued that Williams’ aesthetic thinking harmonises with an interpretation of the 
ethical role of imagination in the appropriation of paradoxical revelation, in Kierkegaard’s 
thinking, as discussed above. It is on this premiss that I build the rest of this chapter. 
 
(2) Williams, Kierkegaard & Dunning: Anamnesis or Imaginative Indirection?  
 
According to Stephen M. Dunning’s reading of Kierkegaardian thought, however, and which I 
turn to now, there is no room at all for imaginative activity at the level of the appropriation of 
paradoxical faith, just as there is no room for specifically artistic aesthetic activity at this level. 
In fact it would be fair to say, in light of the reading of Kierkegaard’s position that I set out 
earlier in this chapter, (and more fully in chapter one), that Dunning does not at all distinguish 
between imaginative interpretation in response to revelation, and the role of imaginative 
interpretation in the creation and appreciation of art.  
 
Central to the analysis of the role of imagination in the life of faith that I have been following is 
the understanding that imagination is essentially a medium sustaining a tension between 
opposite tendencies, such as receptivity and activity. From the purely human perspective, as we 
saw in chapter one, revelation is mediated by an attentive effort of imaginatively interpretive 
receptivity. The act of will in the Kierkegaardian ‘leap of faith’ is an effort of receptivity, 
stretching immanent imaginative resources to interpret, falteringly, what could never have been 
imagined by those resources alone. 
 
In light of this understanding of imagination, in what follows, I aim to deepen my reading of 
Williams’ ethically motivated aesthetics, by showing how his thought resists Dunning’s 
criticism, not least because Dunning bases his argument on what I believe to be an inadequate 
reading of Kierkegaardian thought, especially in relation to the ethical role of Kierkegaardian 
imagination.  
                                                                        





In The Crisis and the Quest, Dunning focuses his critique of Williams’ poetic theology through 
a reading of the dynamics of Kierkegaard’s analysis of the human condition in terms of three 
stages of existence, or existential spheres, (an analysis which we encountered in the first 
chapter). Dunning puts forward a fascinating reading of the implicit aesthetic theory, or poetics, 
which is set to work by Williams in his major poetic cycle, The Arthuriad. The questions 
motivating Dunning’s theoretical analysis concern the structural coherence of Williams’ 
poetics: does a perceived incoherence in William’s aesthetic theory lead to a breakdown of 
significance in his aesthetic practice? Is, as Dunning suggests, Williams in the grip of an 
existential crisis? Is a religiously motivated existential double-mindedness, on William’s part, 
causing a breakdown of meaningfulness at the level of aesthetic theory, to the detriment of his 
creativity, at the level of poetic practice? Dunning characterises William’s existential bind as an 
indecisive hovering between ‘religiousness A’ and ‘religiousness B’, leading him to become, 
and, perhaps, to recognise that he has become, what Kierkegaard describes as merely a ‘poet of 
existence’: one who avoids decision by objectifying, or poeticising a genuine insight into an 
extremely painful existential crisis, so as not to have to face what he dreads: actually doing 
something about it. Dunning regards Williams as at the edge of his immanent aesthetic 
resources: realising that his own abilities are inadequate to save him, Williams is poeticising his 
‘despair’, according to the Kierkegaardian scheme.  
 
In view of Ferreira’s findings concerning the crucial role of imagination within the conversion 
to paradoxical revelation, and in the process of the appropriation of that revelation through the 
life of faith – as a ‘knight of faith’ – I suggest that Dunning could be misreading William’s 
theologically motivated aesthetics to the detriment of his assessment of the significance of 
William’s poetry. The problem, according to Dunning, is that poetry is said by Williams to be 
able to mediate saving revelation, yet also, and in apparent contradiction to William’s 
recognition of the impossibility of any schemes of self-salvation, poetry is regarded as an 
activity falling completely within immanent human capabilities. I suggest, however, that 
Williams recognises that the poet’s imagination can be actively receptive to un-pre-thinkable 
otherness in composition, when that poet is someone realising the impossibility of self-
salvation, and who is therefore imaginatively active in the receptive appropriation of 
paradoxical revelation. Qualifying Dunning’s assessment in light of my understanding of 
imagination as set forth above, I suggest that Williams sees the patterning of poetic style, (as 
exemplified in the quotation from Mount Badon, which I gave above), as the medium of 
manifestation of the eternal logos pattern, incarnate in the universe, and thus woven into, and 




It follows that any poetic insight into the world as a divine Creation cannot be extricated from 
an awareness of the reality of loss and suffering that all process involves. Refusing to 
‘eternalise’, to flee into the immanent closure and safety of an idealistic ‘infinite resignation’, 
the poet perceives, and invites his audience to participate his vision of the patterning of eternal 
meaning in and as the course of time: the two levels cannot be separated out in any 
teleologically secured insight into trans-temporal fulfilment. Thus it is not a question of an ideal 
pattern coming to poetic manifestation in separation from a current event, but rather that poetry 
enables a current experience to be seen in the temporal ‘shape’ of an opportunity: one could 
say, I suggest – and taking Kant’s thinking on the imagination as my frame of reference – that 
the interpretive opportunity opened up by verse at a given time schematises that given situation, 
allowing a problem to appear as an opportunity. But this does not come about by reading the 
poem as if it were an a-temporal map of time, (as Dunning suggests), as if the poem were an 
ideal archetype of temporal pattern, discreet in itself; rather an insight comes about by 
envisaging the current situation, as viewed through the poetry, as an opportunity. The poetry 
becomes relevant on the basis of the situation, yet at the same time, the situation only signifies 
as an opportunity on the basis of the poetic interpretation. Neither aspect can claim temporal or 
even logical precedence over the other, and yet the difference between the two – as a creative 
difference – is not fused into indifference or identity: rather the imagination sustains a 
productive tension between both poles –poetic ‘ideality’ and temporal reality – allowing each to 
illumine the other, or as we have seen that Coleridge would put it, to transform one another 
through a permeation or ‘translucence’ of the general in the particular, and vice versa.  
 
Here we must remember Kant’s crucial analysis of the nature and activity of productive 
imagination, as discussed earlier. For Kant, it will be recalled, imagination is a component of 
the mind’s constructive spontaneity, since all synthesis of the manifold of sense belongs to the 
imagination. And yet as a mode of intuition, imagination is intrinsically bound up with a 
sensible receptivity, which it can only synthesise on the basis of the conceptual, categorical 
forms to which its schematising activity is subservient. But again, such categorically structuring 
conceptual features could be said to depend on this same imaginative schematic activity, as a 
mode of hypotyposis, or presentation of concepts, on the basis of which concepts are introduced 
to sensible representations. On the one hand, transcendental imagination structures sensible 
apprehension, and does so in accordance with conceptual categories, which give experience its 
objectivity. On the other hand, and equally, the schematism according to which sensible 
apprehension is structured is an imaginatively apprehending activity, on the basis of which, 




Thus, for Kant, the factor which enables categorically structured time, as the interpretive form 
of inner sense, is the same transcendental imagination whose structuring activity in relation to 
the form of inner sense is enabled by the pure understanding. The transcendental imagination is 
thus both guide and guided: grounding the possibility of experience and grounded by the shape 
of possible experience as a whole. Again, we see that no temporally or logically un-ambivalent 
solution can be accorded to the possibility of human experience. Truthfulness in aesthetic 
interpretation, through artistic creativity, thus demands the eschewal of any objectively secured 
account of human existence – any idealistic, or as we shall see below, any sinuous, hedonistic 
attempt to falsify the intrinsically uncertain nature of the human condition, as essentially 
unfinished. Human beings can have no ultimate grasp of their own becoming. Such an account 
of, or relation to experience would amount to a premature claim for teleological fulfilment or 
self-salvific achievement. The illusion of teleological certainty of ‘Religiousness A’, as 
Kierkegaard saw, as equally the hedonistic aestheticism of the first part of Either/Or, as we 
shall see, are wish-fulfilling strategies that falsify experience. Such strategies are in fact flights 
from reality. 
 
In applying these Kantian findings to William’s thought, I suggest that imaginative productivity 
manifests a tension between structuring framework – this would be the poetic temporal schema 
– and the actual situation which invites interpretation in terms of the poetic temporality. So 
resuming our discussion of Williams theological aesthetics, I suggest that a poem can become 
significant as a source of opportunity on the basis of an actual life-context, while this same 
context is only viewable as a relevant opportunity on the basis of its poetic schematisation. Thus 
the ideal element – the poem – does not give a-temporal knowledge of temporal, or embodied 
Logos structure, rather such structure is made manifest through the ‘Coleridgean’ mutual 
permeation of the ideal and the real: the poetry and the reality.  
 
Granting, with Dunning, that it is fruitful and appropriate to read Williams’ thought through the 
template of Kierkegaardian existential thinking, then I believe this Kantian-imaginative model 
does far more justice to Williams, as also informing a more nuanced view of imaginative 
process as central to Kierkegaard’s conception of human existence. Recalling chapter one, we 
saw that Kierkegaard understands ethical self-realisation in general, and not just the 
appropriation of paradoxical faith, as not simply the following of objective ethical commands, 
but rather as involving the imaginative re-envisioning of life situations in new ways, as 
‘infinite’ thought-contents come to be seen as possibilities for actual becoming. It was seen in 
chapter two that the on-going, temporal movement of choosing oneself ethically is not a 
decision to do something, but an ‘indirect’ decision, and thus in the terms of Ferreira’s 
discussion of Kierkegaardian will, an act of interpretive effort, requiring imaginative mediation. 
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Through the choice to interpret imaginatively one is enabled to behave in accord with a given 
self-image. But this self-image or possibility is not regarded by Kierkegaard as if affording a 
discreet ‘picture’ to which one might unambiguously refer in order to take one’s ethical 
bearings. Rather, through imaginative activity, one becomes translucent to an emerging ethical 
possibility. Kierkegaard, like Coleridge, speaks in terms of concrete life becoming ‘permeated 
with consciousness’ (my italics): the ideal and the real are held in a productive tension, rather 
than dissolved in an idealistic synthesis of opposites, solely within the objectivity of thought. 
 
But Dunning does not think in terms of the Kierkegaardian imagination as mediating an 
interpretive and actually productive tension of real and ideal opposites in existence.  According 
to Dunning, Williams tends to forget that on the basis of his own theoretical limitation of the 
role of poetry, his distinguishing it from the actual existence which it can represent, poetic 
translations of a painful growth process can only achieve ideality, or aesthetic objectivity 
(religiousness A), and that such poetic insights must therefore leap over actual processive 
engagement and suffering.
826
 However, I believe that attention to Williams own words in this 
regard, as set out in the preface to Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind, might suggest a 
different interpretation, more in line with the Kierkegaardian position which I set out at the 
beginning of the chapter, and which I will now build on. Williams writes, 
The relation between poetic experience and actual experience, which has divided 
some critics, has been no more than touched on. That relation is of high 
importance, yet it is obscure. We must not make poetry serve our morals, yet we 
must not consider it independent of our morals. It is not a spiritual guide, yet it 
possesses a reality which continually persuades us to repose upon it even in 
practical things of everyday (my italics).
827
  
‘We have only to enjoy it’, Williams says next, but radically qualifies, and deepens, what any 
genuine joy derived from poetic insight would mean: ‘but only in proportion as we enjoy it with 
our whole being’ – that is, as appropriating, by embodying in our lives, the reality 
communicated by the verse – ‘can it be said of it that no man shall take its joy from us’. Thus 
Williams affirms an existentially illuminating role for poetry, while denying that it can serve as 
a spiritual guide or road map. The nature of poetic illumination will not be directly and 
straightforwardly translatable into any objective, didactic formula. 
 
It should be remembered that at the beginning of this chapter, as in chapter one, we saw that 
Kierkegaard regards subjective truth as a refusal of the temptation of objective certainty. 
Objective truth distorts the reality of existence, which is a matter of on-going and unfinishable 
                                                                        
826 Dunning, The Crisis and the Quest, p. 147 
827 Williams, Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind, p. vi. 
257 
 
interpretation. As ‘Inter-Esse’, the structure of subjectivity is poised always between ideality 
and reality: by interpreting reality linguistically, we are always already converting it into 
ideality. But such a translation or conversion is not any translation into the ‘Hegelian’ ideality 
of pure thought, since, in the Kierkegaardian analysis of existence (in Johannes Climacus, for 
example), it becomes clear that thought is aware that it is based upon or grounded in what 
Kierkegaard describe as ‘sensuous immediacy’, (in ‘Either/Or’). Similarly,  in  Reason and 
Beauty, Williams contrasts verse from prose on the basis that prose is always tempted to forget 
the limited nature of all human patterning, tempted towards the illusion of an unsituated, God’s-
eye ‘view from nowhere’. In verse, 
So long as this rhythmical form divides itself into lines and prints itself so 
(presumably because of some inner necessity of its nature), so long it makes 
ostentation a part of its very existence in a way in which prose does not. Prose 
pretends and tends to subdue its own method of existence to its business of dealing 
with its reader (...) Prose, especially sweet and rational prose, conceals its human 
limitations. It may argue or instruct or exhort, but all that while it subdues or hides 
from us the pattern which is our reminder that its conclusions are what they are 
because of its own limitations – which are the writer’s – which are in the nature of 
man. Man cannot know things by any means but through his own nature, and it is 
that nature in its thousand different capacities, but still only man’s, which the 
pattern of poetry makes ostentatious to us.
828
 
The prose through which our everyday engagements and interactions is mediated, and through 
which learned authors seek to give transparent clarity to questions concerning the ‘meaning of 
life’, can lead us to forget the perspectival, tentative nature of such linguistic mediation. Against 
such a tendency, Williams' characterisation of the ‘ostentation’ of verse points up the uncertain 
and interpretively constructed nature of real experience. The familiarity which our habituation 
to prose engenders tends to make one feel that one has some unquestionable purchase on reality, 
and therefore Williams insistence on a distinction between a world conjured within the strict 
patterning of verse, as distinct from our everyday life-world, is designed to block any escapist 
attempt through artistic creativity to foster an illusion of a-temporal certainty. Verse self-
consciously constructs its imagined world, while existence is the for the most part unaware of 
epistemological construction, and thus tends to be lulled into illusory certainties. Verse wakes 
us up, making us aware of constructive patterning, and is thus true to the nature of real 
experience, and simultaneously distant from any false and self comforting objectifications of 
existential uncertainty. 
 
                                                                        
828 Williams, Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind, pp. 7-8. 
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It seems to me, therefore, that William’s separation of actual life experience from poetic 
experience, (to which Dunning draws attention in objecting that Williams surreptitiously elides 
the distinction between existence and its poetic expression), is in fact oriented to the avoidance 
of an illusory certainty, belying our historically situated, essentially hermeneutical condition, 
through objective dogmatic didacticism.  
 
Williams’ existential/poetic distinction thus agrees with Kierkegaard’s objection to any attempt 
at a univocally direct or objectively mediated relation to religious truth. In a religious context, 
any didactic attempt to ‘mine’ poetry for univocally communicable theological ‘truths’ would 
constitute an objectification of Christian faith, and as such would remain within the aesthetic 
sphere of existence, as Kierkegaard understands the term, since there would be no 
‘reduplication’, or personal appropriation of the content of faith through what Kierkegaard 
describes as ‘second immediacy’: a reinstating of one’s life-world on the transformed basis of a 
receptive activity of imagination, as one re-interprets one’s world in relation to a paradoxical 
revelation that resists objective, conceptual mediation. It is through such imaginatively 
interpretive reduplication that the aesthetic aspect of human being finds a place in genuine faith. 
In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, this criticism of an objectifying relation to truth is 
levelled against both the formulaic lip-service of nominal ecclesiastical Christianity, and the 
zealotry of enthusiasts and pseudo-evangelical revivalists. True transcendence, as Kierkegaard 
sees it, lies beyond any objectively univocal account of the sacred. 
 
But here we come to the heart of the problem, as Dunning sees it. According to Dunning, this 
bodily availability of embodied meaning means that there is an immanent continuity of aesthetic 
revelation and our receptivity to it, as opposed to a paradoxical breach of immanence. For 
Dunning,
829
 this signifies that we are still in ‘religiousness A’, according to the Kierkegaardian 
paradigm, despite the existential turn which Williams has striven to give to poetic experience, 
through his envisaging of a responsibility of aesthetic interpretive acts.  
 
William’s embodied logos is, in effect, regarded by Dunning as an eternal substrate which 
individuals always already participate, which they can always already tap into. Thus I would 
suggest that Dunning sees Williams' theological scheme as a sort of Platonic reflex, or 
Platonism in reverse: the fallen or damaged noetic perspective is counteracted anamnetically by 
an already healthy embodied insight, as mediated through the physical patterns of poetry.  
 
                                                                        
829 Dunning, The Crisis and the Quest, p. 164-174. 
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Thus, for Dunning, a kind of inverted Platonism
830
 in William’s theological aesthetic leads to 
the same false, immanent securing of existential identity that we saw Kierkegaard attacking, 
earlier on, in the form of its own mirror image in Fear and Trembling, as a self-securing, 
conceptually a-temporal certainty.  
 
But I would maintain, on the contrary, that a tensional model of imaginative activity as an 
attentive effort of interpretive receptivity, such as we have been following to interpret the 
dynamics of faith in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, could offer a more adequate insight 
into William’s aesthetic theory, and thus into his poetic theology, because such an account is 
more alive to the subtleties of Kierkegaard’s account of imagination as a sustaining of 
interpretive tension between opposite tendencies and possibilities. To the extent that a human 
interpretive activity in response to revelation is neither purely active nor passive, it can be 
reasonably suggested that it is not a flat contradiction for Williams to regard human imaginative 
activity, whether in aesthetic composition or appreciation, as primarily a dis-possessive 
openness of interpretive response: an active passivity, or as Williams defines it in Mount Badon 
(above), a ‘passion of patience’ (my italics).  
 
In The Figure of Beatrice, as we shall see, Williams distinguishes between true and false 
romanticisms, along similar lines to our discussion in chapters six and seven with reference to 
an aesthetic dialectic of presence and absence. For Williams, true romantic or expressive 
creativity is always, and primarily, a response to genuine otherness. As explicitly opposed to the 
pseudo-romantic sentimentality of an egoistic and hedonistic manipulation of experience, such 
as is represented by the aesthetic anonym of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, the Figure of Beatrice is 
a Dantean theology of romantic love, in which true romantic experience is regarded as a turning 
towards a fuller and truer revelation of reality: an aesthetically mediated communication that 
orients one towards the appropriation of ever more abundant life. Williams sets this true 
romanticism in stark contrast to a self-serving manipulation of the revealed beauty of the Logos 
in creation, which he diagnoses as a desire to make the image serve the interpreter, rather than 
vice versa, in a refusal of saving conversion. Williams' contention in The Figure of Beatrice is 
that, in attempting to falsify reality by acting as if the created ego were the uncreated centre, the 
pseudo-romantic aesthete affirms non-being, inverting the Logos structure, and that such, 
ultimately, is the road to Dante’s Inferno.  
 
However, in order fully to vindicate Williams from the charge of a muddled and unintentional 
advocacy of self-salvation through poetic activity, some important intermediate steps of 
                                                                        
830 Such anamnesis is actually seen as arising from a differentiated identity of polar opposites, such as we have met with in reference 
to post-Kantian Naturphilosophie: a position which is characterised by Dunning as basically Heraclitean; see Dunning, The Crisis 
and the Quest, pp.168-169. 
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argument are still lacking. Against Dunning, we have been analysing William’s verse as itself a 
hermeneutically faithful aesthetic response, and as such, sharing the same basic structure as a 
Kierkegaardian model of imaginative activity at work in the appropriation of revelation in the 
life of faith. But we will need to look more closely at the problematic nature of Kierkegaard’s 
own attitude to purely artistic aesthetic activity. As Kierkegaard’s position stands, Dunning 
would appear to be right that there can be no role for human artistry in the mediation of 
revelation, no aesthetic mediation of the decision between Religiousness ‘A’ and Religiousness 
‘B’.  
 
The problem with this, as I have been suggesting from the beginning of this thesis, is that 
Kierkegaard’s position in fact cannot stand without finding a role for poetic or artistic activity 
in the mediation of revelation. As the intrinsic importance of his own strategy of indirect 
communication to any genuine faith relation makes clear, Kierkegaard’s account of the 
existential spheres, in so far as it banishes art from faith is structurally flawed. But more 
importantly, perhaps, it is also theologically flawed. For Kierkegaard, aesthetic activity can be 
redeemed only within the subject’s imaginative relation to revealed truth. Thus Kierkegaard will 
not allow that purely artistic, aesthetic activity can be a means at least of intimating the true 
freedom that is of course only fully revealed in Christ. And yet if the flesh is still not redeemed, 
if, simply as flesh, as the sensuous immediacy of living, created drives and even, by extension, 
cosmic energies, it remains in an external relation to the Law, then Kierkegaard’s paradox is not 
as radical as he suggests. In this case, the trans-subjective actuality of the paradoxical revelation 
– which need not imply a reified objectivity – is again restricted to subjective ideality, albeit in 
terms of an ‘existential’ experience that is more holistically conceived than Hegelian dialectical 
thought.  
 
I propose to show that for Williams, as for Kierkegaard, the ethical quality of existence is 
dependent on a free, personal decision. However, as seen, Kierkegaard regards all ‘external’ 
aesthetic interests as sub-serving egotistical hedonism. This means that, for Kierkegaard, all 
aesthetic appreciation of nature or art is simply seen as distracting the self away from the task of 
cultivating its own subjective freedom. Consequently decision will be a choice to move from 




As against this approach, in the Figure of Beatrice, Williams suggests the possibility that an 
ethical path may open up within the sphere of the aesthetic itself, which through the repeatedly 
demanded renewed of a decision to subordinate immediate sensible gratification to the 
                                                                        
831 As is made manifest in his writings under a variety of pseudonyms; I will be focusing on the pseudonymous anonym ‘A’ (‘the 
aesthete’) in Either/Or, as ‘edited’ by ‘Victor Emerita’, and the ‘Johannes Climacus’ of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
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appreciation and appropriation of a sensibly embodied presentiment of religious truth, can lead 
to real personal growth. Such is the path of salvation pursued by Dante, in response to, and led 
onward by the figure of Beatrice, in the Divine Comedy. The poem starts with Dante hesitating 
and disoriented in a wood, symbolising a moment of crisis that offers the possibility of the 
renewal of a course of poetic discipleship that has been lost sight of in the course of his life, and 
also reveals to him the inevitable price of its refusal in the Inferno.  
 
(3) Kierkegaard, Williams & Dante: The Aesthetic as Ethical 
 
As was discovered earlier in the chapter, ethical decision, according to Kierkegaard, must be 
continually re-affirmed and re-appropriated through life. I will try to show that such is indeed 
Williams’s view of the matter also, but with the crucial difference that, for Williams, ethical 
faithfulness can flourish in response to natural or artistic beauty. For Kierkegaard, on the other 
hand, such beauty can only really function as a snare, a distraction from ethical decision, rather 
than acting as a creative focus for personal growth towards the true, divine centre, and away 
from egocentricity, as Williams suggests. I propose, first, to demonstrate the primacy of the 
existential category of decision for both Kierkegaard and Williams, before examining the 
divergence of their paths. I will start by recurring to aspects of chapter one, in order to deepen 
my findings concerning aesthetic subjectivity by relating Kierkegaard’s account to Williams’ 
understanding of aesthetic existence in The Figure of Beatrice.  
 
As we saw in the first chapter, for Kierkegaard, Don Giovanni represents the nature of all pre-
verbal desire, or sensuous immediacy. ‘He’ is thus not really an individual, but a sort of non-
verbal, purely musically mediated ‘universal’: a pre-linguistic universal, a musical self-
revelation, music itself being understood as a deficient language, since without words it is 
unable to ascend to the level of ethical reflection. Don Giovanni is a symbol also of the Protean 
vitality of music, since this mirrors the nature of sheer physical desire: like ocean waves, 
musical forms or objects of desire rise and dissolve, surge and diminish only so that they can 
surge again with increased power. Such also is the aspiration of the aesthetic anonym for his 
own existence: he seeks endless variation for which thematic materials or contents - and even 
other people are made use of in this way – serve merely as opportunities for self-gratification. 
Aesthetic contents must divert, must be interesting, but are not regarded as intrinsically valuable 
in any way. They are related to solely in so far as they can temporarily assuage the insatiable 
hunger of a hedonistic egotism. To escape from boredom becomes the sole motivation for the 




Thus, as well as symbolising Kierkegaard’s understanding of music, Don Giovanni could also 
be seen as a symbol for the anonymous ‘author’ himself: the aesthete ‘A’. In Either/Or, the 
aesthete’s life-style emerges as one that seeks orientation solely from without, or which is in 
endless pursuit of external determination. In the pursuit of the outwardly diverting or 
interesting, and in the avoidance of boredom, particular pass-times are sought. Time, the 
unavoidable experience of process, is regarded by the aesthetically conditioned individual as the 
great enemy, as in the vividly claustrophobic experience of a nightmare when the desire for 
flight is unquenchable, in spite of the certainty of the futility of escape. Diversions are 
discovered by the self in flight from himself, but ego-centred enjoyment always palls, as itself a 
temporal, and thus passing phenomenon. The ego, however, impossibly wants to be an 
unchanging centre: it wants to be eternally blissful, to usurp the place of God. However the only 
opportunity of human consistency is temporal, is through the self-determination or decision for 
self limitation that is the carrying into effect of a course of action, and this is the very self-
limiting decision from which aesthetic existence flees. By wanting to be everywhere, the 
concupiscent, aesthetic self is lastingly or enduringly nowhere, and is thus intrinsically empty. 
By wanting the stability of a thing, an objective entity, the aesthetic will renders itself 





Buffeted from one eventual dissatisfaction to another, the necessarily disappointed aesthete 
wants to remain undetermined, to relate imaginatively to every momentarily interesting 
possibility, but to choose to embody none consistently. The aesthete is thus in a condition of 
despair, because he is a subject who does not want the temporally delimited conditions of 
subjectivity, which are however it’s only possibility for growth towards fulfilment. Human 
wholeness in this life is a directional project. To be a subject is to decide upon a course, and to 
pursue it over time. The aesthete in the first part of Either/Or is fighting against his own finite 
conditions as an existing subject who does not want to limit himself, unwilling to recognise that 





The aesthete, ‘A’, is truly anonymous or without identity, in a deeper sense than the authorial; 
or better, Kierkegaard, through this character, is exploring the sense in which all our lives are 
authorial constructions for which we bear the responsibility. It is true to character (or lack of it) 
that the anonym ‘A’ seeks to avoid identification with his own literary efforts: Kierkegaard, 
through this character, is attacking the early romanticism of Friedrich von Schlegel, in his 
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 See, for example, Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript (passim). 
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 before the influence of Schleiermacher and Schelling on his thinking. 
Through romantic-ironic self-consciousness, Schlegelian-Fichtian subjectivity is wilfully self-
distanced from any creative self-expression, as in itself an all determining and intrinsically 
undetermined, eternalised ego. Kierkegaard paints for us the disturbing picture of the 
existential, or ethical consequences of acting upon such an impossibility, a refusal of 
existence’s own finite, temporal conditions by an existing person leading ineluctably to an 
impasse of self-negating futility.  
 
The Schlegelian-Fichtean romantic impossibly wants to be without the effort of becoming; 
always seeking to avoid the choice of whom he is to become: who he is to try to be. 
Kierkegaard’s aesthetic anonym, in pursuit of romantic irony, and thus in flight from 
commitment, seeks to escape the unease of his self-contradictory predicament through thinking. 
Romantic irony is enthralled by the nature of self-consciousness, as theoretically reconstructed 
by Fichte as a self-subject which can never itself become an object, a power to be intuited, a 
reconstruction of the self derived from the Kantian epistemological condition of transcendental 
subjectivity. But Fichte’s transcendental idealism converts this epistemological norm into an 
ontological absolute. As absolutely self-positing, or absolved from all relative conditions and 
effects, this transcendental ego exists solely in and as thought. In accord with this theory of self-
consciousness, Kierkegaard’s Schlegelian anonym seeks to theorise himself out of all relational 
ties.  
 
But subjectivity is essentially relational, and comes to fruition through the responsibility of 
activity within a shared, public sphere of engagement, through the taking upon oneself of 
commitments and through a willingness to respond to the demands of others. Thought, as only 
potentiality for existence, is thus the only element within which the Schlegelian aesthete can 
approach himself, in flight from the painful self-contradiction that is his own failure to realise 
himself. Consequently, this idealising theorist of the self relates to himself through objective 
categories: he would objectify himself as an aesthetic object in his flight from the boredom of 
wasted time that is his own, inner, wasting away. He seeks, through thought, to absent himself 
from his own inwardness: in despair he despises himself, as an existence refusing to exist, 
vainly protesting against the conditions for self-realisation.  
 
The hedonistic egotist that Kierkegaard shows us is too intelligent not to recognise, while 
seeking to evade the recognition, that such a lack of innerness, such a futile existence is 
desperately claustrophobic: there can be no subjective, ethical development, because the self is 
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in constant flight from itself as an ethical task to be worked upon.
835
 And while empty selfhood 
is experienced as a prison, there can be no ultimate evasion of the self: there really is no way 
out in the direction in which the aesthete is looking.  
 
In the Figure of Beatrice, Charles Williams also identifies this ‘place’, or predicament in which 
Kierkegaard’s aesthete finds himself, through his theological interpretation of the poetry of 
Dante Alighieri. In the first Canto of the Inferno, this subjective wasteland is symbolised as a 
dark wood in which Dante
836
 has lost his way in the midst of life. In the wood, Dante’s way is 
blocked by a she-wolf,
837
  an image of the state of self-will or selfish desire that is threatening to 
consume him. A figure of insatiable hunger, the wolf tracks the poet, impeding movement out 
of the wood and causing him to regress ever deeper into it. The wolf is depicted as uncannily 
shadowing, yet determining, his every move. Virgil has been sent to Dante’s aid by the celestial 
Beatrice, and warning him of the wolf he explains that 
So bad and so accursed is her kind, 
That never sated is her ravenous will, 




The symbolic world of Dante is informed by Thomistic cosmology, and Williams interprets the 
imagery of the great poet in terms of his own, romantic theology. In this opening canto, Dante’s 
character is met at a moment of crisis, a moment of vital decision. In his youth, the poet had 
experienced a vision of pure, aesthetic beauty, an intimation of eschatological fulfilment. In 
interpreting the figure of Beatrice which overwhelms him, the young Dante experiences the 
promise of salvation as in a way already present, but still not yet attained: a living presence of 
ultimate possibility is glimpsed in the figure of a girl moving along a Florentine street in the late 
thirteenth century. This Beatrician event, as first described by Dante in his Vita Nuova, is, in 
Pauline terms,
839
 an intimation of the salvation achieved once for all time upon the Cross, and 
yet, paradoxically as that final achievement, still awaiting consummation. 
 
Beatrice is an ordinary girl in Florence, as fallible as anyone else, yet she is also the 
presentiment, for Dante, of her and his future beatitude, as glimpsed in an aesthetic response of 
love. It is to be noted that Williams follows Wordsworth, in The Figure of Beatrice and 
elsewhere, in focusing on a concept of the ‘feeling intellect’: a kind of imaginatively reflective, 
interpretive insight that is seen as the height of intellectual attainment, an intimation of an 
                                                                        
835 Kierkegaard, Either/Or part 1, p. 49. 
836 That is, the narrator of the poem: the poet’s self-characterisation in verse. 
837 Dante Alighieri, The Vision of Dante, Henry Francis Cary (tr.), (London: Oxford University Press, 1913), Inferno, Canto I, ll. 50-
56; (Cary chose to adopt this title for his translation of what is more commonly known as Dante’s Divine Comedy). 
838 Dante, Inferno, Canto I, ll. 93-95. 
839 David Horrell, An Introduction to the Study of Paul, (London: Continuum, 2000), pp. 66-67. 
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‘unknown mode of being’840 as combining, in a holistic, or ‘existential’ kind of insight, vital, 
affective and cognitive elements in poetic vision,
841
 through aesthetic response to the mystery of 
experienced beauty, and through the creative interpretation of that explorative response in verse. 
But, importantly, this image of Beatrice presents Dante with an ethical choice, and Williams 
holds that this is the case with all powerful aesthetic experience. Dante, in the poem, can either 
relate to the image manipulatively for the sake of immediate sensory gratification, or relate to it 
in open-hearted and attentive, imaginative receptivity, in willingness to discover, to be led 
beyond his present horizons.  
 
Thinking through the consequences of an ethical receptivity to beauty, Williams points to 
Dante’s equation of the image of the human form and philosophy, in another work, the 
Convivio:
842
 ‘the difficulties of the Summa seen as a compassionate lady? Yes, no doubt, but 
also the mysteries of a compassionate lady seen as another kind of Summa’.843 We have seen 
that, for Williams, the body is an organised index of the organising logos, structuring the 
universe; Dante expresses his relational appreciation of the potential significance of human 
beauty thus: the ‘divine light “radiates into her – I mean, in her speech and in those acts which 
we call her bearing and her behaviour”’.844 I think it is important to underline the essential 
relationality of such insights: it is in loving attentiveness to human otherness, that is also an 
aesthetic appreciation, that Dante becomes ethically more than he could have been before; the 
ethics of beauty were manifested to him in relation to a particular individual: through loving 





So in the poem La Vita Nuova, which recounts the birth of his love for Beatrice, the youthful 
Dante is faced with the choice between growing in love (and, indeed, into divine Love), or 
merely basking in the sheer sensual pleasure of his awakening to the beauty of a human form. 
Years later, at the beginning of the Inferno, we have witnessed Dante’s experience of spiritual 
impasse, having fallen from the ‘way of affirmation of images’ (Williams’ description of the 
aesthetic via positiva that his theology explores). The existential decision arising from a purely 
aesthetic encounter is between the ‘dark wood’ of aesthetic emptiness, an ego-centric flight 
from true selfhood and ethical growth, which Kierkegaard so vividly portrays in Either/Or, and 
the attentive willingness to see the other as an index to the archetype of all beauty, and to grow 
                                                                        
840 Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, p. 14. 
841 Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, p. 62; Charles Williams, Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1933), p. 32. 
842 Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, pp. 60-68. 
843 Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, p. 60. 
844 Dante, Convivio (III, vii), quoted in Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, p.63. 
845 Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, p. 158. 
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through loving fidelity to the aesthetic image: a willingness to forego hedonistic manipulative 
strategies. 
 
The hedonistic aesthete, as delineated through the first part of Either/Or, avoids the demands of 
self-development by relating to himself solely through thought, as an objectification of himself. 
Kierkegaard’s aesthete is utterly self-alienated: as if lost deep in Dante’s dark wood, he will not 
recognise that to know the truth about oneself is not a matter of mere theory. For Kierkegaard, 
thought by itself is powerless to give one actual knowledge of oneself, since it relates only to 
whom one might possibly become: it is mere potentiality. A truly existential thinker takes upon 
himself to become the content of his thought, to embody it through self-activity. Really to know 
oneself, one must become what one knows, and this may prove utterly different from what one 
had imagined before the sphere of ethical actuality was entered through decision. Thus for 
Kierkegaard, ethico-religious truth is essentially un-pre-thinkable, and is so most radically in 
relation to paradoxical Christian revelation: existence’s highest relational opportunity, as an 
intimation of its true, eschatological fulfilment. The final word concerning who we are to be is 
Christ’s – not ours. 
 
For Kierkegaard, self-determination through decision is fundamental to the structure of 
existence, of subjectivity. Even the avoidance of personal commitment is a matter of personal 
responsibility, for which there is a price to pay.
846
 The nature of Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
decision, and thus the reason for the central importance of the concept of decision within the 
Kierkegaardian project, are brought out most clearly in relation to his critique of Hegelian 
idealism.
847
 Hegel’s ‘movement’ of dialectical thought is shown to be an illusion of process. 
Transformation of thought patterns occurs over the course of people’s lives, by virtue of the 
quality of their situation and interactions, and such transformation is a temporal process. 
People’s thoughts change, but Hegelian dialectical movement is an abstraction from the reality 
of thinking, which is always a property of interactive, embodied thinkers enduring and altering 
through changes in circumstances, and whose thought processes develop and change 
accordingly. Hegelian dialectical change, the ‘process’ of conceptually driven ‘movements’ in 
metaphysical logic, is nothing but a concept of change, itself an unchanging thought with no 
power of self-alteration. Existence as a process is oriented through the dynamism of the will. In 
so far as an existent human being is a thinker, his thoughts will change, but the dynamism 
belongs to the existing individual, not to his capacity to think treated as an abstract 
metaphysical principle. 
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For Kierkegaard, ethical decisions actually occur in existential time, an enduring growth 
process, as we have learned from Bergson. Hegelian dialectical movement, on the other hand, is 
illusory. The passage from possibility to actuality, the movement to decisive action, or from 
thought to reality, from plan to effect or from the possibility of belief to active faith, is actually 
un-sayable, in so far as it is an actual movement, a conversion or commitment of the will to act 
in a given manner. That this conversion-in-commitment is literally un-sayable, in itself, is 
because words express concepts, which, as generalisations, are merely abstractions from 
moving reality. As we learned from Bergson, words are names or notations cut out of the 
temporal flux, and such labels lack movement, as intrinsically inert. Therefore words cannot 
state the processive medium from which they have been abstracted. As static momentary 
snapshots of moving reality, words derive from the temporal flow, but are not imbued with its 
dynamism. Potential belief turns into active faith through time, whereas the conceptual 
abstractions of Hegelian ‘pure’ thought have in themselves no independent temporal existence, 
and what does not itself manifest motility cannot be said to change or endure in its own right. 
Existent actuality is temporal; thought’s reality is, in contrast to actual existence, a-temporal 
potentiality. The knowledge that a decision has been reached is not itself the actual process of 
deciding.
848
 Neither is knowing what love is like the actual experience of falling in love, any 
more than studying human nature is the same as leading a particular style of life. 
 
Like Bergson, therefore, Kierkegaard points out the inadequacy of words and concepts to 
discern the flowing movement of actual life. Just as Bergson criticises Kant’s ‘spatialised’ time-
line, as we have seen, so Kierkegaard objects to Hegel’s illusory interaction of concepts in pure 
thought. We will see in the last chapter how some romantic thinkers saw the same deficiency. 
Wackenroder and Schopenhauer both realised that music can discover the nature of the flow of 
emotional experience: where words generalise, music can present the shades and nuances of 
emotional movement. With the same insight, Susanne Langer notes that music functions as a 
‘presentational’, purely connotative symbolism. Kierkegaard’s point is that the development of 
spirit is not something that one can discover objectively, as Hegel would have it, by finding out 
through his publications that the ‘world-spirit’ has now overcome Christianity by fulfilling and 
making overt, as absolute idealism, its hitherto undeveloped and imagistic, conceptual content. 
Rather, Kierkegaard points out that to develop spiritually is for an existing subjectivity to grow 




However, I believe that focused as he was on the need to defend ethical realities in the face of 
the Hegelian project, and of Schlegelian romantic irony, Kierkegaard could not or did not 
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268 
 
envisage the possibility of any genuine ethical decision-making emerging from within the 
aesthetic dimension of existence. In this regard, I suggest that he interpreted the aesthetic sphere 
too narrowly, and thus tarred all sensible aesthetic appreciation with the same, Schlegelian 
brush, as it were. Even Friedrich Schlegel himself moved away from the purely Fichtean origins 
of his thinking, inspired by Schelling’s natürphilosophie and Schleiermacher’s conception of 




Williams’ approach to aesthetics recognises the real, ethical possibilities inherent in aesthetic 
experience, and thus its potential pitfalls: pitfalls which involve the possibility of refusing to 
choose between selfish sensuality and ethically responsive attentiveness altogether. In the 
Inferno, Dante and his guide, Virgil encounters Limbo, the place of what Williams describes as 
‘the suspended imagination’.851 Here, Williams says, are all those who have neither chosen to 
serve love, nor to have love serve them; but not to choose is also to experience the Hell of 
willed non-being. The souls in Limbo experience the emptiness which Kierkegaard’s 
anonymous aesthete is compelled to, but unable to flee from: the inner emptiness that leads 
ultimately to the hellish state of ‘never for ever’.852 The souls in Limbo that would not decide, 
just as much as those who chose egotism in Hell proper, have equally ‘willingly insisted on the 
necessity of their own wishes’.853  
 
Further into the Inferno, in the first circle of hell, Francesca da Rimini and Paolo, her adulterous 
lover, are encountered by Dante, both of them eternally ensnared in the choice of their own 
sensual gratification. Francesca and her lover are locked into what Williams describes as ‘the 
first, tender, passionate, and half-excusable consent of the soul to sin’.854  The excuse however 
is, ‘precisely’, the sin.855 What Dante describes as ‘lussuria’ is self-yielding or indulgence, and 
thus the opposite of the displacement of the ego. The choice is between the via positiva, or way 
of affirmation of images, and their self-interested manipulation: in terms of Dante’s poetry, 
between the image of Beatrice and the image of Francesca.  
 
For Williams this is a choice between Francescan pseudo-romanticism and Beatrician 
romanticism;
856
 between self-interested wallowing and manipulation – making oneself, and not 
Love, the centre – and spiritual growth through imaginative, empathic insight. I believe this to 
be a key distinction as regards the argument of my thesis, because it sheds light on what I 
perceive to be the flaw in Kierkegaard’s stance towards aesthetic experience and imagery. 
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854 Williams, The Figure of Beatrice, p. 117. 
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Ethical decision arises within the aesthetic sphere, unavoidably. One can ethically choose to 
grow through a response of what Kant might describe as disinterested interest, to respect the 
alterity of the image, personal or artistic, or one can choose to manipulate others hedonistically, 
or in another and equally perverse aspect, sentimentally choose to falsify the terms of one’s 
engagement with reality, in either case distorting the truth for some perception or calculation of 
gain. Pleasure, fear, avoidance of pain, whatever the motive for the self-indulgent choice might 
be, Dante shows us that an all-consuming egotist could well end up eating out his own heart for 
all eternity. 
 
But ethical decision, for Kierkegaard, can only represent a move entirely away from the 
aesthetic into a separate ethical sphere.
857
 Nevertheless, we have seen that any crude 
understanding – in terms of a direct ‘fiat’ of the will – of the nature of the decision that 
mediates between Kierkegaard’s existential spheres is indeed mitigated by Ferreira’s 
uncovering of the role of imaginative activity in such transitions. But Kierkegaard still cannot 
admit that any externalised or artistic imaginative activity and receptivity could play a role in 
ethical decision making, and this is the case in spite of the indirect, aesthetic nature of his own 
project of anonymous authorship. Kierkegaard’s Christian irony tries to enable an awareness of 
a paradoxical truth that could never, in principle, come to direct and thus non-paradoxical 
statement: the reality of the God-man. This consideration goes to show that poetic creativity and 
appreciation demand a place in Kierkegaard’s thinking which, however, he is unwilling to grant 
them. I believe that Charles Williams’ thinking offers a model of a kind of ethical aesthetics 
that would be compatible with the Kierkegaardian project. Williams discovers a moment of 
decision arising within the sphere of the aesthetic, as an intrinsically ethical choice.  
 
In Williams’ terminology, one might say that Kierkegaard can only discern the possibility of a 
‘Francescan’ aesthetic, of an egotistical aesthetic relation, in spite of the aesthetic qualities of 
his own pseudonymous authorship, and the purpose which he seeks to serve through such a use 
of poetically indirect communication of truth. Williams would regard the aesthetic relation as 
portrayed in Either/Or as an aberration, but makes a distinction between egocentricity and an 
aesthetic norm of disinterested interest. For Kierkegaard, on the other hand, the aberrant relation 
is the norm. Given his high valuation of human embodied-ness, it should be noted that Williams 
takes pains to point out that he is not advocating some sort of sexual Puritanism.
858
 The question 
is the appropriateness of response in any given situation. In some contexts physical enjoyment 
is central to the fruition of aesthetic experience. But for physical pleasure to be an appropriate 
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response, it would involve the mutuality of self-giving love, and be part of a wider loving 
relationship: as Williams writes, ‘the intention of fidelity is the safeguard of romanticism’.859 
 
Williams notes two stages that are involved in relation to the Beatrician response. At first, in the 
Vita Nuova, Dante is immediately affected by the appearance of Beatrice: ‘la sua immagine’.860 
This image brings on a reaction, which Dante describes as a ‘quality’ of himself towards 
Beatrice.
861
 This could be described, I think, as an existential reaction, as it affects Dante 
(according to the physiological understanding of his time) holistically, in all three aspects of his 
being: the ‘spirit of life’ in the heart; the ‘animal spirit’ in the perceptual faculty; the ‘natural 
spirit’, or seat of organic life.862 Dante’s whole being responds, including his ‘spiritual emotions 
and intellectual perceptions’, recognising and experiencing a newly emergent quality of his 
being: love. Later on the quality of love is said to affect Dante in the form of an agony of 
choice. At first, Dante revelled in the sheer experience of his feelings towards Beatrice, noting 
how it imbued his reactions to all around him. But love later appears to him in a dream, telling 
him ‘I am the centre of a circle to which all parts of the circumference are in a similar relation; 
but you are not so’.863 Williams points out that this mysterious utterance bears a striking 
resemblance to St. Bonaventure’s famous dictum, ‘God is a circle whose centre is everywhere 
and whose circumference is nowhere’. For Bonaventure, God is omnipresent, and therefore 
every loving encounter is potentially an opening up of a way to God, a via affirmativa. God is at 
the centre of each human being, and human being is essentially relational: our personal relations 
thus find there ultimate fruition in relation to their Trinitarian archetypes. But Dante’s dream 
considers the love relation from another, complimentary aspect to that of Bonaventure. God is 
love itself, whereas the love which Dante experiences in relation to Beatrice is an ‘accident’, (in 
scholastic terminology): a quality of his being. Dante is not substantial love, but whether he 
experiences love or not still depends on external circumstances: he is on the periphery of a love 
that is in itself infinite; a centre without circumference. Dante is still relating love to his finite 
ego, with the ego at the centre of his experienced world, rather than displacing his ego by 
subordinating his own self-interest to love, which, in its divine origination, is in fact his true 
self-interest. So his dream of love personified tells him ‘flee away, if you find it tiresome to 
perish’.864  
 
Dante is faced, therefore, with a decision: he can continue to bask in what Kierkegaard might 
describe as the ‘sensuous immediacy’ of Either/Or, indulging his pleasure until it inevitably 
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palls, (as pall, in time, it must), or he can place his experience at the service of love, rather than 
manipulating his experience of love. The choice decides whether he will undergo ‘a little 
death’, recognising that his ego is not the centre, that he is a creature, not the Creator. He says ‘I 
have set my feet in that part of life beyond which it is not possible to go with any intention of 
return’; ‘I grow drunk with a great trembling, and seem to hear the very stones crying out to me 
“Die, die!”’.865 Williams comments that this is the ‘choice of self preservation and self-loss’. 
Beauty and joy are ‘absolute over him’: for Dante, it is either ‘flight or death’. 
 
What if Dante had not chosen to serve love, but to manipulate it as a self-centred creature (and 
thus a contradiction in terms: the experienced non-being of hell for Dante, and subjective 
despair for Kierkegaard)? At the beginning of the Inferno we meet Dante years after the events 
of the Vita Nuova, and he is, as we have seen, at crisis-point. Lost in a wood of self-deceit, he 
faces a wolf, the symbol of the course which his self-centred desire is set upon. Here Dante has 
lost sight of love, ‘il bel del’inteletto’, and is confronted by the image of the wolf as the 
opposite of the image of Beatrice: the refusal of the little death which is the self-displacement of 
the via positiva.  
 
The insatiable wolf is Dante’s anti-telos, as it were, and ‘lean with infinite craving’:  a figure for 
self-will. Kierkegaard’s aesthete is described, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as 
essentially ‘a depression’, a void where there should be an active subjectivity: ‘an existence 
possibility which cannot attain existence’.866 Williams would agree that the insatiability of the 
wolf of self-will is inevitably self-destructive. And yet where Kierkegaard can only envisage the 
via negativa, in spite of his own creativity in religiously significant writing, Williams celebrates 
the way of affirmation of images. 
 
(4) Kierkegaard, Williams & Shakespeare: A Reconciliation of Indirect Communication 
and Poetry 
 
It is important to note that the way of human relationships is, for Williams, only one possible 
method of the affirmative way. For example,
867
 Williams speaks of Wordsworth as pursuing 
romantic affirmation through the imagery of nature, and symbolism is the key to the way, 
whichever images it is focused through. Williams follows Coleridge in defining symbolism. As 
we have already learned in an earlier chapter, the Coleridgean symbol must have its own 
subsistence, whilst being derived from and representing that greater whole from which it 
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 In Reason and Beauty in the Poetic Mind, Williams explores a mode of the way of 
affirmation whose symbolic value resides solely in poetic style.  
 
For Williams, the style alone of Shakespeare’s late plays is the uniquely distinctive medium 
through which a possible eschatological order is glimpsed, albeit evanescently. Here I find the 
corrective to Kierkegaard’s self-defeating failure to admit the possibility of a via positiva that 
would also make sense within the theoretical matrix of Kierkegaardian thought, and that could 
thus offer a rationale for Kierkegaard’s own practice of indirect communication in terms that he 
might recognise as related to the existential outlook and parameters of his own thinking. 
 
In order to understand what Williams has to say about the nature of late Shakespearian drama, it 
will be helpful to look first, and in some depth, at what I believe to be the implications of his 
theory of the nature of poetic reality as stylistically mediated.
869
 By interacting related themes 
and findings pertaining to Coleridge’s thought, as previously discovered, with that of Williams, 
I hope to enhance insight into the thinking of both, as I find their suggestions to be reciprocally 
enriching. 
 
Williams regards a poetic style as a verbally embodied form of articulation: a rhythmic, sensible 
patterning which conveys the ‘how?’ of a given theme, by which I mean the manner in which a 
disclosure about the poet’s world or imagined order is expressed,870 or how its reality is 
imaginatively construed. In fact, the nature of that envisaged order is given through an 
overarching vision, and this is primarily disclosed by the manner of the arrangement in which 
his words, or what he has to say, is conveyed. Diction, or choice of words conveys this ‘what?’ 
through plot, character-description and dialogue. But the world in which characters move and 
interact is conveyed through an overall, imaginatively construed patterning: through the poet’s 
distinctive style: ‘The poet, as well as the reader, discovers (i) his own method of experiencing, 
(ii) his own method of communicating that experience.’871 What the poet thinks he may want to 
say may be radically different from what emerges within the overall pattern of the poetry, as his 
images come to life through a unique stylistic arrangement of materials. A poetic, formally 
constructive act is itself an investigation of the ‘how’ or manner in which an aesthetic 
experience unfolds to, for and, importantly, with the attentive, co-operative, interpretive activity 
of the poet.  
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At this point, I will go beyond Williams' text, in light of our earlier engagement with the 
aesthetic thinking of Coleridge, to propose an experience of landscape as an example of an 
aesthetic experience. Such an experience would unfold as a unique relationship between the 
poet and what he sees: Williams ‘method of experiencing’, as quoted above. The aesthetic 
experience has an intrinsically relational mode of being: like a rainbow, it exists as the 
interaction between the object seen and the subjective view. In Coleridge’s terms, object and 
subject interpenetrate and the interpenetration is the aesthetic, interpretive experience. Before 
the writing of a poem is attempted, interpretation is already embodied in and as the unique 
quality of aesthetic disclosure. The experienced landscape must be distinguished from the 
subject experiencing and the object experienced; it is an imaginative reality, a reflective in-
dwelling of the landscape by the poet, a permeation of inner and outer realities. The aesthetic 
experience, the interpenetration of object and subject in a specific manner or method of 
experiencing is an imaginative mode of being, sui generis, and as such, irreducible to either of 
its subjective or objective aspects. Therefore not what is seen, but how it is seen is the aesthetic 
experience, and poetic communication will depend primarily on the poet’s imaginative ability 
to construe this unique mode of experience through the arrangement of words in an overarching 
style: a formal ‘idea’, in the Kantian sense of aesthetic idea, or organising principle of the poem. 
According to the organic conception of aesthetics addressed in relation to Kant’s Critique of 
Judgement and Coleridge’s aesthetics, the words as parts will derive their significance from 
their place in the overarching whole, within the style or imaginative ordering: the ‘how’ of the 
‘what’ that is being said. 
 
The style itself is obviously never something directly expressed, as a mode of being and not an 
entity. The style is read between the lines, as it were, it is the organising dynamic of the 
arrangement of the lines and of the words within the lines, the imaginative medium through 
which they render the relational quality of the reality of the original aesthetic experience: how 
subjectivity interacts with objectivity. Specific contents thus take on a unique, relational 
significance within an imaginative construal ordering a poetic whole, which itself expresses an 
original permeation of content and form, of landscape and subjectively receptive engagement 
(according to our example).  
 
The mode of being of the poet’s aesthetic experience is externalised in his creative expression 
of that experience, but what emerges might not, perhaps, be what the poet first envisaged 
himself expressing. The act of ordering his experience in effect reconstructs, re-construes it. 
While there is an analogy between actual experience and poetic reality, the reality of the poem 
is an integrity in its own right. The analogue is not a mere copy, but an imaginative recreation 
of the experience of landscape. The authentic affective quality of the poet’s encounter with 
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nature can thus only be accessible to an imaginatively empathic interpretation on the part of the 
reader, as a dynamic mode of experience only indirectly communicated, and indeed only 
indirectly communicable, through its poetic analogue. 
 
Only what is said can be directly communicated through verbal labelling. Essences or quiddities 
can be defined exactly, but dynamic movement, the flow of emotional response and the 
particular aesthetic colouration lent by interpretation to that which inspires it, unfolds after a 
particular manner through time, and this durational quality of experience, to which Bergson 
pointed us in an earlier chapter, can only be indirectly expressed. 
 
In Kantian terms, the poet’s attentively open and reactive interaction with nature, the free 
movement and interplay of conceptuality and imagination, manifests poetically as an aesthetic 
idea, or dynamic focus for conceptual reflection. More simply, in Williams’ terms, this is the 
poem’s style; in Kierkegaard’s terms, this is aesthetically indirect communication. 
 
Thus the meaning of a poet’s experience, embodied in a poem, becomes manifest ‘between the 
lines’ as an indirect stylistic communication. Style is a formal pattern, a finite construct for 
Williams, through which the conceptually indeterminable quality of the movement of 
experience is encapsulated, in indirect translation. The formal stylistic pattern gives access, by 
intimation, to a directly inexpressible manner of being (the poet’s mode of interaction with the 
natural scene). The style thus bodies forth a unique, finite perspective on an infinite, in the 
sense of conceptually indeterminable, experience.  
 
The poem’s style is how the poet communicates his experience, but it is also an opportunity for 
the reader as the communication of an interpretive possibility, having the power to enrich the 
reader’s future engagement with reality, potentially extending his horizons of experience. In so 
doing, the poem can potentially introduce new possibilities for the reader’s subjective 
becoming. Who the reader is can be altered and enriched by extending his capacities to feel and 
participate in the world around him, exploring hitherto unsuspected modes of engagement with 
reality. 
 
Like a Coleridgean symbol, this poetic, stylistic construct is neither subjective nor objective, but 
more than, though transformatively inclusive of both poles of experience, as focused through 
the burning lens of imagination. Even though the poetic style is the work of the poet, who could 
be said in one sense to impose the structure on the material, it would be equally true to say that 
the poetic act will also modify and enrich the poet, as we have suggested that the act of poetic 
reconstruction of experience will externalise it, and thus constitute a new mode of relation to his 
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own experience: an unsuspected aspect of it, that could not have been suspected before the 
process of writing. The experience and the poet will both change through the act of poetic 
construction. As Williams expresses it, the poem ‘has absorbed into itself not merely the fact 
[what is expressed] but the poet experiencing the fact, and has made a harmony of both – has 
indeed made a new thing of both, which is to us a new experience’.872 I now move to examine a 
uniquely important instance of such stylistic, poetic indirection. 
 
Williams discerns three stages in Shakespeare’s aesthetic development.873 In the early plays, 
(for example, the ‘history plays’), concentration is focussed on plot, on logical sequencing of 
events. The overriding linguistic concern is with the direct expression of what happens. A 
second stage of development, represented by the great tragedies, (for example, Hamlet, 
Macbeth, King Lear), focuses attention of character interaction. How relationships are played 
out, how or in what manner characters develop through dynamic interaction becomes the 
dominant aesthetic concern. Through the gradual disclosure of characters in interaction, 
Shakespeare is able to intimate, suggestively, through a rhetorically indirect use of language, an 
overarching ‘metaphysical’ picture of distortions in the cosmic ordering of his imagined world: 
Shakespeare indirectly shows us through the disrupted and destructive patterning of human 
relationships how the ‘times are out of joint’. If the early plays primarily denote significance 
through the verbal construction of plot-lines, the middle period tragedies indirectly connote or 
intimate metaphysical insights through dialogical character disclosure. In a final phase, 
represented by the late comedies, Shakespeare, according to Williams, relativises considerations 
of both plot and character – the objective denoting of the ‘what’ and the inter-subjective 
connotation of the ‘how’ of his aesthetic vision – in a manner reminiscent of the view of poetic 
creativity that we have just been examining, above. In this third phase of Shakespeare’s creative 
development, Williams suggests, echoing Coleridge, that both plot and character disclosure 
interact to become as it were translucent to one another in a purely stylistic, organisational 
‘reconciliation of discordant elements’ in verse which is organised around the construction of a 
pregnant moment or perhaps Χαιρος: a finite, cumulative ‘moment’ of significance intimating 
an eternal wholeness through the sheer power of an informing style.
874
 Speaking, for example, 
of the characters of Miranda and Ferdinand in The Tempest, Williams writes: 
Those two exist for and in their moment alone. The unities of dramatic 
concentration are so present – as they always should be but rarely are – that all past 
and future maybe felt in the instant, but as the instant and not as themselves. Truth 
and beauty, from whatever cause, are here absolutely one in the perfection of 
Shakespeare’s style; itself as magical as the enchanted island, as earthly as 
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Caliban, as elemental as Ariel, as lovely as Miranda. In a too rash fantasy the 
island itself might seem to float for its permitted hour in its ocean as the earth itself 
might seem to float in blue space, and upon it the principles of human life, 
incarnate in forms, live and move and are harmoniously united in the composure of 
delight. But so far a dream is our own dallying with the innocence of love; we may 
indulge but not impose it. We must not repose upon anything but the style – the 
manner of diction and rhythm, the purpose and dramatic meaning with which the 
diction and rhythms were used.
875
 
The aesthetic vision of an eschatological order is nonsense in direct statement, or in terms of 
‘fancy’ as distinct from productive ‘imagination’, as we have learned to differentiate them with 
Coleridge. True religious significance may be intimated indirectly, through the tensile unity of 
style, as a ‘Coleridgean symbol’ or Kantian ‘aesthetic idea’. Williams regards the style of late 
Shakespearian drama as a summit of such aesthetically indirect vision. 
 
Through the manner in which Shakespeare interacts his materials, a higher order of vision 
comes to expression, though through nothing more than a certain unique ‘method of 
experiencing’ in terms of the organisation of linguistic significances.876 Williams contends that 
in Shakespeare’s later works, in plays such as Cymbelene or The Tempest, a vision of order 
restored, of times no longer ‘out of joint’ emerges.  
 
Like light dispersing a mist,
877
 Shakespeare’s imaginative horizon clears in the late dramas, and 
does so utterly unforeseeably, as supervening upon the rigorously envisioned, and relentlessly 
carried-out self-implosion of his imaginative world in the middle period tragedies.
878
 Those 
dark works embody the fruits of a willingness to look into the abyss of human self-
destructiveness, as born of a persistent aesthetic truthfulness, and as such, an ethical honesty of 




This study of Williams’ romantically and existentially informed theology has attempted to 
explore the possibilities of a genuinely un-foreseeable, or un-pre-thinkable process of artistic 
discovery, through which intimations of religious significance may dawn upon an ethically 
attentive, aesthetic receptivity. Williams calls the first chapter of Reason and Beauty in the 
Poetic Mind ‘The Ostentation of Verse’. As we have seen in this chapter, Williams claims that 
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poetic reality, through its highlighting of the patterned nature of all human experience – its 
interpretive and perspectival character – is intrinsically truer to experienced reality than prose, 
which tends to foster the illusion of a God’s eye view, a ‘view from nowhere’. I hope in the 
foregoing paragraphs to have indicated how aesthetically reflected experience and its poetic 
communication might disclose truths to which objective prose may be completely blind. It is 
reasonable to suggest, on this basis, that freed from the theological stumbling block of an 
overarching metaphysical apriorism, the claims, examined earlier, of romantic natürphilosophie 
and aesthetic theory to open a vista onto a dynamic natura naturans (completely overlooked by 
a narrow, Enlightenment conception of reason) may be shown to have some basis in actual 
aesthetic and poetic experience. I have sought to integrate my findings regarding Kierkegaard, 
Coleridge, Bergson and Kant, through an examination of Williams’ poetic theology. In 
addressing Williams’ interpretation of Dante in The Figure of Beatrice, my exploration of a 
common motivation between Kierkegardian theological ethics and a specifically Christian 
account of romantic aesthetics has been deepened along the lines of the ethico-aesthetic model 
laid down in chapter seven of my thesis. Finally, in focusing on one particular example of a 
poetic style, that of the late plays of William Shakespeare, as Williams sees it, I have 
discovered a specific, religiously significant use of indirect, stylistic communication in action as 
poetic art, thus justifying a role for poetry in the indirect communication of religious truth, 







The Tradition of Imagination as a Metaphysical Mediating Principle 
 
This idea of a medium between matter and mind derives from very ancient roots in the 
philosophy of imagination. The Neo-Platonists Porphyry, Iamblichus and Synesius discuss 
variations of an idea of imaginative mediation between hypostatic Mind or Nous, and the World-
Soul emanating from it. Imagination or Phantasia is said to be the aetherial or astral body – a 
tenuous reality halfway between matter and mind – that mediates between the intelligible and 
sensible realms of being, and in Iamblichus, the medium of Divine, oracular communication. 
Drawing on a Stoic, pantheistic conception of Pneuma or Spiritus – a quasi-material, breath-
like, and thus intangible medium of the World-Soul’s unity – the imagination is regarded as a 
metaphysical vesture, the first bodily shape into which the immortal and immaterial rational 
element of the human soul descends, and through which it can perceive itself as reflected in the 
multiple shapes of the rationally structured world, which are its own otherness. This conception 
of imagination, or phantasia as a medium between the mind and the senses ultimately derives 
from Aristotelean psychology.  
 
See Iamblichus, De Mysteriis, Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon and Jackson P. Hershbell (tr.) 
(Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 3.11, 3.14; P. Hadot, The Veil of Isis, Michael 
Chase (tr.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 59-60, 332-3; J. M. Cocking, 






Bergson’s Critique of Kantian Time: Intensive Magnitude 
 
We have seen how Bergsonian philosophical intuition gains in rational clarity in the light of 
Kant’s aesthetic mode of conceptually indeterminate judgement. Here we will see in more detail 
how Bergson’s thinking, in turn, can enable effective critical insight to be brought to bear on 
Kant’s under-nourished and spatialised concept of time. In the light of what Bergson has to say 
in this regard, we can deepen our understanding of how that Kant’s findings concerning time 
are only true in relation to determinate, empirical knowledge. 
 
While Bergson appropriates Kantian insights about the nature of organisms in reflecting upon 
duration, he is strictly opposed to any traditional conception of teleology, or final causation, in 
elaborating his metaphysic. We have seen in chapter four that Bergson’s philosophy of 
metaphysical process is to be preferred to Schelling’s romantic idealism on theological grounds. 
Revelatory theology cannot be subordinated to a philosophical conceptual scheme that can 
know the nature of ultimate reality in advance. Bergson’s thinking, as we also saw in that 
chapter, prioritises and promotes emergent novelty. The Bergsonian future arises in the course 
of meaningful process, but no Kantian time-line is draw on which to plot that future, translating 
a flow of qualitative difference into schematic, or quantitatively based re-patternings of the past.  
 
Bergson criticises Kant over his account of the category of quality, both in the section on 
‘Schematism’ and in the ‘Anticipations of Sense Perception’, in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Kant’s schematism of quality (according to judgemental moments of reality, limitation and 
negation) deals with the transcendental determination of the reality of sensation, considered as a 
material factor in empirical perception in independence from its spatio-temporal formal 
conditions. But this consideration is in terms of continuous quantity, as measurable in degrees. 
It is to this quantification of experiential quality that Bergson objects.  
 
In his Time and Free Will, Bergson maintains the irreducibly qualitative nature of the temporal 
succession of consciousness. Bergson argues against Kant that the concept of ‘intensive 
magnitude’, through which he attempts to measure qualitative change, is incoherent. We will 
discuss the Kantian concept of intensive magnitude below. Bergson deems it a bogus quantity, 
misrepresenting fluid, qualitative transition. Bergson insists that the flow of consciousness 
cannot be adequately measured, and thus translated in terms of quantity, because any accurate 
calculation of qualitative experience is intrinsically impossible. The Bergsonian position I am 
argued for, against Kant, can be summarised as follows: there can be no degrees of sensation, 
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but only ‘sensation of degree’. Once acknowledged, this criticism can be usefully related to 
Kant’s account of time and imagination. I shall now explain what I mean. 
 
For Kant, elements of being and non-being are always co-implicated in the knowledge of any 
finite reality. This is because Kantian objectivity is a unification in judgement for a 
transcendental subjectivity, and all acts of judgement negate: by affirming something, all other 
possibilities for judgement are ruled out. All affirmation in judgement is also negation, as the 
thing affirmed is both limited and enabled through its relation to everything else. The being of 
anything is not only thus limited through judgement, but through that very judgemental 
negation or limitation, it is formally constituted in relation to everything else. This means that 
positive, finite identification can only be arrived at in terms of negation.  
 
The judgement of something’s actuality, a cognitive act of its objective unification for 
transcendental subjectivity, constitutes the form of that thing as an extensive magnitude in time 
and space, the forms of intuition. Kant however wants to say that such spatio-temporal 
unification in judgement is not all that an object is, (otherwise we would only be dealing with 
the form of a thing, and not its content-rich actuality). Over and above its spatio-temporality, 
the extra-subjective reality of a formally constructed thing is registered in a given sensation: a 
datum of consciousness. Kant says that this sensation of a thing is its material element, as 
distinct from its spatio-temporal form.  
 
The matter of a thing fills the forms of space and time, and this filling of space and time can be 
measured, according to Kant, in terms of degrees of intensity of sensation. The object of 
judgemental unity is an empirical object that exists under conditions of transcendentally ideal 
formal construction. But as empirically real, the object’s matter (its empirical matter as opposed 
to any super-sensible ground of appearance) affects sensation. This affecting or impacting on 
the part of the object is registered as a degree of sensation: an intensive magnitude, or the 
measurable degree of intensity of a received sensation. Importantly for Bergson’s argument 
(which we will be coming to soon), Kant sharply contrasts intensive magnitude to extensive 
magnitude, in so far as the transcendental imaginative synthesis relating to intensive magnitude, 
as a calculation of degree or quantity of sensation, is merely spatial, not temporal.  
 
In general, the transcendental imaginative synthesis must involve a temporal, reproductive 
synthesis, (holding prior experience together with the present and anticipating the future). But 
the transcendental imagination also schematises – a priori, and according to the pure concept of 
‘quality’ – the scale of degrees according to which the reality of any possible sensation can be 
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gauged. Such imaginative synthesis runs through a scale of degrees of reality involved in a 
given sensation. I shall explain. 
 
An intensive magnitude (such as the intensity of heat, for example) is totally present all at once 
(as opposed to being made of spatio-temporal parts) and is thus simple. This means that the 
constitutive degrees involved in any sensation of heat are not added together sequentially, as is 
the case with an extensive magnitude, or quantitative aspect of an empirical object (which is 
transcendentally discerned as a measurable occupancy of space and time, as we learned in 
chapter three). The schematism of the empirical matter of a possible object – the degree to 
which it affects sensibility – is an inclusive registration of all the lower degrees that combine to 
‘add up’ to that degree, but in a non-sequential, or instantaneous act of the transcendental 
imagination.  
 
Thus imagination synthesises the matter or given-ness of possible sensation according to a pre-
set scale, assessing the relation between the interaction of being and non-being (e.g., the 
fluctuating presence of increasing and decreasing degrees of heat, or the absence of higher 
degrees of heat that is felt as cold). This assessment is therefore carried out in terms of the 
degree, or limitation of the quality sensed, the degree of the empirical reality of effectiveness of 
that quality of sensation.  
 
In this way the schema of quality acts as an interpretive guide to the a priori application of 
transcendental concepts of reality, negation, and limitation, according to Kant. But Bergson 
would argue that such transcendental schematising of Kantian judgements of ‘quality’, as an 
assessment of sense data in terms of an a priori scale of degrees of intensity, or presence and 
absence, amounts to no more than the quantification of quality. Due to such necessary 
schematic guidance, sensation can be anticipated formally, as conformable to an a priori 
calibration. This means that, for Kant, there is a formally predictable aspect involved even in 
our receptivity to the given-ness of sensible contents; the formulaic and calculable nature of 
schematic procedure ensuring that a calculable aspect even of sensible data is always already 
knowable, in principle, in advance.  
 
Bergson deals with these issues in his Time and Free Will.  For Bergson, the quality of 
consciousness cannot be thus quantified. Therefore it cannot be calculated in terms of ‘degrees 
of reality’. Bergson insists that any such calculation implies that the quality of experiential 
contents has already been schematically translated into spatial terms (recalling our discussion of 
the schema of number in chapter three), so that it can be manipulated and predicted. In contrast 
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to such a translation, Bergson maintains that what endures is successive, and cannot be 
commensurable.  
 
To measure is to compare co-present terms, to translate what is successive into simultaneity. 
Only simultaneities can be judged quantitatively. Succession is made countable by negating it 
as succession, and re-construing a moving whole in terms of homogeneous mental marks or 
abstract units. Such abstracted ‘moments’ are content-less, static points traced upon movement 
by calculative thought. One measurable moment is qualitatively indistinguishable from another.  
 
A mental marker is thus abstracted from temporal progression to be carried forward in thought 
and numbered alongside the next mental mark. Such moments are thus really spatial units, 
thought of together or simultaneously with one another, and thus not really successive. This 
spatialising procedure presupposes an extent of space and time to be crossed, an area already all 
present, which a moving object must pass across. At different moments the object will be at 
different points along a linear trajectory. Only such points can be measured, the static marks 
which are as it were arranged in a row, that is to say, in space, like beads along a thread.  
 
In contrast to this procedure of time measurement, which reconstrues time in terms of space, 
true succession resists analysis into composite moments. It is simple continuity of movement. 
Consciousness is simple, as an enduring reality. Such duration can be intuited, but not 
conceptually known. Ordinarily, intellect spatialises duration for practical purposes, but 
Bergson contends that intelligence can be turned inwards to raise instinctual life to 
consciousness, thereby intuiting life as a flowing reality. Bergson distances himself from 
romantic intellectual intuition (of Schelling, for example), since his intuition is of time, and not 
of an eternalised subjectivity enabling time. He therefore agrees with Kant that we can only 
know what is temporally intuitable, although he suggests that Kant’s spatialised analysis of time 
is far from fundamental.  
 
According to Kant there are two types of magnitude or quantity, intensive, schematised in terms 
of degree, and extensive, schematised in terms of number. An extensive magnitude is concerned 
with spatially located numerically measurable accumulations or co-existences. Bergson finds no 
problem with this: the intellect, as we have seen is directed to such spatial arrangements by its 
nature, as fitted to manipulate and calculate obstacles and opportunities. However Bergson 
detects a confusion in the notion of intensive quantities as measures of qualities of feeling in 
terms of degrees of magnitude.
879
 Bergson’s diagnosis of the confusion is that the cause of any 
given sensation can be measured (e.g., the felt brightness of one light as brighter than another is 
                                                                        
879 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 2-4. 
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due to a more powerful light bulb), and the quantifiability of the cause is assigned to the sensed 
effect. However, Bergson contends that no feeling can be more intense than another, and that 
the very term intensity used in relation to feeling is a mistaken categorisation of felt quality in 
terms of quantity.  
 
For Bergson, the so-called intensity of any sensation is a matter of qualitative change in the 
nature of the feeling, not a matter of greater or lesser quantity, which could only be correctly 
applied to certain kinds of sensory stimulus (the physical electric bulb, rather than the quality of 
illumination; the physiologically quantifiable tension of muscles, as distinct from the feeling of 
strain).
880
 Therefore, instead of speaking of a ‘more intense’ sensation of light or heat, one 
should say that one is now experiencing a different kind of heat to that which was felt before. 
Thinking in terms of the magnitude of such a sensation depends on ‘the physical ‘cause having 
been put into the effect’.881 Thus one should not speak of an increase in pain, but of different 
kinds of painful sensation.  
 
Bergson analyses the varying sensations involved with an increasing pressure applied to the 
surface of the body, (the variation in pressure, as a physical cause, unlike its effect – pain – is 
legitimately quantifiable). He suggests that one might first feel a contact, then a pressure, and 
then a pain: all distinct sensations, not a magnification of a single feeling. The pain itself goes 
through qualitative changes as it spreads over a given area. Again, the area affected is 
quantifiable in terms of space, and distinct from the sensation felt, but the feelings themselves 
undergo qualitative changes through the continuity of felt duration, merging and 
interpenetrating, but never analysable into homogeneous degrees as if along a spatial scale.
882
 
As we saw in the last chapter, feeling, living, endures as heterogeneous multiplicity, the past 
contributing to a qualitatively unique future, that is untranslatable into the mosaic snapshots, or 
psychological ‘states’, into which concepts analyse it. In the same way, the movement of events 
is not identical to the sequence of static frames that record them on a reel of film. Feeling, like 
movement, is incommensurable, unquantifiable in terms of homogeneous units or degrees, as 
simple yet heterogeneous continuity. 
 
Bergson suggests that on hearing successive chimes of a clock,
883
 the enduring sensations are 
similarly externalised or translated in terms of their cause as situated in space. The chimes are 
thought of as outside one another, as if arranged in a row, or passing in a parade. Such 
spatialised succession is a symbolic substitute for felt duration. The spatialised chimes are 
                                                                        
880 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 10-11. 
881 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 47. 
882 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 48. 
883 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 124. 
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estimated in terms of the sameness of the bell which is their cause, and each chime (a sound 
temporally and imaginatively apprehended as quality) of the bell is conceived as identical in so 
far as it is a bell-chime (emanating from a location in space). A translated experience of bell-
chimes tends indeed towards homogeneity: it is no longer experienced as the qualitatively rich 
diversity of musical movement. One cannot count musical movement, but one can and does 
superpose the units of ‘bell-chime’, as numerical marker-translations aggregating or piling-up 
on top of one another in the spatialised convention that is ‘clock-time’. Where clock-time 
‘marks time’, or counts the bars spread out along the stave in the score, musical qualities endure 
and grow in simple continuity, a whole symphony being present at any one point, just as a cell 
of an organism is what it is as expressive of the activity of the whole process of the life-system 
in a qualitatively distinctive function. The bell-chimes are clockwork, mechanism; the sounding 
tones interpenetrate, each expressive of a quality distinct from the others, each organically 
modified by its predecessors, and modifying them in turn ‘as a new organisation of the 
whole’.884 The individual sensations ‘melt into one another’ informed and transformed by a 





Thus a musical model of time is presented to us by Bergson: a time in which not only is the past 
transformed in the light of future development, but in which the shape of hat future 
development cannot be pre-determined by what has gone before, while growing organically 
from it.  
 
As we learned in chapter four, the experiential richness of temporal duration is intrinsically 
unpredictable, for Bergson. Explanation in terms of final causes, however, always presupposes 
a goal to be arrived at through premeditated planning. Teleological planning has evolved with 
human beings as a requirement for successful adaptation to the obstacles inherent in our 
environment. We calculate our course through life by utilising what we find lying around us 
arbitrarily as means for projected ends. Teleological causality thus selectively adapts materials 
to suit our plans, and is not  an appropriate framework for the consideration of genuine 
ontological creativity.  
 
Bergson concludes, then, that there are two forms of experienced multiplicity: a homogeneous, 
spatialised time, and an ontologically more fundamental, organic duration, which is the 
experiential condition of the former. While the duration involves a mutual interpenetration of 
                                                                        
884 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 124. 
885 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 127. 
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heterogeneous elements, spatialised time is merely ‘the extensive symbol of true duration’.886 
Spatialised time is the ‘clock-time’ in which the chiming of hours is considered in terms of 
identical units, as the sensation of chiming sound spatialised and translated into Kantian 
‘intensive magnitudes’. To refer, as Kant does, to such ‘intensive magnitudes’ as themselves 
qualities, amounts to nothing more than a category mistake, a metabasis eis allo genos: the 
confusion of quality with quantity.  
 
Samuel Alexander, in his Space, Time and Deity, analyses the nature of this ‘category mistake’ 
on Kant’s part. In delineating his own categorial scheme, Alexander points out that ‘quality’ 
cannot be included, since it is an ‘empirical generalisation’, or mere ‘collective name’ for all 
particular and heterogeneous qualities, and not a ‘pervasive determination’ of ‘Space-Time’.887 
Kant, as we have learned, also sought categories which condition the spatio-temporal forms of 
objective experience, but Alexander contends that qualities are irreducible to such quantifiable 
‘complexes’:  
It may be answered that everything possesses some quality or other, and therefore 
quality is categorial; everything is a complex of Space-Time and to complexity 
corresponds quality...But the objection does not hit the mark. Complexity in Space-
Time makes everything a complex, but not a quality. It is specific sorts of 
complexes which are hard or sweet. Complexity as such is not a qualitative but a 




Alexander cites the example of the quality of light. On his showing, light’s quantitative 
complexity is measurable in terms of wavelength-frequency, and a wavelength ‘is a quantity, 
not a quality’.889 The colour red is a quality, and felt as such; but while we may measure 
wavelengths, we do not experience them: they form part of an abstract, scientific conceptual 
scheme, and are not feelings. Because all empirical things have qualities does not mean that 
quality is a category, or pervasive determination of empirical reality. A category is pervasive 
and homogenous; qualities may be pervasive but they are particular and heterogeneous. We 
may no more say that qualitativeness is categorial than we may say that the property of all 
spatio-temporal things ‘being empirical’ is categorial, ‘for being empirical is only a collective 
generalisation of empirical things’: 
In so far as everything is empirical it is not categorial. There is no category of 
empiricity which pervades all empirical things. There are only empirical things. In 
                                                                        
886 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 128. 
887 Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1920) vol. 1, p. 326. 
888 Alexander, Space, Time and Deity vol. 1, p. 327. 
889 Alexander, Space, Time and Deity vol. 1, p. 327. 
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the same way there are red and sweet and life and mind; and these are qualities. But 
there is no universal, quality. Quality is therefore not categorial, but empirical.
890
 
Alexander points to the same difficulty as Bergson, with reference to the Kantian ‘category 
mistake’ over quality: 
Kant himself though he regarded quality as a category could only use it in 
experience, could only schematise it, in the form of intensive quantity, which is as 





For Bergson, quality pertains to human beings so far as they endure, and thus in so far as they 
are free. Categories mark out necessary features of possible empirical experience. Duration is 
qualitative, organic growth, it is purposive and indeterminate, leading towards an unforeseeable 
future. It is thus not teleological in the Kantian sense of temporal predictability, as there is no 
pre-determination of the future. Durational life is creative of genuine novelty, the future is 
open-ended. Later in this thesis we shall see important theological consequences of thinking of 
human existential purpose, in relation to Kierkegaardian faith, in terms of durational freedom 




On the basis of his criticism of Kant’s account of intensive magnitude, Bergson relativises  
Kant’s transcendental deduction by showing that the spatialised time on which empirical 
knowledge depends is itself conditioned by an organic conception of duration, which is to say 
that Bergson grants epistemological priority to Kantian aesthetically reflective conceptuality 
over empirical conceptual determination. Kantian empirical knowledge is thus re-situated in a 
wider, aesthetically re-conceived and open-ended temporality by Bergson. 
 
In this thesis I am concerned with the possibility of a theological account of time that accords 
with the paradoxicality of the revelation of salvation in Christ, as Kierkegaard understands it. 
Such an account, given what we have just learned about their intrinsic calculability, will eschew 
Kantian teleological approaches, such as are found in post-Kantian systematic accounts. A 
conceptually paradoxical, or non-teleological eschatology might however derive insight from 
Bergson’s durational account of the qualitative unpredictability of the future. Considered in 
such terms, the eschaton would remain a conceptually incalculable revelation, to be approached 
                                                                        
890 Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, vol. 1, p. 327. 
891 Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, vol. 1, p. 328. 
892 This stress on human existential purpose is not to suggest that, for Bergson, empirical objects in space do not also endure. He 
believes that there are multiple durations, albeit at lesser ‘tensions’ than human duration, since objects only tend towards spatiality, 
they are never as fully spatialised as our knowledge frame construes them for practical ends. Bergson’s durational élan is a cosmic, 
dynamic ground, and not only the form of human existence. But material things are in various degrees of ‘detension’, as we saw in 
the last chapter. The durational ‘tension’ of human mind is unique (at least on the basis of available evidence about the universe: 
Bergson’s is, after all, an inductive metaphysic). 
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Analysis of the Structure and Role of Kantian Transcendental Imagination in the 
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories 
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, according to Kant’s first-edition version of the Transcendental 
Deduction
893
, it is held that objective experience is made possible by means of a threefold 
synthesis of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. Kant assigns these moments of one 
overarching synthetic activity to sense, imagination and conceptuality respectively. But all 
synthesis is the work of imagination. The three ‘moments’ of imaginative synthesis are in fact 
different aspects of the one, imaginative activity
894
, the focus varying to show imaginative 
activity as it bears in one respect on sensibility, and in another, on the understanding. I will 
show that imagination, in one unifying activity, manifests itself in relation both to sensory and 
conceptual elements in possible cognition.  
 
Imagination makes present what is absent: it is ‘the faculty for representing an object even 
without its presence in intuition’895. The synthesis of apprehension is the unification of the 
manifold in inner sense. The manifold of representations is a mere unconnected multitude, or 
synopsis, without imaginative synthetic activity
896
. Inner sense, in which all representations, 
inner and outer come to pass, is time. To combine the synopsis of inner sense into a temporal 
synthesis is the work of imagination, as the faculty of making present what is absent: past 
moments are successively retained and future ones anticipated in imaginative temporal 
combination
897
. The activity of imagination makes possible an intuition or apprehension of 
temporal continuity, thus enabling a formal intuition of time (as opposed to which all reference 




Kant’s analysis of the threefold synthesis, in distinguishing different relations of the one 
imaginative activity in regard to sense on the one hand, and understanding on the other, shows 
the role of imagination in enabling sensible apprehension. From the above discussion, it has 
become clear that in its pure passivity, sensory receptivity is not sufficient for perception. While 
in general in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant regards sensibility as the mode of the mind’s 
receptivity, he realises that this needs qualification, and his account of the role of imagination in 
the synthesis of apprehension illustrates that there is an active element in the mind that is not 
itself conceptual: the imagination.  Given a division of the mind into sensibility and 
                                                                        
893 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A94-110. 
894 H. J. Paton, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience, vol. I, p. 376. 
895 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B151. 
896 Paton, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience vol. I, pp. 360-1; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A98. 
897 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A102. 
898 Paton, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience vol. I, p. 359. 
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understanding, one would think that Kant held to a straightforward distinction between active 
and passive aspects of cognition. However, Kant was heir to a long philosophical tradition of 
thinking about the imagination as a mediating power (see appendix two).
899
 In his Anthropology 
from a Pragmatic Point of View, (1798b)
900
, Kant codified his earlier thinking on the 
imagination as found in his Critiques of Pure Reason and of the Power of Judgement. Kant 
distinguishes sensibility into imaginative-active and sensory-passive components. Sense is 
defined as the ‘faculty of intuition in the presence of an object’, and therefore a purely passive 
receptivity, while imagination is conceived as ‘the faculty of intuition without the presence of an 
object (echoing the description of imagination given in the Critique of Pure Reason, at B151, as 
discussed above). Against the activity of the conceptual faculty, therefore, there is juxtaposed 
not only the passivity of sense, but also a power of sensible intuition that was not, however, 
dependent on the presence of an object for the production of images. As empirical imagination, 
this latter intuitive power is able to recall and anticipate past and future representations in their 
absence, but only on the basis of the former actual presence of objects of experience. In 
conjunction with the understanding, empirical imagination makes memory and ‘prevision’ or 
foresight possible. But to make such empirical reproduction of past experience possible, the 
synopsis of the sensory manifold must be gathered together in an apprehension of sequence, as a 
formal intuition in inner sense, as discussed above. For this role, imagination can obviously not 
be dependent on any former experience, since the production of a content-rich, temporal 
intuition is a transcendental condition of any possible experience. Kant thus distinguishes a 
productive imaginative capacity from that of empirical imagination. By virtue of its creative, 
transcendental role, the productive imagination is the same power that works unconsciously to 
guide aesthetic production in works of genius. I will discuss this aesthetic aspect of the 
productive imagination below. The point to be grasped here is that Kant distinguishes between 
empirical image-production and an interpretive, synthetic activity assigned to the productive 
imagination. Productive, or transcendental imagination gives a temporal interpretation to the 
synopsis of the manifold in inner sense, allowing an awareness of formal intuition of the 
manifold as contained in the form of intuition (this form of inner sense being, in itself, merely an 
abstraction for the purposes of analysis as stated earlier). It is the productive imagination that 
occupies Kant’s thought, in its epistemological and aesthetic bearings, respectively, in the 
Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgement.  
 
In the apprehensive synthesis that has been under discussion, imagination creates the formal 
intuition of time through a synthesis of pure reproduction
901
: the second analytical moment that 
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Kant focuses on in his treatment of the ‘threefold synthesis’. It will emerge that the synthesis of 
apprehension intrinsically involves the synthesis of reproduction, reinforcing the view that the 
threefold synthesis is in fact the analysis of different aspects of the one work of productive or 
transcendental imagination. Kant identifies the productive imagination as responsible for all 
synthetic activity: ‘synthesis in general is...the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though 
indispensible function of the soul without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which 
we are seldom even conscious’.902 
 
Imagination is specifically assigned the role of pure reproduction
903
 of the sensory manifold in 
Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis. From this we can gather that sensible apprehension, 
as imaginatively enabled, must involve the production of temporal consciousness by the 
arranging and retaining of the individual appearances of the manifold in necessary sequential 
relations through imaginative synthetic activity. The reproductive synthesis enables a formal 
intuition of the temporal manifold, or in other words, it enables awareness of inner sense. 
Therefore this imaginative activity is pure, not empirical: this activity is the work of the 
transcendental imagination, and the ground of any possible empirical imaginative connection 
through mere association, with which it must not be confused. As enabling, or constituting a 
formal intuition of objective temporal sequence, Kant also refers to the activity of the pure, 
transcendental imagination as productive. But this does not contradict passages in which he 
shows that a priori imaginative synthesis proceeds reproductively. The production by 
transcendental imagination of a formal intuition of time proceeds through imaginative 
reproduction: reproductive anticipation and retention in the present of future and past moments 
is the nature of the transcendental imaginative production of a formal intuition of time, since 
imagination is a faculty of making present what is absent. 
 
The third moment of imaginative synthesis concerns the involvement of pure conceptual 
components in the transcendental possibility of objective experience
904
. The sequence of 
representations referred to, in the last paragraph, as an imaginatively construed arrangement, or 
temporal interpretation, must be a necessary ordering, in order to be an objective consciousness 
of time, as opposed to a subjective impression, which can be either slow or rapid, depending on 
emotional and other, accidental, considerations. Only a rule bound sequence can have this 
required objectivity, free from all arbitrary subjective considerations. The understanding, as a 
faculty of concepts, is a faculty of rules. A necessary sequence is brought to bear on imaginative 
temporal synthesis through the combination of successive moments in accordance with a single 
plan. The single plan gives unity to the temporal synthesis, and its temporal shape is expressed 
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in transcendental concepts. The unity that comes to expression in judgement is grounded in 
transcendental subjectivity, (as already discussed in some detail in the first chapter). 
Transcendental subjectivity, as the self-awareness that must in principle be able to accompany 
all objective experience
905
, is the unity of consciousness, manifest in acts of objective 
judgement, which is a correlate of and requirement for experiential objectivity; an objectivity 
conceived as the conceptually structured unity of the formal intuition of a temporal manifold, as 














                                                                        






Plato, Aristotle & Coleridgean Meontology 
 
What I offer here is meant to provide a background to my interpretation of Coleridge in 
chapters six and seven. In what follows I am indebted to Frederick Copleston’s readings of 
Plato, Plotinus and Aristotle.
906
 This hermeneutical contextualisation relates as much to the 
ancient conceptualities on which so much in Coleridge’s thought depends, as to the guiding 
presuppositions of his thinking, and the flaws which I have been led to detect in these.  
 
It has emerges through the last two chapters that I hold the genuineness of any given 
metaphysical insight of Coleridge’s to be assessable according to the extent to which he does 
not achieve a fully-rounded, systematic completeness of form in its presentation. I shall now 
explain why. 
 
(1)  Teleological time versus the process of transcendent aesthetic intimation. 
 
One of the claims developed through this thesis is that a connecting link between romanticism 
and existentialism, between Coleridge and Kierkegaard, is just this sense of a more-than-
empirical, but less than complete intimation of a fullness of metaphysical or theological 
significance.   I would suggest that any truly romantic or existential ‘metaphysic’ – whatever 
other differences there may be – is a metaphysic which always remains a perspective: an 
aesthetically grasped or conceptually indeterminate intimation of wholeness. I suggest further 
that the confidence with which such self-confessedly tentative or temporary positions are put 
forward discloses a crucial awareness of the centrality of time in conditioning human 
experience. As we exist, time is both our limitation and our field of possibility. This temporal 
dimension will be important to bear in mind in reading the next chapter, as my argument will be 
found to hinge on the distinction between a qualitatively evolving ‘lived time’, that we have 
already learned about from Bergson, and a mode of a priori systematic philosophical thought 
working to a pre-set schedule in the form of a teleological trajectory: a discontinuous, since 
essentially spatial, reconstruction of time for the sake of its calculative usefulness for 
explanatory completeness.  
 
I have claimed that Coleridge, as a poet, and in aesthetic contemplation, achieves the kind of 
metaphysical vision I have been speaking of: the partial vision or intimation of an overarching 
context of creativity over and above, yet pulsing through, the empirically mechanical order. 
Coleridge entertained such a vision in poetic receptivity, but could not grasp it as a possession, 
                                                                        
906 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 1, pp. 166, 190-1, 292-3, 469-70. 
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or absolute purchase-point: the impossible ‘view from nowhere’ claimed to have been achieved 
by Hegel, as we saw earlier. Moreover, I suggest that Coleridge the philosopher had this same 
vision before him. As primarily a creative thinker, he worked on the basis of a guiding 
intimation of the result at which he aimed., as afforded to him aesthetically But this imaginative 
insight could not survive his attempt to reduce it, schematically and teleologically, to the strictly 
objective terms of a priori conceptual determination.  
 
I interpret Coleridge in the last two chapters as a thinker who spent his activity as an a priori 
systematician vainly trying to play ‘catch-up’ with his aesthetically indeterminate vision. But 
nevertheless, even if he did fail as a systemtician, Coleridge never shied away from, or 
attempted to fudge his conceptual dilemmas. He remained as true to his faith in personal 
freedom as to his belief in the power of philosophy to accommodate this commitment, but I 
suggest that the conceptual resources available to him necessarily led – albeit unintentionally – 
to a compromised presentation of his Christian faith. I shall be arguing, in short, that the very 
systematicity of Coleridge’s thinking is structurally inappropriate to the theological ends to 
which it is directed and set in motion by the living unison of his faith and his poetic vision. 
 
I suggest that this theoretical impasse is fundamentally rooted in the question of time. Coleridge 
is, perhaps unwittingly, torn between the two temporalities I have drawn attention to above, and 
that fissure is pregnant with others. It gives birth to the theoretical chasm that he experiences in 
trying to reconcile his Christian faith with his poetic vision. While both these were organically 
linked in his life, Coleridge struggled to formalise their dynamic inter-play in philosophical 
terms, owing to his repeated attempts to translate or schematise an aesthetically dynamic and 
evolving vision into objectively systematic teleology.  
 
My argument in the last two chapters, informed by my reading of Kierkegaard earlier in this 
thesis, is based on the notion that by pre-setting a theoretical agenda, Coleridge tries to pin 
down the living, creative processes in nature; processes that are for him intimative of divinity as 
the manifestation of the supra-natural through the natural.  But Coleridge tries to plot this 
creativity on a spatialised map through the use of dialectical logic. Because of this, he works 
with a teleological plan, involving the projection of a threefold pattern or schematic template of 
‘development’ that cannot evolve qualitatively, being, by its very nature, a schema quantifiable 
or calculable in advance. Thus in chapter seven I argue that Coleridge’s philosophically 
systematic thinking could not truly be reconciled with his faith, as a faith in human freedom in 





(2)  Coleridge and meontological dialectics 
 
I will now introduce important background information regarding some key metaphysical tenets 
of ancient thought that form the basis of Coleridge’s approach in important areas of his 
philosophy.  
 
These aspects concern two contrasting dialectical treatments of the relation of matter to form. 
The thinkers in question are Plato and Aristotle.  With regard to the former,
907
 Platonic ontology 
forms the implicit subtext of much of the philosophical translation of Coleridge’s vision. I shall 
argue that this amounts to a mistranslation. Coleridge attempts to rectify the problems caused 
by this mistranslation of his poetic insight through attention to the themes of actuality, potency 
and potentiality. He does so through  an application of principles that derive ultimately from 
Aristotle; (Coleridge’s treatment here is influenced by the theosophy of Jacob Boehme, and is 
thus related to the thought of the later Schelling).
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 I argue that this foray into meontology does 
no mend matters either in systematic-theological or philosophical terms, since the matrices from 
which the various strands of his thinking are drawn – whether Platonic or Aristotlean – share in 
the fundamental assumption of just that spatialised temporality that has been noted immediately 
above and earlier on in relation to Henri Bergson. This implicit assumption has therefore an 
ancient pedigree, although it is first made explicit and ‘transcendentalised’ in Kant’s treatment 
of imaginative schematism: an important theme, also addressed in earlier chapters, that recurs in 
the Coleridgean context, as I understand it.  
 
Aristotle, as Plato’s former student, approached his own thinking in the light of Plato’s 
ontological doctrine, as its constructive and radical critic. The simplest overarching way to 
describe the difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought over the issue of matter and 
form is to suggest that while Plato looks to transcendent explanations – shapings of matter from 
a superior realm of being – Aristotle holds that the organising principle of any empirical being 
is inseparable from it.  
 
Epistemological and ontological themes are intermeshed in Plato’s work, making it hard to 
analyse them independently. I suggest that this is because, unlike Kant, Plato is not concerned 
with how we come to know, or with the conditions of possible knowledge, but rather with 
ascertaining the correct object of true knowledge, as distinguished from what passes as such on 
the basis of common experience, which he dismisses as mere opinion. The true object of 
                                                                        
907 See Plato, Republic, G. M. A. Grubbe, rev. C. D. C. Reeve (tr.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), pp. 971-1224; Timaeus, Donald J. 
Zeyl (tr.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), pp. 1224-1292. 
908 Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom; ‘Of the first principle of the divine essence’, in 
Robin Waterfield (ed, & tr.), Western Esoteric Masters Series: Jacob Boehme, (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2001), pp. 82-7. 
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knowledge is found to be the central feature of Plato’s metaphysics: transcendent forms or 
ideas. So far from ruling out the possibility of transcendent knowledge, Plato makes these ideal 
‘thought-entities’, and above all, their source –  the form or idea of Goodness –  the criteria by 
which truth and falsehood in the empirical world are measured. Plato gives his epistemological 
question a metaphysical answer. 
 
Plato regards truth as eternally unchanging. Our knowledge is true to the extent that it 
corresponds with transcendent forms or ideas. Mind is not primarily located within human 
beings, but is equated with divinity as the intelligible principle in all that can be said to exist. 
Reason, as the intelligible principle is equated with true being – that which necessarily is –  thus 
all that exists must to some extent participate in reason or true being. Being is divine. Gods 
participate in being more than humans, therefore gods are more divine than humans, although 
humans possess a spark of divinity, their eternal soul. As participating in universal reason, 
people are immortal; as participating in the material realm of change and becoming – as bodies 
– they are mortal: they grow and decline. But what is rational cannot not be. What is material 
only participates in reason, and therefore changes state constantly. Movement is thus inferior to 
stasis. Mind, to the extent that it is rational is non-material; logical truths are incontrovertible, 
they eternally are, and as such are hypostatised by Plato as eternal Forms of the finite things that 
participate in them, in the same relation that shadows bear to the bodies which inform them as 
their silhouetted images. In fact, one might say that the Ideal forms of things are information. 
To express Plato’s contention in twenty-first century terms, one might think of eternal ideas as 
‘programmes’ or ‘software’.  
 
But this analogy must be carefully qualified, because the ‘software’ in question, unlike a 
computer programme, is also responsible for the existence of the hardware which it informs. 
While matter for Plato is a co-eternal principle alongside form (or ‘the forms’), in itself it has no 
inherent identity. For matter to participate in true being it must be rationally informed, enabling 
it to manifest coherent structure, a viable order. Ontological participation is a communication of 
the structuring conditions which shape matter (in itself mere privation of being) into contingent 
beings.  But to the extent that ideally derived beings also participate in matter, they can also 
cease to be, since the principle of their being is not intrinsic. The identity of a rock, for example, 
is merely borrowed on a temporary basis. And yet, in the language of the early nineteenth 
century thought with which we are much concerned in this thesis, it could be said that matter 
and form are in polarity with one another, since each requires the other to be what it is. While 
Plato never argues that matter and form are in differentiated identity, as did Schelling for 
example (‘mind is visible matter, matter invisible mind’), he does posit their co-eternity. Forms 
create the structures whereby matter is transiently stabilised, but do not create matter itself. 
300 
 
Here Platonism crucially differs from Christianity, and this should forewarn us that Coleridge’s 
admiration for Platonism (especially in its Neo-platonic, Plotinian variant) might cause 
problems in relation to his theological aims. Christianity follows Genesis in holding the very 
materiality of the world to be good, whereas Plato in the Timaeus regards it merely negatively, 
as an inevitable chaos which must be informed in order for there to be a Cosmos. 
 
Movement, as we have seen, is a decline from true, eternal form for Plato. The material 
conditions of space and time are thus seen as ontologically deficient. Here again, Coleridge can 
be criticised for what I shall be arguing is his over-hasty tendency to elide Platonic and 
Christian conceptualities. For Plato, the realm of becoming can only haltingly imitate eternally 
unmoving truth. In his Republic, Plato has epistemology and ontology coincide in the form of 
the Good, as mentioned above. This is seen as a divine perfection of being, the truth in itself, 
which is independent of all conditioning as eternally self-existent, the criterion of all being and 
knowledge. Temporal process is merely the ‘moving image of eternity’ (Timaeus), and as less 
than fully real, is the condition of our mistakes and illusions about truth. Time is a veil hiding us 
from the truth of our own eternal natures as rational souls. But the immortality of the soul is not 
a Christian doctrine. Resurrection is the teaching at the heart of Christianity as the ultimate 
revelation of saving truth; the revelation of a divine transformation of human life that stops all 
speculation, Platonic or otherwise, dead in its tracks.  Resurrection is a dynamic event, a 
challenge to our logic, or as Bonhoeffer calls it, a revealed ‘counter-Logos’ beyond our 
conceptual control. I shall argue that precisely such a Platonic tendency to devalue temporal 
process is deeply ingrained in Coleridge’s formal philosophical thinking. This is coupled with a 
related Kantian teleological approach that (as we learned from Bergson) tends to reduce the 
experienced flow of time to a skeletal or ‘spatialised’ schema. I shall argue that these related 
Platonic and Kantian trends as regards the nature and value of temporality radically 
compromise Coleridge’s attempt to reconcile the aesthetic and ethical dimensions of his 
Christian experience. 
 
We have seen that Plato answered his question concerning the true object of knowledge in 
terms of transcendent exemplars of which things are copies, and that this proposal leads to a 
devaluation of the world of becoming. Aristotle objected that postulating another world does 
not answer any causal questions concerning this one. Plato simply doubles the initial problem 
according to Aristotle; instead of just the one world for which an account must be found, 
another is postulated on top of this, with no more enlightenment as to the cause of the latter than 





 his dissatisfaction with Plato’s theory of Ideas led him to postulate his own, 
fourfold theory of causality,
910
 central to which is the notion of immanent form: the inherence in 
a substance of a necessary essential element, which unlike merely contingent or ‘accidental’ 
forms (such as hair colour, eye colour, etc.), determines that substance’s identity in terms of a 
delimiting and thus objective definition of the kind of being in question, in terms of species and 
genus. Since on the other hand Aristotle claimed that the term substantiality in its primary sense 
can only be applied to independently existing individuals, such general and specific definition 
would need to include not only the necessary formal or informing structural characteristics 
present in an individual being, but also that which limits its existence in a negative sense. 
Matter as well as form must be a component of an Aristotelian essence, since formal, universal 
structural features are only extant in numerically particular and contingent, empirical beings. 
Thus the theory of immanent form demanded from Aristotle a more detailed and nuanced 
analysis of the concept of matter than that provided by Plato. 
 
Plato, in his Timaeus, suggests that physical objects originate in terms of a combination of 
‘intelligent’ or purposive and ‘necessary’ causes. While the former display intention 
determining something according to a structural plan or design, the latter are described by Plato 
as ‘errant’ or ‘indeterminate’ causes. Plato works with a conception of necessity that embraces 
the notions of chance and accident. What he primarily means by necessary or errant causation is 
thus a development which is blind: unintentional insofar as it is in accordance with no 
intelligent plan, and (literally, in the original Greek) ‘wandering’ as undetermined or 
undirected. On its own, without formal input, necessary causation is not akin to the 
determinations of modern empirical science, but as connoting themes such as randomness, 
necessity is regarded as no more than chaotic. In the combination of necessity and intelligently 
informed processes that is the spatio-temporal world, necessity is identifiable with the 
traditional Greek concept of ’αναγκη (ananke) or fate. 
 
Regarded as fate, Plato’s concept of blind material necessity is shown to be still close to 
mythological forms of explanation. Aristotle needed to develop the concept of matter to the 
extent that he could provide a reasoned account of the persistence of formal features through 
change. The forms, as no longer regarded as transcendent, indwell material substrates which is 
characterised as primarily passive. Matter is the medium through which form is realised 
                                                                        
909 Aristotle, Metaphysics, §§ 990a; 990b; 991a; 997b. 
910 The complete causal account of anything consists of four factors for Aristotle. Causality is regarded: (1) in terms of efficiency or 
the interaction of dynamic changes in space and time (e.g. factors such as physical impacts); (2) in terms of finality or teleologically 
oriented structural development (e.g. growth); (3) in terms of material substrate or that through which a persisting developmental 
process is realised (e.g. Gold is the matter in which a ring is fashioned, while a particular state of one of the four cardinal elements 
is the matter for gold); (4) in terms of formal causality, or the determining universal structural features that come to realisation 
through the material cause (as in 3), in accordance with a final objective (as in 2), and by the instrumentality of some natural or 
human agency (as in 1). 
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gradually, it is thus also, and dialectically, that which retards the development of form. Form is 
actual only in series, only through time, and is never wholly present, but is always either 
growing or declining. Change in formal state is mediated by matter, which regarded in itself 
(proton hyle; prima materia) is no more than the possibility of formal realisation, although (and 
again dialectically) by thus mediating processive actualisation, matter is also that which inhibits 
pure actuality, which in itself must be regarded as timeless. The power to become is therefore 
also a privation of fullness of being. Aristotle’s forms are thus enmeshed in a dynamic interplay 
of actuality and a potentiality which is both potency for being and privation of being. Prime 
matter, as already indicated, is without any determinate features. As privation of being it is not 
anything, while as the power of becoming it is not literally nothing, or nothing absolutely. 
Material ‘non-being’ is rather in a dialectical relationship with actual being. As potency or 
power of being it is real, but not actual, it is not nothing, but also not actual: matter is potential, 
the power to actualise form. It therefore emerges that there are three key ontological distinctions 
in such a doctrine of relative non-being two of these, the distinctions of actuality and possibility 
are coordinate, and both are embraced by the overarching concept of reality. As not absolutely 
nothing, potentiality is real – a power of being – but it is real only as the possibility of an actual 
finite being. Only the logically impossible could be regarded as absolutely unreal. 
 
Th  Greek language usefully distinguishes between relative non-being, or potentiality (με ’ον 
/me on), and absolute non-being (ουκ ’ον /ouk on). The former term gives rise to meontology as 
the study of relative – or as Paul Tillich describes it – ‘dialectical’ non-being. Here we confront 
an issue that is at the heart of this thesis, having special application to the different 
understandings of dialectical thought displayed in the work of Coleridge on the one  hand and 
Kierkegaard on the other.  
 
Two senses of the term ‘dialectical’ that have been brought into play in this thesis. In chapter 
one, we discovered Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegelian dialectic as in a sense no more than a 
conceptual sleight of hand. Hegel claims that opposite polarities, such as subjectivity and 
objectivity, activity and passivity, freedom and determination, are intrinsically related to each 
other. The significance of any one member of such pairs of terms is said to be conceptually 
dependent on its polar counterpart. Hegel seeks to solve theoretical impasses between each pair 
of such terms by the strategy of ‘sublation’, as we saw. The inner relationship – the dialectic – 
pertaining between pairs of opposites is said to be productive. Hegel’s claim is therefore that 
abstract conceptual relationships are themselves possessed of real power (thus harmonising the 
polarities of real and ideal, subjective and objective). It is Hegel’s contention that the dynamic 
changes (e.g. necessary efficient causality on the one hand, and free human volition on the 
other) met with and lived through in ordinary experience are rooted in a deeper creative 
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activity: an activity of reason, conceived as a self-realising dynamism, realising its own latent 
power, unfolding its potential for polar conceptual structure teleologically through the inner 
movements of antithetical concepts as they surmount their differences in synthesis. Each 
dialectical concept is seen as fulfilled by its antithesis, each seen as in some sense needing the 
other for its own completion. Kierkegaard’s point is that Hegel illicitly borrows from the reality 
of human striving – which takes place in and is only known through finite existence – in order 
to ‘animate’ mere thoughts. In an anthropomorphic move, the human activity of thinking – a 
property of persons – is seen as creative of those very persons and the universe in which they 
are dependently situated. People’s thoughts are personified as actualisers of the people who 
think them, as themselves possessed of volition and dynamic drive. 
 
We have learned that Aristotle’s concept of relative non-being is dialectical in a different sense 
from the Hegelian. Matter is regarded by Aristotle as potentiality for form, and as such, both an 
active potency and a passive receptivity to formal actualisation. The inner relationship between 
the two aspects which interact in the Aristotelian concept of potentiality –  both potency and 
receptive possibility – can be seen to be logically related to one another, but this dialectical 
relationship cannot itself be the object of a conceptually necessary or determinate judgement. 
Hegel’s claim is to have utilised a deeper form of logic – a triadic logic – over and above the 
common and dualistic, ‘subject-predicate’ logic of Aristotle (Verstand), as pertaining to reason 
in a more creative and encompassing sense (Vernunft). But I shall argue in the next chapter that 
Coleridge’s utilisation of a similar triadic dialectic is precisely the problem with his systematic 
work, theologically speaking. I suggest that the calculability, the mechanistic instrumentality of 
such a ‘higher logic’, as a necessarily determinable, infinitely iterable threefold process of 
thought is at the root of Kierkegaard’s objection, in the light of personal divine revelation, to 
any theological use of objective metaphysical thinking in Christian theology.  
 
Kierkegaard’s faith is in a Christ whose self-sacrificial offer of salvation is as literally 
incalculable to human knowledge as it is to human standards of moral value. It is because we 
are in need of salvation that our corrupted, self-centring understanding cannot regard that 
salvation as anything other than logically impossible. As we argued in chapter one, Kierkegaard 
can be read as suggesting a suspension or ‘captivity’ of the understanding – not its annihilation, 
but its imaginatively or indeterminately mediated receptivity to an incalculable revelation 
beyond all human judgement. This imaginative effort, sustaining an interpretively productive 
tension between the calculable and the incalculable, is an extreme example of the same 
willingness to perceive a tensional, non-determinable intrinsic relationship that is displayed in 
the dialectical structure – the unity of difference – of Aristotle’s model of potentiality as an 




Coleridge attempts to underpin his metaphysics with meontological thinking, in order to 
safeguard both human and divine personal freedom. However Coleridge’s use of the concept of 
relative non-being has more in common with Hegelian dialectical determination than with the 
aesthetic apprehension of unities through imaginative tension, the effort of receptive 
attentiveness that is manifest and communicable through his poetry, as shown in chapter seven. 
At bottom, it is this attempt to make the logically calculable stand in for the aesthetically 
indeterminable (as I argue in chapter six), that is the cause of the problematic nature of 
Coleridge’s systematic philosophical theology.  
 
  
 
 
